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Merge branch 'v6v7' into devel
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / kernel / auditfilter.c
blobadd2819af71bb2a050907a49c2d228fbf0c1d00d
1 /* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events
2 *
3 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
4 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
5 * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation
6 *
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
11 *
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 *
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
20 */
21
22 #include <linux/kernel.h>
23 #include <linux/audit.h>
24 #include <linux/kthread.h>
25 #include <linux/mutex.h>
26 #include <linux/fs.h>
27 #include <linux/namei.h>
28 #include <linux/netlink.h>
29 #include <linux/sched.h>
30 #include <linux/slab.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include "audit.h"
33
34 /*
35 * Locking model:
36 *
37 * audit_filter_mutex:
38 * Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
39 * data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
40 * contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
41 * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
42 * must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
43 * An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
44 * be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
45 */
46
47 /* Audit filter lists, defined in <linux/audit.h> */
48 struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
49 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
50 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
51 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
52 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
53 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
54 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]),
55 #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6
56 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
57 #endif
58 };
59 static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
60 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[0]),
61 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[1]),
62 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[2]),
63 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]),
64 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]),
65 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]),
66 };
67
68 DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
69
70 static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
71 {
72 int i;
73 struct audit_krule *erule = &e->rule;
74
75 /* some rules don't have associated watches */
76 if (erule->watch)
77 audit_put_watch(erule->watch);
78 if (erule->fields)
79 for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++) {
80 struct audit_field *f = &erule->fields[i];
81 kfree(f->lsm_str);
82 security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
83 }
84 kfree(erule->fields);
85 kfree(erule->filterkey);
86 kfree(e);
87 }
88
89 void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
90 {
91 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
92 audit_free_rule(e);
93 }
94
95 /* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */
96 static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
97 {
98 struct audit_entry *entry;
99 struct audit_field *fields;
100
101 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
102 if (unlikely(!entry))
103 return NULL;
104
105 fields = kzalloc(sizeof(*fields) * field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
106 if (unlikely(!fields)) {
107 kfree(entry);
108 return NULL;
109 }
110 entry->rule.fields = fields;
111
112 return entry;
113 }
114
115 /* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
116 * buffer. */
117 char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
118 {
119 char *str;
120
121 if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain))
122 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
123
124 /* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX
125 * defines the longest valid length.
126 */
127 if (len > PATH_MAX)
128 return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
129
130 str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
131 if (unlikely(!str))
132 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
133
134 memcpy(str, *bufp, len);
135 str[len] = 0;
136 *bufp += len;
137 *remain -= len;
138
139 return str;
140 }
141
142 /* Translate an inode field to kernel respresentation. */
143 static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule,
144 struct audit_field *f)
145 {
146 if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
147 krule->watch || krule->inode_f || krule->tree ||
148 (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal))
149 return -EINVAL;
150
151 krule->inode_f = f;
152 return 0;
153 }
154
155 static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES];
156
157 int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list)
158 {
159 __u32 *p = kzalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL);
160 if (!p)
161 return -ENOMEM;
162 while (*list != ~0U) {
163 unsigned n = *list++;
164 if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) {
165 kfree(p);
166 return -EINVAL;
167 }
168 p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n);
169 }
170 if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) {
171 kfree(p);
172 return -EINVAL;
173 }
174 classes[class] = p;
175 return 0;
176 }
177
178 int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall)
179 {
180 if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32))
181 return 0;
182 if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class]))
183 return 0;
184 return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall);
185 }
186
187 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
188 static inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask)
189 {
190 int i;
191
192 if (classes[class]) {
193 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
194 if (mask[i] & classes[class][i])
195 return 0;
196 }
197 return 1;
198 }
199
200 static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry)
201 {
202 struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f;
203
204 if (!arch) {
205 /* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch
206 * as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */
207 return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
208 entry->rule.mask) &&
209 audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
210 entry->rule.mask));
211 }
212
213 switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) {
214 case 0: /* native */
215 return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL,
216 entry->rule.mask));
217 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
218 return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32,
219 entry->rule.mask));
220 default:
221 return 1;
222 }
223 }
224 #endif
225
226 /* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */
227 static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
228 {
229 unsigned listnr;
230 struct audit_entry *entry;
231 int i, err;
232
233 err = -EINVAL;
234 listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
235 switch(listnr) {
236 default:
237 goto exit_err;
238 case AUDIT_FILTER_USER:
239 case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE:
240 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
241 case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY:
242 case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT:
243 case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK:
244 #endif
245 ;
246 }
247 if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) {
248 printk(KERN_ERR "AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n");
249 goto exit_err;
250 }
251 if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
252 goto exit_err;
253 if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
254 goto exit_err;
255
256 err = -ENOMEM;
257 entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count);
258 if (!entry)
259 goto exit_err;
260
261 entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
262 entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
263 entry->rule.action = rule->action;
264 entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
265
266 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
267 entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
268
269 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) {
270 int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1;
271 __u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)];
272 __u32 *class;
273
274 if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit)))
275 continue;
276 *p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit);
277 class = classes[i];
278 if (class) {
279 int j;
280 for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++)
281 entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j];
282 }
283 }
284
285 return entry;
286
287 exit_err:
288 return ERR_PTR(err);
289 }
290
291 static u32 audit_ops[] =
292 {
293 [Audit_equal] = AUDIT_EQUAL,
294 [Audit_not_equal] = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL,
295 [Audit_bitmask] = AUDIT_BIT_MASK,
296 [Audit_bittest] = AUDIT_BIT_TEST,
297 [Audit_lt] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN,
298 [Audit_gt] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN,
299 [Audit_le] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
300 [Audit_ge] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
301 };
302
303 static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op)
304 {
305 u32 n;
306 for (n = Audit_equal; n < Audit_bad && audit_ops[n] != op; n++)
307 ;
308 return n;
309 }
310
311
312 /* Translate struct audit_rule to kernel's rule respresentation.
313 * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
314 static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
315 {
316 struct audit_entry *entry;
317 int err = 0;
318 int i;
319
320 entry = audit_to_entry_common(rule);
321 if (IS_ERR(entry))
322 goto exit_nofree;
323
324 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
325 struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
326 u32 n;
327
328 n = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
329
330 /* Support for legacy operators where
331 * AUDIT_NEGATE bit signifies != and otherwise assumes == */
332 if (n & AUDIT_NEGATE)
333 f->op = Audit_not_equal;
334 else if (!n)
335 f->op = Audit_equal;
336 else
337 f->op = audit_to_op(n);
338
339 entry->rule.vers_ops = (n & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
340
341 f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
342 f->val = rule->values[i];
343
344 err = -EINVAL;
345 if (f->op == Audit_bad)
346 goto exit_free;
347
348 switch(f->type) {
349 default:
350 goto exit_free;
351 case AUDIT_PID:
352 case AUDIT_UID:
353 case AUDIT_EUID:
354 case AUDIT_SUID:
355 case AUDIT_FSUID:
356 case AUDIT_GID:
357 case AUDIT_EGID:
358 case AUDIT_SGID:
359 case AUDIT_FSGID:
360 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
361 case AUDIT_PERS:
362 case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
363 case AUDIT_PPID:
364 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
365 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
366 case AUDIT_EXIT:
367 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
368 /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
369 if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
370 goto exit_free;
371 break;
372 case AUDIT_ARG0:
373 case AUDIT_ARG1:
374 case AUDIT_ARG2:
375 case AUDIT_ARG3:
376 break;
377 /* arch is only allowed to be = or != */
378 case AUDIT_ARCH:
379 if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
380 goto exit_free;
381 entry->rule.arch_f = f;
382 break;
383 case AUDIT_PERM:
384 if (f->val & ~15)
385 goto exit_free;
386 break;
387 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
388 if ((f->val & ~S_IFMT) > S_IFMT)
389 goto exit_free;
390 break;
391 case AUDIT_INODE:
392 err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
393 if (err)
394 goto exit_free;
395 break;
396 }
397 }
398
399 if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
400 entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
401
402 exit_nofree:
403 return entry;
404
405 exit_free:
406 audit_free_rule(entry);
407 return ERR_PTR(err);
408 }
409
410 /* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule respresentation. */
411 static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
412 size_t datasz)
413 {
414 int err = 0;
415 struct audit_entry *entry;
416 void *bufp;
417 size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
418 int i;
419 char *str;
420
421 entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data);
422 if (IS_ERR(entry))
423 goto exit_nofree;
424
425 bufp = data->buf;
426 entry->rule.vers_ops = 2;
427 for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
428 struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
429
430 err = -EINVAL;
431
432 f->op = audit_to_op(data->fieldflags[i]);
433 if (f->op == Audit_bad)
434 goto exit_free;
435
436 f->type = data->fields[i];
437 f->val = data->values[i];
438 f->lsm_str = NULL;
439 f->lsm_rule = NULL;
440 switch(f->type) {
441 case AUDIT_PID:
442 case AUDIT_UID:
443 case AUDIT_EUID:
444 case AUDIT_SUID:
445 case AUDIT_FSUID:
446 case AUDIT_GID:
447 case AUDIT_EGID:
448 case AUDIT_SGID:
449 case AUDIT_FSGID:
450 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
451 case AUDIT_PERS:
452 case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
453 case AUDIT_PPID:
454 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
455 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
456 case AUDIT_EXIT:
457 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
458 case AUDIT_ARG0:
459 case AUDIT_ARG1:
460 case AUDIT_ARG2:
461 case AUDIT_ARG3:
462 break;
463 case AUDIT_ARCH:
464 entry->rule.arch_f = f;
465 break;
466 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
467 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
468 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
469 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
470 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
471 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
472 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
473 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
474 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
475 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
476 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
477 if (IS_ERR(str))
478 goto exit_free;
479 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
480
481 err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
482 (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
483 /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
484 * become valid after a policy reload. */
485 if (err == -EINVAL) {
486 printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
487 "\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
488 err = 0;
489 }
490 if (err) {
491 kfree(str);
492 goto exit_free;
493 } else
494 f->lsm_str = str;
495 break;
496 case AUDIT_WATCH:
497 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
498 if (IS_ERR(str))
499 goto exit_free;
500 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
501
502 err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op);
503 if (err) {
504 kfree(str);
505 goto exit_free;
506 }
507 break;
508 case AUDIT_DIR:
509 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
510 if (IS_ERR(str))
511 goto exit_free;
512 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
513
514 err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op);
515 kfree(str);
516 if (err)
517 goto exit_free;
518 break;
519 case AUDIT_INODE:
520 err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
521 if (err)
522 goto exit_free;
523 break;
524 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
525 err = -EINVAL;
526 if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
527 goto exit_free;
528 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
529 if (IS_ERR(str))
530 goto exit_free;
531 entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
532 entry->rule.filterkey = str;
533 break;
534 case AUDIT_PERM:
535 if (f->val & ~15)
536 goto exit_free;
537 break;
538 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
539 if ((f->val & ~S_IFMT) > S_IFMT)
540 goto exit_free;
541 break;
542 default:
543 goto exit_free;
544 }
545 }
546
547 if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
548 entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
549
550 exit_nofree:
551 return entry;
552
553 exit_free:
554 audit_free_rule(entry);
555 return ERR_PTR(err);
556 }
557
558 /* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */
559 static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str)
560 {
561 size_t len = strlen(str);
562
563 memcpy(*bufp, str, len);
564 *bufp += len;
565
566 return len;
567 }
568
569 /* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule.
570 * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
571 static struct audit_rule *audit_krule_to_rule(struct audit_krule *krule)
572 {
573 struct audit_rule *rule;
574 int i;
575
576 rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
577 if (unlikely(!rule))
578 return NULL;
579
580 rule->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
581 rule->action = krule->action;
582 rule->field_count = krule->field_count;
583 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
584 rule->values[i] = krule->fields[i].val;
585 rule->fields[i] = krule->fields[i].type;
586
587 if (krule->vers_ops == 1) {
588 if (krule->fields[i].op == Audit_not_equal)
589 rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NEGATE;
590 } else {
591 rule->fields[i] |= audit_ops[krule->fields[i].op];
592 }
593 }
594 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) rule->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
595
596 return rule;
597 }
598
599 /* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule_data. */
600 static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
601 {
602 struct audit_rule_data *data;
603 void *bufp;
604 int i;
605
606 data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
607 if (unlikely(!data))
608 return NULL;
609 memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data));
610
611 data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
612 data->action = krule->action;
613 data->field_count = krule->field_count;
614 bufp = data->buf;
615 for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
616 struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i];
617
618 data->fields[i] = f->type;
619 data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op];
620 switch(f->type) {
621 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
622 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
623 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
624 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
625 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
626 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
627 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
628 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
629 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
630 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
631 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
632 audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
633 break;
634 case AUDIT_WATCH:
635 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
636 audit_pack_string(&bufp,
637 audit_watch_path(krule->watch));
638 break;
639 case AUDIT_DIR:
640 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
641 audit_pack_string(&bufp,
642 audit_tree_path(krule->tree));
643 break;
644 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
645 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
646 audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey);
647 break;
648 default:
649 data->values[i] = f->val;
650 }
651 }
652 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
653
654 return data;
655 }
656
657 /* Compare two rules in kernel format. Considered success if rules
658 * don't match. */
659 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
660 {
661 int i;
662
663 if (a->flags != b->flags ||
664 a->listnr != b->listnr ||
665 a->action != b->action ||
666 a->field_count != b->field_count)
667 return 1;
668
669 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
670 if (a->fields[i].type != b->fields[i].type ||
671 a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op)
672 return 1;
673
674 switch(a->fields[i].type) {
675 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
676 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
677 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
678 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
679 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
680 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
681 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
682 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
683 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
684 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
685 if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
686 return 1;
687 break;
688 case AUDIT_WATCH:
689 if (strcmp(audit_watch_path(a->watch),
690 audit_watch_path(b->watch)))
691 return 1;
692 break;
693 case AUDIT_DIR:
694 if (strcmp(audit_tree_path(a->tree),
695 audit_tree_path(b->tree)))
696 return 1;
697 break;
698 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
699 /* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */
700 if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey))
701 return 1;
702 break;
703 default:
704 if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
705 return 1;
706 }
707 }
708
709 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
710 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
711 return 1;
712
713 return 0;
714 }
715
716 /* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
717 * re-initialized. */
718 static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
719 struct audit_field *sf)
720 {
721 int ret = 0;
722 char *lsm_str;
723
724 /* our own copy of lsm_str */
725 lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
726 if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
727 return -ENOMEM;
728 df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
729
730 /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
731 ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
732 (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
733 /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
734 * become valid after a policy reload. */
735 if (ret == -EINVAL) {
736 printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
737 "invalid\n", df->lsm_str);
738 ret = 0;
739 }
740
741 return ret;
742 }
743
744 /* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
745 * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
746 * will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
747 * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
748 * The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
749 * the initial copy. */
750 struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
751 {
752 u32 fcount = old->field_count;
753 struct audit_entry *entry;
754 struct audit_krule *new;
755 char *fk;
756 int i, err = 0;
757
758 entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
759 if (unlikely(!entry))
760 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
761
762 new = &entry->rule;
763 new->vers_ops = old->vers_ops;
764 new->flags = old->flags;
765 new->listnr = old->listnr;
766 new->action = old->action;
767 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
768 new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
769 new->prio = old->prio;
770 new->buflen = old->buflen;
771 new->inode_f = old->inode_f;
772 new->field_count = old->field_count;
773
774 /*
775 * note that we are OK with not refcounting here; audit_match_tree()
776 * never dereferences tree and we can't get false positives there
777 * since we'd have to have rule gone from the list *and* removed
778 * before the chunks found by lookup had been allocated, i.e. before
779 * the beginning of list scan.
780 */
781 new->tree = old->tree;
782 memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
783
784 /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
785 * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
786 for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
787 switch (new->fields[i].type) {
788 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
789 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
790 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
791 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
792 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
793 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
794 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
795 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
796 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
797 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
798 err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
799 &old->fields[i]);
800 break;
801 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
802 fk = kstrdup(old->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
803 if (unlikely(!fk))
804 err = -ENOMEM;
805 else
806 new->filterkey = fk;
807 }
808 if (err) {
809 audit_free_rule(entry);
810 return ERR_PTR(err);
811 }
812 }
813
814 if (old->watch) {
815 audit_get_watch(old->watch);
816 new->watch = old->watch;
817 }
818
819 return entry;
820 }
821
822 /* Find an existing audit rule.
823 * Caller must hold audit_filter_mutex to prevent stale rule data. */
824 static struct audit_entry *audit_find_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
825 struct list_head **p)
826 {
827 struct audit_entry *e, *found = NULL;
828 struct list_head *list;
829 int h;
830
831 if (entry->rule.inode_f) {
832 h = audit_hash_ino(entry->rule.inode_f->val);
833 *p = list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
834 } else if (entry->rule.watch) {
835 /* we don't know the inode number, so must walk entire hash */
836 for (h = 0; h < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; h++) {
837 list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
838 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
839 if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
840 found = e;
841 goto out;
842 }
843 }
844 goto out;
845 } else {
846 *p = list = &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr];
847 }
848
849 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list)
850 if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) {
851 found = e;
852 goto out;
853 }
854
855 out:
856 return found;
857 }
858
859 static u64 prio_low = ~0ULL/2;
860 static u64 prio_high = ~0ULL/2 - 1;
861
862 /* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. */
863 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
864 {
865 struct audit_entry *e;
866 struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
867 struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
868 struct list_head *list;
869 int err;
870 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
871 int dont_count = 0;
872
873 /* If either of these, don't count towards total */
874 if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER ||
875 entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
876 dont_count = 1;
877 #endif
878
879 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
880 e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
881 if (e) {
882 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
883 err = -EEXIST;
884 /* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */
885 if (tree)
886 audit_put_tree(tree);
887 goto error;
888 }
889
890 if (watch) {
891 /* audit_filter_mutex is dropped and re-taken during this call */
892 err = audit_add_watch(&entry->rule, &list);
893 if (err) {
894 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
895 goto error;
896 }
897 }
898 if (tree) {
899 err = audit_add_tree_rule(&entry->rule);
900 if (err) {
901 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
902 goto error;
903 }
904 }
905
906 entry->rule.prio = ~0ULL;
907 if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) {
908 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND)
909 entry->rule.prio = ++prio_high;
910 else
911 entry->rule.prio = --prio_low;
912 }
913
914 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
915 list_add(&entry->rule.list,
916 &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
917 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
918 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
919 } else {
920 list_add_tail(&entry->rule.list,
921 &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
922 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
923 }
924 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
925 if (!dont_count)
926 audit_n_rules++;
927
928 if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
929 audit_signals++;
930 #endif
931 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
932
933 return 0;
934
935 error:
936 if (watch)
937 audit_put_watch(watch); /* tmp watch, matches initial get */
938 return err;
939 }
940
941 /* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */
942 static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
943 {
944 struct audit_entry *e;
945 struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
946 struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree;
947 struct list_head *list;
948 int ret = 0;
949 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
950 int dont_count = 0;
951
952 /* If either of these, don't count towards total */
953 if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER ||
954 entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE)
955 dont_count = 1;
956 #endif
957
958 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
959 e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list);
960 if (!e) {
961 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
962 ret = -ENOENT;
963 goto out;
964 }
965
966 if (e->rule.watch)
967 audit_remove_watch_rule(&e->rule);
968
969 if (e->rule.tree)
970 audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule);
971
972 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
973 list_del(&e->rule.list);
974 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
975
976 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
977 if (!dont_count)
978 audit_n_rules--;
979
980 if (!audit_match_signal(entry))
981 audit_signals--;
982 #endif
983 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
984
985 out:
986 if (watch)
987 audit_put_watch(watch); /* match initial get */
988 if (tree)
989 audit_put_tree(tree); /* that's the temporary one */
990
991 return ret;
992 }
993
994 /* List rules using struct audit_rule. Exists for backward
995 * compatibility with userspace. */
996 static void audit_list(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
997 {
998 struct sk_buff *skb;
999 struct audit_krule *r;
1000 int i;
1001
1002 /* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
1003 * iterator to sync with list writers. */
1004 for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1005 list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1006 struct audit_rule *rule;
1007
1008 rule = audit_krule_to_rule(r);
1009 if (unlikely(!rule))
1010 break;
1011 skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
1012 rule, sizeof(*rule));
1013 if (skb)
1014 skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1015 kfree(rule);
1016 }
1017 }
1018 skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
1019 if (skb)
1020 skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1021 }
1022
1023 /* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */
1024 static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
1025 {
1026 struct sk_buff *skb;
1027 struct audit_krule *r;
1028 int i;
1029
1030 /* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
1031 * iterator to sync with list writers. */
1032 for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1033 list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1034 struct audit_rule_data *data;
1035
1036 data = audit_krule_to_data(r);
1037 if (unlikely(!data))
1038 break;
1039 skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1,
1040 data, sizeof(*data) + data->buflen);
1041 if (skb)
1042 skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1043 kfree(data);
1044 }
1045 }
1046 skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
1047 if (skb)
1048 skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
1049 }
1050
1051 /* Log rule additions and removals */
1052 static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
1053 char *action, struct audit_krule *rule,
1054 int res)
1055 {
1056 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1057
1058 if (!audit_enabled)
1059 return;
1060
1061 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
1062 if (!ab)
1063 return;
1064 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u", loginuid, sessionid);
1065 if (sid) {
1066 char *ctx = NULL;
1067 u32 len;
1068 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
1069 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
1070 else {
1071 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
1072 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1073 }
1074 }
1075 audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
1076 audit_log_string(ab, action);
1077 audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
1078 audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res);
1079 audit_log_end(ab);
1080 }
1081
1082 /**
1083 * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type
1084 * @type: audit message type
1085 * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages
1086 * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages
1087 * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number
1088 * @data: payload data
1089 * @datasz: size of payload data
1090 * @loginuid: loginuid of sender
1091 * @sessionid: sessionid for netlink audit message
1092 * @sid: SE Linux Security ID of sender
1093 */
1094 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
1095 size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid)
1096 {
1097 struct task_struct *tsk;
1098 struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
1099 int err = 0;
1100 struct audit_entry *entry;
1101
1102 switch (type) {
1103 case AUDIT_LIST:
1104 case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
1105 /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
1106 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
1107 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
1108 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
1109 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
1110
1111 dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL);
1112 if (!dest)
1113 return -ENOMEM;
1114 dest->pid = pid;
1115 skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q);
1116
1117 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1118 if (type == AUDIT_LIST)
1119 audit_list(pid, seq, &dest->q);
1120 else
1121 audit_list_rules(pid, seq, &dest->q);
1122 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1123
1124 tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list");
1125 if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
1126 skb_queue_purge(&dest->q);
1127 kfree(dest);
1128 err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
1129 }
1130 break;
1131 case AUDIT_ADD:
1132 case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
1133 if (type == AUDIT_ADD)
1134 entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
1135 else
1136 entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
1137 if (IS_ERR(entry))
1138 return PTR_ERR(entry);
1139
1140 err = audit_add_rule(entry);
1141 audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "add rule",
1142 &entry->rule, !err);
1143
1144 if (err)
1145 audit_free_rule(entry);
1146 break;
1147 case AUDIT_DEL:
1148 case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
1149 if (type == AUDIT_DEL)
1150 entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
1151 else
1152 entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
1153 if (IS_ERR(entry))
1154 return PTR_ERR(entry);
1155
1156 err = audit_del_rule(entry);
1157 audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "remove rule",
1158 &entry->rule, !err);
1159
1160 audit_free_rule(entry);
1161 break;
1162 default:
1163 return -EINVAL;
1164 }
1165
1166 return err;
1167 }
1168
1169 int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right)
1170 {
1171 switch (op) {
1172 case Audit_equal:
1173 return (left == right);
1174 case Audit_not_equal:
1175 return (left != right);
1176 case Audit_lt:
1177 return (left < right);
1178 case Audit_le:
1179 return (left <= right);
1180 case Audit_gt:
1181 return (left > right);
1182 case Audit_ge:
1183 return (left >= right);
1184 case Audit_bitmask:
1185 return (left & right);
1186 case Audit_bittest:
1187 return ((left & right) == right);
1188 default:
1189 BUG();
1190 return 0;
1191 }
1192 }
1193
1194 /* Compare given dentry name with last component in given path,
1195 * return of 0 indicates a match. */
1196 int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path,
1197 int *dirlen)
1198 {
1199 int dlen, plen;
1200 const char *p;
1201
1202 if (!dname || !path)
1203 return 1;
1204
1205 dlen = strlen(dname);
1206 plen = strlen(path);
1207 if (plen < dlen)
1208 return 1;
1209
1210 /* disregard trailing slashes */
1211 p = path + plen - 1;
1212 while ((*p == '/') && (p > path))
1213 p--;
1214
1215 /* find last path component */
1216 p = p - dlen + 1;
1217 if (p < path)
1218 return 1;
1219 else if (p > path) {
1220 if (*--p != '/')
1221 return 1;
1222 else
1223 p++;
1224 }
1225
1226 /* return length of path's directory component */
1227 if (dirlen)
1228 *dirlen = p - path;
1229 return strncmp(p, dname, dlen);
1230 }
1231
1232 static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
1233 struct audit_krule *rule,
1234 enum audit_state *state)
1235 {
1236 int i;
1237
1238 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
1239 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
1240 int result = 0;
1241
1242 switch (f->type) {
1243 case AUDIT_PID:
1244 result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, f->op, f->val);
1245 break;
1246 case AUDIT_UID:
1247 result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, f->op, f->val);
1248 break;
1249 case AUDIT_GID:
1250 result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, f->op, f->val);
1251 break;
1252 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
1253 result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
1254 break;
1255 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
1256 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
1257 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
1258 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
1259 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
1260 if (f->lsm_rule)
1261 result = security_audit_rule_match(cb->sid,
1262 f->type,
1263 f->op,
1264 f->lsm_rule,
1265 NULL);
1266 break;
1267 }
1268
1269 if (!result)
1270 return 0;
1271 }
1272 switch (rule->action) {
1273 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
1274 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
1275 }
1276 return 1;
1277 }
1278
1279 int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb)
1280 {
1281 enum audit_state state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
1282 struct audit_entry *e;
1283 int ret = 1;
1284
1285 rcu_read_lock();
1286 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
1287 if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
1288 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1289 ret = 0;
1290 break;
1291 }
1292 }
1293 rcu_read_unlock();
1294
1295 return ret; /* Audit by default */
1296 }
1297
1298 int audit_filter_type(int type)
1299 {
1300 struct audit_entry *e;
1301 int result = 0;
1302
1303 rcu_read_lock();
1304 if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE]))
1305 goto unlock_and_return;
1306
1307 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE],
1308 list) {
1309 int i;
1310 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
1311 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
1312 if (f->type == AUDIT_MSGTYPE) {
1313 result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val);
1314 if (!result)
1315 break;
1316 }
1317 }
1318 if (result)
1319 goto unlock_and_return;
1320 }
1321 unlock_and_return:
1322 rcu_read_unlock();
1323 return result;
1324 }
1325
1326 static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
1327 {
1328 struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
1329 struct audit_entry *nentry;
1330 int err = 0;
1331
1332 if (!security_audit_rule_known(r))
1333 return 0;
1334
1335 nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r);
1336 if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
1337 /* save the first error encountered for the
1338 * return value */
1339 err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
1340 audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
1341 if (r->watch)
1342 list_del(&r->rlist);
1343 list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
1344 list_del(&r->list);
1345 } else {
1346 if (r->watch || r->tree)
1347 list_replace_init(&r->rlist, &nentry->rule.rlist);
1348 list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
1349 list_replace(&r->list, &nentry->rule.list);
1350 }
1351 call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
1352
1353 return err;
1354 }
1355
1356 /* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
1357 * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
1358 * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
1359 * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
1360 * updated rule. */
1361 int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
1362 {
1363 struct audit_krule *r, *n;
1364 int i, err = 0;
1365
1366 /* audit_filter_mutex synchronizes the writers */
1367 mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1368
1369 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
1370 list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
1371 int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
1372 if (!err)
1373 err = res;
1374 }
1375 }
1376 mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
1377
1378 return err;
1379 }
Linux with added FPC-III support