security/safesetid/lsm.c

   1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
   2 /*
   3  * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
   4  *
   5  * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
   6  *
   7  * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
   8  *
   9  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  10  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
  11  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
  12  *
  13  */
  14
  15 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
  16
  17 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  18 #include <linux/module.h>
  19 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  20 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
  21 #include <linux/security.h>
  22 #include "lsm.h"
  23
  24 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
  25 int safesetid_initialized;
  26
  27 struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules;
  28 struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules;
  29
  30
  31 /* Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under @policy. */
  32 enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy,
  33                 kid_t src, kid_t dst)
  34 {
  35         struct setid_rule *rule;
  36         enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
  37
  38         if (policy->type == UID) {
  39                 hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kuid_val(src.uid)) {
  40                         if (!uid_eq(rule->src_id.uid, src.uid))
  41                                 continue;
  42                         if (uid_eq(rule->dst_id.uid, dst.uid))
  43                                 return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
  44                         result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
  45                 }
  46         } else if (policy->type == GID) {
  47                 hash_for_each_possible(policy->rules, rule, next, __kgid_val(src.gid)) {
  48                         if (!gid_eq(rule->src_id.gid, src.gid))
  49                                 continue;
  50                         if (gid_eq(rule->dst_id.gid, dst.gid)){
  51                                 return SIDPOL_ALLOWED;
  52                         }
  53                         result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
  54                 }
  55         } else {
  56                 /* Should not reach here, report the ID as contrainsted */
  57                 result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
  58         }
  59         return result;
  60 }
  61
  62 /*
  63  * Compute a decision for a transition from @src to @dst under the active
  64  * policy.
  65  */
  66 static enum sid_policy_type setid_policy_lookup(kid_t src, kid_t dst, enum setid_type new_type)
  67 {
  68         enum sid_policy_type result = SIDPOL_DEFAULT;
  69         struct setid_ruleset *pol;
  70
  71         rcu_read_lock();
  72         if (new_type == UID)
  73                 pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setuid_rules);
  74         else if (new_type == GID)
  75                 pol = rcu_dereference(safesetid_setgid_rules);
  76         else { /* Should not reach here */
  77                 result = SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
  78                 rcu_read_unlock();
  79                 return result;
  80         }
  81
  82         if (pol) {
  83                 pol->type = new_type;
  84                 result = _setid_policy_lookup(pol, src, dst);
  85         }
  86         rcu_read_unlock();
  87         return result;
  88 }
  89
  90 static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
  91                                       struct user_namespace *ns,
  92                                       int cap,
  93                                       unsigned int opts)
  94 {
  95         /* We're only interested in CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID. */
  96         if (cap != CAP_SETUID && cap != CAP_SETGID)
  97                 return 0;
  98
  99         /*
 100          * If CAP_SET{U/G}ID is currently used for a setid() syscall, we want to
 101          * let it go through here; the real security check happens later, in the
 102          * task_fix_set{u/g}id hook.
 103          *
 104          * NOTE:
 105          * Until we add support for restricting setgroups() calls, GID security
 106          * policies offer no meaningful security since we always return 0 here
 107          * when called from within the setgroups() syscall and there is no
 108          * additional hook later on to enforce security policies for setgroups().
 109          */
 110         if ((opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID) != 0)
 111                 return 0;
 112
 113         switch (cap) {
 114         case CAP_SETUID:
 115                 /*
 116                 * If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETUID for
 117                 * other purposes.
 118                 */
 119                 if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = cred->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
 120                         return 0;
 121                 /*
 122                  * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
 123                  * set*uid() (e.g. setting up userns uid mappings).
 124                  */
 125                 pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions\n",
 126                         __kuid_val(cred->uid));
 127                 return -EPERM;
 128                 break;
 129         case CAP_SETGID:
 130                 /*
 131                 * If no policy applies to this task, allow the use of CAP_SETGID for
 132                 * other purposes.
 133                 */
 134                 if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = cred->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
 135                         return 0;
 136                 /*
 137                  * Reject use of CAP_SETUID for functionality other than calling
 138                  * set*gid() (e.g. setting up userns gid mappings).
 139                  */
 140                 pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETGID, which is not available to GID %u for operations besides approved set*gid transitions\n",
 141                         __kuid_val(cred->uid));
 142                 return -EPERM;
 143                 break;
 144         default:
 145                 /* Error, the only capabilities were checking for is CAP_SETUID/GID */
 146                 return 0;
 147                 break;
 148         }
 149         return 0;
 150 }
 151
 152 /*
 153  * Check whether a caller with old credentials @old is allowed to switch to
 154  * credentials that contain @new_id.
 155  */
 156 static bool id_permitted_for_cred(const struct cred *old, kid_t new_id, enum setid_type new_type)
 157 {
 158         bool permitted;
 159
 160         /* If our old creds already had this ID in it, it's fine. */
 161         if (new_type == UID) {
 162                 if (uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->uid) || uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->euid) ||
 163                         uid_eq(new_id.uid, old->suid))
 164                         return true;
 165         } else if (new_type == GID){
 166                 if (gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->gid) || gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->egid) ||
 167                         gid_eq(new_id.gid, old->sgid))
 168                         return true;
 169         } else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
 170                 return false;
 171
 172         /*
 173          * Transitions to new UIDs require a check against the policy of the old
 174          * RUID.
 175          */
 176         permitted =
 177             setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, new_id, new_type) != SIDPOL_CONSTRAINED;
 178
 179         if (!permitted) {
 180                 if (new_type == UID) {
 181                         pr_warn("UID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
 182                                 __kuid_val(old->uid), __kuid_val(old->euid),
 183                                 __kuid_val(old->suid), __kuid_val(new_id.uid));
 184                 } else if (new_type == GID) {
 185                         pr_warn("GID transition ((%d,%d,%d) -> %d) blocked\n",
 186                                 __kgid_val(old->gid), __kgid_val(old->egid),
 187                                 __kgid_val(old->sgid), __kgid_val(new_id.gid));
 188                 } else /* Error, new_type is an invalid type */
 189                         return false;
 190         }
 191         return permitted;
 192 }
 193
 194 /*
 195  * Check whether there is either an exception for user under old cred struct to
 196  * set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by
 197  * Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID.
 198  */
 199 static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
 200                                      const struct cred *old,
 201                                      int flags)
 202 {
 203
 204         /* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for our old RUID. */
 205         if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.uid = old->uid}, INVALID_ID, UID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
 206                 return 0;
 207
 208         if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->uid}, UID) &&
 209             id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->euid}, UID) &&
 210             id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->suid}, UID) &&
 211             id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.uid = new->fsuid}, UID))
 212                 return 0;
 213
 214         /*
 215          * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
 216          * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
 217          * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
 218          */
 219         force_sig(SIGKILL);
 220         return -EACCES;
 221 }
 222
 223 static int safesetid_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new,
 224                                      const struct cred *old,
 225                                      int flags)
 226 {
 227
 228         /* Do nothing if there are no setgid restrictions for our old RGID. */
 229         if (setid_policy_lookup((kid_t){.gid = old->gid}, INVALID_ID, GID) == SIDPOL_DEFAULT)
 230                 return 0;
 231
 232         if (id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->gid}, GID) &&
 233             id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->egid}, GID) &&
 234             id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->sgid}, GID) &&
 235             id_permitted_for_cred(old, (kid_t){.gid = new->fsgid}, GID))
 236                 return 0;
 237
 238         /*
 239          * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
 240          * that could arise from a missing allowlist entry preventing a
 241          * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
 242          */
 243         force_sig(SIGKILL);
 244         return -EACCES;
 245 }
 246
 247 static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
 248         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
 249         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
 250         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
 251 };
 252
 253 static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
 254 {
 255         security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
 256                            ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
 257
 258         /* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
 259         safesetid_initialized = 1;
 260
 261         return 0;
 262 }
 263
 264 DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = {
 265         .init = safesetid_security_init,
 266         .name = "safesetid",
 267 };