dm thin metadata: fix __udivdi3 undefined on 32-bit
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / kernel / cred.c
blobff8606f77d901d4ed1201d35d35feaa5066821e3
1 /* Task credentials management - see Documentation/security/credentials.txt
3 * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
8 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
9 * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
11 #include <linux/export.h>
12 #include <linux/cred.h>
13 #include <linux/slab.h>
14 #include <linux/sched.h>
15 #include <linux/key.h>
16 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
17 #include <linux/init_task.h>
18 #include <linux/security.h>
19 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
20 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
22 #if 0
23 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
24 printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n", \
25 current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__)
26 #else
27 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
28 do { \
29 if (0) \
30 no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n", \
31 current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
32 } while (0)
33 #endif
35 static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
37 /* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
38 struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2) };
41 * The initial credentials for the initial task
43 struct cred init_cred = {
44 .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
45 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
46 .subscribers = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
47 .magic = CRED_MAGIC,
48 #endif
49 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
50 .gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
51 .suid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
52 .sgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
53 .euid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
54 .egid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
55 .fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
56 .fsgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
57 .securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
58 .cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET,
59 .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET,
60 .cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET,
61 .cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET,
62 .user = INIT_USER,
63 .user_ns = &init_user_ns,
64 .group_info = &init_groups,
67 static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
69 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
70 atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
71 #endif
74 static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred)
76 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
77 return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers);
78 #else
79 return 0;
80 #endif
83 static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
85 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
86 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
88 atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers);
89 #endif
93 * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials
95 static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
97 struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
99 kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
102 if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD ||
103 atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 ||
104 read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0)
105 panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with"
106 " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n",
107 cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr,
108 atomic_read(&cred->usage),
109 read_cred_subscribers(cred));
110 #else
111 if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
112 panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
113 cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
114 #endif
116 security_cred_free(cred);
117 key_put(cred->session_keyring);
118 key_put(cred->process_keyring);
119 key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
120 key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
121 if (cred->group_info)
122 put_group_info(cred->group_info);
123 free_uid(cred->user);
124 put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
125 kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred);
129 * __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials
130 * @cred: The record to release
132 * Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain.
134 void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
136 kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
137 atomic_read(&cred->usage),
138 read_cred_subscribers(cred));
140 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
141 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
142 BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
143 cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
144 cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
145 #endif
146 BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
147 BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);
149 call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
151 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
154 * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
156 void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
158 struct cred *cred;
160 kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
161 atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
162 read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
164 cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
165 tsk->real_cred = NULL;
166 validate_creds(cred);
167 alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
168 put_cred(cred);
170 cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
171 tsk->cred = NULL;
172 validate_creds(cred);
173 alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
174 put_cred(cred);
178 * get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials
179 * @task: The task to query
181 * Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go
182 * away. Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
184 * The caller must also make sure task doesn't get deleted, either by holding a
185 * ref on task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
187 const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task)
189 const struct cred *cred;
191 rcu_read_lock();
193 do {
194 cred = __task_cred((task));
195 BUG_ON(!cred);
196 } while (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&((struct cred *)cred)->usage));
198 rcu_read_unlock();
199 return cred;
203 * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a
204 * later date without risk of ENOMEM.
206 struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
208 struct cred *new;
210 new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
211 if (!new)
212 return NULL;
214 atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
215 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
216 new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
217 #endif
219 if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
220 goto error;
222 return new;
224 error:
225 abort_creds(new);
226 return NULL;
230 * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
232 * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds
233 * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to
234 * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
235 * calling commit_creds().
237 * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
239 * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
241 * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
243 struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
245 struct task_struct *task = current;
246 const struct cred *old;
247 struct cred *new;
249 validate_process_creds();
251 new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
252 if (!new)
253 return NULL;
255 kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
257 old = task->cred;
258 memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
260 atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
261 set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
262 get_group_info(new->group_info);
263 get_uid(new->user);
264 get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
266 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
267 key_get(new->session_keyring);
268 key_get(new->process_keyring);
269 key_get(new->thread_keyring);
270 key_get(new->request_key_auth);
271 #endif
273 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
274 new->security = NULL;
275 #endif
277 if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
278 goto error;
279 validate_creds(new);
280 return new;
282 error:
283 abort_creds(new);
284 return NULL;
286 EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
289 * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve()
290 * - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex
292 struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
294 struct cred *new;
296 new = prepare_creds();
297 if (!new)
298 return new;
300 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
301 /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
302 key_put(new->thread_keyring);
303 new->thread_keyring = NULL;
305 /* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */
306 key_put(new->process_keyring);
307 new->process_keyring = NULL;
308 #endif
310 return new;
314 * Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
316 * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
317 * set.
