1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
3 * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
11 #include "peerlookup.h"
13 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
14 #include <linux/slab.h>
15 #include <linux/bitmap.h>
16 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
17 #include <linux/highmem.h>
18 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
20 /* This implements Noise_IKpsk2:
24 * -> e, es, s, ss, {t}
25 * <- e, ee, se, psk, {}
28 static const u8 handshake_name
[37] = "Noise_IKpsk2_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s";
29 static const u8 identifier_name
[34] = "WireGuard v1 zx2c4 Jason@zx2c4.com";
30 static u8 handshake_init_hash
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
] __ro_after_init
;
31 static u8 handshake_init_chaining_key
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
] __ro_after_init
;
32 static atomic64_t keypair_counter
= ATOMIC64_INIT(0);
34 void __init
wg_noise_init(void)
36 struct blake2s_state blake
;
38 blake2s(handshake_init_chaining_key
, handshake_name
, NULL
,
39 NOISE_HASH_LEN
, sizeof(handshake_name
), 0);
40 blake2s_init(&blake
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
41 blake2s_update(&blake
, handshake_init_chaining_key
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
42 blake2s_update(&blake
, identifier_name
, sizeof(identifier_name
));
43 blake2s_final(&blake
, handshake_init_hash
);
46 /* Must hold peer->handshake.static_identity->lock */
47 bool wg_noise_precompute_static_static(struct wg_peer
*peer
)
51 down_write(&peer
->handshake
.lock
);
52 if (peer
->handshake
.static_identity
->has_identity
)
54 peer
->handshake
.precomputed_static_static
,
55 peer
->handshake
.static_identity
->static_private
,
56 peer
->handshake
.remote_static
);
58 memset(peer
->handshake
.precomputed_static_static
, 0,
59 NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
60 up_write(&peer
->handshake
.lock
);
64 bool wg_noise_handshake_init(struct noise_handshake
*handshake
,
65 struct noise_static_identity
*static_identity
,
66 const u8 peer_public_key
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
],
67 const u8 peer_preshared_key
[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
],
70 memset(handshake
, 0, sizeof(*handshake
));
71 init_rwsem(&handshake
->lock
);
72 handshake
->entry
.type
= INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE
;
73 handshake
->entry
.peer
= peer
;
74 memcpy(handshake
->remote_static
, peer_public_key
, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
75 if (peer_preshared_key
)
76 memcpy(handshake
->preshared_key
, peer_preshared_key
,
77 NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
);
78 handshake
->static_identity
= static_identity
;
79 handshake
->state
= HANDSHAKE_ZEROED
;
80 return wg_noise_precompute_static_static(peer
);
83 static void handshake_zero(struct noise_handshake
*handshake
)
85 memset(&handshake
->ephemeral_private
, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
86 memset(&handshake
->remote_ephemeral
, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
87 memset(&handshake
->hash
, 0, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
88 memset(&handshake
->chaining_key
, 0, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
89 handshake
->remote_index
= 0;
90 handshake
->state
= HANDSHAKE_ZEROED
;
93 void wg_noise_handshake_clear(struct noise_handshake
*handshake
)
95 wg_index_hashtable_remove(
96 handshake
->entry
.peer
->device
->index_hashtable
,
98 down_write(&handshake
->lock
);
99 handshake_zero(handshake
);
100 up_write(&handshake
->lock
);
101 wg_index_hashtable_remove(
102 handshake
->entry
.peer
->device
->index_hashtable
,
106 static struct noise_keypair
*keypair_create(struct wg_peer
*peer
)
108 struct noise_keypair
*keypair
= kzalloc(sizeof(*keypair
), GFP_KERNEL
);
110 if (unlikely(!keypair
))
112 keypair
->internal_id
= atomic64_inc_return(&keypair_counter
);
113 keypair
->entry
.type
= INDEX_HASHTABLE_KEYPAIR
;
114 keypair
->entry
.peer
= peer
;
115 kref_init(&keypair
->refcount
);
119 static void keypair_free_rcu(struct rcu_head
*rcu
)
121 kzfree(container_of(rcu
, struct noise_keypair
, rcu
));
124 static void keypair_free_kref(struct kref
*kref
)
126 struct noise_keypair
*keypair
=
127 container_of(kref
, struct noise_keypair
, refcount
);
129 net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Keypair %llu destroyed for peer %llu\n",
130 keypair
->entry
.peer
->device
->dev
->name
,
131 keypair
->internal_id
,
132 keypair
->entry
.peer
->internal_id
);
133 wg_index_hashtable_remove(keypair
->entry
.peer
->device
->index_hashtable
,
135 call_rcu(&keypair
->rcu
, keypair_free_rcu
);
138 void wg_noise_keypair_put(struct noise_keypair
*keypair
, bool unreference_now
)
140 if (unlikely(!keypair
))
142 if (unlikely(unreference_now
))
143 wg_index_hashtable_remove(
144 keypair
->entry
.peer
->device
->index_hashtable
,
146 kref_put(&keypair
->refcount
, keypair_free_kref
);
149 struct noise_keypair
*wg_noise_keypair_get(struct noise_keypair
*keypair
)
151 RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_bh_held(),
152 "Taking noise keypair reference without holding the RCU BH read lock");
153 if (unlikely(!keypair
|| !kref_get_unless_zero(&keypair
->refcount
)))
158 void wg_noise_keypairs_clear(struct noise_keypairs
*keypairs
)
160 struct noise_keypair
*old
;
162 spin_lock_bh(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
);
164 /* We zero the next_keypair before zeroing the others, so that
165 * wg_noise_received_with_keypair returns early before subsequent ones
168 old
= rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs
->next_keypair
,
169 lockdep_is_held(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
));
170 RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs
->next_keypair
, NULL
);
171 wg_noise_keypair_put(old
, true);
173 old
= rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs
->previous_keypair
,
174 lockdep_is_held(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
));
175 RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs
->previous_keypair
, NULL
);
176 wg_noise_keypair_put(old
, true);
178 old
= rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs
->current_keypair
,
179 lockdep_is_held(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
));
180 RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs
->current_keypair
, NULL
);
181 wg_noise_keypair_put(old
, true);
183 spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
);
186 void wg_noise_expire_current_peer_keypairs(struct wg_peer
*peer
)
188 struct noise_keypair
*keypair
;
190 wg_noise_handshake_clear(&peer
->handshake
);
191 wg_noise_reset_last_sent_handshake(&peer
->last_sent_handshake
);
193 spin_lock_bh(&peer
->keypairs
.keypair_update_lock
);
194 keypair
= rcu_dereference_protected(peer
->keypairs
.next_keypair
,
195 lockdep_is_held(&peer
->keypairs
.keypair_update_lock
));
197 keypair
->sending
.is_valid
= false;
198 keypair
= rcu_dereference_protected(peer
->keypairs
.current_keypair
,
199 lockdep_is_held(&peer
->keypairs
.keypair_update_lock
));
201 keypair
->sending
.is_valid
= false;
202 spin_unlock_bh(&peer
->keypairs
.keypair_update_lock
);
205 static void add_new_keypair(struct noise_keypairs
*keypairs
,
206 struct noise_keypair
*new_keypair
)
208 struct noise_keypair
*previous_keypair
, *next_keypair
, *current_keypair
;
210 spin_lock_bh(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
);
211 previous_keypair
= rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs
->previous_keypair
,
212 lockdep_is_held(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
));
213 next_keypair
= rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs
->next_keypair
,
214 lockdep_is_held(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
));
215 current_keypair
= rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs
->current_keypair
,
216 lockdep_is_held(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
));
217 if (new_keypair
->i_am_the_initiator
) {
218 /* If we're the initiator, it means we've sent a handshake, and
219 * received a confirmation response, which means this new
220 * keypair can now be used.
223 /* If there already was a next keypair pending, we
224 * demote it to be the previous keypair, and free the
225 * existing current. Note that this means KCI can result
226 * in this transition. It would perhaps be more sound to
227 * always just get rid of the unused next keypair
228 * instead of putting it in the previous slot, but this
229 * might be a bit less robust. Something to think about
232 RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs
->next_keypair
, NULL
);
233 rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs
->previous_keypair
,
235 wg_noise_keypair_put(current_keypair
, true);
236 } else /* If there wasn't an existing next keypair, we replace
237 * the previous with the current one.
239 rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs
->previous_keypair
,
241 /* At this point we can get rid of the old previous keypair, and
242 * set up the new keypair.
244 wg_noise_keypair_put(previous_keypair
, true);
245 rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs
->current_keypair
, new_keypair
);
247 /* If we're the responder, it means we can't use the new keypair
248 * until we receive confirmation via the first data packet, so
249 * we get rid of the existing previous one, the possibly
250 * existing next one, and slide in the new next one.
252 rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs
->next_keypair
, new_keypair
);
253 wg_noise_keypair_put(next_keypair
, true);
254 RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs
->previous_keypair
, NULL
);
255 wg_noise_keypair_put(previous_keypair
, true);
257 spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
);
260 bool wg_noise_received_with_keypair(struct noise_keypairs
*keypairs
,
261 struct noise_keypair
*received_keypair
)
263 struct noise_keypair
*old_keypair
;
266 /* We first check without taking the spinlock. */
267 key_is_new
= received_keypair
==
268 rcu_access_pointer(keypairs
->next_keypair
);
269 if (likely(!key_is_new
))
272 spin_lock_bh(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
);
273 /* After locking, we double check that things didn't change from
276 if (unlikely(received_keypair
!=
277 rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs
->next_keypair
,
278 lockdep_is_held(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
)))) {
279 spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
);
283 /* When we've finally received the confirmation, we slide the next
284 * into the current, the current into the previous, and get rid of
287 old_keypair
= rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs
->previous_keypair
,
288 lockdep_is_held(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
));
289 rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs
->previous_keypair
,
290 rcu_dereference_protected(keypairs
->current_keypair
,
291 lockdep_is_held(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
)));
292 wg_noise_keypair_put(old_keypair
, true);
293 rcu_assign_pointer(keypairs
->current_keypair
, received_keypair
);
294 RCU_INIT_POINTER(keypairs
->next_keypair
, NULL
);
296 spin_unlock_bh(&keypairs
->keypair_update_lock
);
300 /* Must hold static_identity->lock */
301 void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(
302 struct noise_static_identity
*static_identity
,
303 const u8 private_key
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
])
305 memcpy(static_identity
->static_private
, private_key
,
306 NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
307 curve25519_clamp_secret(static_identity
->static_private
);
308 static_identity
->has_identity
= curve25519_generate_public(
309 static_identity
->static_public
, private_key
);
312 /* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF:
313 * - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf
314 * - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
316 static void kdf(u8
*first_dst
, u8
*second_dst
, u8
*third_dst
, const u8
*data
,
317 size_t first_len
, size_t second_len
, size_t third_len
,
318 size_t data_len
, const u8 chaining_key
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
])
320 u8 output
[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
+ 1];
321 u8 secret
[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
];
323 WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG
) &&
324 (first_len
> BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
||
325 second_len
> BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
||
326 third_len
> BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
||
327 ((second_len
|| second_dst
|| third_len
|| third_dst
) &&
328 (!first_len
|| !first_dst
)) ||
329 ((third_len
|| third_dst
) && (!second_len
|| !second_dst
))));
331 /* Extract entropy from data into secret */
332 blake2s256_hmac(secret
, data
, chaining_key
, data_len
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
334 if (!first_dst
|| !first_len
)
337 /* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */
339 blake2s256_hmac(output
, output
, secret
, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
);
340 memcpy(first_dst
, output
, first_len
);
342 if (!second_dst
|| !second_len
)
345 /* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */
346 output
[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
] = 2;
347 blake2s256_hmac(output
, output
, secret
, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
+ 1,
349 memcpy(second_dst
, output
, second_len
);
351 if (!third_dst
|| !third_len
)
354 /* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */
355 output
[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
] = 3;
356 blake2s256_hmac(output
, output
, secret
, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
+ 1,
358 memcpy(third_dst
, output
, third_len
);
361 /* Clear sensitive data from stack */
362 memzero_explicit(secret
, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
);
363 memzero_explicit(output
, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE
+ 1);
366 static void symmetric_key_init(struct noise_symmetric_key
*key
)
368 spin_lock_init(&key
->counter
.receive
.lock
);
369 atomic64_set(&key
->counter
.counter
, 0);
370 memset(key
->counter
.receive
.backtrack
, 0,
371 sizeof(key
->counter
.receive
.backtrack
));
372 key
->birthdate
= ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns();
373 key
->is_valid
= true;
376 static void derive_keys(struct noise_symmetric_key
*first_dst
,
377 struct noise_symmetric_key
*second_dst
,
378 const u8 chaining_key
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
])
380 kdf(first_dst
->key
, second_dst
->key
, NULL
, NULL
,
381 NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
, 0, 0,
383 symmetric_key_init(first_dst
);
384 symmetric_key_init(second_dst
);
387 static bool __must_check
mix_dh(u8 chaining_key
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
],
388 u8 key
[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
],
389 const u8
private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
],
390 const u8
public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
])
392 u8 dh_calculation
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
];
394 if (unlikely(!curve25519(dh_calculation
, private, public)))
396 kdf(chaining_key
, key
, NULL
, dh_calculation
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
,
397 NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
, chaining_key
);
398 memzero_explicit(dh_calculation
, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
402 static void mix_hash(u8 hash
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
], const u8
*src
, size_t src_len
)
404 struct blake2s_state blake
;
406 blake2s_init(&blake
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
407 blake2s_update(&blake
, hash
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
408 blake2s_update(&blake
, src
, src_len
);
409 blake2s_final(&blake
, hash
);
412 static void mix_psk(u8 chaining_key
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
], u8 hash
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
],
413 u8 key
[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
],
414 const u8 psk
[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
])
416 u8 temp_hash
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
];
418 kdf(chaining_key
, temp_hash
, key
, psk
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
,
419 NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
, chaining_key
);
420 mix_hash(hash
, temp_hash
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
421 memzero_explicit(temp_hash
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
424 static void handshake_init(u8 chaining_key
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
],
425 u8 hash
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
],
426 const u8 remote_static
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
])
428 memcpy(hash
, handshake_init_hash
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
429 memcpy(chaining_key
, handshake_init_chaining_key
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
430 mix_hash(hash
, remote_static
, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
433 static void message_encrypt(u8
*dst_ciphertext
, const u8
*src_plaintext
,
434 size_t src_len
, u8 key
[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
],
435 u8 hash
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
])
437 chacha20poly1305_encrypt(dst_ciphertext
, src_plaintext
, src_len
, hash
,
439 0 /* Always zero for Noise_IK */, key
);
440 mix_hash(hash
, dst_ciphertext
, noise_encrypted_len(src_len
));
443 static bool message_decrypt(u8
*dst_plaintext
, const u8
*src_ciphertext
,
444 size_t src_len
, u8 key
[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
],
445 u8 hash
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
])
447 if (!chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst_plaintext
, src_ciphertext
, src_len
,
448 hash
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
,
449 0 /* Always zero for Noise_IK */, key
))
451 mix_hash(hash
, src_ciphertext
, src_len
);
455 static void message_ephemeral(u8 ephemeral_dst
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
],
456 const u8 ephemeral_src
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
],
457 u8 chaining_key
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
],
458 u8 hash
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
])
460 if (ephemeral_dst
!= ephemeral_src
)
461 memcpy(ephemeral_dst
, ephemeral_src
, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
462 mix_hash(hash
, ephemeral_src
, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
463 kdf(chaining_key
, NULL
, NULL
, ephemeral_src
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
, 0, 0,
464 NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
, chaining_key
);
467 static void tai64n_now(u8 output
[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN
])
469 struct timespec64 now
;
471 ktime_get_real_ts64(&now
);
473 /* In order to prevent some sort of infoleak from precise timers, we
474 * round down the nanoseconds part to the closest rounded-down power of
475 * two to the maximum initiations per second allowed anyway by the
478 now
.tv_nsec
= ALIGN_DOWN(now
.tv_nsec
,
479 rounddown_pow_of_two(NSEC_PER_SEC
/ INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND
));
481 /* https://cr.yp.to/libtai/tai64.html */
482 *(__be64
*)output
= cpu_to_be64(0x400000000000000aULL
+ now
.tv_sec
);
483 *(__be32
*)(output
+ sizeof(__be64
)) = cpu_to_be32(now
.tv_nsec
);
487 wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation
*dst
,
488 struct noise_handshake
*handshake
)
490 u8 timestamp
[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN
];
491 u8 key
[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
];
494 /* We need to wait for crng _before_ taking any locks, since
495 * curve25519_generate_secret uses get_random_bytes_wait.
497 wait_for_random_bytes();
499 down_read(&handshake
->static_identity
->lock
);
500 down_write(&handshake
->lock
);
502 if (unlikely(!handshake
->static_identity
->has_identity
))
505 dst
->header
.type
= cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_INITIATION
);
507 handshake_init(handshake
->chaining_key
, handshake
->hash
,
508 handshake
->remote_static
);
511 curve25519_generate_secret(handshake
->ephemeral_private
);
512 if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst
->unencrypted_ephemeral
,
513 handshake
->ephemeral_private
))
515 message_ephemeral(dst
->unencrypted_ephemeral
,
516 dst
->unencrypted_ephemeral
, handshake
->chaining_key
,
520 if (!mix_dh(handshake
->chaining_key
, key
, handshake
->ephemeral_private
,
521 handshake
->remote_static
))
525 message_encrypt(dst
->encrypted_static
,
526 handshake
->static_identity
->static_public
,
527 NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
, key
, handshake
->hash
);
530 kdf(handshake
->chaining_key
, key
, NULL
,
531 handshake
->precomputed_static_static
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
,
532 NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
,
533 handshake
->chaining_key
);
536 tai64n_now(timestamp
);
537 message_encrypt(dst
->encrypted_timestamp
, timestamp
,
538 NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN
, key
, handshake
->hash
);
540 dst
->sender_index
= wg_index_hashtable_insert(
541 handshake
->entry
.peer
->device
->index_hashtable
,
544 handshake
->state
= HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION
;
548 up_write(&handshake
->lock
);
549 up_read(&handshake
->static_identity
->lock
);
550 memzero_explicit(key
, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
);
555 wg_noise_handshake_consume_initiation(struct message_handshake_initiation
*src
,
556 struct wg_device
*wg
)
558 struct wg_peer
*peer
= NULL
, *ret_peer
= NULL
;
559 struct noise_handshake
*handshake
;
560 bool replay_attack
, flood_attack
;
561 u8 key
[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
];
562 u8 chaining_key
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
];
563 u8 hash
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
];
564 u8 s
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
];
565 u8 e
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
];
566 u8 t
[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN
];
567 u64 initiation_consumption
;
569 down_read(&wg
->static_identity
.lock
);
570 if (unlikely(!wg
->static_identity
.has_identity
))
573 handshake_init(chaining_key
, hash
, wg
->static_identity
.static_public
);
576 message_ephemeral(e
, src
->unencrypted_ephemeral
, chaining_key
, hash
);
579 if (!mix_dh(chaining_key
, key
, wg
->static_identity
.static_private
, e
))
583 if (!message_decrypt(s
, src
->encrypted_static
,
584 sizeof(src
->encrypted_static
), key
, hash
))
587 /* Lookup which peer we're actually talking to */
588 peer
= wg_pubkey_hashtable_lookup(wg
->peer_hashtable
, s
);
591 handshake
= &peer
->handshake
;
594 kdf(chaining_key
, key
, NULL
, handshake
->precomputed_static_static
,
595 NOISE_HASH_LEN
, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
,
599 if (!message_decrypt(t
, src
->encrypted_timestamp
,
600 sizeof(src
->encrypted_timestamp
), key
, hash
))
603 down_read(&handshake
->lock
);
604 replay_attack
= memcmp(t
, handshake
->latest_timestamp
,
605 NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN
) <= 0;
606 flood_attack
= (s64
)handshake
->last_initiation_consumption
+
607 NSEC_PER_SEC
/ INITIATIONS_PER_SECOND
>
608 (s64
)ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns();
609 up_read(&handshake
->lock
);
610 if (replay_attack
|| flood_attack
)
613 /* Success! Copy everything to peer */
614 down_write(&handshake
->lock
);
615 memcpy(handshake
->remote_ephemeral
, e
, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
616 if (memcmp(t
, handshake
->latest_timestamp
, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN
) > 0)
617 memcpy(handshake
->latest_timestamp
, t
, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN
);
618 memcpy(handshake
->hash
, hash
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
619 memcpy(handshake
->chaining_key
, chaining_key
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
620 handshake
->remote_index
= src
->sender_index
;
621 if ((s64
)(handshake
->last_initiation_consumption
-
622 (initiation_consumption
= ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns())) < 0)
623 handshake
->last_initiation_consumption
= initiation_consumption
;
624 handshake
->state
= HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION
;
625 up_write(&handshake
->lock
);
629 memzero_explicit(key
, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
);
630 memzero_explicit(hash
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
631 memzero_explicit(chaining_key
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
632 up_read(&wg
->static_identity
.lock
);
638 bool wg_noise_handshake_create_response(struct message_handshake_response
*dst
,
639 struct noise_handshake
*handshake
)
641 u8 key
[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
];
644 /* We need to wait for crng _before_ taking any locks, since
645 * curve25519_generate_secret uses get_random_bytes_wait.
647 wait_for_random_bytes();
649 down_read(&handshake
->static_identity
->lock
);
650 down_write(&handshake
->lock
);
652 if (handshake
->state
!= HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_INITIATION
)
655 dst
->header
.type
= cpu_to_le32(MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE
);
656 dst
->receiver_index
= handshake
->remote_index
;
659 curve25519_generate_secret(handshake
->ephemeral_private
);
660 if (!curve25519_generate_public(dst
->unencrypted_ephemeral
,
661 handshake
->ephemeral_private
))
663 message_ephemeral(dst
->unencrypted_ephemeral
,
664 dst
->unencrypted_ephemeral
, handshake
->chaining_key
,
668 if (!mix_dh(handshake
->chaining_key
, NULL
, handshake
->ephemeral_private
,
669 handshake
->remote_ephemeral
))
673 if (!mix_dh(handshake
->chaining_key
, NULL
, handshake
->ephemeral_private
,
674 handshake
->remote_static
))
678 mix_psk(handshake
->chaining_key
, handshake
->hash
, key
,
679 handshake
->preshared_key
);
682 message_encrypt(dst
->encrypted_nothing
, NULL
, 0, key
, handshake
->hash
);
684 dst
->sender_index
= wg_index_hashtable_insert(
685 handshake
->entry
.peer
->device
->index_hashtable
,
688 handshake
->state
= HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE
;
692 up_write(&handshake
->lock
);
693 up_read(&handshake
->static_identity
->lock
);
694 memzero_explicit(key
, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
);
699 wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(struct message_handshake_response
*src
,
700 struct wg_device
*wg
)
702 enum noise_handshake_state state
= HANDSHAKE_ZEROED
;
703 struct wg_peer
*peer
= NULL
, *ret_peer
= NULL
;
704 struct noise_handshake
*handshake
;
705 u8 key
[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
];
706 u8 hash
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
];
707 u8 chaining_key
[NOISE_HASH_LEN
];
708 u8 e
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
];
709 u8 ephemeral_private
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
];
710 u8 static_private
[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
];
712 down_read(&wg
->static_identity
.lock
);
714 if (unlikely(!wg
->static_identity
.has_identity
))
717 handshake
= (struct noise_handshake
*)wg_index_hashtable_lookup(
718 wg
->index_hashtable
, INDEX_HASHTABLE_HANDSHAKE
,
719 src
->receiver_index
, &peer
);
720 if (unlikely(!handshake
))
723 down_read(&handshake
->lock
);
724 state
= handshake
->state
;
725 memcpy(hash
, handshake
->hash
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
726 memcpy(chaining_key
, handshake
->chaining_key
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
727 memcpy(ephemeral_private
, handshake
->ephemeral_private
,
728 NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
729 up_read(&handshake
->lock
);
731 if (state
!= HANDSHAKE_CREATED_INITIATION
)
735 message_ephemeral(e
, src
->unencrypted_ephemeral
, chaining_key
, hash
);
738 if (!mix_dh(chaining_key
, NULL
, ephemeral_private
, e
))
742 if (!mix_dh(chaining_key
, NULL
, wg
->static_identity
.static_private
, e
))
746 mix_psk(chaining_key
, hash
, key
, handshake
->preshared_key
);
749 if (!message_decrypt(NULL
, src
->encrypted_nothing
,
750 sizeof(src
->encrypted_nothing
), key
, hash
))
753 /* Success! Copy everything to peer */
754 down_write(&handshake
->lock
);
755 /* It's important to check that the state is still the same, while we
756 * have an exclusive lock.
758 if (handshake
->state
!= state
) {
759 up_write(&handshake
->lock
);
762 memcpy(handshake
->remote_ephemeral
, e
, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
763 memcpy(handshake
->hash
, hash
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
764 memcpy(handshake
->chaining_key
, chaining_key
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
765 handshake
->remote_index
= src
->sender_index
;
766 handshake
->state
= HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE
;
767 up_write(&handshake
->lock
);
774 memzero_explicit(key
, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN
);
775 memzero_explicit(hash
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
776 memzero_explicit(chaining_key
, NOISE_HASH_LEN
);
777 memzero_explicit(ephemeral_private
, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
778 memzero_explicit(static_private
, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
);
779 up_read(&wg
->static_identity
.lock
);
783 bool wg_noise_handshake_begin_session(struct noise_handshake
*handshake
,
784 struct noise_keypairs
*keypairs
)
786 struct noise_keypair
*new_keypair
;
789 down_write(&handshake
->lock
);
790 if (handshake
->state
!= HANDSHAKE_CREATED_RESPONSE
&&
791 handshake
->state
!= HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE
)
794 new_keypair
= keypair_create(handshake
->entry
.peer
);
797 new_keypair
->i_am_the_initiator
= handshake
->state
==
798 HANDSHAKE_CONSUMED_RESPONSE
;
799 new_keypair
->remote_index
= handshake
->remote_index
;
801 if (new_keypair
->i_am_the_initiator
)
802 derive_keys(&new_keypair
->sending
, &new_keypair
->receiving
,
803 handshake
->chaining_key
);
805 derive_keys(&new_keypair
->receiving
, &new_keypair
->sending
,
806 handshake
->chaining_key
);
808 handshake_zero(handshake
);
810 if (likely(!READ_ONCE(container_of(handshake
, struct wg_peer
,
811 handshake
)->is_dead
))) {
812 add_new_keypair(keypairs
, new_keypair
);
813 net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Keypair %llu created for peer %llu\n",
814 handshake
->entry
.peer
->device
->dev
->name
,
815 new_keypair
->internal_id
,
816 handshake
->entry
.peer
->internal_id
);
817 ret
= wg_index_hashtable_replace(
818 handshake
->entry
.peer
->device
->index_hashtable
,
819 &handshake
->entry
, &new_keypair
->entry
);
823 rcu_read_unlock_bh();
826 up_write(&handshake
->lock
);