1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
4 * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc.
5 * Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz>
6 * Copyright 2007-2008 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
7 * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
8 * Copyright 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
9 * Copyright 2018-2020 Intel Corporation
12 #include <linux/if_ether.h>
13 #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
16 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
17 #include <linux/slab.h>
18 #include <linux/export.h>
19 #include <net/mac80211.h>
20 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
21 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
22 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
23 #include "driver-ops.h"
24 #include "debugfs_key.h"
32 * DOC: Key handling basics
34 * Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data)
35 * keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface,
36 * each station key also belongs to that interface.
38 * Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms
39 * that are implemented in software, for each key the hardware is asked
40 * to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is
41 * simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm
42 * that isn't implemented in software).
43 * There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW
44 * or HW except by looking into debugfs.
46 * All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all
47 * other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure
48 * references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are
49 * unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware
50 * acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must
51 * remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period.
54 static const u8 bcast_addr
[ETH_ALEN
] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF };
56 static void assert_key_lock(struct ieee80211_local
*local
)
58 lockdep_assert_held(&local
->key_mtx
);
62 update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
, int delta
)
64 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*vlan
;
66 if (sdata
->vif
.type
!= NL80211_IFTYPE_AP
)
69 /* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is protected by this */
70 assert_key_lock(sdata
->local
);
74 list_for_each_entry_rcu(vlan
, &sdata
->u
.ap
.vlans
, u
.vlan
.list
)
75 vlan
->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
+= delta
;
80 static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
)
83 * When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom
84 * for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race
85 * cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one:
87 * 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before
88 * the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off.
90 * 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but
91 * just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks
94 * In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for
95 * tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c)
97 * Solution has been explained at
98 * http://mid.gmane.org/1308590980.4322.19.camel@jlt3.sipsolutions.net
101 assert_key_lock(sdata
->local
);
103 update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata
, 1);
105 if (!sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
++) {
107 * Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no
108 * encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1.
114 static void decrease_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
,
117 assert_key_lock(sdata
->local
);
119 WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
< delta
);
121 update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata
, -delta
);
122 sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
-= delta
;
125 static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key
*key
)
127 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
= key
->sdata
;
128 struct sta_info
*sta
;
129 int ret
= -EOPNOTSUPP
;
133 if (key
->flags
& KEY_FLAG_TAINTED
) {
134 /* If we get here, it's during resume and the key is
135 * tainted so shouldn't be used/programmed any more.
136 * However, its flags may still indicate that it was
137 * programmed into the device (since we're in resume)
138 * so clear that flag now to avoid trying to remove
141 if (key
->flags
& KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE
&&
142 !(key
->conf
.flags
& (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC
|
143 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE
|
144 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM
)))
145 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata
);
147 key
->flags
&= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE
;
151 if (!key
->local
->ops
->set_key
)
152 goto out_unsupported
;
154 assert_key_lock(key
->local
);
159 * If this is a per-STA GTK, check if it
160 * is supported; if not, return.
162 if (sta
&& !(key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
) &&
163 !ieee80211_hw_check(&key
->local
->hw
, SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK
))
164 goto out_unsupported
;
166 if (sta
&& !sta
->uploaded
)
167 goto out_unsupported
;
169 if (sdata
->vif
.type
== NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN
) {
171 * The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces.
172 * Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver.
174 if (!(key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
)) {
176 goto out_unsupported
;
180 /* TKIP countermeasures don't work in encap offload mode */
181 if (key
->conf
.cipher
== WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP
&&
182 sdata
->hw_80211_encap
) {
183 sdata_dbg(sdata
, "TKIP is not allowed in hw 80211 encap mode\n");
187 ret
= drv_set_key(key
->local
, SET_KEY
, sdata
,
188 sta
? &sta
->sta
: NULL
, &key
->conf
);
191 key
->flags
|= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE
;
193 if (!(key
->conf
.flags
& (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC
|
194 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE
|
195 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM
)))
196 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata
, 1);
198 WARN_ON((key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE
) &&
199 (key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV
));
201 WARN_ON((key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE
) &&
202 (key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC
));
207 if (ret
!= -ENOSPC
&& ret
!= -EOPNOTSUPP
&& ret
!= 1)
209 "failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n",
211 sta
? sta
->sta
.addr
: bcast_addr
, ret
);
214 switch (key
->conf
.cipher
) {
215 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40
:
216 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104
:
217 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP
:
218 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP
:
219 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256
:
220 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP
:
221 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256
:
222 /* We cannot do software crypto of data frames with
223 * encapsulation offload enabled. However for 802.11w to
224 * function properly we need cmac/gmac keys.
226 if (sdata
->hw_80211_encap
)
230 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC
:
231 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256
:
232 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128
:
233 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256
:
234 /* all of these we can do in software - if driver can */
237 if (ieee80211_hw_check(&key
->local
->hw
, SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL
))
245 static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key
*key
)
247 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
;
248 struct sta_info
*sta
;
253 if (!key
|| !key
->local
->ops
->set_key
)
256 assert_key_lock(key
->local
);
258 if (!(key
->flags
& KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE
))
264 if (!(key
->conf
.flags
& (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC
|
265 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE
|
266 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM
)))
267 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata
);
269 key
->flags
&= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE
;
270 ret
= drv_set_key(key
->local
, DISABLE_KEY
, sdata
,
271 sta
? &sta
->sta
: NULL
, &key
->conf
);
275 "failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n",
277 sta
? sta
->sta
.addr
: bcast_addr
, ret
);
280 static int _ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key
*key
, bool force
)
282 struct sta_info
*sta
= key
->sta
;
283 struct ieee80211_local
*local
= key
->local
;
285 assert_key_lock(local
);
287 set_sta_flag(sta
, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION
);
289 sta
->ptk_idx
= key
->conf
.keyidx
;
291 if (force
|| !ieee80211_hw_check(&local
->hw
, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT
))
292 clear_sta_flag(sta
, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA
);
293 ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta
);
298 int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key
*key
)
300 return _ieee80211_set_tx_key(key
, false);
303 static void ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(struct ieee80211_key
*old
,
304 struct ieee80211_key
*new)
306 struct ieee80211_local
*local
= new->local
;
307 struct sta_info
*sta
= new->sta
;
310 assert_key_lock(local
);
312 if (new->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX
) {
313 /* Extended Key ID key install, initial one or rekey */
315 if (sta
->ptk_idx
!= INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX
&&
316 !ieee80211_hw_check(&local
->hw
, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT
)) {
317 /* Aggregation Sessions with Extended Key ID must not
318 * mix MPDUs with different keyIDs within one A-MPDU.
319 * Tear down running Tx aggregation sessions and block
320 * new Rx/Tx aggregation requests during rekey to
321 * ensure there are no A-MPDUs when the driver is not
322 * supporting A-MPDU key borders. (Blocking Tx only
323 * would be sufficient but WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA gets the
324 * job done for the few ms we need it.)
326 set_sta_flag(sta
, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA
);
327 mutex_lock(&sta
->ampdu_mlme
.mtx
);
328 for (i
= 0; i
< IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
; i
++)
329 ___ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_session(sta
, i
,
330 AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST
);
331 mutex_unlock(&sta
->ampdu_mlme
.mtx
);
334 /* Rekey without Extended Key ID.
335 * Aggregation sessions are OK when running on SW crypto.
336 * A broken remote STA may cause issues not observed with HW
339 if (!(old
->flags
& KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE
))
342 /* Stop Tx till we are on the new key */
343 old
->flags
|= KEY_FLAG_TAINTED
;
344 ieee80211_clear_fast_xmit(sta
);
345 if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local
->hw
, AMPDU_AGGREGATION
)) {
346 set_sta_flag(sta
, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA
);
347 ieee80211_sta_tear_down_BA_sessions(sta
,
348 AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST
);
350 if (!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(local
->hw
.wiphy
,
351 NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0
)) {
352 pr_warn_ratelimited("Rekeying PTK for STA %pM but driver can't safely do that.",
354 /* Flushing the driver queues *may* help prevent
355 * the clear text leaks and freezes.
357 ieee80211_flush_queues(local
, old
->sdata
, false);
362 static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
,
363 int idx
, bool uni
, bool multi
)
365 struct ieee80211_key
*key
= NULL
;
367 assert_key_lock(sdata
->local
);
369 if (idx
>= 0 && idx
< NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS
)
370 key
= key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
, sdata
->keys
[idx
]);
373 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata
->default_unicast_key
, key
);
374 ieee80211_check_fast_xmit_iface(sdata
);
375 if (sdata
->vif
.type
!= NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN
)
376 drv_set_default_unicast_key(sdata
->local
, sdata
, idx
);
380 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata
->default_multicast_key
, key
);
382 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata
);
385 void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
, int idx
,
386 bool uni
, bool multi
)
388 mutex_lock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
389 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata
, idx
, uni
, multi
);
390 mutex_unlock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
394 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
, int idx
)
396 struct ieee80211_key
*key
= NULL
;
398 assert_key_lock(sdata
->local
);
400 if (idx
>= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS
&&
401 idx
< NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS
+ NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS
)
402 key
= key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
, sdata
->keys
[idx
]);
404 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata
->default_mgmt_key
, key
);
406 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata
);
409 void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
,
412 mutex_lock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
413 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata
, idx
);
414 mutex_unlock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
418 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
, int idx
)
420 struct ieee80211_key
*key
= NULL
;
422 assert_key_lock(sdata
->local
);
424 if (idx
>= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS
+ NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS
&&
425 idx
< NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS
+ NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS
+
426 NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS
)
427 key
= key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
, sdata
->keys
[idx
]);
429 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata
->default_beacon_key
, key
);
431 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata
);
434 void ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
,
437 mutex_lock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
438 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata
, idx
);
439 mutex_unlock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
442 static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
,
443 struct sta_info
*sta
,
445 struct ieee80211_key
*old
,
446 struct ieee80211_key
*new)
450 bool defunikey
, defmultikey
, defmgmtkey
, defbeaconkey
;
452 /* caller must provide at least one old/new */
453 if (WARN_ON(!new && !old
))
457 list_add_tail_rcu(&new->list
, &sdata
->key_list
);
459 WARN_ON(new && old
&& new->conf
.keyidx
!= old
->conf
.keyidx
);
461 if (new && sta
&& pairwise
) {
462 /* Unicast rekey needs special handling. With Extended Key ID
463 * old is still NULL for the first rekey.
465 ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(old
, new);
469 idx
= old
->conf
.keyidx
;
471 if (old
->flags
& KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE
) {
472 ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(old
);
475 ret
= ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new);
478 /* new must be provided in case old is not */
479 idx
= new->conf
.keyidx
;
480 if (!new->local
->wowlan
)
481 ret
= ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new);
489 rcu_assign_pointer(sta
->ptk
[idx
], new);
491 !(new->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX
))
492 _ieee80211_set_tx_key(new, true);
494 rcu_assign_pointer(sta
->gtk
[idx
], new);
496 /* Only needed for transition from no key -> key.
497 * Still triggers unnecessary when using Extended Key ID
498 * and installing the second key ID the first time.
501 ieee80211_check_fast_rx(sta
);
504 old
== key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
,
505 sdata
->default_unicast_key
);
507 old
== key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
,
508 sdata
->default_multicast_key
);
510 old
== key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
,
511 sdata
->default_mgmt_key
);
512 defbeaconkey
= old
&&
513 old
== key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
,
514 sdata
->default_beacon_key
);
516 if (defunikey
&& !new)
517 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata
, -1, true, false);
518 if (defmultikey
&& !new)
519 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata
, -1, false, true);
520 if (defmgmtkey
&& !new)
521 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata
, -1);
522 if (defbeaconkey
&& !new)
523 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata
, -1);
525 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata
->keys
[idx
], new);
526 if (defunikey
&& new)
527 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata
, new->conf
.keyidx
,
529 if (defmultikey
&& new)
530 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata
, new->conf
.keyidx
,
532 if (defmgmtkey
&& new)
533 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata
,
535 if (defbeaconkey
&& new)
536 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata
,
541 list_del_rcu(&old
->list
);
546 struct ieee80211_key
*
547 ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher
, int idx
, size_t key_len
,
549 size_t seq_len
, const u8
*seq
,
550 const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme
*cs
)
552 struct ieee80211_key
*key
;
555 if (WARN_ON(idx
< 0 ||
556 idx
>= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS
+ NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS
+
557 NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS
))
558 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL
);
560 key
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ieee80211_key
) + key_len
, GFP_KERNEL
);
562 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM
);
565 * Default to software encryption; we'll later upload the
566 * key to the hardware if possible.
