1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
5 * Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2006
6 * Author(s): Robert Burroughs
7 * Eric Rossman (edrossma@us.ibm.com)
9 * Hotplug & misc device support: Jochen Roehrig (roehrig@de.ibm.com)
10 * Major cleanup & driver split: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
13 #ifndef _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_
14 #define _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_
16 struct T6_keyBlock_hdr
{
23 * mapping for the cca private ME key token.
24 * Three parts of interest here: the header, the private section and
27 * mapping for the cca key token header
29 struct cca_token_hdr
{
30 unsigned char token_identifier
;
31 unsigned char version
;
32 unsigned short token_length
;
33 unsigned char reserved
[4];
36 #define CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT 0x1E
38 #define CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL 0x80
41 * mapping for the cca public section
42 * In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public
43 * section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be
44 * used, for a section length of 0x0F always.
46 struct cca_public_sec
{
47 unsigned char section_identifier
;
48 unsigned char version
;
49 unsigned short section_length
;
50 unsigned char reserved
[2];
51 unsigned short exponent_len
;
52 unsigned short modulus_bit_len
;
53 unsigned short modulus_byte_len
; /* In a private key, this is 0 */
57 * mapping for the cca private CRT key 'token'
58 * The first three parts (the only parts considered in this release)
59 * are: the header, the private section and the public section.
60 * The header and public section are the same as for the
61 * struct cca_private_ext_ME
63 * Following the structure are the quantities p, q, dp, dq, u, pad,
64 * and modulus, in that order, where pad_len is the modulo 8
65 * complement of the residue modulo 8 of the sum of
66 * (p_len + q_len + dp_len + dq_len + u_len).
68 struct cca_pvt_ext_CRT_sec
{
69 unsigned char section_identifier
;
70 unsigned char version
;
71 unsigned short section_length
;
72 unsigned char private_key_hash
[20];
73 unsigned char reserved1
[4];
74 unsigned char key_format
;
75 unsigned char reserved2
;
76 unsigned char key_name_hash
[20];
77 unsigned char key_use_flags
[4];
80 unsigned short dp_len
;
81 unsigned short dq_len
;
83 unsigned short mod_len
;
84 unsigned char reserved3
[4];
85 unsigned short pad_len
;
86 unsigned char reserved4
[52];
87 unsigned char confounder
[8];
90 #define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT 0x08
91 #define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL 0x40
94 * Set up private key fields of a type6 MEX message. The _pad variant
95 * strips leading zeroes from the b_key.
96 * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian,
97 * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian.
99 * @mex: pointer to user input data
100 * @p: pointer to memory area for the key
102 * Returns the size of the key area or negative errno value.
104 static inline int zcrypt_type6_mex_key_en(struct ica_rsa_modexpo
*mex
, void *p
)
106 static struct cca_token_hdr static_pub_hdr
= {
107 .token_identifier
= 0x1E,
109 static struct cca_public_sec static_pub_sec
= {
110 .section_identifier
= 0x04,
113 struct T6_keyBlock_hdr t6_hdr
;
114 struct cca_token_hdr pubHdr
;
115 struct cca_public_sec pubSec
;
122 * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching
123 * function zcrypt_rsa_modexpo(). However, do a plausibility check
124 * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized
125 * to compromise the system.
127 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mex
->inputdatalength
> 512))
130 memset(key
, 0, sizeof(*key
));
132 key
->pubHdr
= static_pub_hdr
;
133 key
->pubSec
= static_pub_sec
;
135 /* key parameter block */
136 temp
= key
->exponent
;
137 if (copy_from_user(temp
, mex
->b_key
, mex
->inputdatalength
))
139 /* Strip leading zeroes from b_key. */
140 for (i
= 0; i
< mex
->inputdatalength
; i
++)
143 if (i
>= mex
->inputdatalength
)
145 memmove(temp
, temp
+ i
, mex
->inputdatalength
- i
);
146 temp
+= mex
->inputdatalength
- i
;
148 if (copy_from_user(temp
, mex
->n_modulus
, mex
->inputdatalength
))
151 key
->pubSec
.modulus_bit_len
= 8 * mex
->inputdatalength
;
152 key
->pubSec
.modulus_byte_len
= mex
->inputdatalength
;
153 key
->pubSec
.exponent_len
= mex
->inputdatalength
- i
;
154 key
->pubSec
.section_length
= sizeof(key
->pubSec
) +
155 2*mex
->inputdatalength
- i
;
156 key
->pubHdr
.token_length
=
157 key
->pubSec
.section_length
+ sizeof(key
->pubHdr
);
158 key
->t6_hdr
.ulen
= key
->pubHdr
.token_length
+ 4;
159 key
->t6_hdr
.blen
= key
->pubHdr
.token_length
+ 6;
160 return sizeof(*key
) + 2*mex
->inputdatalength
- i
;
164 * Set up private key fields of a type6 CRT message.
165 * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian,
166 * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian.
168 * @mex: pointer to user input data
169 * @p: pointer to memory area for the key
171 * Returns the size of the key area or -EFAULT
173 static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt
*crt
, void *p
)
175 static struct cca_public_sec static_cca_pub_sec
= {
176 .section_identifier
= 4,
177 .section_length
= 0x000f,
178 .exponent_len
= 0x0003,
180 static char pk_exponent
[3] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
182 struct T6_keyBlock_hdr t6_hdr
;
183 struct cca_token_hdr token
;
184 struct cca_pvt_ext_CRT_sec pvt
;
187 struct cca_public_sec
*pub
;
188 int short_len
, long_len
, pad_len
, key_len
, size
;
191 * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching
192 * function zcrypt_rsa_crt(). However, do a plausibility check
193 * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized
194 * to compromise the system.
196 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crt
->inputdatalength
> 512))
199 memset(key
, 0, sizeof(*key
));
201 short_len
= (crt
->inputdatalength
+ 1) / 2;
202 long_len
= short_len
+ 8;
203 pad_len
= -(3*long_len
+ 2*short_len
) & 7;
204 key_len
= 3*long_len
+ 2*short_len
+ pad_len
+ crt
->inputdatalength
;
205 size
= sizeof(*key
) + key_len
+ sizeof(*pub
) + 3;
207 /* parameter block.key block */
208 key
->t6_hdr
.blen
= size
;
209 key
->t6_hdr
.ulen
= size
- 2;
211 /* key token header */
212 key
->token
.token_identifier
= CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT
;
213 key
->token
.token_length
= size
- 6;
215 /* private section */
216 key
->pvt
.section_identifier
= CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT
;
217 key
->pvt
.section_length
= sizeof(key
->pvt
) + key_len
;
218 key
->pvt
.key_format
= CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL
;
219 key
->pvt
.key_use_flags
[0] = CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL
;
220 key
->pvt
.p_len
= key
->pvt
.dp_len
= key
->pvt
.u_len
= long_len
;
221 key
->pvt
.q_len
= key
->pvt
.dq_len
= short_len
;
222 key
->pvt
.mod_len
= crt
->inputdatalength
;
223 key
->pvt
.pad_len
= pad_len
;
226 if (copy_from_user(key
->key_parts
, crt
->np_prime
, long_len
) ||
227 copy_from_user(key
->key_parts
+ long_len
,
228 crt
->nq_prime
, short_len
) ||
229 copy_from_user(key
->key_parts
+ long_len
+ short_len
,
230 crt
->bp_key
, long_len
) ||
231 copy_from_user(key
->key_parts
+ 2*long_len
+ short_len
,
232 crt
->bq_key
, short_len
) ||
233 copy_from_user(key
->key_parts
+ 2*long_len
+ 2*short_len
,
234 crt
->u_mult_inv
, long_len
))
236 memset(key
->key_parts
+ 3*long_len
+ 2*short_len
+ pad_len
,
237 0xff, crt
->inputdatalength
);
238 pub
= (struct cca_public_sec
*)(key
->key_parts
+ key_len
);
239 *pub
= static_cca_pub_sec
;
240 pub
->modulus_bit_len
= 8 * crt
->inputdatalength
;
242 * In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public
243 * section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be
246 memcpy((char *) (pub
+ 1), pk_exponent
, 3);
250 #endif /* _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ */