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rt2x00usb: fix anchor initialization
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / net / bluetooth / smp.c
blob43faf2aea2abbbd16f20a24c803a2f83dfeddc86
1 /*
2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
4
5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 published by the Free Software Foundation;
8
9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
17
18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
21 */
22
23 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
25 #include <linux/crypto.h>
26 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
27 #include <crypto/hash.h>
28
29 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
30 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
31 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
32 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
33
34 #include "ecc.h"
35 #include "smp.h"
36
37 #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
38 ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
39
40 /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
41 * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
42 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
43 */
44 #ifdef DEBUG
45 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
46 ##__VA_ARGS__)
47 #else
48 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
49 ##__VA_ARGS__)
50 #endif
51
52 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
53
54 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
55 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
56
57 #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
58
59 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
60 0x1f : 0x07)
61 #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
62
63 /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
64 #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
65
66 enum {
67 SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
68 SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING,
69 SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
70 SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
71 SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
72 SMP_FLAG_SC,
73 SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
74 SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
75 SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
76 SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
77 SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB,
78 SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB,
79 };
80
81 struct smp_dev {
82 /* Secure Connections OOB data */
83 u8 local_pk[64];
84 u8 local_sk[32];
85 u8 local_rand[16];
86 bool debug_key;
87
88 u8 min_key_size;
89 u8 max_key_size;
90
91 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
92 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
93 };
94
95 struct smp_chan {
96 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
97 struct delayed_work security_timer;
98 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
99
100 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
101 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
102 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
103 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
104 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
105 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
106 u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
107 u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
108 u8 enc_key_size;
109 u8 remote_key_dist;
110 bdaddr_t id_addr;
111 u8 id_addr_type;
112 u8 irk[16];
113 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
114 struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
115 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
116 struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
117 struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
118 u8 *link_key;
119 unsigned long flags;
120 u8 method;
121 u8 passkey_round;
122
123 /* Secure Connections variables */
124 u8 local_pk[64];
125 u8 local_sk[32];
126 u8 remote_pk[64];
127 u8 dhkey[32];
128 u8 mackey[16];
129
130 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
131 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
132 };
133
134 /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
135 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
136 * private debug key.
137 */
138 static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
139 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
140 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
141 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
142 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
143
144 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
145 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
146 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
147 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
148 };
149
150 static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
151 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
152 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
153 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
154 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
155 };
156
157 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
158 {
159 size_t i;
160
161 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
162 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
163 }
164
165 /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
166 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
167 */
168
169 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
170 size_t len, u8 mac[16])
171 {
172 uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
173 SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
174 int err;
175
176 if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
177 return -EFBIG;
178
179 if (!tfm) {
180 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
181 return -EINVAL;
182 }
183
184 desc->tfm = tfm;
185 desc->flags = 0;
186
187 /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
188 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
189 swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
190
191 SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
192 SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
193
194 err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
195 if (err) {
196 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
197 return err;
198 }
199
200 err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
201 shash_desc_zero(desc);
202 if (err) {
203 BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
204 return err;
205 }
206
207 swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
208
209 SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
210
211 return 0;
212 }
213
214 static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
215 const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
216 {
217 u8 m[65];
218 int err;
219
220 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
221 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
222 SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
223
224 m[0] = z;
225 memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
226 memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
227
228 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
229 if (err)
230 return err;
231
232 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
233
234 return err;
235 }
236
237 static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
238 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
239 const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
240 {
241 /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
242 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
243 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
244 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
245 * endian format.
246 */
247 const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
248 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
249 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
250 const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
251 u8 m[53], t[16];
252 int err;
253
254 SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
255 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
256 SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
257
258 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
259 if (err)
260 return err;
261
262 SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
263
264 memcpy(m, length, 2);
265 memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
266 memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
267 memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
268 memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
269 memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
270
271 m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
272
273 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
274 if (err)
275 return err;
276
277 SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
278
279 m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
280
281 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
282 if (err)
283 return err;
284
285 SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
286
287 return 0;
288 }
289
290 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
291 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
292 const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
293 u8 res[16])
294 {
295 u8 m[65];
296 int err;
297
298 SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
299 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
300 SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
301
302 memcpy(m, a2, 7);
303 memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
304 memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
305 memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
306 memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
307 memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
308
309 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
310 if (err)
311 return err;
312
313 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
314
315 return err;
316 }
317
318 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
319 const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
320 {
321 u8 m[80], tmp[16];
322 int err;
323
324 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
325 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
326 SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
327
328 memcpy(m, y, 16);
329 memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
330 memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
331
332 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
333 if (err)
334 return err;
335
336 *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
337 *val %= 1000000;
338
339 SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
340
341 return 0;
342 }
343
344 static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
345 const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
346 {
347 int err;
348
349 SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
350
351 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
352 if (err)
353 return err;
354
355 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
356
357 return err;
358 }
359
360 /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
361 * s1 and ah.
362 */
363
364 static int smp_e(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
365 {
366 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
367 int err;
368
369 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
370
371 if (!tfm) {
372 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
373 return -EINVAL;
374 }
375
376 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
377 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
378
379 err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
380 if (err) {
381 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
382 return err;
383 }
384
385 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
386 swap_buf(r, data, 16);
387
388 crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, data, data);
389
390 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
391 swap_buf(data, r, 16);
392
393 SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
394
395 return err;
396 }
397
398 static int smp_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
399 const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
400 const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
401 {
402 u8 p1[16], p2[16];
403 int err;
404
405 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
406 SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
407 SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
408
409 memset(p1, 0, 16);
410
411 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
412 p1[0] = _iat;
413 p1[1] = _rat;
414 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
415 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
416
417 SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
418
419 /* res = r XOR p1 */
420 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
421
422 /* res = e(k, res) */
423 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
424 if (err) {
425 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
426 return err;
427 }
428
429 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
430 memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
431 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
432 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
433
434 SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
435
436 /* res = res XOR p2 */
437 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
438
439 /* res = e(k, res) */
440 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
441 if (err)
442 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
443
444 return err;
445 }
446
447 static int smp_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
448 const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
449 {
450 int err;
451
452 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
453 memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
454 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
455
456 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
457 if (err)
458 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
459
460 return err;
461 }
462
463 static int smp_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16],
464 const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
465 {
466 u8 _res[16];
467 int err;
468
469 /* r' = padding || r */
470 memcpy(_res, r, 3);
471 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
472
473 err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
474 if (err) {
475 BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
476 return err;
477 }
478
479 /* The output of the random address function ah is:
480 * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
481 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
482 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
483 * result of ah.