571 key
->conf
.cipher
= cipher
;
572 key
->conf
.keyidx
= idx
;
573 key
->conf
.keylen
= key_len
;
575 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40
:
576 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104
:
577 key
->conf
.iv_len
= IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN
;
578 key
->conf
.icv_len
= IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN
;
580 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP
:
581 key
->conf
.iv_len
= IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN
;
582 key
->conf
.icv_len
= IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN
;
584 for (i
= 0; i
< IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
; i
++) {
585 key
->u
.tkip
.rx
[i
].iv32
=
586 get_unaligned_le32(&seq
[2]);
587 key
->u
.tkip
.rx
[i
].iv16
=
588 get_unaligned_le16(seq
);
591 spin_lock_init(&key
->u
.tkip
.txlock
);
593 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP
:
594 key
->conf
.iv_len
= IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN
;
595 key
->conf
.icv_len
= IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN
;
597 for (i
= 0; i
< IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
+ 1; i
++)
598 for (j
= 0; j
< IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN
; j
++)
599 key
->u
.ccmp
.rx_pn
[i
][j
] =
600 seq
[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN
- j
- 1];
603 * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
604 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
606 key
->u
.ccmp
.tfm
= ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(
607 key_data
, key_len
, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN
);
608 if (IS_ERR(key
->u
.ccmp
.tfm
)) {
609 err
= PTR_ERR(key
->u
.ccmp
.tfm
);
614 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256
:
615 key
->conf
.iv_len
= IEEE80211_CCMP_256_HDR_LEN
;
616 key
->conf
.icv_len
= IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN
;
617 for (i
= 0; seq
&& i
< IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
+ 1; i
++)
618 for (j
= 0; j
< IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN
; j
++)
619 key
->u
.ccmp
.rx_pn
[i
][j
] =
620 seq
[IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN
- j
- 1];
621 /* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
622 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
624 key
->u
.ccmp
.tfm
= ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(
625 key_data
, key_len
, IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN
);
626 if (IS_ERR(key
->u
.ccmp
.tfm
)) {
627 err
= PTR_ERR(key
->u
.ccmp
.tfm
);
632 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC
:
633 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256
:
634 key
->conf
.iv_len
= 0;
635 if (cipher
== WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC
)
636 key
->conf
.icv_len
= sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie
);
638 key
->conf
.icv_len
= sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16
);
640 for (j
= 0; j
< IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN
; j
++)
641 key
->u
.aes_cmac
.rx_pn
[j
] =
642 seq
[IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN
- j
- 1];
644 * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
645 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
647 key
->u
.aes_cmac
.tfm
=
648 ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(key_data
, key_len
);
649 if (IS_ERR(key
->u
.aes_cmac
.tfm
)) {
650 err
= PTR_ERR(key
->u
.aes_cmac
.tfm
);
655 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128
:
656 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256
:
657 key
->conf
.iv_len
= 0;
658 key
->conf
.icv_len
= sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16
);
660 for (j
= 0; j
< IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN
; j
++)
661 key
->u
.aes_gmac
.rx_pn
[j
] =
662 seq
[IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN
- j
- 1];
663 /* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
664 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
666 key
->u
.aes_gmac
.tfm
=
667 ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(key_data
, key_len
);
668 if (IS_ERR(key
->u
.aes_gmac
.tfm
)) {
669 err
= PTR_ERR(key
->u
.aes_gmac
.tfm
);
674 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP
:
675 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256
:
676 key
->conf
.iv_len
= IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN
;
677 key
->conf
.icv_len
= IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN
;
678 for (i
= 0; seq
&& i
< IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
+ 1; i
++)
679 for (j
= 0; j
< IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN
; j
++)
680 key
->u
.gcmp
.rx_pn
[i
][j
] =
681 seq
[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN
- j
- 1];
682 /* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
683 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
685 key
->u
.gcmp
.tfm
= ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(key_data
,
687 if (IS_ERR(key
->u
.gcmp
.tfm
)) {
688 err
= PTR_ERR(key
->u
.gcmp
.tfm
);
695 if (seq_len
&& seq_len
!= cs
->pn_len
) {
697 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL
);
700 key
->conf
.iv_len
= cs
->hdr_len
;
701 key
->conf
.icv_len
= cs
->mic_len
;
702 for (i
= 0; i
< IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
+ 1; i
++)
703 for (j
= 0; j
< seq_len
; j
++)
704 key
->u
.gen
.rx_pn
[i
][j
] =
705 seq
[seq_len
- j
- 1];
706 key
->flags
|= KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME
;
709 memcpy(key
->conf
.key
, key_data
, key_len
);
710 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key
->list
);
715 static void ieee80211_key_free_common(struct ieee80211_key
*key
)
717 switch (key
->conf
.cipher
) {
718 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP
:
719 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256
:
720 ieee80211_aes_key_free(key
->u
.ccmp
.tfm
);
722 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC
:
723 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256
:
724 ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key
->u
.aes_cmac
.tfm
);
726 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128
:
727 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256
:
728 ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(key
->u
.aes_gmac
.tfm
);
730 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP
:
731 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256
:
732 ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(key
->u
.gcmp
.tfm
);
738 static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key
*key
,
742 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
= key
->sdata
;
744 ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key
);
746 if (delay_tailroom
) {
747 /* see ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec */
748 sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
++;
749 schedule_delayed_work(&sdata
->dec_tailroom_needed_wk
,
752 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata
, 1);
756 ieee80211_key_free_common(key
);
759 static void ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key
*key
,
766 * Synchronize so the TX path and rcu key iterators
767 * can no longer be using this key before we free/remove it.
771 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key
, delay_tailroom
);
774 void ieee80211_key_free_unused(struct ieee80211_key
*key
)
776 WARN_ON(key
->sdata
|| key
->local
);
777 ieee80211_key_free_common(key
);
780 static bool ieee80211_key_identical(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
,
781 struct ieee80211_key
*old
,
782 struct ieee80211_key
*new)
784 u8 tkip_old
[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP
], tkip_new
[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP
];
787 if (!old
|| new->conf
.keylen
!= old
->conf
.keylen
)
790 tk_old
= old
->conf
.key
;
791 tk_new
= new->conf
.key
;
794 * In station mode, don't compare the TX MIC key, as it's never used
795 * and offloaded rekeying may not care to send it to the host. This
796 * is the case in iwlwifi, for example.
798 if (sdata
->vif
.type
== NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION
&&
799 new->conf
.cipher
== WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP
&&
800 new->conf
.keylen
== WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP
&&
801 !(new->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
)) {
802 memcpy(tkip_old
, tk_old
, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP
);
803 memcpy(tkip_new
, tk_new
, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP
);
804 memset(tkip_old
+ NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY
, 0, 8);
805 memset(tkip_new
+ NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY
, 0, 8);
810 return !crypto_memneq(tk_old
, tk_new
, new->conf
.keylen
);
813 int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key
*key
,
814 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
,
815 struct sta_info
*sta
)
817 struct ieee80211_key
*old_key
;
818 int idx
= key
->conf
.keyidx
;
819 bool pairwise
= key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
;
821 * We want to delay tailroom updates only for station - in that
822 * case it helps roaming speed, but in other cases it hurts and
823 * can cause warnings to appear.
825 bool delay_tailroom
= sdata
->vif
.type
== NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION
;
826 int ret
= -EOPNOTSUPP
;
828 mutex_lock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
830 if (sta
&& pairwise
) {
831 struct ieee80211_key
*alt_key
;
833 old_key
= key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
, sta
->ptk
[idx
]);
834 alt_key
= key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
, sta
->ptk
[idx
^ 1]);
836 /* The rekey code assumes that the old and new key are using
837 * the same cipher. Enforce the assumption for pairwise keys.
839 if ((alt_key
&& alt_key
->conf
.cipher
!= key
->conf
.cipher
) ||
840 (old_key
&& old_key
->conf
.cipher
!= key
->conf
.cipher
))
843 old_key
= key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
, sta
->gtk
[idx
]);
845 old_key
= key_mtx_dereference(sdata
->local
, sdata
->keys
[idx
]);
848 /* Non-pairwise keys must also not switch the cipher on rekey */
850 if (old_key
&& old_key
->conf
.cipher
!= key
->conf
.cipher
)
855 * Silently accept key re-installation without really installing the
856 * new version of the key to avoid nonce reuse or replay issues.
858 if (ieee80211_key_identical(sdata
, old_key
, key
)) {
859 ieee80211_key_free_unused(key
);
864 key
->local
= sdata
->local
;
868 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata
);
870 ret
= ieee80211_key_replace(sdata
, sta
, pairwise
, old_key
, key
);
873 ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key
);
874 ieee80211_key_destroy(old_key
, delay_tailroom
);
876 ieee80211_key_free(key
, delay_tailroom
);
880 mutex_unlock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
885 void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key
*key
, bool delay_tailroom
)
891 * Replace key with nothingness if it was ever used.
894 ieee80211_key_replace(key
->sdata
, key
->sta
,
895 key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
,
897 ieee80211_key_destroy(key
, delay_tailroom
);
900 void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
)
902 struct ieee80211_key
*key
;
903 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*vlan
;
907 mutex_lock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
909 sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
= 0;
910 sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
= 0;
912 if (sdata
->vif
.type
== NL80211_IFTYPE_AP
) {
913 list_for_each_entry(vlan
, &sdata
->u
.ap
.vlans
, u
.vlan
.list
) {
914 vlan
->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
= 0;
915 vlan
->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
= 0;
919 if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata
)) {
920 list_for_each_entry(key
, &sdata
->key_list
, list
) {
921 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata
);
922 ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key
);
926 mutex_unlock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
929 void ieee80211_iter_keys(struct ieee80211_hw
*hw
,
930 struct ieee80211_vif
*vif
,
931 void (*iter
)(struct ieee80211_hw
*hw
,
932 struct ieee80211_vif
*vif
,
933 struct ieee80211_sta
*sta
,
934 struct ieee80211_key_conf
*key
,
938 struct ieee80211_local
*local
= hw_to_local(hw
);
939 struct ieee80211_key
*key
, *tmp
;
940 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
;
944 mutex_lock(&local
->key_mtx
);
946 sdata
= vif_to_sdata(vif
);
947 list_for_each_entry_safe(key
, tmp
, &sdata
->key_list
, list
)
948 iter(hw
, &sdata
->vif
,
949 key
->sta
? &key
->sta
->sta
: NULL
,
950 &key
->conf
, iter_data
);
952 list_for_each_entry(sdata
, &local
->interfaces
, list
)
953 list_for_each_entry_safe(key
, tmp
,
954 &sdata
->key_list
, list
)
955 iter(hw
, &sdata
->vif
,
956 key
->sta
? &key
->sta
->sta
: NULL
,
957 &key
->conf
, iter_data
);
959 mutex_unlock(&local
->key_mtx
);
961 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys
);
964 _ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw
*hw
,
965 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
,
966 void (*iter
)(struct ieee80211_hw
*hw
,
967 struct ieee80211_vif
*vif
,
968 struct ieee80211_sta
*sta
,
969 struct ieee80211_key_conf
*key
,
973 struct ieee80211_key
*key
;
975 list_for_each_entry_rcu(key
, &sdata
->key_list
, list
) {
976 /* skip keys of station in removal process */
977 if (key
->sta
&& key
->sta
->removed
)
979 if (!(key
->flags
& KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE
))
982 iter(hw
, &sdata
->vif
,
983 key
->sta
? &key
->sta
->sta
: NULL
,
984 &key
->conf
, iter_data
);
988 void ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw
*hw
,
989 struct ieee80211_vif
*vif
,
990 void (*iter
)(struct ieee80211_hw
*hw
,
991 struct ieee80211_vif
*vif
,
992 struct ieee80211_sta
*sta
,
993 struct ieee80211_key_conf
*key
,
997 struct ieee80211_local
*local
= hw_to_local(hw
);
998 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
;
1001 sdata
= vif_to_sdata(vif
);
1002 _ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw
, sdata
, iter
, iter_data
);
1004 list_for_each_entry_rcu(sdata
, &local
->interfaces
, list
)
1005 _ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw
, sdata
, iter
, iter_data
);
1008 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu
);
1010 static void ieee80211_free_keys_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
,
1011 struct list_head
*keys
)
1013 struct ieee80211_key
*key
, *tmp
;
1015 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata
,
1016 sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
);
1017 sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
= 0;
1019 ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_mgmt_default(sdata
);
1020 ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_beacon_default(sdata
);
1022 list_for_each_entry_safe(key
, tmp
, &sdata
->key_list
, list
) {
1023 ieee80211_key_replace(key
->sdata
, key
->sta
,
1024 key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
,
1026 list_add_tail(&key
->list
, keys
);
1029 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata
);
1032 void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
,
1033 bool force_synchronize
)
1035 struct ieee80211_local
*local
= sdata
->local
;
1036 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*vlan
;
1037 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*master
;
1038 struct ieee80211_key
*key
, *tmp
;
1041 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&sdata
->dec_tailroom_needed_wk
);
1043 mutex_lock(&local
->key_mtx
);
1045 ieee80211_free_keys_iface(sdata
, &keys
);
1047 if (sdata
->vif
.type
== NL80211_IFTYPE_AP
) {
1048 list_for_each_entry(vlan
, &sdata
->u
.ap
.vlans
, u
.vlan
.list
)
1049 ieee80211_free_keys_iface(vlan
, &keys
);
1052 if (!list_empty(&keys
) || force_synchronize
)
1054 list_for_each_entry_safe(key
, tmp
, &keys
, list
)
1055 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key
, false);
1057 if (sdata
->vif
.type
== NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN
) {
1059 master
= container_of(sdata
->bss
,
1060 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
,
1063 WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
!=
1064 master
->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
);
1067 WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
||
1068 sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
);
1071 if (sdata
->vif
.type
== NL80211_IFTYPE_AP
) {
1072 list_for_each_entry(vlan
, &sdata
->u
.ap
.vlans
, u
.vlan
.list
)
1073 WARN_ON_ONCE(vlan
->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt
||
1074 vlan
->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
);
1077 mutex_unlock(&local
->key_mtx
);
1080 void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local
*local
,
1081 struct sta_info
*sta
)
1083 struct ieee80211_key
*key
;
1086 mutex_lock(&local
->key_mtx
);
1087 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(sta
->gtk
); i
++) {
1088 key
= key_mtx_dereference(local
, sta
->gtk
[i
]);
1091 ieee80211_key_replace(key
->sdata
, key
->sta
,
1092 key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
,
1094 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key
, key
->sdata
->vif
.type
==
1095 NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION
);
1098 for (i
= 0; i
< NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS
; i
++) {
1099 key
= key_mtx_dereference(local
, sta
->ptk
[i
]);
1102 ieee80211_key_replace(key
->sdata
, key
->sta
,
1103 key
->conf
.flags
& IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE
,
1105 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key
, key
->sdata
->vif
.type
==
1106 NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION
);
1109 mutex_unlock(&local
->key_mtx
);
1112 void ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(struct work_struct
*wk
)
1114 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
;
1116 sdata
= container_of(wk
, struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
,
1117 dec_tailroom_needed_wk
.work
);
1120 * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to
1121 * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted
1122 * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the
1123 * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes
1124 * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this
1125 * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on
1126 * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than
1127 * zero and no 0->1 transition happens.
1129 * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys
1130 * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no
1131 * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case
1132 * within an ESS this usually won't happen.
1135 mutex_lock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
1136 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata
,
1137 sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
);
1138 sdata
->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
= 0;
1139 mutex_unlock(&sdata
->local
->key_mtx
);
1142 void ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(struct ieee80211_vif
*vif
, const u8
*bssid
,
1143 const u8
*replay_ctr
, gfp_t gfp
)
1145 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
= vif_to_sdata(vif
);
1147 trace_api_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata
, bssid
, replay_ctr
);
1149 cfg80211_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata
->dev
, bssid
, replay_ctr
, gfp
);
1151 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify
);
1153 void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf
*keyconf
,
1154 int tid
, struct ieee80211_key_seq
*seq
)
1156 struct ieee80211_key
*key
;
1159 key
= container_of(keyconf
, struct ieee80211_key
, conf
);
1161 switch (key
->conf
.cipher
) {
1162 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP
:
1163 if (WARN_ON(tid
< 0 || tid
>= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
))
1165 seq
->tkip
.iv32
= key
->u
.tkip
.rx
[tid
].iv32
;
1166 seq
->tkip
.iv16
= key
->u
.tkip
.rx
[tid
].iv16
;
1168 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP
:
1169 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256
:
1170 if (WARN_ON(tid
< -1 || tid
>= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
))
1173 pn
= key
->u
.ccmp
.rx_pn
[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
];
1175 pn
= key
->u
.ccmp
.rx_pn
[tid
];
1176 memcpy(seq
->ccmp
.pn
, pn
, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN
);
1178 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC
:
1179 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256
:
1180 if (WARN_ON(tid
!= 0))
1182 pn
= key
->u
.aes_cmac
.rx_pn
;
1183 memcpy(seq
->aes_cmac
.pn
, pn
, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN
);
1185 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128
:
1186 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256
:
1187 if (WARN_ON(tid
!= 0))
1189 pn
= key
->u
.aes_gmac
.rx_pn
;
1190 memcpy(seq
->aes_gmac
.pn
, pn
, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN
);
1192 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP
:
1193 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256
:
1194 if (WARN_ON(tid
< -1 || tid
>= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
))
1197 pn
= key
->u
.gcmp
.rx_pn
[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
];
1199 pn
= key
->u
.gcmp
.rx_pn
[tid
];
1200 memcpy(seq
->gcmp
.pn
, pn
, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN
);
1204 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq
);
1206 void ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf
*keyconf
,
1207 int tid
, struct ieee80211_key_seq
*seq
)
1209 struct ieee80211_key
*key
;
1212 key
= container_of(keyconf
, struct ieee80211_key
, conf
);
1214 switch (key
->conf
.cipher
) {
1215 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP
:
1216 if (WARN_ON(tid
< 0 || tid
>= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
))
1218 key
->u
.tkip
.rx
[tid
].iv32
= seq
->tkip
.iv32
;
1219 key
->u
.tkip
.rx
[tid
].iv16
= seq
->tkip
.iv16
;
1221 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP
:
1222 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256
:
1223 if (WARN_ON(tid
< -1 || tid
>= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
))
1226 pn
= key
->u
.ccmp
.rx_pn
[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
];
1228 pn
= key
->u
.ccmp
.rx_pn
[tid
];
1229 memcpy(pn
, seq
->ccmp
.pn
, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN
);
1231 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC
:
1232 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256
:
1233 if (WARN_ON(tid
!= 0))
1235 pn
= key
->u
.aes_cmac
.rx_pn
;
1236 memcpy(pn
, seq
->aes_cmac
.pn
, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN
);
1238 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128
:
1239 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256
:
1240 if (WARN_ON(tid
!= 0))
1242 pn
= key
->u
.aes_gmac
.rx_pn
;
1243 memcpy(pn
, seq
->aes_gmac
.pn
, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN
);
1245 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP
:
1246 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256
:
1247 if (WARN_ON(tid
< -1 || tid
>= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
))
1250 pn
= key
->u
.gcmp
.rx_pn
[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS
];
1252 pn
= key
->u
.gcmp
.rx_pn
[tid
];
1253 memcpy(pn
, seq
->gcmp
.pn
, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN
);
1260 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq
);
1262 void ieee80211_remove_key(struct ieee80211_key_conf
*keyconf
)
1264 struct ieee80211_key
*key
;
1266 key
= container_of(keyconf
, struct ieee80211_key
, conf
);
1268 assert_key_lock(key
->local
);
1271 * if key was uploaded, we assume the driver will/has remove(d)
1272 * it, so adjust bookkeeping accordingly
1274 if (key
->flags
& KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE
) {
1275 key
->flags
&= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE
;
1277 if (!(key
->conf
.flags
& (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC
|
1278 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE
|
1279 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM
)))
1280 increment_tailroom_need_count(key
->sdata
);
1283 ieee80211_key_free(key
, false);
1285 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_remove_key
);
1287 struct ieee80211_key_conf
*
1288 ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(struct ieee80211_vif
*vif
,
1289 struct ieee80211_key_conf
*keyconf
)
1291 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data
*sdata
= vif_to_sdata(vif
);
1292 struct ieee80211_local
*local
= sdata
->local
;
1293 struct ieee80211_key
*key
;
1296 if (WARN_ON(!local
->wowlan
))
1297 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL
);
1299 if (WARN_ON(vif
->type
!= NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION
))
1300 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL
);
1302 key
= ieee80211_key_alloc(keyconf
->cipher
, keyconf
->keyidx
,
1303 keyconf
->keylen
, keyconf
->key
,
1306 return ERR_CAST(key
);
1308 if (sdata
->u
.mgd
.mfp
!= IEEE80211_MFP_DISABLED
)
1309 key
->conf
.flags
|= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RX_MGMT
;
1311 err
= ieee80211_key_link(key
, sdata
, NULL
);
1313 return ERR_PTR(err
);
1317 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add
);