2 * AppArmor security module
4 * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
15 #include "include/apparmor.h"
16 #include "include/audit.h"
17 #include "include/file.h"
18 #include "include/match.h"
19 #include "include/path.h"
20 #include "include/policy.h"
22 struct file_perms nullperms
;
26 * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
27 * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
28 * @mask: permission mask to convert
30 static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, u32 mask
)
36 if (mask
& AA_EXEC_MMAP
)
38 if (mask
& (MAY_READ
| AA_MAY_META_READ
))
40 if (mask
& (MAY_WRITE
| AA_MAY_META_WRITE
| AA_MAY_CHMOD
|
43 else if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
45 if (mask
& AA_MAY_CREATE
)
47 if (mask
& AA_MAY_DELETE
)
49 if (mask
& AA_MAY_LINK
)
51 if (mask
& AA_MAY_LOCK
)
57 audit_log_string(ab
, str
);
61 * file_audit_cb - call back for file specific audit fields
62 * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
63 * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
65 static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, void *va
)
67 struct common_audit_data
*sa
= va
;
68 kuid_t fsuid
= current_fsuid();
70 if (sa
->aad
->fs
.request
& AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK
) {
71 audit_log_format(ab
, " requested_mask=");
72 audit_file_mask(ab
, sa
->aad
->fs
.request
);
74 if (sa
->aad
->fs
.denied
& AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK
) {
75 audit_log_format(ab
, " denied_mask=");
76 audit_file_mask(ab
, sa
->aad
->fs
.denied
);
78 if (sa
->aad
->fs
.request
& AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK
) {
79 audit_log_format(ab
, " fsuid=%d",
80 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, fsuid
));
81 audit_log_format(ab
, " ouid=%d",
82 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, sa
->aad
->fs
.ouid
));
85 if (sa
->aad
->fs
.target
) {
86 audit_log_format(ab
, " target=");
87 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, sa
->aad
->fs
.target
);
92 * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
93 * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
94 * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
95 * @gfp: allocation flags
96 * @op: operation being mediated
97 * @request: permissions requested
98 * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
99 * @target: name of target (MAYBE NULL)
101 * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
102 * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
104 * Returns: %0 or error on failure
106 int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile
*profile
, struct file_perms
*perms
,
107 gfp_t gfp
, int op
, u32 request
, const char *name
,
108 const char *target
, kuid_t ouid
, const char *info
, int error
)
110 int type
= AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO
;
111 struct common_audit_data sa
;
112 struct apparmor_audit_data aad
= {0,};
113 sa
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE
;
116 aad
.fs
.request
= request
;
118 aad
.fs
.target
= target
;
123 if (likely(!sa
.aad
->error
)) {
124 u32 mask
= perms
->audit
;
126 if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile
) == AUDIT_ALL
))
129 /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
130 sa
.aad
->fs
.request
&= mask
;
132 if (likely(!sa
.aad
->fs
.request
))
134 type
= AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT
;
136 /* only report permissions that were denied */
137 sa
.aad
->fs
.request
= sa
.aad
->fs
.request
& ~perms
->allow
;
139 if (sa
.aad
->fs
.request
& perms
->kill
)
140 type
= AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL
;
142 /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
143 if ((sa
.aad
->fs
.request
& perms
->quiet
) &&
144 AUDIT_MODE(profile
) != AUDIT_NOQUIET
&&
145 AUDIT_MODE(profile
) != AUDIT_ALL
)
146 sa
.aad
->fs
.request
&= ~perms
->quiet
;
148 if (!sa
.aad
->fs
.request
)
149 return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile
) ? 0 : sa
.aad
->error
;
152 sa
.aad
->fs
.denied
= sa
.aad
->fs
.request
& ~perms
->allow
;
153 return aa_audit(type
, profile
, gfp
, &sa
, file_audit_cb
);
157 * map_old_perms - map old file perms layout to the new layout
158 * @old: permission set in old mapping
160 * Returns: new permission mapping
162 static u32
map_old_perms(u32 old
)
166 new |= AA_MAY_META_READ
;
168 new |= AA_MAY_META_WRITE
| AA_MAY_CREATE
| AA_MAY_DELETE
|
169 AA_MAY_CHMOD
| AA_MAY_CHOWN
;