484 */
485 memcpy(res, _res, 3);
486
487 return 0;
488 }
489
490 bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
491 const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
492 {
493 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
494 struct smp_dev *smp;
495 u8 hash[3];
496 int err;
497
498 if (!chan || !chan->data)
499 return false;
500
501 smp = chan->data;
502
503 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
504
505 err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
506 if (err)
507 return false;
508
509 return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
510 }
511
512 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
513 {
514 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
515 struct smp_dev *smp;
516 int err;
517
518 if (!chan || !chan->data)
519 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
520
521 smp = chan->data;
522
523 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
524
525 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
526 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
527
528 err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
529 if (err < 0)
530 return err;
531
532 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
533
534 return 0;
535 }
536
537 int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
538 {
539 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
540 struct smp_dev *smp;
541 int err;
542
543 if (!chan || !chan->data)
544 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
545
546 smp = chan->data;
547
548 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
549 BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
550 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
551 memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
552 smp->debug_key = true;
553 } else {
554 while (true) {
555 /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
556 if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
557 return -EIO;
558
559 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
560 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
561 */
562 if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
563 break;
564 }
565 smp->debug_key = false;
566 }
567
568 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
569 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
570 SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
571
572 get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
573
574 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
575 smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
576 if (err < 0)
577 return err;
578
579 memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
580
581 return 0;
582 }
583
584 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
585 {
586 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
587 struct smp_chan *smp;
588 struct kvec iv[2];
589 struct msghdr msg;
590
591 if (!chan)
592 return;
593
594 BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
595
596 iv[0].iov_base = &code;
597 iv[0].iov_len = 1;
598
599 iv[1].iov_base = data;
600 iv[1].iov_len = len;
601
602 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
603
604 iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, iv, 2, 1 + len);
605
606 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
607
608 if (!chan->data)
609 return;
610
611 smp = chan->data;
612
613 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
614 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
615 }
616
617 static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
618 {
619 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
620 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
621 return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
622 else
623 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
624 } else {
625 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
626 }
627 }
628
629 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
630 {
631 switch (sec_level) {
632 case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
633 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
634 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
635 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
636 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
637 default:
638 return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
639 }
640 }
641
642 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
643 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
644 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
645 {
646 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
647 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
648 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
649 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
650 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
651
652 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
653 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
654 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
655 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
656 } else {
657 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
658 }
659
660 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
661 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
662
663 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
664 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
665
666 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
667 (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
668 struct oob_data *oob_data;
669 u8 bdaddr_type;
670
671 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
672 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
673 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
674 }
675
676 if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
677 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
678 else
679 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
680
681 oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
682 bdaddr_type);
683 if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
684 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
685 oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
686 memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
687 memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
688 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
689 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
690 }
691
692 } else {
693 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
694 }
695
696 if (rsp == NULL) {
697 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
698 req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
699 req->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
700 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
701 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
702 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
703
704 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
705 return;
706 }
707
708 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
709 rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
710 rsp->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
711 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
712 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
713 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
714
715 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
716 }
717
718 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
719 {
720 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
721 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
722 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
723
724 if (max_key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
725 max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
726 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
727
728 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
729
730 return 0;
731 }
732
733 static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
734 {
735 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
736 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
737 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
738 bool complete;
739
740 BUG_ON(!smp);
741
742 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
743
744 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
745 mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
746
747 kzfree(smp->csrk);
748 kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
749 kzfree(smp->link_key);
750
751 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
752 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
753
754 /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
755 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
756 */
757 if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
758 !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
759 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
760 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
761 smp->ltk = NULL;
762 }
763
764 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
765 if (!complete) {
766 if (smp->ltk) {
767 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
768 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
769 }
770
771 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
772 list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
773 kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
774 }
775
776 if (smp->remote_irk) {
777 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
778 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
779 }
780 }
781
782 chan->data = NULL;
783 kzfree(smp);
784 hci_conn_drop(hcon);
785 }
786
787 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
788 {
789 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
790 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
791
792 if (reason)
793 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
794 &reason);
795
796 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
797
798 if (chan->data)
799 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
800 }
801
802 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00
803 #define JUST_CFM 0x01
804 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
805 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
806 #define REQ_OOB 0x04
807 #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
808 #define OVERLAP 0xFF
809
810 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
811 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
812 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
813 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
814 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
815 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
816 };
817
818 static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
819 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
820 { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
821 { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
822 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
823 { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
824 };
825
826 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
827 {
828 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
829 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
830 */
831 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
832 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
833 return JUST_CFM;
834
835 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
836 return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
837
838 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
839 }
840
841 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
842 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
843 {
844 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
845 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
846 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
847 u32 passkey = 0;
848 int ret = 0;
849
850 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
851 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
852 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
853
854 BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
855
856 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
857 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
858 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
859 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
860 * table.
861 */
862 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
863 smp->method = JUST_CFM;
864 else
865 smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
866
867 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
868 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
869 &smp->flags))
870 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
871
872 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
873 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
874 hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
875 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
876
877 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
878 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
879 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
880 return 0;
881 }
882
883 /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
884 * can only recover the just-works case.
885 */
886 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
887 return -EINVAL;
888
889 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
890 if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
891 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
892 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
893 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
894 }
895
896 /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
897 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
898 */
899 if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
900 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
901 smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
902 else
903 smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
904 }
905
906 /* Generate random passkey. */
907 if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
908 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
909 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
910 passkey %= 1000000;
911 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
912 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
913 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
914 }
915
916 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
917 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
918 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
919 else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
920 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
921 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
922 passkey, 1);
923 else
924 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
925 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
926 passkey, 0);
927
928 return ret;
929 }
930
931 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
932 {
933 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
934 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
935 int ret;
936
937 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
938
939 ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
940 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
941 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
942 cp.confirm_val);
943 if (ret)
944 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
945
946 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
947
948 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
949
950 if (conn->hcon->out)
951 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
952 else
953 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
954
955 return 0;
956 }
957
958 static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
959 {
960 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
961 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
962 u8 confirm[16];
963 int ret;
964
965 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
966 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
967
968 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
969
970 ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
971 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
972 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
973 if (ret)
974 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
975
976 if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) {
977 BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
978 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
979 }
980
981 if (hcon->out) {
982 u8 stk[16];
983 __le64 rand = 0;
984 __le16 ediv = 0;
985
986 smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
987
988 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
989 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
990
991 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
992 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
993 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
994 } else {
995 u8 stk[16], auth;
996 __le64 rand = 0;
997 __le16 ediv = 0;
998
999 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1000 smp->prnd);
1001
1002 smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
1003
1004 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1005 auth = 1;
1006 else
1007 auth = 0;
1008
1009 /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
1010 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
1011 * STK never needs to be stored).
1012 */
1013 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1014 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1015 }
1016
1017 return 0;
1018 }
1019
1020 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1021 {
1022 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1023 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1024 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1025 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1026 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1027 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1028 bool persistent;
1029
1030 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1031 if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1032 persistent = false;
1033 else
1034 persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
1035 &hcon->flags);
1036 } else {
1037 /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
1038 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
1039 * authentication requests.
1040 */
1041 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
1042 SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
1043 }
1044
1045 if (smp->remote_irk) {
1046 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
1047
1048 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
1049 * identity address track the connection based on it
1050 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
1051 */
1052 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
1053 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
1054 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
1055 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
1056 }
1057 }
1058
1059 if (smp->csrk) {
1060 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1061 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1062 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
1063 }
1064
1065 if (smp->slave_csrk) {
1066 smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1067 bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1068 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
1069 }
1070
1071 if (smp->ltk) {
1072 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1073 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1074 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
1075 }
1076
1077 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
1078 smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1079 bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1080 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
1081 }
1082
1083 if (smp->link_key) {
1084 struct link_key *key;
1085 u8 type;
1086
1087 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1088 type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
1089 else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1090 type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1091 else
1092 type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1093
1094 key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
1095 smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
1096 if (key) {
1097 mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
1098
1099 /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
1100 * flag is not set.
1101 */
1102 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
1103 key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
1104 list_del_rcu(&key->list);
1105 kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
1106 }
1107 }
1108 }
1109 }
1110
1111 static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1112 {
1113 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1114 u8 key_type, auth;
1115
1116 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1117 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
1118 else
1119 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
1120
1121 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1122 auth = 1;
1123 else
1124 auth = 0;
1125
1126 smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1127 key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1128 0, 0);
1129 }
1130
1131 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1132 {
1133 /* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
1134 * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp1' and 'lebr'.
1135 */
1136 const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1137 const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
1138
1139 smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
1140 if (!smp->link_key)
1141 return;
1142
1143 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
1144 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1145 smp->link_key = NULL;
1146 return;
1147 }
1148
1149 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
1150 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1151 smp->link_key = NULL;
1152 return;
1153 }
1154 }
1155
1156 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
1157 {
1158 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
1159 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
1160 * them in the correct order.
1161 */
1162 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
1163 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
1164 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
1165 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
1166 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1167 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
1168 }
1169
1170 static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1171 {
1172 /* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
1173 * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp2' and 'brle'.
1174 */
1175 const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1176 const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
1177 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1178 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1179 struct link_key *key;
1180
1181 key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
1182 if (!key) {
1183 BT_ERR("%s No Link Key found to generate LTK", hdev->name);
1184 return;
1185 }
1186
1187 if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1188 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1189
1190 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
1191 return;
1192
1193 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
1194 return;
1195
1196 sc_add_ltk(smp);
1197 }
1198
1199 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
1200 {
1201 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
1202 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1203 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1204 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1205 __u8 *keydist;
1206
1207 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1208
1209 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1210
1211 /* The responder sends its keys first */
1212 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
1213 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1214 return;
1215 }
1216
1217 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1218
1219 if (hcon->out) {
1220 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
1221 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
1222 } else {
1223 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
1224 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
1225 }
1226
1227 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1228 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
1229 sc_generate_link_key(smp);
1230 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
1231 sc_generate_ltk(smp);
1232
1233 /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
1234 *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1235 }
1236
1237 BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
1238
1239 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
1240 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
1241 struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
1242 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
1243 u8 authenticated;
1244 __le16 ediv;
1245 __le64 rand;
1246
1247 /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
1248 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
1249 * of the value to zeroes.
1250 */
1251 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
1252 memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
1253 sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
1254
1255 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
1256 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
1257
1258 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
1259
1260 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1261 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1262 SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
1263 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1264 smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
1265
1266 ident.ediv = ediv;
1267 ident.rand = rand;
1268
1269 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
1270
1271 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1272 }
1273
1274 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
1275 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
1276 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
1277
1278 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
1279
1280 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
1281
1282 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
1283 * after the connection has been established.
1284 *
1285 * This is true even when the connection has been
1286 * established using a resolvable random address.
1287 */
1288 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
1289 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
1290
1291 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
1292 &addrinfo);
1293
1294 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1295 }
1296
1297 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
1298 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
1299 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1300
1301 /* Generate a new random key */
1302 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
1303
1304 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1305 if (csrk) {
1306 if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
1307 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
1308 else
1309 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
1310 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1311 }
1312 smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
1313
1314 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
1315
1316 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1317 }
1318
1319 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
1320 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
1321 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1322 return;
1323 }
1324
1325 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
1326 smp_notify_keys(conn);
1327
1328 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
1329 }
1330
1331 static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
1332 {
1333 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
1334 security_timer.work);
1335 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1336
1337 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1338
1339 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
1340 }
1341
1342 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1343 {
1344 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1345 struct smp_chan *smp;
1346
1347 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
1348 if (!smp)
1349 return NULL;
1350
1351 smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
1352 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
1353 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
1354 kzfree(smp);
1355 return NULL;
1356 }
1357
1358 smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
1359 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
1360 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
1361 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
1362 kzfree(smp);
1363 return NULL;
1364 }
1365
1366 smp->conn = conn;
1367 chan->data = smp;
1368
1369 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
1370
1371 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
1372
1373 hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
1374
1375 return smp;
1376 }
1377
1378 static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
1379 {
1380 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1381 u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
1382
1383 if (hcon->out) {
1384 na = smp->prnd;
1385 nb = smp->rrnd;
1386 } else {
1387 na = smp->rrnd;
1388 nb = smp->prnd;
1389 }
1390
1391 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1392 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1393 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1394 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1395
1396 return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
1397 }
1398
1399 static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
1400 {
1401 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1402 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
1403 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
1404 u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
1405
1406 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1407 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1408 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1409 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1410
1411 if (hcon->out) {
1412 local_addr = a;
1413 remote_addr = b;
1414 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
1415 } else {
1416 local_addr = b;
1417 remote_addr = a;
1418 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
1419 }
1420
1421 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
1422
1423 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1424 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
1425
1426 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
1427 memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
1428
1429 smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
1430 local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
1431
1432 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
1433 }
1434
1435 static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1436 {
1437 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1438 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1439 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
1440 u8 r;
1441
1442 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1443 r |= 0x80;
1444
1445 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1446
1447 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
1448 cfm.confirm_val))
1449 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1450
1451 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
1452
1453 return 0;
1454 }
1455
1456 static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
1457 {
1458 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1459 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1460 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1461 u8 cfm[16], r;
1462
1463 /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
1464 if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
1465 return 0;
1466
1467 switch (smp_op) {
1468 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
1469 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1470 r |= 0x80;
1471
1472 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
1473 smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
1474 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1475
1476 if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
1477 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1478
1479 smp->passkey_round++;
1480
1481 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
1482 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
1483 if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
1484 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1485 }
1486
1487 /* The round is only complete when the initiator
1488 * receives pairing random.
1489 */
1490 if (!hcon->out) {
1491 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1492 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1493 if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
1494 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1495 else
1496 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1497 return 0;
1498 }
1499
1500 /* Start the next round */
1501 if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
1502 return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
1503
1504 /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
1505 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1506 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1507
1508 break;
1509
1510 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
1511 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
1512 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1513 return 0;
1514 }
1515
1516 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1517
1518 if (hcon->out) {
1519 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1520 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1521 return 0;
1522 }
1523
1524 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1525
1526 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
1527 default:
1528 /* Initiating device starts the round */
1529 if (!hcon->out)
1530 return 0;
1531
1532 BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
1533 smp->passkey_round + 1);
1534
1535 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1536
1537 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1538 }
1539
1540 return 0;
1541 }
1542
1543 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1544 {
1545 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1546 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1547 u8 smp_op;
1548
1549 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
1550
1551 switch (mgmt_op) {
1552 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1553 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1554 return 0;
1555 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1556 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
1557 return 0;
1558 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1559 hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1560 smp->passkey_round = 0;
1561
1562 if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
1563 smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
1564 else
1565 smp_op = 0;
1566
1567 if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
1568 return -EIO;
1569
1570 return 0;
1571 }
1572
1573 /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
1574 if (hcon->out) {
1575 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1576 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1577 } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1578 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1579 sc_add_ltk(smp);
1580 }
1581
1582 return 0;
1583 }
1584
1585 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1586 {
1587 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
1588 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
1589 struct smp_chan *smp;
1590 u32 value;
1591 int err;
1592
1593 BT_DBG("");
1594
1595 if (!conn)
1596 return -ENOTCONN;
1597
1598 chan = conn->smp;
1599 if (!chan)
1600 return -ENOTCONN;
1601
1602 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
1603 if (!chan->data) {
1604 err = -ENOTCONN;
1605 goto unlock;
1606 }
1607
1608 smp = chan->data;
1609
1610 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1611 err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
1612 goto unlock;
1613 }
1614
1615 switch (mgmt_op) {
1616 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1617 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1618 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
1619 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
1620 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
1621 /* Fall Through */
1622 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
1623 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
1624 break;
1625 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1626 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1627 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1628 err = 0;
1629 goto unlock;
1630 default:
1631 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1632 err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
1633 goto unlock;
1634 }
1635
1636 err = 0;
1637
1638 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
1639 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1640 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
1641 if (rsp)
1642 smp_failure(conn, rsp);
1643 }
1644
1645 unlock:
1646 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
1647 return err;
1648 }
1649
1650 static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
1651 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
1652 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
1653 {
1654 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1655 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1656 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
1657
1658 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
1659 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1660 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1661 }
1662
1663 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
1664 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1665
1666 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
1667 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1668
1669 if (!rsp) {
1670 memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
1671
1672 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
1673 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
1674 req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1675
1676 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
1677
1678 return;
1679 }
1680
1681 memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
1682
1683 rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1684 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
1685 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
1686
1687 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
1688 }
1689
1690 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1691 {
1692 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
1693 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1694 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1695 struct smp_chan *smp;
1696 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
1697 int ret;
1698
1699 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1700
1701 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
1702 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1703
1704 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
1705 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1706
1707 if (!chan->data)
1708 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
1709 else
1710 smp = chan->data;
1711
1712 if (!smp)
1713 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1714
1715 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
1716 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1717
1718 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
1719 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
1720 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1721
1722 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1723 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1724
1725 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1726 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
1727 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
1728
1729 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1730 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1731 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1732 */
1733 if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
1734 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1735
1736 /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
1737 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1738 /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
1739 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
1740 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
1741 return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
1742
1743 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1744
1745 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
1746
1747 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1748 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1749 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1750
1751 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1752 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1753
1754 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1755 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1756 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1757
1758 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1759 return 0;
1760 }
1761
1762 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
1763
1764 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC)
1765 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1766
1767 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1768 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
1769 else
1770 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
1771
1772 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
1773 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
1774
1775 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1776 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1777 u8 method;
1778
1779 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
1780 req->io_capability);
1781 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1782 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1783 }
1784
1785 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1786 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1787 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1788
1789 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1790
1791 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1792 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1793
1794 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1795
1796 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
1797
1798 /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
1799 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
1800 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
1801 * positive SC enablement.
1802 */
1803 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1804
1805 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1806 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1807 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1808 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1809 /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
1810 return 0;
1811 }
1812
1813 /* Request setup of TK */
1814 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
1815 if (ret)
1816 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1817
1818 return 0;
1819 }
1820
1821 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1822 {
1823 struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
1824
1825 BT_DBG("");
1826
1827 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
1828 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
1829 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
1830
1831 if (!chan || !chan->data)
1832 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1833
1834 smp_dev = chan->data;
1835
1836 memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
1837 memcpy(smp->local_sk, smp_dev->local_sk, 32);
1838 memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
1839
1840 if (smp_dev->debug_key)
1841 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1842
1843 goto done;
1844 }
1845
1846 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
1847 BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
1848 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
1849 memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
1850 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1851 } else {
1852 while (true) {
1853 /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
1854 if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
1855 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1856
1857 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
1858 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
1859 */
1860 if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
1861 break;
1862 }
1863 }
1864
1865 done:
1866 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
1867 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
1868 SMP_DBG("Local Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
1869
1870 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
1871
1872 return 0;
1873 }
1874
1875 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1876 {
1877 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
1878 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1879 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1880 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1881 u8 key_size, auth;
1882 int ret;
1883
1884 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1885
1886 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
1887 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1888
1889 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
1890 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1891
1892 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
1893
1894 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1895
1896 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
1897 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1898 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1899
1900 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1901
1902 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1903 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1904
1905 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1906 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1907 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1908 */
1909 if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
1910 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1911
1912 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1913 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
1914
1915 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1916 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1917 */
1918 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1919
1920 /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
1921 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1922 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1923 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1924 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1925 return 0;
1926 }
1927
1928 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1929 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1930 else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1931 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1932
1933 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1934 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1935 u8 method;
1936
1937 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
1938 rsp->io_capability);
1939 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1940 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1941 }
1942
1943 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1944
1945 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1946 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1947 */
1948 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1949
1950 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1951 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1952 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1953 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1954 return sc_send_public_key(smp);
1955 }
1956
1957 auth |= req->auth_req;
1958
1959 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
1960 if (ret)
1961 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1962
1963 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1964
1965 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
1966 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
1967 return smp_confirm(smp);
1968
1969 return 0;
1970 }
1971
1972 static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1973 {
1974 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1975
1976 BT_DBG("");
1977
1978 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1979 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1980
1981 if (conn->hcon->out) {
1982 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1983 smp->prnd);
1984 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1985 }
1986
1987 return 0;
1988 }
1989
1990 /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
1991 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
1992 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
1993 */
1994 static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
1995 {
1996 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1997 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1998 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1999 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
2000 u8 auth;
2001
2002 /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
2003 if (hcon->out)
2004 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2005
2006 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
2007 BT_ERR("Refusing SMP SC -> legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
2008 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2009 }
2010
2011 BT_ERR("Trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
2012
2013 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2014 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2015
2016 /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
2017 smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
2018
2019 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2020
2021 if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
2022 BT_ERR("Failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
2023 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2024 }
2025
2026 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2027
2028 return 0;
2029 }
2030
2031 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2032 {
2033 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2034 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2035
2036 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
2037
2038 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
2039 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2040
2041 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2042 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2043
2044 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2045 int ret;
2046
2047 /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
2048 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
2049 return sc_check_confirm(smp);
2050
2051 BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
2052
2053 ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
2054 if (ret)
2055 return ret;
2056 }
2057
2058 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2059 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2060 smp->prnd);
2061 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2062 return 0;
2063 }
2064
2065 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2066 return smp_confirm(smp);
2067
2068 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2069
2070 return 0;
2071 }
2072
2073 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2074 {
2075 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2076 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2077 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2078 u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
2079 u32 passkey;
2080 int err;
2081
2082 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2083
2084 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
2085 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2086
2087 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2088 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2089
2090 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
2091 return smp_random(smp);
2092
2093 if (hcon->out) {
2094 pkax = smp->local_pk;
2095 pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
2096 na = smp->prnd;
2097 nb = smp->rrnd;
2098 } else {
2099 pkax = smp->remote_pk;
2100 pkbx = smp->local_pk;
2101 na = smp->rrnd;
2102 nb = smp->prnd;
2103 }
2104
2105 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2106 if (!hcon->out)
2107 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2108 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2109 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2110 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2111 }
2112
2113 /* Passkey entry has special treatment */
2114 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2115 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2116
2117 if (hcon->out) {
2118 u8 cfm[16];
2119
2120 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
2121 smp->rrnd, 0, cfm);
2122 if (err)
2123 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2124
2125 if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
2126 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2127 } else {
2128 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2129 smp->prnd);
2130 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2131 }
2132
2133 mackey_and_ltk:
2134 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
2135 err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
2136 if (err)
2137 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2138
2139 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2140 if (hcon->out) {
2141 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2142 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2143 }
2144 return 0;
2145 }
2146
2147 err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
2148 if (err)
2149 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2150
2151 err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2152 hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
2153 if (err)
2154 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2155
2156 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2157
2158 return 0;
2159 }
2160
2161 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
2162 {
2163 struct smp_ltk *key;
2164 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2165
2166 key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
2167 if (!key)
2168 return false;
2169
2170 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
2171 return false;
2172
2173 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
2174 return true;
2175
2176 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
2177 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
2178
2179 /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
2180 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
2181
2182 return true;
2183 }
2184
2185 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
2186 enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
2187 {
2188 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
2189 return true;
2190
2191 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
2192 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
2193 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
2194 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
2195 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
2196 */
2197 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
2198 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
2199 hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
2200 return false;
2201
2202 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
2203 return true;
2204
2205 return false;
2206 }
2207
2208 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2209 {
2210 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2211 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2212 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2213 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2214 struct smp_chan *smp;
2215 u8 sec_level, auth;
2216
2217 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2218
2219 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2220 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2221
2222 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2223 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2224
2225 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2226
2227 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
2228 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2229
2230 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
2231 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2232 else
2233 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
2234
2235 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2236 return 0;
2237
2238 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2239 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2240
2241 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2242 return 0;
2243
2244 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2245 if (!smp)
2246 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2247
2248 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
2249 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
2250 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2251
2252 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2253
2254 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
2255 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
2256
2257 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2258 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2259
2260 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2261 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2262
2263 return 0;
2264 }
2265
2266 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
2267 {
2268 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2269 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2270 struct smp_chan *smp;
2271 __u8 authreq;
2272 int ret;
2273
2274 BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
2275
2276 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
2277 if (!conn)
2278 return 1;
2279
2280 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2281 return 1;
2282
2283 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2284 return 1;
2285
2286 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2287 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2288
2289 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2290 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2291 return 0;
2292
2293 chan = conn->smp;
2294 if (!chan) {
2295 BT_ERR("SMP security requested but not available");
2296 return 1;
2297 }
2298
2299 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2300
2301 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
2302 if (chan->data) {
2303 ret = 0;
2304 goto unlock;
2305 }
2306
2307 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2308 if (!smp) {
2309 ret = 1;
2310 goto unlock;
2311 }
2312
2313 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
2314
2315 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
2316 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
2317
2318 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
2319 * requires it.
2320 */
2321 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
2322 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2323 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
2324
2325 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
2326 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2327
2328 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
2329 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2330 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2331
2332 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2333 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2334 } else {
2335 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
2336 cp.auth_req = authreq;
2337 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2338 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
2339 }
2340
2341 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
2342 ret = 0;
2343
2344 unlock:
2345 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2346 return ret;
2347 }
2348
2349 void smp_cancel_pairing(struct hci_conn *hcon)
2350 {
2351 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2352 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2353 struct smp_chan *smp;
2354
2355 if (!conn)
2356 return;
2357
2358 chan = conn->smp;
2359 if (!chan)
2360 return;
2361
2362 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2363
2364 smp = chan->data;
2365 if (smp) {
2366 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
2367 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2368 else
2369 smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
2370 }
2371
2372 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2373 }
2374
2375 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2376 {
2377 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2378 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2379 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2380
2381 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2382
2383 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2384 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2385
2386 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
2387
2388 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2389
2390 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
2391
2392 return 0;
2393 }
2394
2395 static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2396 {
2397 struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2398 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2399 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2400 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
2401 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2402 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
2403 u8 authenticated;
2404
2405 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2406
2407 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2408 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2409
2410 /* Mark the information as received */
2411 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
2412
2413 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
2414 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
2415 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2416 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2417
2418 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2419
2420 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
2421 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
2422 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
2423 rp->ediv, rp->rand);
2424 smp->ltk = ltk;
2425 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2426 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2427
2428 return 0;
2429 }
2430
2431 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2432 {
2433 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2434 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2435 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2436
2437 BT_DBG("");
2438
2439 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2440 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2441
2442 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
2443
2444 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2445
2446 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
2447
2448 return 0;
2449 }
2450
2451 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2452 struct sk_buff *skb)
2453 {
2454 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2455 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2456 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2457 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2458 bdaddr_t rpa;
2459
2460 BT_DBG("");
2461
2462 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2463 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2464
2465 /* Mark the information as received */
2466 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
2467
2468 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2469 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2470
2471 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2472
2473 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
2474 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
2475 * as "identity information". However, since such
2476 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
2477 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
2478 * received an IRK for such a device.
2479 *
2480 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
2481 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
2482 */
2483 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
2484 !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
2485 BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address");
2486 goto distribute;
2487 }
2488
2489 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
2490 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
2491
2492 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
2493 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
2494 else
2495 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
2496
2497 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
2498 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
2499
2500 distribute:
2501 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2502 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2503
2504 return 0;
2505 }
2506
2507 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2508 {
2509 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2510 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2511 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2512 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
2513
2514 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2515
2516 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2517 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2518
2519 /* Mark the information as received */
2520 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
2521
2522 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2523
2524 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
2525 if (csrk) {
2526 if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2527 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
2528 else
2529 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
2530 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
2531 }
2532 smp->csrk = csrk;
2533 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2534
2535 return 0;
2536 }
2537
2538 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
2539 {
2540 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2541 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2542 struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
2543 u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
2544
2545 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
2546 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
2547 return REQ_OOB;
2548
2549 /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
2550 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
2551 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
2552 * first byte which contains the opcode.
2553 */
2554 if (hcon->out) {
2555 local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2556 remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2557 } else {
2558 local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2559 remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2560 }
2561
2562 local_io = local->io_capability;
2563 remote_io = remote->io_capability;
2564
2565 local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2566 remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2567
2568 /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
2569 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
2570 */
2571 if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
2572 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
2573 else
2574 method = JUST_WORKS;
2575
2576 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
2577 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
2578 method = JUST_WORKS;
2579
2580 return method;
2581 }
2582
2583 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2584 {
2585 struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
2586 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2587 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2588 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2589 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2590 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
2591 int err;
2592
2593 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2594
2595 if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
2596 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2597
2598 memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
2599
2600 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2601 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
2602 smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2603 if (err)
2604 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2605
2606 if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
2607 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2608 }
2609
2610 /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
2611 * the key from the initiating device.
2612 */
2613 if (!hcon->out) {
2614 err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
2615 if (err)
2616 return err;
2617 }
2618
2619 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
2620 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
2621
2622 if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey))
2623 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2624
2625 SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
2626
2627 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
2628
2629 smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
2630
2631 BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
2632
2633 /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
2634 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
2635 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2636 else
2637 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
2638
2639 if (!memcmp(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
2640 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
2641
2642 if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
2643 get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
2644 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
2645 hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
2646 hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
2647 smp->passkey_round = 0;
2648 if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2649 hcon->dst_type,
2650 hcon->passkey_notify,
2651 hcon->passkey_entered))
2652 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2653 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2654 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2655 }
2656
2657 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2658 if (hcon->out)
2659 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2660 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2661
2662 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2663
2664 return 0;
2665 }
2666
2667 if (hcon->out)
2668 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2669
2670 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
2671 if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2672 hcon->dst_type))
2673 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2674 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2675 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2676 return 0;
2677 }
2678
2679 /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
2680 * send the confirm value.
2681 */
2682 if (conn->hcon->out)
2683 return 0;
2684
2685 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
2686 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2687 if (err)
2688 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2689
2690 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
2691 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2692
2693 return 0;
2694 }
2695
2696 static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2697 {
2698 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
2699 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2700 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2701 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2702 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
2703 u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
2704 int err;
2705
2706 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2707
2708 if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
2709 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2710
2711 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
2712 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
2713 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
2714 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
2715
2716 if (hcon->out) {
2717 local_addr = a;
2718 remote_addr = b;
2719 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
2720 } else {
2721 local_addr = b;
2722 remote_addr = a;
2723 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
2724 }
2725
2726 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
2727
2728 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2729 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
2730 else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
2731 memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
2732
2733 err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
2734 io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
2735 if (err)
2736 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2737
2738 if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16))
2739 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
2740
2741 if (!hcon->out) {
2742 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
2743 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2744 return 0;
2745 }
2746
2747 /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
2748 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2749 }
2750
2751 sc_add_ltk(smp);
2752
2753 if (hcon->out) {
2754 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
2755 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
2756 }
2757
2758 return 0;
2759 }
2760
2761 static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2762 struct sk_buff *skb)
2763 {
2764 struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
2765
2766 BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
2767
2768 return 0;
2769 }
2770
2771 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
2772 {
2773 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2774 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2775 struct smp_chan *smp;
2776 __u8 code, reason;
2777 int err = 0;
2778
2779 if (skb->len < 1)
2780 return -EILSEQ;
2781
2782 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
2783 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2784 goto done;
2785 }
2786
2787 code = skb->data[0];
2788 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
2789
2790 smp = chan->data;
2791
2792 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
2793 goto drop;
2794
2795 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
2796 goto drop;
2797
2798 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
2799 * pairing request and security request.
2800 */
2801 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
2802 goto drop;
2803
2804 switch (code) {
2805 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
2806 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
2807 break;
2808
2809 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
2810 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2811 err = -EPERM;
2812 break;
2813
2814 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
2815 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
2816 break;
2817
2818 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
2819 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
2820 break;
2821
2822 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
2823 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
2824 break;
2825
2826 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
2827 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
2828 break;
2829
2830 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
2831 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
2832 break;
2833
2834 case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
2835 reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
2836 break;
2837
2838 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
2839 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
2840 break;
2841
2842 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
2843 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
2844 break;
2845
2846 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
2847 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
2848 break;
2849
2850 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
2851 reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
2852 break;
2853
2854 case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
2855 reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
2856 break;
2857
2858 case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
2859 reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
2860 break;
2861
2862 default:
2863 BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
2864 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2865 goto done;
2866 }
2867
2868 done:
2869 if (!err) {
2870 if (reason)
2871 smp_failure(conn, reason);
2872 kfree_skb(skb);
2873 }
2874
2875 return err;
2876
2877 drop:
2878 BT_ERR("%s unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", hcon->hdev->name,
2879 code, &hcon->dst);
2880 kfree_skb(skb);
2881 return 0;
2882 }
2883
2884 static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
2885 {
2886 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2887
2888 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
2889
2890 if (chan->data)
2891 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
2892
2893 conn->smp = NULL;
2894 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
2895 }
2896
2897 static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
2898 {
2899 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2900 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2901 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2902 struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
2903 struct smp_chan *smp;
2904
2905 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
2906
2907 /* Only new pairings are interesting */
2908 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
2909 return;
2910
2911 /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
2912 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
2913 return;
2914
2915 /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
2916 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2917 return;
2918
2919 /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
2920 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
2921 return;
2922
2923 /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
2924 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
2925 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
2926 return;
2927
2928 /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
2929 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2930 return;
2931
2932 /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
2933 if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
2934 return;
2935
2936 /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
2937 if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
2938 return;
2939
2940 /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
2941 if (chan->data)
2942 return;
2943
2944 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2945 if (!smp) {
2946 BT_ERR("%s unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR",
2947 hdev->name);
2948 return;
2949 }
2950
2951 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2952
2953 BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
2954
2955 /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
2956 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
2957
2958 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2959 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
2960
2961 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
2962 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2963 }
2964
2965 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
2966 {
2967 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2968 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2969 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2970
2971 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
2972
2973 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
2974 bredr_pairing(chan);
2975 return;
2976 }
2977
2978 if (!smp)
2979 return;
2980
2981 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
2982 return;
2983
2984 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
2985
2986 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2987 }
2988
2989 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
2990 {
2991 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2992 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2993
2994 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
2995
2996 /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
2997 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
2998 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
2999 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
3000 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
3001 */
3002 conn->smp = chan;
3003
3004 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3005 bredr_pairing(chan);
3006 }
3007
3008 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
3009 {
3010 int err;
3011
3012 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3013
3014 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
3015 if (err) {
3016 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3017
3018 if (smp)
3019 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
3020
3021 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
3022 }
3023
3024 return err;
3025 }
3026
3027 static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
3028 unsigned long hdr_len,
3029 unsigned long len, int nb)
3030 {
3031 struct sk_buff *skb;
3032
3033 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
3034 if (!skb)
3035 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3036
3037 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
3038 bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
3039
3040 return skb;
3041 }
3042
3043 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
3044 .name = "Security Manager",
3045 .ready = smp_ready_cb,
3046 .recv = smp_recv_cb,
3047 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
3048 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
3049 .resume = smp_resume_cb,
3050
3051 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
3052 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3053 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3054 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3055 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3056 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3057 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3058 };
3059
3060 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
3061 {
3062 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3063
3064 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
3065
3066 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3067 if (!chan)
3068 return NULL;
3069
3070 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
3071 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
3072 chan->scid = pchan->scid;
3073 chan->dcid = chan->scid;
3074 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
3075 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
3076 chan->mode = pchan->mode;
3077
3078 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
3079 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
3080 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
3081 * warnings.
3082 */
3083 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
3084
3085 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
3086
3087 return chan;
3088 }
3089
3090 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
3091 .name = "Security Manager Root",
3092 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
3093
3094 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
3095 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3096 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
3097 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
3098 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3099 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
3100 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
3101 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3102 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3103 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
3104 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3105 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3106 };
3107
3108 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
3109 {
3110 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3111 struct smp_dev *smp;
3112 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
3113 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3114
3115 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
3116 smp = NULL;
3117 goto create_chan;
3118 }
3119
3120 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
3121 if (!smp)
3122 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3123
3124 tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3125 if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
3126 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
3127 kzfree(smp);
3128 return ERR_CAST(tfm_aes);
3129 }
3130
3131 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3132 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3133 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3134 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3135 kzfree(smp);
3136 return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
3137 }
3138
3139 smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
3140 smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
3141 smp->min_key_size = SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
3142 smp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
3143
3144 create_chan:
3145 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3146 if (!chan) {
3147 if (smp) {
3148 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
3149 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3150 kzfree(smp);
3151 }
3152 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3153 }
3154
3155 chan->data = smp;
3156
3157 l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
3158
3159 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
3160
3161 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
3162 u8 bdaddr_type;
3163
3164 hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
3165
3166 if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
3167 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
3168 else
3169 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
3170 } else {
3171 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
3172 chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
3173 }
3174
3175 chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
3176 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
3177 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
3178 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
3179
3180 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
3181 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
3182
3183 return chan;
3184 }
3185
3186 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3187 {
3188 struct smp_dev *smp;
3189
3190 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3191
3192 smp = chan->data;
3193 if (smp) {
3194 chan->data = NULL;
3195 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
3196 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3197 kzfree(smp);
3198 }
3199
3200 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3201 }
3202
3203 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
3204 char __user *user_buf,
3205 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3206 {
3207 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3208 char buf[3];
3209
3210 buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
3211 buf[1] = '\n';
3212 buf[2] = '\0';
3213 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
3214 }
3215
3216 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
3217 const char __user *user_buf,
3218 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3219 {
3220 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3221 char buf[32];
3222 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf)-1));
3223 bool enable;
3224
3225 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3226 return -EFAULT;
3227
3228 buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3229 if (strtobool(buf, &enable))
3230 return -EINVAL;
3231
3232 if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3233 return -EALREADY;
3234
3235 if (enable) {
3236 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3237
3238 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3239 if (IS_ERR(chan))
3240 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3241
3242 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3243 } else {
3244 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3245
3246 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3247 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3248 smp_del_chan(chan);
3249 }
3250
3251 hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
3252
3253 return count;
3254 }
3255
3256 static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = {
3257 .open = simple_open,
3258 .read = force_bredr_smp_read,
3259 .write = force_bredr_smp_write,
3260 .llseek = default_llseek,
3261 };
3262
3263 static ssize_t le_min_key_size_read(struct file *file,
3264 char __user *user_buf,
3265 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3266 {
3267 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3268 char buf[4];
3269
3270 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size);
3271
3272 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
3273 }
3274
3275 static ssize_t le_min_key_size_write(struct file *file,
3276 const char __user *user_buf,
3277 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3278 {
3279 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3280 char buf[32];
3281 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
3282 u8 key_size;
3283
3284 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3285 return -EFAULT;
3286
3287 buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3288
3289 sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
3290
3291 if (key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
3292 key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
3293 return -EINVAL;
3294
3295 SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size = key_size;
3296
3297 return count;
3298 }
3299
3300 static const struct file_operations le_min_key_size_fops = {
3301 .open = simple_open,
3302 .read = le_min_key_size_read,
3303 .write = le_min_key_size_write,
3304 .llseek = default_llseek,
3305 };
3306
3307 static ssize_t le_max_key_size_read(struct file *file,
3308 char __user *user_buf,
3309 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3310 {
3311 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3312 char buf[4];
3313
3314 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size);
3315
3316 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
3317 }
3318
3319 static ssize_t le_max_key_size_write(struct file *file,
3320 const char __user *user_buf,
3321 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3322 {
3323 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3324 char buf[32];
3325 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
3326 u8 key_size;
3327
3328 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3329 return -EFAULT;
3330
3331 buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3332
3333 sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
3334
3335 if (key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE ||
3336 key_size < SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size)
3337 return -EINVAL;
3338
3339 SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size = key_size;
3340
3341 return count;
3342 }
3343
3344 static const struct file_operations le_max_key_size_fops = {
3345 .open = simple_open,
3346 .read = le_max_key_size_read,
3347 .write = le_max_key_size_write,
3348 .llseek = default_llseek,
3349 };
3350
3351 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3352 {
3353 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3354
3355 BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
3356
3357 /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
3358 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
3359 */
3360 if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
3361 return 0;
3362
3363 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
3364 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3365 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3366 smp_del_chan(chan);
3367 }
3368
3369 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
3370 if (IS_ERR(chan))
3371 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3372
3373 hdev->smp_data = chan;
3374
3375 debugfs_create_file("le_min_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
3376 &le_min_key_size_fops);
3377 debugfs_create_file("le_max_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
3378 &le_max_key_size_fops);
3379
3380 /* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
3381 * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
3382 *
3383 * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs
3384 * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting
3385 * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections.
3386 */
3387 if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
3388 debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs,
3389 hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops);
3390
3391 /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */
3392 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3393 return 0;
3394 }
3395
3396 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
3397 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3398 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3399 smp_del_chan(chan);
3400 }
3401
3402 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3403 if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
3404 int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
3405 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3406 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3407 smp_del_chan(chan);
3408 return err;
3409 }
3410
3411 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3412
3413 return 0;
3414 }
3415
3416 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3417 {
3418 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3419
3420 if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
3421 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3422 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3423 smp_del_chan(chan);
3424 }
3425
3426 if (hdev->smp_data) {
3427 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3428 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3429 smp_del_chan(chan);
3430 }
3431 }
3432
3433 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
3434
3435 static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
3436 {
3437 const u8 irk[16] = {
3438 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3439 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3440 const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
3441 const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
3442 u8 res[3];
3443 int err;
3444
3445 err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res);
3446 if (err)
3447 return err;
3448
3449 if (memcmp(res, exp, 3))
3450 return -EINVAL;
3451
3452 return 0;
3453 }
3454
3455 static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
3456 {
3457 const u8 k[16] = {
3458 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3459 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3460 const u8 r[16] = {
3461 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
3462 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
3463 const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
3464 const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
3465 const u8 _iat = 0x01;
3466 const u8 _rat = 0x00;
3467 const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
3468 const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
3469 const u8 exp[16] = {
3470 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
3471 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
3472 u8 res[16];
3473 int err;
3474
3475 err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
3476 if (err)
3477 return err;
3478
3479 if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
3480 return -EINVAL;
3481
3482 return 0;
3483 }
3484
3485 static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
3486 {
3487 const u8 k[16] = {
3488 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3489 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3490 const u8 r1[16] = {
3491 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
3492 const u8 r2[16] = {
3493 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
3494 const u8 exp[16] = {
3495 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
3496 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
3497 u8 res[16];
3498 int err;
3499
3500 err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res);
3501 if (err)
3502 return err;
3503
3504 if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
3505 return -EINVAL;
3506
3507 return 0;
3508 }
3509
3510 static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3511 {
3512 const u8 u[32] = {
3513 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3514 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3515 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3516 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3517 const u8 v[32] = {
3518 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3519 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3520 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3521 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3522 const u8 x[16] = {
3523 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3524 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3525 const u8 z = 0x00;
3526 const u8 exp[16] = {
3527 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
3528 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
3529 u8 res[16];
3530 int err;
3531
3532 err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
3533 if (err)
3534 return err;
3535
3536 if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
3537 return -EINVAL;
3538
3539 return 0;
3540 }
3541
3542 static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3543 {
3544 const u8 w[32] = {
3545 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
3546 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
3547 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3548 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3549 const u8 n1[16] = {
3550 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3551 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3552 const u8 n2[16] = {
3553 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3554 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3555 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3556 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3557 const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
3558 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
3559 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
3560 const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
3561 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3562 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3563 u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
3564 int err;
3565
3566 err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
3567 if (err)
3568 return err;
3569
3570 if (memcmp(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
3571 return -EINVAL;
3572
3573 if (memcmp(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
3574 return -EINVAL;
3575
3576 return 0;
3577 }
3578
3579 static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3580 {
3581 const u8 w[16] = {
3582 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3583 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3584 const u8 n1[16] = {
3585 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3586 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3587 const u8 n2[16] = {
3588 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3589 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3590 const u8 r[16] = {
3591 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
3592 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
3593 const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
3594 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3595 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3596 const u8 exp[16] = {
3597 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
3598 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
3599 u8 res[16];
3600 int err;
3601
3602 err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
3603 if (err)
3604 return err;
3605
3606 if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
3607 return -EINVAL;
3608
3609 return 0;
3610 }
3611
3612 static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3613 {
3614 const u8 u[32] = {
3615 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3616 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3617 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3618 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3619 const u8 v[32] = {
3620 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3621 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3622 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3623 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3624 const u8 x[16] = {
3625 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3626 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3627 const u8 y[16] = {
3628 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3629 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3630 const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
3631 u32 val;
3632 int err;
3633
3634 err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
3635 if (err)
3636 return err;
3637
3638 if (val != exp_val)
3639 return -EINVAL;
3640
3641 return 0;
3642 }
3643
3644 static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3645 {
3646 const u8 w[16] = {
3647 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3648 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3649 const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
3650 const u8 exp[16] = {
3651 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
3652 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
3653 u8 res[16];
3654 int err;
3655
3656 err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
3657 if (err)
3658 return err;
3659
3660 if (memcmp(res, exp, 16))
3661 return -EINVAL;
3662
3663 return 0;
3664 }
3665
3666 static char test_smp_buffer[32];
3667
3668 static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
3669 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3670 {
3671 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
3672 strlen(test_smp_buffer));
3673 }
3674
3675 static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
3676 .open = simple_open,
3677 .read = test_smp_read,
3678 .llseek = default_llseek,
3679 };
3680
3681 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes,
3682 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3683 {
3684 ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
3685 unsigned long long duration;
3686 int err;
3687
3688 calltime = ktime_get();
3689
3690 err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
3691 if (err) {
3692 BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
3693 goto done;
3694 }
3695
3696 err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
3697 if (err) {
3698 BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
3699 goto done;
3700 }
3701
3702 err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
3703 if (err) {
3704 BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
3705 goto done;
3706 }
3707
3708 err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
3709 if (err) {
3710 BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
3711 goto done;
3712 }
3713
3714 err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
3715 if (err) {
3716 BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
3717 goto done;
3718 }
3719
3720 err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
3721 if (err) {
3722 BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
3723 goto done;
3724 }
3725
3726 err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
3727 if (err) {
3728 BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
3729 goto done;
3730 }
3731
3732 err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
3733 if (err) {
3734 BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
3735 goto done;
3736 }
3737
3738 rettime = ktime_get();
3739 delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
3740 duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
3741
3742 BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
3743
3744 done:
3745 if (!err)
3746 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
3747 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
3748 else
3749 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
3750
3751 debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
3752 &test_smp_fops);
3753
3754 return err;
3755 }
3756
3757 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
3758 {
3759 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
3760 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3761 int err;
3762
3763 tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3764 if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
3765 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
3766 return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
3767 }
3768
3769 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3770 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3771 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3772 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3773 return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
3774 }
3775
3776 err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac);
3777
3778 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3779 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3780
3781 return err;
3782 }
3783
3784 #endif
Linux with added FPC-III support