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Linux 4.19.168
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / net / bluetooth / smp.c
blobcc2f7ca91ccdd32136ea82f5fc6bbcff87206d1d
1 /*
2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
4
5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 published by the Free Software Foundation;
8
9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
17
18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
21 */
22
23 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
25 #include <linux/crypto.h>
26 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
27 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
28 #include <crypto/hash.h>
29 #include <crypto/kpp.h>
30
31 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
32 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
33 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
34 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
35
36 #include "ecdh_helper.h"
37 #include "smp.h"
38
39 #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
40 ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
41
42 /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
43 * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
44 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
45 */
46 #ifdef DEBUG
47 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
48 ##__VA_ARGS__)
49 #else
50 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
51 ##__VA_ARGS__)
52 #endif
53
54 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
55
56 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
57 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
58
59 #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
60
61 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
62 0x3f : 0x07)
63 #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
64
65 /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
66 #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
67
68 enum {
69 SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
70 SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING,
71 SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
72 SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
73 SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
74 SMP_FLAG_SC,
75 SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
76 SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
77 SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
78 SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
79 SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB,
80 SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB,
81 SMP_FLAG_CT2,
82 };
83
84 struct smp_dev {
85 /* Secure Connections OOB data */
86 bool local_oob;
87 u8 local_pk[64];
88 u8 local_rand[16];
89 bool debug_key;
90
91 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
92 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
93 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
94 };
95
96 struct smp_chan {
97 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
98 struct delayed_work security_timer;
99 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
100
101 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
102 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
103 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
104 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
105 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
106 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
107 u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
108 u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
109 u8 enc_key_size;
110 u8 remote_key_dist;
111 bdaddr_t id_addr;
112 u8 id_addr_type;
113 u8 irk[16];
114 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
115 struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
116 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
117 struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
118 struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
119 u8 *link_key;
120 unsigned long flags;
121 u8 method;
122 u8 passkey_round;
123
124 /* Secure Connections variables */
125 u8 local_pk[64];
126 u8 remote_pk[64];
127 u8 dhkey[32];
128 u8 mackey[16];
129
130 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
131 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
132 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
133 };
134
135 /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
136 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
137 * private debug key.
138 */
139 static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
140 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
141 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
142 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
143 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
144
145 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
146 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
147 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
148 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
149 };
150
151 static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
152 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
153 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
154 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
155 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
156 };
157
158 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
159 {
160 size_t i;
161
162 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
163 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
164 }
165
166 /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
167 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
168 */
169
170 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
171 size_t len, u8 mac[16])
172 {
173 uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
174 SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
175 int err;
176
177 if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
178 return -EFBIG;
179
180 if (!tfm) {
181 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
182 return -EINVAL;
183 }
184
185 desc->tfm = tfm;
186 desc->flags = 0;
187
188 /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
189 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
190 swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
191
192 SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
193 SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
194
195 err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
196 if (err) {
197 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
198 return err;
199 }
200
201 err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
202 shash_desc_zero(desc);
203 if (err) {
204 BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
205 return err;
206 }
207
208 swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
209
210 SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
211
212 return 0;
213 }
214
215 static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
216 const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
217 {
218 u8 m[65];
219 int err;
220
221 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
222 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
223 SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
224
225 m[0] = z;
226 memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
227 memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
228
229 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
230 if (err)
231 return err;
232
233 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
234
235 return err;
236 }
237
238 static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
239 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
240 const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
241 {
242 /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
243 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
244 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
245 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
246 * endian format.
247 */
248 const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
249 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
250 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
251 const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
252 u8 m[53], t[16];
253 int err;
254
255 SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
256 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
257 SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
258
259 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
260 if (err)
261 return err;
262
263 SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
264
265 memcpy(m, length, 2);
266 memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
267 memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
268 memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
269 memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
270 memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
271
272 m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
273
274 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
275 if (err)
276 return err;
277
278 SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
279
280 m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
281
282 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
283 if (err)
284 return err;
285
286 SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
287
288 return 0;
289 }
290
291 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
292 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
293 const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
294 u8 res[16])
295 {
296 u8 m[65];
297 int err;
298
299 SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
300 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
301 SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
302
303 memcpy(m, a2, 7);
304 memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
305 memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
306 memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
307 memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
308 memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
309
310 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
311 if (err)
312 return err;
313
314 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
315
316 return err;
317 }
318
319 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
320 const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
321 {
322 u8 m[80], tmp[16];
323 int err;
324
325 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
326 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
327 SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
328
329 memcpy(m, y, 16);
330 memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
331 memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
332
333 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
334 if (err)
335 return err;
336
337 *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
338 *val %= 1000000;
339
340 SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
341
342 return 0;
343 }
344
345 static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
346 const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
347 {
348 int err;
349
350 SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
351
352 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
353 if (err)
354 return err;
355
356 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
357
358 return err;
359 }
360
361 static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
362 const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16])
363 {
364 int err;
365
366 SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt);
367
368 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res);
369 if (err)
370 return err;
371
372 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
373
374 return err;
375 }
376
377 /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
378 * s1 and ah.
379 */
380
381 static int smp_e(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
382 {
383 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
384 int err;
385
386 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
387
388 if (!tfm) {
389 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
390 return -EINVAL;
391 }
392
393 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
394 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
395
396 err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
397 if (err) {
398 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
399 return err;
400 }
401
402 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
403 swap_buf(r, data, 16);
404
405 crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, data, data);
406
407 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
408 swap_buf(data, r, 16);
409
410 SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
411
412 return err;
413 }
414
415 static int smp_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
416 const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
417 const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
418 {
419 u8 p1[16], p2[16];
420 int err;
421
422 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
423 SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
424 SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
425
426 memset(p1, 0, 16);
427
428 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
429 p1[0] = _iat;
430 p1[1] = _rat;
431 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
432 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
433
434 SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
435
436 /* res = r XOR p1 */
437 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
438
439 /* res = e(k, res) */
440 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
441 if (err) {
442 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
443 return err;
444 }
445
446 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
447 memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
448 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
449 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
450
451 SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
452
453 /* res = res XOR p2 */
454 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
455
456 /* res = e(k, res) */
457 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
458 if (err)
459 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
460
461 return err;
462 }
463
464 static int smp_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
465 const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
466 {
467 int err;
468
469 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
470 memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
471 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
472
473 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
474 if (err)
475 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
476
477 return err;
478 }
479
480 static int smp_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16],
481 const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
482 {
483 u8 _res[16];
484 int err;
485
486 /* r' = padding || r */
487 memcpy(_res, r, 3);
488 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
489
490 err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
491 if (err) {
492 BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
493 return err;
494 }
495
496 /* The output of the random address function ah is:
497 * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
498 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
499 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
500 * result of ah.
501 */
502 memcpy(res, _res, 3);
503
504 return 0;
505 }
506
507 bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
508 const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
509 {
510 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
511 struct smp_dev *smp;
512 u8 hash[3];
513 int err;
514
515 if (!chan || !chan->data)
516 return false;
517
518 smp = chan->data;
519
520 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
521
522 err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
523 if (err)
524 return false;
525
526 return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
527 }
528
529 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
530 {
531 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
532 struct smp_dev *smp;
533 int err;
534
535 if (!chan || !chan->data)
536 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
537
538 smp = chan->data;
539
540 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
541
542 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
543 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
544
545 err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
546 if (err < 0)
547 return err;
548
549 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
550
551 return 0;
552 }
553
554 int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
555 {
556 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
557 struct smp_dev *smp;
558 int err;
559
560 if (!chan || !chan->data)
561 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
562
563 smp = chan->data;
564
565 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
566 BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
567 err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
568 if (err)
569 return err;
570 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
571 smp->debug_key = true;
572 } else {
573 while (true) {
574 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
575 err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
576 if (err)
577 return err;
578
579 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
580 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
581 */
582 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
583 break;
584 }
585 smp->debug_key = false;
586 }
587
588 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
589 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
590
591 get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
592
593 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
594 smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
595 if (err < 0)
596 return err;
597
598 memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
599
600 smp->local_oob = true;
601
602 return 0;
603 }
604
605 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
606 {
607 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
608 struct smp_chan *smp;
609 struct kvec iv[2];
610 struct msghdr msg;
611
612 if (!chan)
613 return;
614
615 BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
616
617 iv[0].iov_base = &code;
618 iv[0].iov_len = 1;
619
620 iv[1].iov_base = data;
621 iv[1].iov_len = len;
622
623 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
624
625 iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, iv, 2, 1 + len);
626
627 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
628
629 if (!chan->data)
630 return;
631
632 smp = chan->data;
633
634 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
635 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
636 }
637
638 static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
639 {
640 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
641 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
642 return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
643 else
644 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
645 } else {
646 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
647 }
648 }
649
650 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
651 {
652 switch (sec_level) {
653 case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
654 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
655 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
656 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
657 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
658 default:
659 return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
660 }
661 }
662
663 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
664 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
665 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
666 {
667 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
668 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
669 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
670 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
671 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
672
673 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
674 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
675 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
676 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
677 } else {
678 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
679 }
680
681 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
682 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
683
684 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
685 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
686
687 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
688 (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
689 struct oob_data *oob_data;
690 u8 bdaddr_type;
691
692 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
693 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
694 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
695 }
696
697 if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
698 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
699 else
700 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
701
702 oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
703 bdaddr_type);
704 if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
705 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
706 oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
707 memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
708 memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
709 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
710 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
711 }
712
713 } else {
714 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
715 }
716
717 if (rsp == NULL) {
718 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
719 req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
720 req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
721 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
722 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
723 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
724
725 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
726 return;
727 }
728
729 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
730 rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
731 rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
732 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
733 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
734 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
735
736 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
737 }
738
739 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
740 {
741 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
742 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
743 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
744
745 if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
746 max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
747 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
748
749 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
750
751 return 0;
752 }
753
754 static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
755 {
756 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
757 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
758 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
759 bool complete;
760
761 BUG_ON(!smp);
762
763 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
764
765 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
766 mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
767
768 kzfree(smp->csrk);
769 kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
770 kzfree(smp->link_key);
771
772 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
773 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
774 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
775
776 /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
777 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
778 */
779 if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
780 !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
781 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
782 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
783 smp->ltk = NULL;
784 }
785
786 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
787 if (!complete) {
788 if (smp->ltk) {
789 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
790 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
791 }
792
793 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
794 list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
795 kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
796 }
797
798 if (smp->remote_irk) {
799 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
800 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
801 }
802 }
803
804 chan->data = NULL;
805 kzfree(smp);
806 hci_conn_drop(hcon);
807 }
808
809 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
810 {
811 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
812 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
813
814 if (reason)
815 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
816 &reason);
817
818 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
819
820 if (chan->data)
821 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
822 }
823
824 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00
825 #define JUST_CFM 0x01
826 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
827 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
828 #define REQ_OOB 0x04
829 #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
830 #define OVERLAP 0xFF
831
832 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
833 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
834 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
835 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
836 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
837 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
838 };
839
840 static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
841 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
842 { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
843 { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
844 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
845 { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
846 };
847
848 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
849 {
850 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
851 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
852 */
853 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
854 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
855 return JUST_CFM;
856
857 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
858 return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
859
860 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
861 }
862
863 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
864 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
865 {
866 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
867 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
868 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
869 u32 passkey = 0;
870 int ret = 0;
871
872 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
873 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
874 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
875
876 BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
877
878 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
879 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
880 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
881 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
882 * table.
883 */
884 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
885 smp->method = JUST_CFM;
886 else
887 smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
888
889 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
890 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
891 &smp->flags))
892 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
893
894 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
895 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
896 hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
897 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
898
899 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
900 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
901 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
902 return 0;
903 }
904
905 /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
906 * can only recover the just-works case.
907 */
908 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
909 return -EINVAL;
910
911 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
912 if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
913 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
914 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
915 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
916 }
917
918 /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
919 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
920 */
921 if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
922 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
923 smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
924 else
925 smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
926 }
927
928 /* Generate random passkey. */
929 if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
930 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
931 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
932 passkey %= 1000000;
933 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
934 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
935 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
936 }
937
938 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
939 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
940 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
941 else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
942 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
943 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
944 passkey, 1);
945 else
946 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
947 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
948 passkey, 0);
949
950 return ret;
951 }
952
953 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
954 {
955 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
956 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
957 int ret;
958
959 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
960
961 ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
962 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
963 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
964 cp.confirm_val);
965 if (ret)
966 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
967
968 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
969
970 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
971
972 if (conn->hcon->out)
973 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
974 else
975 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
976
977 return 0;
978 }
979
980 static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
981 {
982 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
983 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
984 u8 confirm[16];
985 int ret;
986
987 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
988 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
989
990 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
991
992 ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
993 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
994 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
995 if (ret)
996 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
997
998 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) {
999 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed "
1000 "(confirmation values mismatch)");
1001 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1002 }
1003
1004 if (hcon->out) {
1005 u8 stk[16];
1006 __le64 rand = 0;
1007 __le16 ediv = 0;
1008
1009 smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
1010
1011 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
1012 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1013
1014 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
1015 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
1016 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
1017 } else {
1018 u8 stk[16], auth;
1019 __le64 rand = 0;
1020 __le16 ediv = 0;
1021
1022 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1023 smp->prnd);
1024
1025 smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
1026
1027 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1028 auth = 1;
1029 else
1030 auth = 0;
1031
1032 /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
1033 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
1034 * STK never needs to be stored).
1035 */
1036 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1037 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1038 }
1039
1040 return 0;
1041 }
1042
1043 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1044 {
1045 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1046 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1047 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1048 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1049 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1050 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1051 bool persistent;
1052
1053 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1054 if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1055 persistent = false;
1056 else
1057 persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
1058 &hcon->flags);
1059 } else {
1060 /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
1061 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
1062 * authentication requests.
1063 */
1064 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
1065 SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
1066 }
1067
1068 if (smp->remote_irk) {
1069 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
1070
1071 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
1072 * identity address track the connection based on it
1073 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
1074 */
1075 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
1076 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
1077 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
1078 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
1079 }
1080 }
1081
1082 if (smp->csrk) {
1083 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1084 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1085 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
1086 }
1087
1088 if (smp->slave_csrk) {
1089 smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1090 bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1091 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
1092 }
1093
1094 if (smp->ltk) {
1095 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1096 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1097 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
1098 }
1099
1100 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
1101 smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1102 bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1103 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
1104 }
1105
1106 if (smp->link_key) {
1107 struct link_key *key;
1108 u8 type;
1109
1110 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1111 type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
1112 else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1113 type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1114 else
1115 type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1116
1117 key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
1118 smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
1119 if (key) {
1120 mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
1121
1122 /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
1123 * flag is not set.
1124 */
1125 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
1126 key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
1127 list_del_rcu(&key->list);
1128 kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
1129 }
1130 }
1131 }
1132 }
1133
1134 static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1135 {
1136 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1137 u8 key_type, auth;
1138
1139 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1140 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
1141 else
1142 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
1143
1144 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1145 auth = 1;
1146 else
1147 auth = 0;
1148
1149 smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1150 key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1151 0, 0);
1152 }
1153
1154 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1155 {
1156 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */
1157 const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
1158
1159 smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
1160 if (!smp->link_key)
1161 return;
1162
1163 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1164 /* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
1165 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1166
1167 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
1168 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1169 smp->link_key = NULL;
1170 return;
1171 }
1172 } else {
1173 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */
1174 const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1175
1176 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
1177 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1178 smp->link_key = NULL;
1179 return;
1180 }
1181 }
1182
1183 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
1184 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1185 smp->link_key = NULL;
1186 return;
1187 }
1188 }
1189
1190 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
1191 {
1192 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
1193 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
1194 * them in the correct order.
1195 */
1196 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
1197 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
1198 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
1199 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
1200 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1201 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
1202 }
1203
1204 static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1205 {
1206 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */
1207 const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
1208 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1209 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1210 struct link_key *key;
1211
1212 key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
1213 if (!key) {
1214 bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK");
1215 return;
1216 }
1217
1218 if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1219 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1220
1221 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1222 /* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
1223 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1224
1225 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
1226 return;
1227 } else {
1228 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */
1229 const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1230
1231 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
1232 return;
1233 }
1234
1235 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
1236 return;
1237
1238 sc_add_ltk(smp);
1239 }
1240
1241 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
1242 {
1243 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
1244 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1245 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1246 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1247 __u8 *keydist;
1248
1249 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1250
1251 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1252
1253 /* The responder sends its keys first */
1254 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
1255 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1256 return;
1257 }
1258
1259 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1260
1261 if (hcon->out) {
1262 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
1263 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
1264 } else {
1265 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
1266 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
1267 }
1268
1269 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1270 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
1271 sc_generate_link_key(smp);
1272 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
1273 sc_generate_ltk(smp);
1274
1275 /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
1276 *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1277 }
1278
1279 BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
1280
1281 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
1282 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
1283 struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
1284 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
1285 u8 authenticated;
1286 __le16 ediv;
1287 __le64 rand;
1288
1289 /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
1290 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
1291 * of the value to zeroes.
1292 */
1293 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
1294 memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
1295 sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
1296
1297 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
1298 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
1299
1300 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
1301
1302 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1303 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1304 SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
1305 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1306 smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
1307
1308 ident.ediv = ediv;
1309 ident.rand = rand;
1310
1311 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
1312
1313 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1314 }
1315
1316 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
1317 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
1318 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
1319
1320 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
1321
1322 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
1323
1324 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
1325 * after the connection has been established.
1326 *
1327 * This is true even when the connection has been
1328 * established using a resolvable random address.
1329 */
1330 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
1331 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
1332
1333 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
1334 &addrinfo);
1335
1336 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1337 }
1338
1339 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
1340 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
1341 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1342
1343 /* Generate a new random key */
1344 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
1345
1346 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1347 if (csrk) {
1348 if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
1349 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
1350 else
1351 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
1352 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1353 }
1354 smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
1355
1356 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
1357
1358 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1359 }
1360
1361 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
1362 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
1363 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1364 return;
1365 }
1366
1367 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
1368 smp_notify_keys(conn);
1369
1370 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
1371 }
1372
1373 static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
1374 {
1375 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
1376 security_timer.work);
1377 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1378
1379 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1380
1381 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
1382 }
1383
1384 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1385 {
1386 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1387 struct smp_chan *smp;
1388
1389 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
1390 if (!smp)
1391 return NULL;
1392
1393 smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
1394 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
1395 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
1396 goto zfree_smp;
1397 }
1398
1399 smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
1400 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
1401 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
1402 goto free_cipher;
1403 }
1404
1405 smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
1406 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
1407 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
1408 goto free_shash;
1409 }
1410
1411 smp->conn = conn;
1412 chan->data = smp;
1413
1414 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
1415
1416 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
1417
1418 hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
1419
1420 return smp;
1421
1422 free_shash:
1423 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
1424 free_cipher:
1425 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
1426 zfree_smp:
1427 kzfree(smp);
1428 return NULL;
1429 }
1430
1431 static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
1432 {
1433 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1434 u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
1435
1436 if (hcon->out) {
1437 na = smp->prnd;
1438 nb = smp->rrnd;
1439 } else {
1440 na = smp->rrnd;
1441 nb = smp->prnd;
1442 }
1443
1444 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1445 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1446 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1447 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1448
1449 return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
1450 }
1451
1452 static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
1453 {
1454 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1455 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
1456 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
1457 u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
1458
1459 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1460 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1461 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1462 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1463
1464 if (hcon->out) {
1465 local_addr = a;
1466 remote_addr = b;
1467 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
1468 } else {
1469 local_addr = b;
1470 remote_addr = a;
1471 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
1472 }
1473
1474 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
1475
1476 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1477 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
1478
1479 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
1480 memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
1481
1482 smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
1483 local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
1484
1485 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
1486 }
1487
1488 static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1489 {
1490 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1491 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1492 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
1493 u8 r;
1494
1495 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1496 r |= 0x80;
1497
1498 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1499
1500 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
1501 cfm.confirm_val))
1502 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1503
1504 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
1505
1506 return 0;
1507 }
1508
1509 static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
1510 {
1511 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1512 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1513 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1514 u8 cfm[16], r;
1515
1516 /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
1517 if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
1518 return 0;
1519
1520 switch (smp_op) {
1521 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
1522 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1523 r |= 0x80;
1524
1525 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
1526 smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
1527 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1528
1529 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
1530 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1531
1532 smp->passkey_round++;
1533
1534 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
1535 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
1536 if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
1537 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1538 }
1539
1540 /* The round is only complete when the initiator
1541 * receives pairing random.
1542 */
1543 if (!hcon->out) {
1544 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1545 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1546 if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
1547 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1548 else
1549 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1550 return 0;
1551 }
1552
1553 /* Start the next round */
1554 if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
1555 return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
1556
1557 /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
1558 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1559 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1560
1561 break;
1562
1563 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
1564 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
1565 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1566 return 0;
1567 }
1568
1569 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1570
1571 if (hcon->out) {
1572 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1573 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1574 return 0;
1575 }
1576
1577 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1578
1579 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
1580 default:
1581 /* Initiating device starts the round */
1582 if (!hcon->out)
1583 return 0;
1584
1585 BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
1586 smp->passkey_round + 1);
1587
1588 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1589
1590 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1591 }
1592
1593 return 0;
1594 }
1595
1596 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1597 {
1598 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1599 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1600 u8 smp_op;
1601
1602 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
1603
1604 switch (mgmt_op) {
1605 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1606 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1607 return 0;
1608 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1609 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
1610 return 0;
1611 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1612 hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1613 smp->passkey_round = 0;
1614
1615 if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
1616 smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
1617 else
1618 smp_op = 0;
1619
1620 if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
1621 return -EIO;
1622
1623 return 0;
1624 }
1625
1626 /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
1627 if (hcon->out) {
1628 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1629 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1630 } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1631 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1632 sc_add_ltk(smp);
1633 }
1634
1635 return 0;
1636 }
1637
1638 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1639 {
1640 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
1641 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
1642 struct smp_chan *smp;
1643 u32 value;
1644 int err;
1645
1646 BT_DBG("");
1647
1648 if (!conn)
1649 return -ENOTCONN;
1650
1651 chan = conn->smp;
1652 if (!chan)
1653 return -ENOTCONN;
1654
1655 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
1656 if (!chan->data) {
1657 err = -ENOTCONN;
1658 goto unlock;
1659 }
1660
1661 smp = chan->data;
1662
1663 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1664 err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
1665 goto unlock;
1666 }
1667
1668 switch (mgmt_op) {
1669 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1670 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1671 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
1672 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
1673 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
1674 /* Fall Through */
1675 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
1676 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
1677 break;
1678 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1679 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1680 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1681 err = 0;
1682 goto unlock;
1683 default:
1684 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1685 err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
1686 goto unlock;
1687 }
1688
1689 err = 0;
1690
1691 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
1692 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1693 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
1694 if (rsp)
1695 smp_failure(conn, rsp);
1696 }
1697
1698 unlock:
1699 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
1700 return err;
1701 }
1702
1703 static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
1704 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
1705 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
1706 {
1707 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1708 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1709 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
1710
1711 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
1712 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1713 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1714 }
1715
1716 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
1717 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1718
1719 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
1720 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1721
1722 if (!rsp) {
1723 memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
1724
1725 req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1726 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
1727 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
1728 req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1729
1730 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
1731
1732 return;
1733 }
1734
1735 memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
1736
1737 rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1738 rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1739 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
1740 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
1741
1742 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
1743 }
1744
1745 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1746 {
1747 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
1748 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1749 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1750 struct smp_chan *smp;
1751 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
1752 int ret;
1753
1754 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1755
1756 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
1757 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1758
1759 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
1760 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1761
1762 if (!chan->data)
1763 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
1764 else
1765 smp = chan->data;
1766
1767 if (!smp)
1768 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1769
1770 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
1771 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1772
1773 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
1774 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
1775 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1776
1777 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1778 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1779
1780 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1781 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
1782 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
1783
1784 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1785 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1786 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1787 */
1788 if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1789 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1790
1791 /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
1792 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1793 /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
1794 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
1795 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
1796 return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
1797
1798 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1799
1800 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
1801
1802 if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1803 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1804
1805 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1806 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1807 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1808
1809 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1810 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1811
1812 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1813 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1814 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1815
1816 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1817 return 0;
1818 }
1819
1820 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
1821
1822 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) {
1823 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1824
1825 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1826 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1827 }
1828
1829 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1830 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
1831 else
1832 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
1833
1834 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
1835 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
1836
1837 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1838 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1839 u8 method;
1840
1841 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
1842 req->io_capability);
1843 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1844 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1845 }
1846
1847 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1848 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1849 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1850
1851 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1852
1853 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1854 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1855
1856 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1857
1858 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
1859
1860 /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
1861 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
1862 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
1863 * positive SC enablement.
1864 */
1865 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1866
1867 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1868 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1869 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1870 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1871 /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
1872 return 0;
1873 }
1874
1875 /* Request setup of TK */
1876 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
1877 if (ret)
1878 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1879
1880 return 0;
1881 }
1882
1883 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1884 {
1885 struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
1886
1887 BT_DBG("");
1888
1889 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
1890 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
1891 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
1892
1893 if (!chan || !chan->data)
1894 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1895
1896 smp_dev = chan->data;
1897
1898 memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
1899 memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
1900
1901 if (smp_dev->debug_key)
1902 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1903
1904 goto done;
1905 }
1906
1907 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
1908 BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
1909 if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
1910 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1911 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
1912 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1913 } else {
1914 while (true) {
1915 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
1916 if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
1917 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1918
1919 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
1920 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
1921 */
1922 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
1923 break;
1924 }
1925 }
1926
1927 done:
1928 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
1929 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
1930
1931 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
1932
1933 return 0;
1934 }
1935
1936 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1937 {
1938 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
1939 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1940 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1941 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1942 u8 key_size, auth;
1943 int ret;
1944
1945 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1946
1947 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
1948 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1949
1950 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
1951 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1952
1953 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
1954
1955 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1956
1957 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
1958 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1959 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1960
1961 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1962
1963 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1964 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1965
1966 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1967 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1968 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1969 */
1970 if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
1971 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1972
1973 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1974 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
1975
1976 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1977 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1978 */
1979 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1980
1981 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2))
1982 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1983
1984 /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
1985 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1986 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1987 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1988 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1989 return 0;
1990 }
1991
1992 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1993 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1994 else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1995 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1996
1997 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1998 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1999 u8 method;
2000
2001 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
2002 rsp->io_capability);
2003 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
2004 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2005 }
2006
2007 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
2008
2009 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
2010 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
2011 */
2012 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
2013
2014 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2015 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
2016 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
2017 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2018 return sc_send_public_key(smp);
2019 }
2020
2021 auth |= req->auth_req;
2022
2023 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
2024 if (ret)
2025 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2026
2027 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2028
2029 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
2030 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2031 return smp_confirm(smp);
2032
2033 return 0;
2034 }
2035
2036 static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
2037 {
2038 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2039
2040 BT_DBG("");
2041
2042 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2043 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2044
2045 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2046 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2047 smp->prnd);
2048 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2049 }
2050
2051 return 0;
2052 }
2053
2054 /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
2055 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
2056 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
2057 */
2058 static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
2059 {
2060 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2061 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2062 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2063 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
2064 u8 auth;
2065
2066 /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
2067 if (hcon->out)
2068 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2069
2070 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
2071 bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
2072 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2073 }
2074
2075 bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
2076
2077 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2078 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2079
2080 /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
2081 smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
2082
2083 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2084
2085 if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
2086 bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
2087 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2088 }
2089
2090 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2091
2092 return 0;
2093 }
2094
2095 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2096 {
2097 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2098 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2099
2100 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
2101
2102 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
2103 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2104
2105 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2106 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2107
2108 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2109 int ret;
2110
2111 /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
2112 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
2113 return sc_check_confirm(smp);
2114
2115 BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
2116
2117 ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
2118 if (ret)
2119 return ret;
2120 }
2121
2122 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2123 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2124 smp->prnd);
2125 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2126 return 0;
2127 }
2128
2129 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2130 return smp_confirm(smp);
2131
2132 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2133
2134 return 0;
2135 }
2136
2137 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2138 {
2139 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2140 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2141 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2142 u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
2143 u32 passkey;
2144 int err;
2145
2146 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2147
2148 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
2149 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2150
2151 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2152 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2153
2154 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
2155 return smp_random(smp);
2156
2157 if (hcon->out) {
2158 pkax = smp->local_pk;
2159 pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
2160 na = smp->prnd;
2161 nb = smp->rrnd;
2162 } else {
2163 pkax = smp->remote_pk;
2164 pkbx = smp->local_pk;
2165 na = smp->rrnd;
2166 nb = smp->prnd;
2167 }
2168
2169 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2170 if (!hcon->out)
2171 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2172 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2173 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2174 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2175 }
2176
2177 /* Passkey entry has special treatment */
2178 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2179 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2180
2181 if (hcon->out) {
2182 u8 cfm[16];
2183
2184 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
2185 smp->rrnd, 0, cfm);
2186 if (err)
2187 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2188
2189 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
2190 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2191 } else {
2192 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2193 smp->prnd);
2194 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2195 }
2196
2197 mackey_and_ltk:
2198 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
2199 err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
2200 if (err)
2201 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2202
2203 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2204 if (hcon->out) {
2205 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2206 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2207 }
2208 return 0;
2209 }
2210
2211 err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
2212 if (err)
2213 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2214
2215 err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2216 hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
2217 if (err)
2218 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2219
2220 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2221
2222 return 0;
2223 }
2224
2225 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
2226 {
2227 struct smp_ltk *key;
2228 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2229
2230 key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
2231 if (!key)
2232 return false;
2233
2234 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
2235 return false;
2236
2237 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
2238 return true;
2239
2240 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
2241 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
2242
2243 /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
2244 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
2245
2246 return true;
2247 }
2248
2249 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
2250 enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
2251 {
2252 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
2253 return true;
2254
2255 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
2256 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
2257 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
2258 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
2259 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
2260 */
2261 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
2262 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
2263 hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
2264 return false;
2265
2266 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
2267 return true;
2268
2269 return false;
2270 }
2271
2272 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2273 {
2274 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2275 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2276 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2277 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2278 struct smp_chan *smp;
2279 u8 sec_level, auth;
2280
2281 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2282
2283 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2284 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2285
2286 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2287 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2288
2289 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2290
2291 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
2292 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2293
2294 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
2295 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2296 else
2297 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
2298
2299 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) {
2300 /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we
2301 * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3,
2302 * Part H 2.4.6
2303 */
2304 smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level);
2305 return 0;
2306 }
2307
2308 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2309 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2310
2311 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2312 return 0;
2313
2314 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2315 if (!smp)
2316 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2317
2318 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
2319 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
2320 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2321
2322 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2323
2324 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
2325 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
2326
2327 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2328 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2329
2330 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2331 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2332
2333 return 0;
2334 }
2335
2336 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
2337 {
2338 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2339 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2340 struct smp_chan *smp;
2341 __u8 authreq;
2342 int ret;
2343
2344 BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
2345
2346 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
2347 if (!conn)
2348 return 1;
2349
2350 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2351 return 1;
2352
2353 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2354 return 1;
2355
2356 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2357 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2358
2359 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2360 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2361 return 0;
2362
2363 chan = conn->smp;
2364 if (!chan) {
2365 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available");
2366 return 1;
2367 }
2368
2369 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2370
2371 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
2372 if (chan->data) {
2373 ret = 0;
2374 goto unlock;
2375 }
2376
2377 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2378 if (!smp) {
2379 ret = 1;
2380 goto unlock;
2381 }
2382
2383 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
2384
2385 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) {
2386 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
2387 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED))
2388 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
2389 }
2390
2391 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
2392 * requires it.
2393 */
2394 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
2395 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2396 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
2397
2398 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
2399 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2400
2401 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
2402 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2403 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2404
2405 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2406 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2407 } else {
2408 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
2409 cp.auth_req = authreq;
2410 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2411 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
2412 }
2413
2414 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
2415 ret = 0;
2416
2417 unlock:
2418 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2419 return ret;
2420 }
2421
2422 int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
2423 u8 addr_type)
2424 {
2425 struct hci_conn *hcon;
2426 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
2427 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2428 struct smp_chan *smp;
2429 int err;
2430
2431 err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2432 hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2433
2434 hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
2435 if (!hcon)
2436 goto done;
2437
2438 conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2439 if (!conn)
2440 goto done;
2441
2442 chan = conn->smp;
2443 if (!chan)
2444 goto done;
2445
2446 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2447
2448 smp = chan->data;
2449 if (smp) {
2450 /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
2451 * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
2452 smp->ltk = NULL;
2453 smp->slave_ltk = NULL;
2454 smp->remote_irk = NULL;
2455
2456 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
2457 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2458 else
2459 smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
2460 err = 0;
2461 }
2462
2463 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2464
2465 done:
2466 return err;
2467 }
2468
2469 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2470 {
2471 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2472 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2473 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2474
2475 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2476
2477 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2478 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2479
2480 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
2481
2482 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2483
2484 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
2485
2486 return 0;
2487 }
2488
2489 static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2490 {
2491 struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2492 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2493 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2494 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
2495 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2496 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
2497 u8 authenticated;
2498
2499 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2500
2501 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2502 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2503
2504 /* Mark the information as received */
2505 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
2506
2507 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
2508 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
2509 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2510 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2511
2512 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2513
2514 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
2515 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
2516 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
2517 rp->ediv, rp->rand);
2518 smp->ltk = ltk;
2519 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2520 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2521
2522 return 0;
2523 }
2524
2525 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2526 {
2527 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2528 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2529 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2530
2531 BT_DBG("");
2532
2533 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2534 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2535
2536 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
2537
2538 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2539
2540 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
2541
2542 return 0;
2543 }
2544
2545 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2546 struct sk_buff *skb)
2547 {
2548 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2549 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2550 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2551 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2552 bdaddr_t rpa;
2553
2554 BT_DBG("");
2555
2556 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2557 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2558
2559 /* Mark the information as received */
2560 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
2561
2562 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2563 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2564
2565 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2566
2567 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
2568 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
2569 * as "identity information". However, since such
2570 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
2571 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
2572 * received an IRK for such a device.
2573 *
2574 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
2575 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
2576 */
2577 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
2578 !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
2579 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address");
2580 goto distribute;
2581 }
2582
2583 /* Drop IRK if peer is using identity address during pairing but is
2584 * providing different address as identity information.
2585 *
2586 * Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse is known to have this bug.
2587 */
2588 if (hci_is_identity_address(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type) &&
2589 (bacmp(&info->bdaddr, &hcon->dst) ||
2590 info->addr_type != hcon->dst_type)) {
2591 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev,
2592 "ignoring IRK with invalid identity address");
2593 goto distribute;
2594 }
2595
2596 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
2597 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
2598
2599 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
2600 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
2601 else
2602 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
2603
2604 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
2605 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
2606
2607 distribute:
2608 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2609 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2610
2611 return 0;
2612 }
2613
2614 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2615 {
2616 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2617 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2618 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2619 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
2620
2621 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2622
2623 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2624 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2625
2626 /* Mark the information as received */
2627 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
2628
2629 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2630
2631 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
2632 if (csrk) {
2633 if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2634 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
2635 else
2636 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
2637 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
2638 }
2639 smp->csrk = csrk;
2640 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2641
2642 return 0;
2643 }
2644
2645 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
2646 {
2647 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2648 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2649 struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
2650 u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
2651
2652 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
2653 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
2654 return REQ_OOB;
2655
2656 /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
2657 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
2658 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
2659 * first byte which contains the opcode.
2660 */
2661 if (hcon->out) {
2662 local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2663 remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2664 } else {
2665 local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2666 remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2667 }
2668
2669 local_io = local->io_capability;
2670 remote_io = remote->io_capability;
2671
2672 local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2673 remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2674
2675 /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
2676 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
2677 */
2678 if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
2679 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
2680 else
2681 method = JUST_WORKS;
2682
2683 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
2684 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
2685 method = JUST_WORKS;
2686
2687 return method;
2688 }
2689
2690 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2691 {
2692 struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
2693 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2694 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2695 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2696 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2697 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
2698 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
2699 int err;
2700
2701 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2702
2703 if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
2704 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2705
2706 memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
2707
2708 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2709 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
2710 smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2711 if (err)
2712 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2713
2714 if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
2715 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2716 }
2717
2718 /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
2719 * the key from the initiating device.
2720 */
2721 if (!hcon->out) {
2722 err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
2723 if (err)
2724 return err;
2725 }
2726
2727 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
2728 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
2729
2730 /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
2731 * key was set/generated.
2732 */
2733 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2734 struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data;
2735 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
2736
2737 if (!hchan || !hchan->data)
2738 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2739
2740 smp_dev = hchan->data;
2741
2742 tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
2743 } else {
2744 tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
2745 }
2746
2747 if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
2748 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2749
2750 SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
2751
2752 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
2753
2754 smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
2755
2756 BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
2757
2758 /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
2759 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
2760 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2761 else
2762 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
2763
2764 if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
2765 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
2766
2767 if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
2768 get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
2769 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
2770 hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
2771 hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
2772 smp->passkey_round = 0;
2773 if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2774 hcon->dst_type,
2775 hcon->passkey_notify,
2776 hcon->passkey_entered))
2777 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2778 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2779 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2780 }
2781
2782 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2783 if (hcon->out)
2784 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2785 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2786
2787 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2788
2789 return 0;
2790 }
2791
2792 if (hcon->out)
2793 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2794
2795 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
2796 if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2797 hcon->dst_type))
2798 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2799 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2800 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2801 return 0;
2802 }
2803
2804 /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
2805 * send the confirm value.
2806 */
2807 if (conn->hcon->out)
2808 return 0;
2809
2810 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
2811 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2812 if (err)
2813 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2814
2815 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
2816 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2817
2818 return 0;
2819 }
2820
2821 static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2822 {
2823 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
2824 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2825 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2826 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2827 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
2828 u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
2829 int err;
2830
2831 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2832
2833 if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
2834 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2835
2836 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
2837 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
2838 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
2839 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
2840
2841 if (hcon->out) {
2842 local_addr = a;
2843 remote_addr = b;
2844 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
2845 } else {
2846 local_addr = b;
2847 remote_addr = a;
2848 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
2849 }
2850
2851 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
2852
2853 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2854 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
2855 else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
2856 memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
2857
2858 err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
2859 io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
2860 if (err)
2861 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2862
2863 if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
2864 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
2865
2866 if (!hcon->out) {
2867 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
2868 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2869 return 0;
2870 }
2871
2872 /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
2873 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2874 }
2875
2876 sc_add_ltk(smp);
2877
2878 if (hcon->out) {
2879 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
2880 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
2881 }
2882
2883 return 0;
2884 }
2885
2886 static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2887 struct sk_buff *skb)
2888 {
2889 struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
2890
2891 BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
2892
2893 return 0;
2894 }
2895
2896 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
2897 {
2898 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2899 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2900 struct smp_chan *smp;
2901 __u8 code, reason;
2902 int err = 0;
2903
2904 if (skb->len < 1)
2905 return -EILSEQ;
2906
2907 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
2908 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2909 goto done;
2910 }
2911
2912 code = skb->data[0];
2913 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
2914
2915 smp = chan->data;
2916
2917 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
2918 goto drop;
2919
2920 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
2921 goto drop;
2922
2923 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
2924 * pairing request and security request.
2925 */
2926 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
2927 goto drop;
2928
2929 switch (code) {
2930 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
2931 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
2932 break;
2933
2934 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
2935 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2936 err = -EPERM;
2937 break;
2938
2939 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
2940 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
2941 break;
2942
2943 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
2944 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
2945 break;
2946
2947 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
2948 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
2949 break;
2950
2951 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
2952 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
2953 break;
2954
2955 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
2956 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
2957 break;
2958
2959 case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
2960 reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
2961 break;
2962
2963 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
2964 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
2965 break;
2966
2967 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
2968 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
2969 break;
2970
2971 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
2972 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
2973 break;
2974
2975 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
2976 reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
2977 break;
2978
2979 case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
2980 reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
2981 break;
2982
2983 case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
2984 reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
2985 break;
2986
2987 default:
2988 BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
2989 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2990 goto done;
2991 }
2992
2993 done:
2994 if (!err) {
2995 if (reason)
2996 smp_failure(conn, reason);
2997 kfree_skb(skb);
2998 }
2999
3000 return err;
3001
3002 drop:
3003 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR",
3004 code, &hcon->dst);
3005 kfree_skb(skb);
3006 return 0;
3007 }
3008
3009 static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
3010 {
3011 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3012
3013 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3014
3015 if (chan->data)
3016 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
3017
3018 conn->smp = NULL;
3019 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3020 }
3021
3022 static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3023 {
3024 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3025 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3026 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
3027 struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
3028 struct smp_chan *smp;
3029
3030 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3031
3032 /* Only new pairings are interesting */
3033 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
3034 return;
3035
3036 /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
3037 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3038 return;
3039
3040 /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
3041 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
3042 return;
3043
3044 /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
3045 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
3046 return;
3047
3048 /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
3049 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
3050 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3051 return;
3052
3053 /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
3054 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
3055 return;
3056
3057 /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
3058 if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
3059 return;
3060
3061 /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
3062 if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
3063 return;
3064
3065 /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
3066 if (chan->data)
3067 return;
3068
3069 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
3070 if (!smp) {
3071 bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR");
3072 return;
3073 }
3074
3075 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
3076
3077 BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
3078
3079 /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
3080 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
3081
3082 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
3083 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
3084
3085 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
3086 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
3087 }
3088
3089 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3090 {
3091 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3092 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3093 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3094
3095 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3096
3097 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
3098 bredr_pairing(chan);
3099 return;
3100 }
3101
3102 if (!smp)
3103 return;
3104
3105 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3106 return;
3107
3108 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
3109
3110 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
3111 }
3112
3113 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3114 {
3115 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3116 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3117
3118 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3119
3120 /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
3121 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
3122 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
3123 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
3124 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
3125 */
3126 conn->smp = chan;
3127
3128 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3129 bredr_pairing(chan);
3130 }
3131
3132 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
3133 {
3134 int err;
3135
3136 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3137
3138 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
3139 if (err) {
3140 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3141
3142 if (smp)
3143 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
3144
3145 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
3146 }
3147
3148 return err;
3149 }
3150
3151 static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
3152 unsigned long hdr_len,
3153 unsigned long len, int nb)
3154 {
3155 struct sk_buff *skb;
3156
3157 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
3158 if (!skb)
3159 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3160
3161 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
3162 bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
3163
3164 return skb;
3165 }
3166
3167 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
3168 .name = "Security Manager",
3169 .ready = smp_ready_cb,
3170 .recv = smp_recv_cb,
3171 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
3172 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
3173 .resume = smp_resume_cb,
3174
3175 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
3176 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3177 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3178 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3179 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3180 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3181 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3182 };
3183
3184 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
3185 {
3186 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3187
3188 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
3189
3190 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3191 if (!chan)
3192 return NULL;
3193
3194 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
3195 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
3196 chan->scid = pchan->scid;
3197 chan->dcid = chan->scid;
3198 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
3199 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
3200 chan->mode = pchan->mode;
3201
3202 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
3203 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
3204 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
3205 * warnings.
3206 */
3207 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
3208
3209 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
3210
3211 return chan;
3212 }
3213
3214 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
3215 .name = "Security Manager Root",
3216 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
3217
3218 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
3219 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3220 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
3221 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
3222 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3223 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
3224 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
3225 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3226 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3227 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
3228 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3229 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3230 };
3231
3232 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
3233 {
3234 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3235 struct smp_dev *smp;
3236 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
3237 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3238 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3239
3240 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
3241 smp = NULL;
3242 goto create_chan;
3243 }
3244
3245 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
3246 if (!smp)
3247 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3248
3249 tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3250 if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
3251 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
3252 kzfree(smp);
3253 return ERR_CAST(tfm_aes);
3254 }
3255
3256 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3257 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3258 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3259 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3260 kzfree(smp);
3261 return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
3262 }
3263
3264 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
3265 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3266 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3267 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3268 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3269 kzfree(smp);
3270 return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
3271 }
3272
3273 smp->local_oob = false;
3274 smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
3275 smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
3276 smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
3277
3278 create_chan:
3279 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3280 if (!chan) {
3281 if (smp) {
3282 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
3283 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3284 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3285 kzfree(smp);
3286 }
3287 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3288 }
3289
3290 chan->data = smp;
3291
3292 l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
3293
3294 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
3295
3296 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
3297 u8 bdaddr_type;
3298
3299 hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
3300
3301 if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
3302 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
3303 else
3304 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
3305 } else {
3306 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
3307 chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
3308 }
3309
3310 chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
3311 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
3312 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
3313 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
3314
3315 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
3316 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
3317
3318 return chan;
3319 }
3320
3321 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3322 {
3323 struct smp_dev *smp;
3324
3325 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3326
3327 smp = chan->data;
3328 if (smp) {
3329 chan->data = NULL;
3330 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
3331 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3332 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3333 kzfree(smp);
3334 }
3335
3336 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3337 }
3338
3339 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
3340 char __user *user_buf,
3341 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3342 {
3343 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3344 char buf[3];
3345
3346 buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
3347 buf[1] = '\n';
3348 buf[2] = '\0';
3349 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
3350 }
3351
3352 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
3353 const char __user *user_buf,
3354 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3355 {
3356 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3357 bool enable;
3358 int err;
3359
3360 err = kstrtobool_from_user(user_buf, count, &enable);
3361 if (err)
3362 return err;
3363
3364 if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3365 return -EALREADY;
3366
3367 if (enable) {
3368 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3369
3370 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3371 if (IS_ERR(chan))
3372 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3373
3374 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3375 } else {
3376 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3377
3378 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3379 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3380 smp_del_chan(chan);
3381 }
3382
3383 hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
3384
3385 return count;
3386 }
3387
3388 static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = {
3389 .open = simple_open,
3390 .read = force_bredr_smp_read,
3391 .write = force_bredr_smp_write,
3392 .llseek = default_llseek,
3393 };
3394
3395 static ssize_t le_min_key_size_read(struct file *file,
3396 char __user *user_buf,
3397 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3398 {
3399 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3400 char buf[4];
3401
3402 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", hdev->le_min_key_size);
3403
3404 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
3405 }
3406
3407 static ssize_t le_min_key_size_write(struct file *file,
3408 const char __user *user_buf,
3409 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3410 {
3411 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3412 char buf[32];
3413 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
3414 u8 key_size;
3415
3416 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3417 return -EFAULT;
3418
3419 buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3420
3421 sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
3422
3423 if (key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
3424 key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
3425 return -EINVAL;
3426
3427 hdev->le_min_key_size = key_size;
3428
3429 return count;
3430 }
3431
3432 static const struct file_operations le_min_key_size_fops = {
3433 .open = simple_open,
3434 .read = le_min_key_size_read,
3435 .write = le_min_key_size_write,
3436 .llseek = default_llseek,
3437 };
3438
3439 static ssize_t le_max_key_size_read(struct file *file,
3440 char __user *user_buf,
3441 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3442 {
3443 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3444 char buf[4];
3445
3446 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", hdev->le_max_key_size);
3447
3448 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
3449 }
3450
3451 static ssize_t le_max_key_size_write(struct file *file,
3452 const char __user *user_buf,
3453 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3454 {
3455 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3456 char buf[32];
3457 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
3458 u8 key_size;
3459
3460 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3461 return -EFAULT;
3462
3463 buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3464
3465 sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
3466
3467 if (key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE ||
3468 key_size < hdev->le_min_key_size)
3469 return -EINVAL;
3470
3471 hdev->le_max_key_size = key_size;
3472
3473 return count;
3474 }
3475
3476 static const struct file_operations le_max_key_size_fops = {
3477 .open = simple_open,
3478 .read = le_max_key_size_read,
3479 .write = le_max_key_size_write,
3480 .llseek = default_llseek,
3481 };
3482
3483 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3484 {
3485 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3486
3487 BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
3488
3489 /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
3490 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
3491 */
3492 if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
3493 return 0;
3494
3495 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
3496 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3497 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3498 smp_del_chan(chan);
3499 }
3500
3501 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
3502 if (IS_ERR(chan))
3503 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3504
3505 hdev->smp_data = chan;
3506
3507 debugfs_create_file("le_min_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
3508 &le_min_key_size_fops);
3509 debugfs_create_file("le_max_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
3510 &le_max_key_size_fops);
3511
3512 /* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
3513 * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
3514 *
3515 * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs
3516 * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting
3517 * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections.
3518 */
3519 if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
3520 debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs,
3521 hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops);
3522
3523 /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */
3524 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3525 return 0;
3526 }
3527
3528 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
3529 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3530 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3531 smp_del_chan(chan);
3532 }
3533
3534 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3535 if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
3536 int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
3537 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3538 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3539 smp_del_chan(chan);
3540 return err;
3541 }
3542
3543 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3544
3545 return 0;
3546 }
3547
3548 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3549 {
3550 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3551
3552 if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
3553 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3554 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3555 smp_del_chan(chan);
3556 }
3557
3558 if (hdev->smp_data) {
3559 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3560 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3561 smp_del_chan(chan);
3562 }
3563 }
3564
3565 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
3566
3567 static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3568 {
3569 u8 pk[64];
3570 int err;
3571
3572 err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
3573 if (err)
3574 return err;
3575
3576 err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
3577 if (err)
3578 return err;
3579
3580 if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
3581 return -EINVAL;
3582
3583 return 0;
3584 }
3585
3586 static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
3587 {
3588 const u8 irk[16] = {
3589 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3590 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3591 const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
3592 const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
3593 u8 res[3];
3594 int err;
3595
3596 err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res);
3597 if (err)
3598 return err;
3599
3600 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3))
3601 return -EINVAL;
3602
3603 return 0;
3604 }
3605
3606 static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
3607 {
3608 const u8 k[16] = {
3609 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3610 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3611 const u8 r[16] = {
3612 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
3613 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
3614 const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
3615 const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
3616 const u8 _iat = 0x01;
3617 const u8 _rat = 0x00;
3618 const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
3619 const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
3620 const u8 exp[16] = {
3621 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
3622 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
3623 u8 res[16];
3624 int err;
3625
3626 err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
3627 if (err)
3628 return err;
3629
3630 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3631 return -EINVAL;
3632
3633 return 0;
3634 }
3635
3636 static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
3637 {
3638 const u8 k[16] = {
3639 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3640 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3641 const u8 r1[16] = {
3642 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
3643 const u8 r2[16] = {
3644 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
3645 const u8 exp[16] = {
3646 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
3647 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
3648 u8 res[16];
3649 int err;
3650
3651 err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res);
3652 if (err)
3653 return err;
3654
3655 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3656 return -EINVAL;
3657
3658 return 0;
3659 }
3660
3661 static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3662 {
3663 const u8 u[32] = {
3664 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3665 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3666 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3667 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3668 const u8 v[32] = {
3669 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3670 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3671 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3672 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3673 const u8 x[16] = {
3674 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3675 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3676 const u8 z = 0x00;
3677 const u8 exp[16] = {
3678 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
3679 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
3680 u8 res[16];
3681 int err;
3682
3683 err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
3684 if (err)
3685 return err;
3686
3687 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3688 return -EINVAL;
3689
3690 return 0;
3691 }
3692
3693 static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3694 {
3695 const u8 w[32] = {
3696 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
3697 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
3698 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3699 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3700 const u8 n1[16] = {
3701 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3702 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3703 const u8 n2[16] = {
3704 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3705 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3706 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3707 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3708 const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
3709 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
3710 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
3711 const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
3712 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3713 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3714 u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
3715 int err;
3716
3717 err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
3718 if (err)
3719 return err;
3720
3721 if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
3722 return -EINVAL;
3723
3724 if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
3725 return -EINVAL;
3726
3727 return 0;
3728 }
3729
3730 static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3731 {
3732 const u8 w[16] = {
3733 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3734 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3735 const u8 n1[16] = {
3736 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3737 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3738 const u8 n2[16] = {
3739 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3740 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3741 const u8 r[16] = {
3742 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
3743 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
3744 const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
3745 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3746 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3747 const u8 exp[16] = {
3748 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
3749 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
3750 u8 res[16];
3751 int err;
3752
3753 err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
3754 if (err)
3755 return err;
3756
3757 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3758 return -EINVAL;
3759
3760 return 0;
3761 }
3762
3763 static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3764 {
3765 const u8 u[32] = {
3766 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3767 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3768 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3769 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3770 const u8 v[32] = {
3771 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3772 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3773 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3774 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3775 const u8 x[16] = {
3776 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3777 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3778 const u8 y[16] = {
3779 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3780 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3781 const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
3782 u32 val;
3783 int err;
3784
3785 err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
3786 if (err)
3787 return err;
3788
3789 if (val != exp_val)
3790 return -EINVAL;
3791
3792 return 0;
3793 }
3794
3795 static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3796 {
3797 const u8 w[16] = {
3798 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3799 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3800 const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
3801 const u8 exp[16] = {
3802 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
3803 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
3804 u8 res[16];
3805 int err;
3806
3807 err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
3808 if (err)
3809 return err;
3810
3811 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3812 return -EINVAL;
3813
3814 return 0;
3815 }
3816
3817 static char test_smp_buffer[32];
3818
3819 static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
3820 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3821 {
3822 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
3823 strlen(test_smp_buffer));
3824 }
3825
3826 static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
3827 .open = simple_open,
3828 .read = test_smp_read,
3829 .llseek = default_llseek,
3830 };
3831
3832 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes,
3833 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
3834 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3835 {
3836 ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
3837 unsigned long long duration;
3838 int err;
3839
3840 calltime = ktime_get();
3841
3842 err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh);
3843 if (err) {
3844 BT_ERR("debug_key test failed");
3845 goto done;
3846 }
3847
3848 err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
3849 if (err) {
3850 BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
3851 goto done;
3852 }
3853
3854 err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
3855 if (err) {
3856 BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
3857 goto done;
3858 }
3859
3860 err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
3861 if (err) {
3862 BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
3863 goto done;
3864 }
3865
3866 err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
3867 if (err) {
3868 BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
3869 goto done;
3870 }
3871
3872 err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
3873 if (err) {
3874 BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
3875 goto done;
3876 }
3877
3878 err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
3879 if (err) {
3880 BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
3881 goto done;
3882 }
3883
3884 err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
3885 if (err) {
3886 BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
3887 goto done;
3888 }
3889
3890 err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
3891 if (err) {
3892 BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
3893 goto done;
3894 }
3895
3896 rettime = ktime_get();
3897 delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
3898 duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
3899
3900 BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
3901
3902 done:
3903 if (!err)
3904 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
3905 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
3906 else
3907 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
3908
3909 debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
3910 &test_smp_fops);
3911
3912 return err;
3913 }
3914
3915 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
3916 {
3917 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
3918 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3919 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3920 int err;
3921
3922 tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3923 if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
3924 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
3925 return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
3926 }
3927
3928 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3929 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3930 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3931 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3932 return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
3933 }
3934
3935 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
3936 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3937 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3938 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3939 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3940 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
3941 }
3942
3943 err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
3944
3945 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3946 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3947 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);
3948
3949 return err;
3950 }
3951
3952 #endif
Linux with added FPC-III support