172 /* the old mapping lock and link_subset flags where overlaid
173 * and use was determined by part of a pair that they were in
176 new |= AA_MAY_LOCK
| AA_LINK_SUBSET
;
177 if (old
& 0x40) /* AA_EXEC_MMAP */
184 * compute_perms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
185 * @dfa: dfa to compute perms for (NOT NULL)
186 * @state: state in dfa
187 * @cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL)
189 * TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry, do computation conversion
192 * Returns: computed permission set
194 static struct file_perms
compute_perms(struct aa_dfa
*dfa
, unsigned int state
,
195 struct path_cond
*cond
)
197 struct file_perms perms
;
199 /* FIXME: change over to new dfa format
200 * currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format
201 * splits the permissions from the dfa. This mapping can be
202 * done at profile load
206 if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond
->uid
)) {
207 perms
.allow
= map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa
, state
));
208 perms
.audit
= map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa
, state
));
209 perms
.quiet
= map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa
, state
));
210 perms
.xindex
= dfa_user_xindex(dfa
, state
);
212 perms
.allow
= map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(dfa
, state
));
213 perms
.audit
= map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(dfa
, state
));
214 perms
.quiet
= map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa
, state
));
215 perms
.xindex
= dfa_other_xindex(dfa
, state
);
217 perms
.allow
|= AA_MAY_META_READ
;
219 /* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
220 if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa
)[state
] & 0x80000000)
221 perms
.allow
|= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE
;
222 if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa
)[state
] & 0x40000000)
223 perms
.allow
|= AA_MAY_ONEXEC
;
229 * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name
230 * @dfa: to match against (MAYBE NULL)
231 * @state: state to start matching in
232 * @name: string to match against dfa (NOT NULL)
233 * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation (NOT NULL)
234 * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name
236 * Returns: the final state in @dfa when beginning @start and walking @name
238 unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa
*dfa
, unsigned int start
,
239 const char *name
, struct path_cond
*cond
,
240 struct file_perms
*perms
)
248 state
= aa_dfa_match(dfa
, start
, name
);
249 *perms
= compute_perms(dfa
, state
, cond
);
255 * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked
256 * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion (NOT NULL)
258 * Returns: %1 if deleted else %0
260 static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry
*dentry
)
262 if (d_unlinked(dentry
) && d_backing_inode(dentry
)->i_nlink
== 0)
268 * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
269 * @op: operation being checked
270 * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
271 * @path: path to check permissions of (NOT NULL)
272 * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
273 * @request: requested permissions
274 * @cond: conditional info for this request (NOT NULL)
276 * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
278 int aa_path_perm(int op
, struct aa_profile
*profile
, struct path
*path
,
279 int flags
, u32 request
, struct path_cond
*cond
)
282 struct file_perms perms
= {};
283 const char *name
, *info
= NULL
;
286 flags
|= profile
->path_flags
| (S_ISDIR(cond
->mode
) ? PATH_IS_DIR
: 0);
287 error
= aa_path_name(path
, flags
, &buffer
, &name
, &info
);
289 if (error
== -ENOENT
&& is_deleted(path
->dentry
)) {
290 /* Access to open files that are deleted are
291 * give a pass (implicit delegation)
295 perms
.allow
= request
;
298 aa_str_perms(profile
->file
.dfa
, profile
->file
.start
, name
, cond
,
300 if (request
& ~perms
.allow
)
303 error
= aa_audit_file(profile
, &perms
, GFP_KERNEL
, op
, request
, name
,
304 NULL
, cond
->uid
, info
, error
);
311 * xindex_is_subset - helper for aa_path_link
312 * @link: link permission set
313 * @target: target permission set
315 * test target x permissions are equal OR a subset of link x permissions
316 * this is done as part of the subset test, where a hardlink must have
317 * a subset of permissions that the target has.
319 * Returns: %1 if subset else %0
321 static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link
, u32 target
)
323 if (((link
& ~AA_X_UNSAFE
) != (target
& ~AA_X_UNSAFE
)) ||
324 ((link
& AA_X_UNSAFE
) && !(target
& AA_X_UNSAFE
)))
331 * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
332 * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
333 * @old_dentry: the target dentry (NOT NULL)
334 * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in (NOT NULL)
335 * @new_dentry: the link being created (NOT NULL)
337 * Handle the permission test for a link & target pair. Permission
338 * is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined
339 * first, and if allowed, the target is tested. The target test
340 * is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA)
341 * making the target permission dependent on the link permission match.
343 * The subset test if required forces that permissions granted
344 * on link are a subset of the permission granted to target.
346 * Returns: %0 if allowed else error
348 int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile
*profile
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
349 struct path
*new_dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
351 struct path link
= { new_dir
->mnt
, new_dentry
};
352 struct path target
= { new_dir
->mnt
, old_dentry
};
353 struct path_cond cond
= {
354 d_backing_inode(old_dentry
)->i_uid
,
355 d_backing_inode(old_dentry
)->i_mode
357 char *buffer
= NULL
, *buffer2
= NULL
;
358 const char *lname
, *tname
= NULL
, *info
= NULL
;
359 struct file_perms lperms
, perms
;
360 u32 request
= AA_MAY_LINK
;
366 /* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
367 error
= aa_path_name(&link
, profile
->path_flags
, &buffer
, &lname
,
372 /* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
373 error
= aa_path_name(&target
, profile
->path_flags
, &buffer2
, &tname
,
379 /* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
380 state
= aa_str_perms(profile
->file
.dfa
, profile
->file
.start
, lname
,
383 if (!(lperms
.allow
& AA_MAY_LINK
))
386 /* test to see if target can be paired with link */
387 state
= aa_dfa_null_transition(profile
->file
.dfa
, state
);
388 aa_str_perms(profile
->file
.dfa
, state
, tname
, &cond
, &perms
);
390 /* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
393 lperms
.audit
= perms
.audit
;
394 lperms
.quiet
= perms
.quiet
;
395 lperms
.kill
= perms
.kill
;
397 if (!(perms
.allow
& AA_MAY_LINK
)) {
398 info
= "target restricted";
402 /* done if link subset test is not required */
403 if (!(perms
.allow
& AA_LINK_SUBSET
))
406 /* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are a
407 * subset of the allowed permissions on target.
409 aa_str_perms(profile
->file
.dfa
, profile
->file
.start
, tname
, &cond
,
412 /* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
413 request
= lperms
.allow
& ~AA_MAY_LINK
;
414 lperms
.allow
&= perms
.allow
| AA_MAY_LINK
;
416 request
|= AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK
& (lperms
.allow
& ~perms
.allow
);
417 if (request
& ~lperms
.allow
) {
419 } else if ((lperms
.allow
& MAY_EXEC
) &&
420 !xindex_is_subset(lperms
.xindex
, perms
.xindex
)) {
421 lperms
.allow
&= ~MAY_EXEC
;
423 info
= "link not subset of target";
431 error
= aa_audit_file(profile
, &lperms
, GFP_KERNEL
, OP_LINK
, request
,
432 lname
, tname
, cond
.uid
, info
, error
);
440 * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
441 * @op: operation being checked
442 * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
443 * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on (NOT NULL)
444 * @request: requested permissions
446 * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
448 int aa_file_perm(int op
, struct aa_profile
*profile
, struct file
*file
,
451 struct path_cond cond
= {
452 .uid
= file_inode(file
)->i_uid
,
453 .mode
= file_inode(file
)->i_mode
456 return aa_path_perm(op
, profile
, &file
->f_path
, PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED
,