rt2x00usb: fix anchor initialization
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
blob42ce9bd4426f17aed0b6b50d6298cc01a950b05f
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4 * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
8 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
9 */
11 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
12 #include <linux/types.h>
13 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
14 #include <linux/compiler.h>
15 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
16 #include <linux/gfp.h>
17 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
18 #include <net/mac80211.h>
19 #include <crypto/aes.h>
21 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
22 #include "michael.h"
23 #include "tkip.h"
24 #include "aes_ccm.h"
25 #include "aes_cmac.h"
26 #include "aes_gmac.h"
27 #include "aes_gcm.h"
28 #include "wpa.h"
30 ieee80211_tx_result
31 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
33 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
34 size_t data_len;
35 unsigned int hdrlen;
36 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
37 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
38 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
39 int tail;
41 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
42 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
43 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
44 return TX_CONTINUE;
46 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
47 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
48 return TX_DROP;
50 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
51 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
53 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
54 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
55 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
58 if (info->control.hw_key &&
59 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
60 tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
61 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
62 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
63 return TX_CONTINUE;
66 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
67 if (!info->control.hw_key)
68 tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
70 if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
71 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
72 "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n",
73 skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
74 skb_tailroom(skb), tail))
75 return TX_DROP;
77 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
78 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
79 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
80 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
81 mic[0]++;
83 return TX_CONTINUE;
87 ieee80211_rx_result
88 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
90 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
91 size_t data_len;
92 unsigned int hdrlen;
93 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
94 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
95 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
96 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
99 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
100 * than data frames.
102 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
103 return RX_CONTINUE;
106 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
107 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
108 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
109 * MIC failure report.
111 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
112 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
113 goto mic_fail_no_key;
115 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
116 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
117 goto update_iv;
119 return RX_CONTINUE;
123 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
124 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
125 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
127 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
128 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
129 return RX_CONTINUE;
131 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
133 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
134 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
135 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
136 * frames in the BSS.
138 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
141 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
142 goto mic_fail;
144 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
145 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
146 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
148 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
149 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
150 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
152 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
153 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
154 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
155 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
156 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
157 goto mic_fail;
159 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
160 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
162 update_iv:
163 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
164 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
165 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
167 return RX_CONTINUE;
169 mic_fail:
170 rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
172 mic_fail_no_key:
174 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
175 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
176 * the key is set.
178 cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata->dev, hdr->addr2,
179 is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ?
180 NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP :
181 NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE,
182 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
183 NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
184 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
187 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
189 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
190 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
191 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
192 unsigned int hdrlen;
193 int len, tail;
194 u64 pn;
195 u8 *pos;
197 if (info->control.hw_key &&
198 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
199 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
200 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
201 return 0;
204 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
205 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
207 if (info->control.hw_key)
208 tail = 0;
209 else
210 tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
212 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
213 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
214 return -1;
216 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
217 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
218 pos += hdrlen;
220 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
221 if (info->control.hw_key &&
222 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
223 return 0;
225 /* Increase IV for the frame */
226 pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
227 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, &key->conf, pn);
229 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
230 if (info->control.hw_key)
231 return 0;
233 /* Add room for ICV */
234 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
236 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
237 key, skb, pos, len);
241 ieee80211_tx_result
242 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
244 struct sk_buff *skb;
246 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
248 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
249 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
250 return TX_DROP;
253 return TX_CONTINUE;
257 ieee80211_rx_result
258 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
260 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
261 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
262 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
263 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
264 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
266 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
268 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
269 return RX_CONTINUE;
271 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
272 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
274 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
275 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
276 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
277 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
280 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
281 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
282 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
284 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
285 hwaccel = 1;
287 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
288 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
289 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
290 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
291 &rx->tkip_iv32,
292 &rx->tkip_iv16);
293 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
294 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
296 /* Trim ICV */
297 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
299 /* Remove IV */
300 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
301 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
303 return RX_CONTINUE;
307 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
309 __le16 mask_fc;
310 int a4_included, mgmt;
311 u8 qos_tid;
312 u16 len_a;
313 unsigned int hdrlen;
314 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
317 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
318 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
320 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
321 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
322 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
323 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
324 if (!mgmt)
325 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
326 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
328 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
329 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
330 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
332 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
333 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
334 else
335 qos_tid = 0;
337 /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
338 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
339 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
340 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
341 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
342 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
344 b_0[0] = 0x1;
346 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
347 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
349 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
350 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
351 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
353 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
354 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
355 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
356 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
357 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
359 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
360 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
361 aad[23] = 0;
363 if (a4_included) {
364 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
365 aad[30] = qos_tid;
366 aad[31] = 0;
367 } else {
368 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
369 aad[24] = qos_tid;
374 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
376 hdr[0] = pn[5];
377 hdr[1] = pn[4];
378 hdr[2] = 0;
379 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
380 hdr[4] = pn[3];
381 hdr[5] = pn[2];
382 hdr[6] = pn[1];
383 hdr[7] = pn[0];
387 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
389 pn[0] = hdr[7];
390 pn[1] = hdr[6];
391 pn[2] = hdr[5];
392 pn[3] = hdr[4];
393 pn[4] = hdr[1];
394 pn[5] = hdr[0];
398 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
399 unsigned int mic_len)
401 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
402 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
403 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
404 int hdrlen, len, tail;
405 u8 *pos;
406 u8 pn[6];
407 u64 pn64;
408 u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN];
409 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
411 if (info->control.hw_key &&
412 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
413 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
414 !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
415 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
416 ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
418 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
419 * header or MIC fields
421 return 0;
424 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
425 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
427 if (info->control.hw_key)
428 tail = 0;
429 else
430 tail = mic_len;
432 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
433 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
434 return -1;
436 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
437 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
439 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
440 if (info->control.hw_key &&
441 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
442 return 0;
444 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
445 pos += hdrlen;
447 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
449 pn[5] = pn64;
450 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
451 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
452 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
453 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
454 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
456 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
458 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
459 if (info->control.hw_key)
460 return 0;
462 pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
463 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
464 return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
465 skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len);
469 ieee80211_tx_result
470 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
471 unsigned int mic_len)
473 struct sk_buff *skb;
475 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
477 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
478 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0)
479 return TX_DROP;
482 return TX_CONTINUE;
486 ieee80211_rx_result
487 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
488 unsigned int mic_len)
490 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
491 int hdrlen;
492 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
493 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
494 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
495 u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
496 int data_len;
497 int queue;
499 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
501 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
502 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
503 return RX_CONTINUE;
505 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
506 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
507 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
508 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
509 mic_len = 0;
510 } else {
511 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
512 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
515 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
516 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
517 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
519 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
520 int res;
522 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
524 queue = rx->security_idx;
526 res = memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
527 IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
528 if (res < 0 ||
529 (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
530 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
531 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
534 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
535 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
536 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
537 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
538 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
540 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
541 key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
542 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
543 data_len,
544 skb->data + skb->len - mic_len, mic_len))
545 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
548 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
551 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
552 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
553 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
554 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
555 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
557 return RX_CONTINUE;
560 static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
562 __le16 mask_fc;
563 u8 qos_tid;
564 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
566 memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
567 memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
568 j_0[13] = 0;
569 j_0[14] = 0;
570 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01;
572 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
573 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC]
575 put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]);
576 /* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
577 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
579 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
580 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
581 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
582 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
583 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
584 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
586 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
587 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
589 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
590 aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
591 aad[23] = 0;
593 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
594 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
595 IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
596 else
597 qos_tid = 0;
599 if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) {
600 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
601 aad[30] = qos_tid;
602 aad[31] = 0;
603 } else {
604 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
605 aad[24] = qos_tid;
609 static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id)
611 hdr[0] = pn[5];
612 hdr[1] = pn[4];
613 hdr[2] = 0;
614 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
615 hdr[4] = pn[3];
616 hdr[5] = pn[2];
617 hdr[6] = pn[1];
618 hdr[7] = pn[0];
621 static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr)
623 pn[0] = hdr[7];
624 pn[1] = hdr[6];
625 pn[2] = hdr[5];
626 pn[3] = hdr[4];
627 pn[4] = hdr[1];
628 pn[5] = hdr[0];
631 static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
633 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
634 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
635 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
636 int hdrlen, len, tail;
637 u8 *pos;
638 u8 pn[6];
639 u64 pn64;
640 u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN];
641 u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
643 if (info->control.hw_key &&
644 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
645 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
646 !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
647 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
648 ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
649 /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP
650 * header or MIC fields
652 return 0;
655 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
656 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
658 if (info->control.hw_key)
659 tail = 0;
660 else
661 tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
663 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
664 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
665 return -1;
667 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
668 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
669 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
670 IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
672 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
673 if (info->control.hw_key &&
674 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
675 return 0;
677 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)pos;
678 pos += hdrlen;
680 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
682 pn[5] = pn64;
683 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
684 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
685 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
686 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
687 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
689 gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
691 /* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */
692 if (info->control.hw_key)
693 return 0;
695 pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
696 gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
697 return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
698 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
701 ieee80211_tx_result
702 ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
704 struct sk_buff *skb;
706 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
708 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
709 if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
710 return TX_DROP;
713 return TX_CONTINUE;
716 ieee80211_rx_result
717 ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
719 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
720 int hdrlen;
721 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
722 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
723 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
724 u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN];
725 int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
727 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
729 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
730 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
731 return RX_CONTINUE;
733 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
734 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
735 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
736 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
737 mic_len = 0;
738 } else {
739 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
740 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
743 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
744 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
745 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
747 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
748 int res;
750 gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
752 queue = rx->security_idx;
754 res = memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue],
755 IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
756 if (res < 0 ||
757 (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
758 key->u.gcmp.replays++;
759 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
762 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
763 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
764 u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
765 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
766 gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
768 if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(
769 key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad,
770 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN,
771 data_len,
772 skb->data + skb->len -
773 IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN))
774 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
777 memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
780 /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */
781 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
782 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
783 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
784 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
786 return RX_CONTINUE;
789 static ieee80211_tx_result
790 ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
791 struct sk_buff *skb)
793 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
794 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
795 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
796 int hdrlen;
797 u8 *pos, iv_len = key->conf.iv_len;
799 if (info->control.hw_key &&
800 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
801 /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */
802 return TX_CONTINUE;
805 if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < iv_len &&
806 pskb_expand_head(skb, iv_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)))
807 return TX_DROP;
809 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
811 pos = skb_push(skb, iv_len);
812 memmove(pos, pos + iv_len, hdrlen);
814 return TX_CONTINUE;
817 static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len)
819 int i;
821 /* pn is little endian */
822 for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
823 if (pn1[i] < pn2[i])
824 return -1;
825 else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i])
826 return 1;
829 return 0;
832 static ieee80211_rx_result
833 ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
835 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
836 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
837 const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL;
838 int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
839 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
840 int data_len;
841 u8 *rx_pn;
842 u8 *skb_pn;
843 u8 qos_tid;
845 if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme ||
846 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
847 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
849 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
850 return RX_CONTINUE;
852 cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme;
854 data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len;
856 if (data_len < 0)
857 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
859 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
860 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
861 IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
862 else
863 qos_tid = 0;
865 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
866 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
868 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
870 rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid];
871 skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off;
873 if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0)
874 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
876 memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len);
878 /* remove security header and MIC */
879 if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len))
880 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
882 memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen);
883 skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len);
885 return RX_CONTINUE;
888 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
890 __le16 mask_fc;
891 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
893 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
895 /* FC type/subtype */
896 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
897 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
898 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
899 IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
900 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
901 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
902 memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
906 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
908 *d++ = pn;
909 *d++ = pn >> 8;
910 *d++ = pn >> 16;
911 *d++ = pn >> 24;
912 *d++ = pn >> 32;
913 *d = pn >> 40;
916 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
918 *d++ = s[5];
919 *d++ = s[4];
920 *d++ = s[3];
921 *d++ = s[2];
922 *d++ = s[1];
923 *d = s[0];
927 ieee80211_tx_result
928 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
930 struct sk_buff *skb;
931 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
932 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
933 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
934 u8 aad[20];
935 u64 pn64;
937 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
938 return TX_DROP;
940 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
942 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
944 if (info->control.hw_key)
945 return TX_CONTINUE;
947 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
948 return TX_DROP;
950 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
951 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
952 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
953 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
955 /* PN = PN + 1 */
956 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
958 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
960 bip_aad(skb, aad);
963 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
965 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
966 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
968 return TX_CONTINUE;
971 ieee80211_tx_result
972 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
974 struct sk_buff *skb;
975 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
976 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
977 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
978 u8 aad[20];
979 u64 pn64;
981 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
982 return TX_DROP;
984 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
986 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
988 if (info->control.hw_key)
989 return TX_CONTINUE;
991 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
992 return TX_DROP;
994 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
995 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
996 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
997 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
999 /* PN = PN + 1 */
1000 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
1002 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
1004 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1006 /* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128)
1008 ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
1009 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
1011 return TX_CONTINUE;
1014 ieee80211_rx_result
1015 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1017 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
1018 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
1019 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
1020 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
1021 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
1022 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
1024 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
1025 return RX_CONTINUE;
1027 /* management frames are already linear */
1029 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
1030 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1032 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
1033 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1034 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
1035 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
1036 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
1038 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
1040 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
1041 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
1042 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1045 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
1046 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
1047 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1048 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
1049 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
1050 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
1051 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
1052 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1056 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
1058 /* Remove MMIE */
1059 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1061 return RX_CONTINUE;
1064 ieee80211_rx_result
1065 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1067 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
1068 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
1069 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
1070 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
1071 u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6];
1072 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
1074 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
1075 return RX_CONTINUE;
1077 /* management frames are already linear */
1079 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
1080 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1082 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
1083 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1084 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
1085 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
1086 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
1088 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
1090 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
1091 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
1092 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1095 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
1096 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
1097 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1098 ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
1099 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
1100 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
1101 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
1102 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1106 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
1108 /* Remove MMIE */
1109 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1111 return RX_CONTINUE;
1114 ieee80211_tx_result
1115 ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
1117 struct sk_buff *skb;
1118 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
1119 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
1120 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
1121 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
1122 u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN];
1123 u64 pn64;
1124 u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
1126 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
1127 return TX_DROP;
1129 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
1131 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
1133 if (info->control.hw_key)
1134 return TX_CONTINUE;
1136 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
1137 return TX_DROP;
1139 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
1140 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
1141 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
1142 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
1144 /* PN = PN + 1 */
1145 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
1147 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
1149 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1151 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
1152 memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
1153 bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number);
1155 /* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */
1156 if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
1157 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0)
1158 return TX_DROP;
1160 return TX_CONTINUE;
1163 ieee80211_rx_result
1164 ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1166 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
1167 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
1168 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
1169 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
1170 u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], mic[GMAC_MIC_LEN], ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
1171 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
1173 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
1174 return RX_CONTINUE;
1176 /* management frames are already linear */
1178 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
1179 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1181 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
1182 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1183 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
1184 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
1185 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
1187 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
1189 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
1190 key->u.aes_gmac.replays++;
1191 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1194 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
1195 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
1196 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1198 memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
1199 memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6);
1201 if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
1202 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24,
1203 mic) < 0 ||
1204 memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
1205 key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
1206 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1210 memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
1212 /* Remove MMIE */
1213 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1215 return RX_CONTINUE;
1218 ieee80211_tx_result
1219 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
1221 struct sk_buff *skb;
1222 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
1223 ieee80211_tx_result res;
1225 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
1226 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
1228 /* handle hw-only algorithm */
1229 if (!info->control.hw_key)
1230 return TX_DROP;
1232 if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME) {
1233 res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb);
1234 if (res != TX_CONTINUE)
1235 return res;
1239 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
1241 return TX_CONTINUE;
1244 ieee80211_rx_result
1245 ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1247 if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme)
1248 return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx);
1250 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;