319 * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
320 * objective and subjective credentials
322 int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
324 struct cred *new;
325 int ret;
327 if (
328 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
329 !p->cred->thread_keyring &&
330 #endif
331 clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
333 p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
334 get_cred(p->cred);
335 alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
336 kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
337 p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
338 read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
339 atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
340 return 0;
343 new = prepare_creds();
344 if (!new)
345 return -ENOMEM;
347 if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
348 ret = create_user_ns(new);
349 if (ret < 0)
350 goto error_put;
353 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
354 /* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
355 * had one */
356 if (new->thread_keyring) {
357 key_put(new->thread_keyring);
358 new->thread_keyring = NULL;
359 if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
360 install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
363 /* The process keyring is only shared between the threads in a process;
364 * anything outside of those threads doesn't inherit.
366 if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
367 key_put(new->process_keyring);
368 new->process_keyring = NULL;
370 #endif
372 atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
373 p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
374 alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
375 validate_creds(new);
376 return 0;
378 error_put:
379 put_cred(new);
380 return ret;
383 static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset)
385 const struct user_namespace *set_ns = set->user_ns;
386 const struct user_namespace *subset_ns = subset->user_ns;
388 /* If the two credentials are in the same user namespace see if
389 * the capabilities of subset are a subset of set.
391 if (set_ns == subset_ns)
392 return cap_issubset(subset->cap_permitted, set->cap_permitted);
394 /* The credentials are in a different user namespaces
395 * therefore one is a subset of the other only if a set is an
396 * ancestor of subset and set->euid is owner of subset or one
397 * of subsets ancestors.
399 for (;subset_ns != &init_user_ns; subset_ns = subset_ns->parent) {
400 if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent) &&
401 uid_eq(subset_ns->owner, set->euid))
402 return true;
405 return false;
409 * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
410 * @new: The credentials to be assigned
412 * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
413 * the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
414 * updated. This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are
415 * in an overridden state.
417 * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
419 * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end
420 * of, say, sys_setgid().
422 int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
424 struct task_struct *task = current;
425 const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
427 kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
428 atomic_read(&new->usage),
429 read_cred_subscribers(new));
431 BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
432 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
433 BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
434 validate_creds(old);
435 validate_creds(new);
436 #endif
437 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
439 get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
441 /* dumpability changes */
442 if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
443 !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
444 !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
445 !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
446 !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
447 if (task->mm)
448 set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
449 task->pdeath_signal = 0;
450 smp_wmb();
453 /* alter the thread keyring */
454 if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid))
455 key_fsuid_changed(task);
456 if (!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
457 key_fsgid_changed(task);
459 /* do it
460 * RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked
461 * in set_user().
463 alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
464 if (new->user != old->user)
465 atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
466 rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
467 rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
468 if (new->user != old->user)
469 atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
470 alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
472 /* send notifications */
473 if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) ||
474 !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) ||
475 !uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid) ||
476 !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid))
477 proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);
479 if (!gid_eq(new->gid, old->gid) ||
480 !gid_eq(new->egid, old->egid) ||
481 !gid_eq(new->sgid, old->sgid) ||
482 !gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
483 proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
485 /* release the old obj and subj refs both */
486 put_cred(old);
487 put_cred(old);
488 return 0;
490 EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
493 * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task
494 * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied
496 * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the
497 * current task.
499 void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
501 kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
502 atomic_read(&new->usage),
503 read_cred_subscribers(new));
505 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
506 BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0);
507 #endif
508 BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
509 put_cred(new);
511 EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
514 * override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials
515 * @new: The credentials to be assigned
517 * Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current
518 * process, returning the old set for later reversion.
520 const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
522 const struct cred *old = current->cred;
524 kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
525 atomic_read(&new->usage),
526 read_cred_subscribers(new));
528 validate_creds(old);
529 validate_creds(new);
530 get_cred(new);
531 alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
532 rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
533 alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
535 kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
536 atomic_read(&old->usage),
537 read_cred_subscribers(old));
538 return old;
540 EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
543 * revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override
544 * @old: The credentials to be restored
546 * Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set,
547 * discarding the override set.
549 void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
551 const struct cred *override = current->cred;
553 kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old,
554 atomic_read(&old->usage),
555 read_cred_subscribers(old));
557 validate_creds(old);
558 validate_creds(override);
559 alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
560 rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
561 alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
562 put_cred(override);
564 EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
567 * initialise the credentials stuff
569 void __init cred_init(void)
571 /* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */
572 cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred),
573 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
577 * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
578 * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
580 * Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service. This can then be used to
581 * override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that
582 * task that requires a different subjective context.
584 * @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL.
585 * If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that;
586 * otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys.
588 * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
590 * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
592 * Does not take, and does not return holding current->cred_replace_mutex.
594 struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
596 const struct cred *old;
597 struct cred *new;
599 new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
600 if (!new)
601 return NULL;
603 kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
605 if (daemon)
606 old = get_task_cred(daemon);
607 else
608 old = get_cred(&init_cred);
610 validate_creds(old);
612 *new = *old;
613 atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
614 set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
615 get_uid(new->user);
616 get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
617 get_group_info(new->group_info);
619 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
620 new->session_keyring = NULL;
621 new->process_keyring = NULL;
622 new->thread_keyring = NULL;
623 new->request_key_auth = NULL;
624 new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
625 #endif
627 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
628 new->security = NULL;
629 #endif
630 if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
631 goto error;
633 put_cred(old);
634 validate_creds(new);
635 return new;
637 error:
638 put_cred(new);
639 put_cred(old);
640 return NULL;
642 EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
645 * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
646 * @new: The credentials to alter
647 * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
649 * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
650 * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
652 int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
654 return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
656 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
659 * set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
660 * @new: The credentials to alter
661 * @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from.
663 * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
664 * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. The
665 * security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be
666 * interpreted by the LSM.
668 int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
670 u32 secid;
671 int ret;
673 ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
674 if (ret < 0)
675 return ret;
677 return set_security_override(new, secid);
679 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
682 * set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials
683 * @new: The credentials to alter
684 * @inode: The inode to take the context from
686 * Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same
687 * as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have
688 * the same MAC context as that inode.
690 int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
692 if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
693 return -EINVAL;
694 new->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
695 new->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
696 return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
698 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
700 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
702 bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
704 if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
705 return true;
706 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
708 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
709 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
711 if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
712 if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
713 return true;
714 if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
715 (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
716 return true;
718 #endif
719 return false;
721 EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);
724 * dump invalid credentials
726 static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label,
727 const struct task_struct *tsk)
729 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n",
730 label, cred,
731 cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "",
732 cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "",
733 cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : "");
734 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n",
735 cred->magic, cred->put_addr);
736 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n",
737 atomic_read(&cred->usage),
738 read_cred_subscribers(cred));
739 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
740 from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
741 from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
742 from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
743 from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));
744 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
745 from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
746 from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
747 from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
748 from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
749 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
750 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p\n", cred->security);
751 if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE &&
752 (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) !=
753 (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)))
754 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x}\n",
755 ((u32*)cred->security)[0],
756 ((u32*)cred->security)[1]);
757 #endif
761 * report use of invalid credentials
763 void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
765 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
766 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
767 dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
768 BUG();
770 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds);
773 * check the credentials on a process
775 void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
776 const char *file, unsigned line)
778 if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
779 if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
780 creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
781 goto invalid_creds;
782 } else {
783 if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
784 read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
785 creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
786 creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
787 goto invalid_creds;
789 return;
791 invalid_creds:
792 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n");
793 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
795 dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
796 if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
797 dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
798 else
799 printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n");
800 BUG();
802 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds);
805 * check creds for do_exit()
807 void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
809 kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})",
810 tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
811 atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
812 read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
814 __validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__);
817 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */