driver core: bus: use list_for_each_entry*
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / security / integrity / ima / ima_policy.c
blob0a3b781f18e55771e0204b7a95e42dbe6fc4f161
1 /*
2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
9 * ima_policy.c
10 * - initialize default measure policy rules
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/security.h>
16 #include <linux/magic.h>
17 #include <linux/parser.h>
18 #include <linux/slab.h>
19 #include <linux/rculist.h>
20 #include <linux/genhd.h>
21 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
23 #include "ima.h"
25 /* flags definitions */
26 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
27 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
28 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
29 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
30 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
31 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
32 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
33 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080
35 #define UNKNOWN 0
36 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
37 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
38 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
39 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
40 #define AUDIT 0x0040
42 int ima_policy_flag;
43 static int temp_ima_appraise;
45 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
46 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
47 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
50 enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
52 struct ima_rule_entry {
53 struct list_head list;
54 int action;
55 unsigned int flags;
56 enum ima_hooks func;
57 int mask;
58 unsigned long fsmagic;
59 u8 fsuuid[16];
60 kuid_t uid;
61 kuid_t fowner;
62 struct {
63 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
64 void *args_p; /* audit value */
65 int type; /* audit type */
66 } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
70 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
71 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
75 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
76 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
77 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
78 * and running executables.
80 static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] = {
81 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
82 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
83 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
84 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
85 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
86 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
87 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
88 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
89 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
90 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
91 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
94 static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] = {
95 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
96 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
97 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
98 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
99 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
100 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
101 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
102 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
105 static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
106 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
107 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
108 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
109 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
110 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
111 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
112 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
113 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
114 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
115 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
118 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
119 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
120 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
121 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
122 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
123 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
124 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
125 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
126 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
127 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
128 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
129 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
130 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
131 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
132 #else
133 /* force signature */
134 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
135 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
136 #endif
139 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
140 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
141 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
142 static struct list_head *ima_rules;
144 static int ima_policy __initdata;
146 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
148 if (ima_policy)
149 return 1;
151 ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
152 return 1;
154 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
156 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
158 if (ima_policy)
159 return 1;
161 if (strcmp(str, "tcb") == 0)
162 ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
164 return 1;
166 __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
168 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
169 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
171 ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
172 return 1;
174 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
177 * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
178 * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
179 * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if
180 * they don't.
182 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
184 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
185 int result;
186 int i;
188 list_for_each_entry(entry, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
189 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
190 if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
191 continue;
192 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
193 Audit_equal,
194 entry->lsm[i].args_p,
195 &entry->lsm[i].rule);
196 BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
202 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
203 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
204 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
205 * @func: LIM hook identifier
206 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
208 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
210 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
211 struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
213 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
214 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
215 int i;
217 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
218 (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
219 return false;
220 if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
221 (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
222 return false;
223 if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
224 (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
225 return false;
226 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
227 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
228 return false;
229 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
230 memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid)))
231 return false;
232 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
233 return false;
234 if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
235 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
236 if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)
237 && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid)
238 && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
239 return false;
240 } else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid))
241 return false;
244 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
245 return false;
246 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
247 int rc = 0;
248 u32 osid, sid;
249 int retried = 0;
251 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
252 continue;
253 retry:
254 switch (i) {
255 case LSM_OBJ_USER:
256 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
257 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
258 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
259 rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
260 rule->lsm[i].type,
261 Audit_equal,
262 rule->lsm[i].rule,
263 NULL);
264 break;
265 case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
266 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
267 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
268 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
269 rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
270 rule->lsm[i].type,
271 Audit_equal,
272 rule->lsm[i].rule,
273 NULL);
274 default:
275 break;
277 if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
278 retried = 1;
279 ima_lsm_update_rules();
280 goto retry;
282 if (!rc)
283 return false;
285 return true;
289 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
290 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
292 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
294 if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
295 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
297 switch (func) {
298 case MMAP_CHECK:
299 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
300 case BPRM_CHECK:
301 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
302 case MODULE_CHECK:
303 return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE;
304 case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
305 return IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE;
306 case FILE_CHECK:
307 default:
308 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
313 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
314 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
315 * @func: IMA hook identifier
316 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
318 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
319 * conditions.
321 * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the
322 * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
323 * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
325 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
326 int flags)
328 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
329 int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
331 rcu_read_lock();
332 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
334 if (!(entry->action & actmask))
335 continue;
337 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
338 continue;
340 action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
342 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
343 if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE)
344 action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
346 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
347 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
348 else
349 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
351 if (!actmask)
352 break;
354 rcu_read_unlock();
356 return action;
360 * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
361 * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
362 * out of a function or not call the function in the first place
363 * can be made earlier.
365 void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
367 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
369 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
370 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
371 ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
374 ima_appraise |= temp_ima_appraise;
375 if (!ima_appraise)
376 ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
380 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
382 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
383 * the new ima_policy_rules.
385 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
387 int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
389 /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
390 measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
391 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
392 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
394 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
395 list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
397 switch (ima_policy) {
398 case ORIGINAL_TCB:
399 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++)
400 list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list,
401 &ima_default_rules);
402 break;
403 case DEFAULT_TCB:
404 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++)
405 list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list,
406 &ima_default_rules);
407 default:
408 break;
411 for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
412 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
413 &ima_default_rules);
416 ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
419 /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
420 int ima_check_policy()
422 if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules))
423 return -EINVAL;
424 return 0;
428 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
430 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
431 * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
432 * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
433 * RCU updater.
435 * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
436 * we switch from the default policy to user defined.
438 void ima_update_policy(void)
440 struct list_head *first, *last, *policy;
442 /* append current policy with the new rules */
443 first = (&ima_temp_rules)->next;
444 last = (&ima_temp_rules)->prev;
445 policy = &ima_policy_rules;
447 synchronize_rcu();
449 last->next = policy;
450 rcu_assign_pointer(list_next_rcu(policy->prev), first);
451 first->prev = policy->prev;
452 policy->prev = last;
454 /* prepare for the next policy rules addition */
455 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_temp_rules);
457 if (ima_rules != policy) {
458 ima_policy_flag = 0;
459 ima_rules = policy;
461 ima_update_policy_flag();
464 enum {
465 Opt_err = -1,
466 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
467 Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
468 Opt_audit,
469 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
470 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
471 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
472 Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
473 Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio
476 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
477 {Opt_measure, "measure"},
478 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
479 {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
480 {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
481 {Opt_audit, "audit"},
482 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
483 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
484 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
485 {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
486 {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
487 {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
488 {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
489 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
490 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
491 {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
492 {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
493 {Opt_euid, "euid=%s"},
494 {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
495 {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
496 {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
497 {Opt_err, NULL}
500 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
501 substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
503 int result;
505 if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
506 return -EINVAL;
508 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
509 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
510 return -ENOMEM;
512 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
513 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
514 Audit_equal,
515 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
516 &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
517 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
518 kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
519 return -EINVAL;
522 return result;
525 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
527 audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
528 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
529 audit_log_format(ab, " ");
532 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
534 struct audit_buffer *ab;
535 char *from;
536 char *p;
537 int result = 0;
539 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
541 entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
542 entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
543 entry->action = UNKNOWN;
544 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
545 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
546 int token;
547 unsigned long lnum;
549 if (result < 0)
550 break;
551 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
552 continue;
553 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
554 switch (token) {
555 case Opt_measure:
556 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
558 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
559 result = -EINVAL;
561 entry->action = MEASURE;
562 break;
563 case Opt_dont_measure:
564 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
566 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
567 result = -EINVAL;
569 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
570 break;
571 case Opt_appraise:
572 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
574 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
575 result = -EINVAL;
577 entry->action = APPRAISE;
578 break;
579 case Opt_dont_appraise:
580 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
582 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
583 result = -EINVAL;
585 entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
586 break;
587 case Opt_audit:
588 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
590 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
591 result = -EINVAL;
593 entry->action = AUDIT;
594 break;
595 case Opt_func:
596 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
598 if (entry->func)
599 result = -EINVAL;
601 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
602 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
603 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
604 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
605 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
606 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
607 entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
608 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
609 entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
610 else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
611 || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
612 entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
613 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
614 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
615 else
616 result = -EINVAL;
617 if (!result)
618 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
619 break;
620 case Opt_mask:
621 ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
623 if (entry->mask)
624 result = -EINVAL;
626 from = args[0].from;
627 if (*from == '^')
628 from++;
630 if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
631 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
632 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
633 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
634 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
635 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
636 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
637 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
638 else
639 result = -EINVAL;
640 if (!result)
641 entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
642 ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
643 break;
644 case Opt_fsmagic:
645 ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
647 if (entry->fsmagic) {
648 result = -EINVAL;
649 break;
652 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
653 if (!result)
654 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
655 break;
656 case Opt_fsuuid:
657 ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
659 if (memchr_inv(entry->fsuuid, 0x00,
660 sizeof(entry->fsuuid))) {
661 result = -EINVAL;
662 break;
665 result = blk_part_pack_uuid(args[0].from,
666 entry->fsuuid);
667 if (!result)
668 entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
669 break;
670 case Opt_uid:
671 ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
672 case Opt_euid:
673 if (token == Opt_euid)
674 ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from);
676 if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
677 result = -EINVAL;
678 break;
681 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
682 if (!result) {
683 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
684 (uid_t) lnum);
685 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
686 (uid_t)lnum != lnum)
687 result = -EINVAL;
688 else
689 entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid)
690 ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
692 break;
693 case Opt_fowner:
694 ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
696 if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
697 result = -EINVAL;
698 break;
701 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
702 if (!result) {
703 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
704 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
705 result = -EINVAL;
706 else
707 entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
709 break;
710 case Opt_obj_user:
711 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
712 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
713 LSM_OBJ_USER,
714 AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
715 break;
716 case Opt_obj_role:
717 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
718 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
719 LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
720 AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
721 break;
722 case Opt_obj_type:
723 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
724 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
725 LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
726 AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
727 break;
728 case Opt_subj_user:
729 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
730 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
731 LSM_SUBJ_USER,
732 AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
733 break;
734 case Opt_subj_role:
735 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
736 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
737 LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
738 AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
739 break;
740 case Opt_subj_type:
741 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
742 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
743 LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
744 AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
745 break;
746 case Opt_appraise_type:
747 if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
748 result = -EINVAL;
749 break;
752 ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
753 if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
754 entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
755 else
756 result = -EINVAL;
757 break;
758 case Opt_permit_directio:
759 entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
760 break;
761 case Opt_err:
762 ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
763 result = -EINVAL;
764 break;
767 if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
768 result = -EINVAL;
769 else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK)
770 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
771 else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
772 temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
773 audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
774 audit_log_end(ab);
775 return result;
779 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
780 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
782 * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
783 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
785 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
787 static const char op[] = "update_policy";
788 char *p;
789 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
790 ssize_t result, len;
791 int audit_info = 0;
793 p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
794 len = strlen(p) + 1;
795 p += strspn(p, " \t");
797 if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
798 return len;
800 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
801 if (!entry) {
802 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
803 NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
804 return -ENOMEM;
807 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
809 result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
810 if (result) {
811 kfree(entry);
812 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
813 NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
814 audit_info);
815 return result;
818 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules);
820 return len;
824 * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
825 * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is
826 * different from the active one. There is also only one user of
827 * ima_delete_rules() at a time.
829 void ima_delete_rules(void)
831 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
832 int i;
834 temp_ima_appraise = 0;
835 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
836 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
837 kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
839 list_del(&entry->list);
840 kfree(entry);
844 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
845 enum {
846 mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
849 static char *mask_tokens[] = {
850 "MAY_EXEC",
851 "MAY_WRITE",
852 "MAY_READ",
853 "MAY_APPEND"
856 enum {
857 func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
858 func_module, func_firmware, func_post
861 static char *func_tokens[] = {
862 "FILE_CHECK",
863 "MMAP_CHECK",
864 "BPRM_CHECK",
865 "MODULE_CHECK",
866 "FIRMWARE_CHECK",
867 "POST_SETATTR"
870 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
872 loff_t l = *pos;
873 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
875 rcu_read_lock();
876 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
877 if (!l--) {
878 rcu_read_unlock();
879 return entry;
882 rcu_read_unlock();
883 return NULL;
886 void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
888 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
890 rcu_read_lock();
891 entry = list_entry_rcu(entry->list.next, struct ima_rule_entry, list);
892 rcu_read_unlock();
893 (*pos)++;
895 return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry;
898 void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
902 #define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern
903 #define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
904 #define ft(token) func_tokens[token]
906 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
908 struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
909 int i = 0;
910 char tbuf[64] = {0,};
912 rcu_read_lock();
914 if (entry->action & MEASURE)
915 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure));
916 if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE)
917 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_measure));
918 if (entry->action & APPRAISE)
919 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_appraise));
920 if (entry->action & DONT_APPRAISE)
921 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise));
922 if (entry->action & AUDIT)
923 seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit));
925 seq_puts(m, " ");
927 if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) {
928 switch (entry->func) {
929 case FILE_CHECK:
930 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file));
931 break;
932 case MMAP_CHECK:
933 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap));
934 break;
935 case BPRM_CHECK:
936 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm));
937 break;
938 case MODULE_CHECK:
939 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module));
940 break;
941 case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
942 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware));
943 break;
944 case POST_SETATTR:
945 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
946 break;
947 default:
948 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->func);
949 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
950 break;
952 seq_puts(m, " ");
955 if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) {
956 if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
957 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec));
958 if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE)
959 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write));
960 if (entry->mask & MAY_READ)
961 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read));
962 if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND)
963 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append));
964 seq_puts(m, " ");
967 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) {
968 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "0x%lx", entry->fsmagic);
969 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsmagic), tbuf);
970 seq_puts(m, " ");
973 if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) {
974 seq_puts(m, "fsuuid=");
975 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(entry->fsuuid); ++i) {
976 switch (i) {
977 case 4:
978 case 6:
979 case 8:
980 case 10:
981 seq_puts(m, "-");
983 seq_printf(m, "%x", entry->fsuuid[i]);
985 seq_puts(m, " ");
988 if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) {
989 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
990 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid), tbuf);
991 seq_puts(m, " ");
994 if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) {
995 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid));
996 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid), tbuf);
997 seq_puts(m, " ");
1000 if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) {
1001 snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner));
1002 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner), tbuf);
1003 seq_puts(m, " ");
1006 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
1007 if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
1008 switch (i) {
1009 case LSM_OBJ_USER:
1010 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
1011 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1012 break;
1013 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
1014 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role),
1015 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1016 break;
1017 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
1018 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type),
1019 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1020 break;
1021 case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
1022 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user),
1023 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1024 break;
1025 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
1026 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role),
1027 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1028 break;
1029 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
1030 seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type),
1031 (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
1032 break;
1036 if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
1037 seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
1038 if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
1039 seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
1040 rcu_read_unlock();
1041 seq_puts(m, "\n");
1042 return 0;
1044 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */