kernel/capability.c

   1 /*
   2  * linux/kernel/capability.c
   3  *
   4  * Copyright (C) 1997  Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org>
   5  *
   6  * Integrated into 2.1.97+,  Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
   7  * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
   8  */
   9
  10 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
  11
  12 #include <linux/audit.h>
  13 #include <linux/capability.h>
  14 #include <linux/mm.h>
  15 #include <linux/export.h>
  16 #include <linux/security.h>
  17 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  18 #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
  19 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
  20 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
  21
  22 /*
  23  * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
  24  */
  25
  26 const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
  27 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
  28
  29 int file_caps_enabled = 1;
  30
  31 static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
  32 {
  33         file_caps_enabled = 0;
  34         return 1;
  35 }
  36 __setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable);
  37
  38 /*
  39  * More recent versions of libcap are available from:
  40  *
  41  *   http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
  42  */
  43
  44 static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void)
  45 {
  46         char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
  47
  48         pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities (legacy support in use)\n",
  49                      get_task_comm(name, current));
  50 }
  51
  52 /*
  53  * Version 2 capabilities worked fine, but the linux/capability.h file
  54  * that accompanied their introduction encouraged their use without
  55  * the necessary user-space source code changes. As such, we have
  56  * created a version 3 with equivalent functionality to version 2, but
  57  * with a header change to protect legacy source code from using
  58  * version 2 when it wanted to use version 1. If your system has code
  59  * that trips the following warning, it is using version 2 specific
  60  * capabilities and may be doing so insecurely.
  61  *
  62  * The remedy is to either upgrade your version of libcap (to 2.10+,
  63  * if the application is linked against it), or recompile your
  64  * application with modern kernel headers and this warning will go
  65  * away.
  66  */
  67
  68 static void warn_deprecated_v2(void)
  69 {
  70         char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
  71
  72         pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure\n",
  73                      get_task_comm(name, current));
  74 }
  75
  76 /*
  77  * Version check. Return the number of u32s in each capability flag
  78  * array, or a negative value on error.
  79  */
  80 static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy)
  81 {
  82         __u32 version;
  83
  84         if (get_user(version, &header->version))
  85                 return -EFAULT;
  86
  87         switch (version) {
  88         case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
  89                 warn_legacy_capability_use();
  90                 *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
  91                 break;
  92         case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
  93                 warn_deprecated_v2();
  94                 /*
  95                  * fall through - v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2.
  96                  */
  97         case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3:
  98                 *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3;
  99                 break;
 100         default:
 101                 if (put_user((u32)_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
 102                         return -EFAULT;
 103                 return -EINVAL;
 104         }
 105
 106         return 0;
 107 }
 108
 109 /*
 110  * The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current
 111  * process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code
 112  * at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities
 113  * in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of
 114  * locks to when we are reading the caps of another process.
 115  */
 116 static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
 117                                      kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp)
 118 {
 119         int ret;
 120
 121         if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) {
 122                 struct task_struct *target;
 123
 124                 rcu_read_lock();
 125
 126                 target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
 127                 if (!target)
 128                         ret = -ESRCH;
 129                 else
 130                         ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
 131
 132                 rcu_read_unlock();
 133         } else
 134                 ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp);
 135
 136         return ret;
 137 }
 138
 139 /**
 140  * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
 141  * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
 142  *      target pid data
 143  * @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
 144  *      and inheritable capabilities that are returned
 145  *
 146  * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
 147  */
 148 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
 149 {
 150         int ret = 0;
 151         pid_t pid;
 152         unsigned tocopy;
 153         kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
 154
 155         ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
 156         if ((dataptr == NULL) || (ret != 0))
 157                 return ((dataptr == NULL) && (ret == -EINVAL)) ? 0 : ret;
 158
 159         if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
 160                 return -EFAULT;
 161
 162         if (pid < 0)
 163                 return -EINVAL;
 164
 165         ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP);
 166         if (!ret) {
 167                 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
 168                 unsigned i;
 169
 170                 for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
 171                         kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i];
 172                         kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i];
 173                         kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i];
 174                 }
 175
 176                 /*
 177                  * Note, in the case, tocopy < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S,
 178                  * we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This
 179                  * has the effect of making older libcap
 180                  * implementations implicitly drop upper capability
 181                  * bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset
 182                  * sequence.
 183                  *
 184                  * This behavior is considered fail-safe
 185                  * behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer
 186                  * version of libcap will enable access to the newer
 187                  * capabilities.
 188                  *
 189                  * An alternative would be to return an error here
 190                  * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to
 191                  * unexpectedly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts
 192                  * before modification is attempted and the application
 193                  * fails.
 194                  */
 195                 if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy
 196                                  * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
 197                         return -EFAULT;
 198                 }
 199         }
 200
 201         return ret;
 202 }
 203
 204 /**
 205  * sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or (*) a group of processes
 206  * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
 207  *      target pid data
 208  * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
 209  *      and inheritable capabilities
 210  *
 211  * Set capabilities for the current process only.  The ability to any other
 212  * process(es) has been deprecated and removed.
 213  *
 214  * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
 215  *
 216  * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
 217  * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
 218  * E: must be set to a subset of new permitted
 219  *
 220  * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
 221  */
 222 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
 223 {
 224         struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
 225         unsigned i, tocopy, copybytes;
 226         kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
 227         struct cred *new;
 228         int ret;
 229         pid_t pid;
 230
 231         ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
 232         if (ret != 0)
 233                 return ret;
 234
 235         if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
 236                 return -EFAULT;
 237
 238         /* may only affect current now */
 239         if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current))
 240                 return -EPERM;
 241
 242         copybytes = tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct);
 243         if (copybytes > sizeof(kdata))
 244                 return -EFAULT;
 245
 246         if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, copybytes))
 247                 return -EFAULT;
 248
 249         for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
 250                 effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
 251                 permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted;
 252                 inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable;
 253         }
 254         while (i < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) {
 255                 effective.cap[i] = 0;
 256                 permitted.cap[i] = 0;
 257                 inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
 258                 i++;
 259         }
 260
 261         effective.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
 262         permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
 263         inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
 264
 265         new = prepare_creds();
 266         if (!new)
 267                 return -ENOMEM;
 268
 269         ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(),
 270                               &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
 271         if (ret < 0)
 272                 goto error;
 273
 274         audit_log_capset(new, current_cred());
 275
 276         return commit_creds(new);
 277
 278 error:
 279         abort_creds(new);
 280         return ret;
 281 }
 282
 283 /**
 284  * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
 285  * @t: The task in question
 286  * @ns: target user namespace
 287  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
 288  *
 289  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
 290  * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
 291  *
 292  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
 293  */
 294 bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
 295                        struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 296 {
 297         int ret;
 298
 299         rcu_read_lock();
 300         ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
 301         rcu_read_unlock();
 302
 303         return (ret == 0);
 304 }
 305
 306 /**
 307  * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
 308  * @t: The task in question
 309  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
 310  *
 311  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
 312  * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
 313  *
 314  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
 315  */
 316 bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 317 {
 318         return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
 319 }
 320
 321 /**
 322  * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
 323  * in a specific user ns.
 324  * @t: The task in question
 325  * @ns: target user namespace
 326  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
 327  *
 328  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
 329  * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
 330  * Do not write an audit message for the check.
 331  *
 332  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
 333  */
 334 bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
 335                                struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 336 {
 337         int ret;
 338
 339         rcu_read_lock();
 340         ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
 341         rcu_read_unlock();
 342
 343         return (ret == 0);
 344 }
 345
 346 /**
 347  * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the
 348  * initial user ns
 349  * @t: The task in question
 350  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
 351  *
 352  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
 353  * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not.  Don't write an
 354  * audit message for the check.
 355  *
 356  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
 357  */
 358 bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 359 {
 360         return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
 361 }
 362
 363 /**
 364  * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
 365  * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
 366  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
 367  *
 368  * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
 369  * available for use, false if not.
 370  *
 371  * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
 372  * assumption that it's about to be used.
 373  */
 374 bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 375 {
 376         if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
 377                 pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
 378                 BUG();
 379         }
 380
 381         if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
 382                 current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
 383                 return true;
 384         }
 385         return false;
 386 }
 387 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
 388
 389 /**
 390  * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect
 391  * @file:  The file we want to check
 392  * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in
 393  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
 394  *
 395  * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect
 396  * when the file was opened.
 397  *
 398  * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not
 399  * actually be privileged.
 400  */
 401 bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns,
 402                      int cap)
 403 {
 404         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap)))
 405                 return false;
 406
 407         if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0)
 408                 return true;
 409
 410         return false;
 411 }
 412 EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable);
 413
 414 /**
 415  * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
 416  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
 417  *
 418  * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
 419  * available for use, false if not.
 420  *
 421  * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
 422  * assumption that it's about to be used.
 423  */
 424 bool capable(int cap)
 425 {
 426         return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
 427 }
 428 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
 429
 430 /**
 431  * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped
 432  * @inode: The inode in question
 433  * @cap: The capability in question
 434  *
 435  * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at
 436  * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
 437  * mapped into the current user namespace.
 438  */
 439 bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
 440 {
 441         struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
 442
 443         return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
 444                 kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
 445 }
 446 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);