Linux 2.6.32.47
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / kernel / sys.c
blobe9512b185801314850e6ace469d02248b63ad826
1 /*
2 * linux/kernel/sys.c
4 * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
5 */
7 #include <linux/module.h>
8 #include <linux/mm.h>
9 #include <linux/utsname.h>
10 #include <linux/mman.h>
11 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
12 #include <linux/notifier.h>
13 #include <linux/reboot.h>
14 #include <linux/prctl.h>
15 #include <linux/highuid.h>
16 #include <linux/fs.h>
17 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
18 #include <linux/resource.h>
19 #include <linux/kernel.h>
20 #include <linux/kexec.h>
21 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
22 #include <linux/capability.h>
23 #include <linux/device.h>
24 #include <linux/key.h>
25 #include <linux/times.h>
26 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
27 #include <linux/security.h>
28 #include <linux/dcookies.h>
29 #include <linux/suspend.h>
30 #include <linux/tty.h>
31 #include <linux/signal.h>
32 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
33 #include <linux/getcpu.h>
34 #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
35 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
36 #include <linux/cpu.h>
37 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
38 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
40 #include <linux/compat.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
43 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
45 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
46 #include <asm/io.h>
47 #include <asm/unistd.h>
49 #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
50 # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
51 #endif
52 #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
53 # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
54 #endif
55 #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL
56 # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
57 #endif
58 #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL
59 # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
60 #endif
61 #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL
62 # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
63 #endif
64 #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL
65 # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL)
66 #endif
67 #ifndef GET_ENDIAN
68 # define GET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
69 #endif
70 #ifndef SET_ENDIAN
71 # define SET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL)
72 #endif
73 #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL
74 # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
75 #endif
76 #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL
77 # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
78 #endif
81 * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
82 * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
85 int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
86 int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;
88 #ifdef CONFIG_UID16
89 EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid);
90 EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid);
91 #endif
94 * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
95 * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
98 int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
99 int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
101 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid);
102 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid);
105 * this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes
108 int C_A_D = 1;
109 struct pid *cad_pid;
110 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cad_pid);
113 * If set, this is used for preparing the system to power off.
116 void (*pm_power_off_prepare)(void);
119 * set the priority of a task
120 * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
122 static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
124 const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
125 int no_nice;
127 if (pcred->uid != cred->euid &&
128 pcred->euid != cred->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
129 error = -EPERM;
130 goto out;
132 if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) {
133 error = -EACCES;
134 goto out;
136 no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
137 if (no_nice) {
138 error = no_nice;
139 goto out;
141 if (error == -ESRCH)
142 error = 0;
143 set_user_nice(p, niceval);
144 out:
145 return error;
148 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval)
150 struct task_struct *g, *p;
151 struct user_struct *user;
152 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
153 int error = -EINVAL;
154 struct pid *pgrp;
156 if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
157 goto out;
159 /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */
160 error = -ESRCH;
161 if (niceval < -20)
162 niceval = -20;
163 if (niceval > 19)
164 niceval = 19;
166 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
167 switch (which) {
168 case PRIO_PROCESS:
169 if (who)
170 p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
171 else
172 p = current;
173 if (p)
174 error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
175 break;
176 case PRIO_PGRP:
177 if (who)
178 pgrp = find_vpid(who);
179 else
180 pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
181 do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
182 error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
183 } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
184 break;
185 case PRIO_USER:
186 user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user;
187 if (!who)
188 who = cred->uid;
189 else if ((who != cred->uid) &&
190 !(user = find_user(who)))
191 goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
193 do_each_thread(g, p)
194 if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who)
195 error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
196 while_each_thread(g, p);
197 if (who != cred->uid)
198 free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */
199 break;
201 out_unlock:
202 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
203 out:
204 return error;
208 * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
209 * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
210 * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
211 * to stay compatible.
213 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who)
215 struct task_struct *g, *p;
216 struct user_struct *user;
217 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
218 long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
219 struct pid *pgrp;
221 if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
222 return -EINVAL;
224 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
225 switch (which) {
226 case PRIO_PROCESS:
227 if (who)
228 p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
229 else
230 p = current;
231 if (p) {
232 niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
233 if (niceval > retval)
234 retval = niceval;
236 break;
237 case PRIO_PGRP:
238 if (who)
239 pgrp = find_vpid(who);
240 else
241 pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
242 do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
243 niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
244 if (niceval > retval)
245 retval = niceval;
246 } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
247 break;
248 case PRIO_USER:
249 user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user;
250 if (!who)
251 who = cred->uid;
252 else if ((who != cred->uid) &&
253 !(user = find_user(who)))
254 goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
256 do_each_thread(g, p)
257 if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who) {
258 niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
259 if (niceval > retval)
260 retval = niceval;
262 while_each_thread(g, p);
263 if (who != cred->uid)
264 free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */
265 break;
267 out_unlock:
268 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
270 return retval;
274 * emergency_restart - reboot the system
276 * Without shutting down any hardware or taking any locks
277 * reboot the system. This is called when we know we are in
278 * trouble so this is our best effort to reboot. This is
279 * safe to call in interrupt context.
281 void emergency_restart(void)
283 machine_emergency_restart();
285 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(emergency_restart);
287 void kernel_restart_prepare(char *cmd)
289 blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, cmd);
290 system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART;
291 device_shutdown();
292 sysdev_shutdown();
296 * kernel_restart - reboot the system
297 * @cmd: pointer to buffer containing command to execute for restart
298 * or %NULL
300 * Shutdown everything and perform a clean reboot.
301 * This is not safe to call in interrupt context.
303 void kernel_restart(char *cmd)
305 kernel_restart_prepare(cmd);
306 if (!cmd)
307 printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system.\n");
308 else
309 printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", cmd);
310 machine_restart(cmd);
312 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_restart);
314 static void kernel_shutdown_prepare(enum system_states state)
316 blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list,
317 (state == SYSTEM_HALT)?SYS_HALT:SYS_POWER_OFF, NULL);
318 system_state = state;
319 device_shutdown();
322 * kernel_halt - halt the system
324 * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system halt.
326 void kernel_halt(void)
328 kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_HALT);
329 sysdev_shutdown();
330 printk(KERN_EMERG "System halted.\n");
331 machine_halt();
334 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_halt);
337 * kernel_power_off - power_off the system
339 * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system power_off.
341 void kernel_power_off(void)
343 kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_POWER_OFF);
344 if (pm_power_off_prepare)
345 pm_power_off_prepare();
346 disable_nonboot_cpus();
347 sysdev_shutdown();
348 printk(KERN_EMERG "Power down.\n");
349 machine_power_off();
351 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_power_off);
353 * Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it,
354 * and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers
355 * so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine.
356 * You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here.
358 * reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this.
360 SYSCALL_DEFINE4(reboot, int, magic1, int, magic2, unsigned int, cmd,
361 void __user *, arg)
363 char buffer[256];
364 int ret = 0;
366 /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
367 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
368 return -EPERM;
370 /* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */
371 if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 ||
372 (magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2 &&
373 magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A &&
374 magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B &&
375 magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2C))
376 return -EINVAL;
378 /* Instead of trying to make the power_off code look like
379 * halt when pm_power_off is not set do it the easy way.
381 if ((cmd == LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF) && !pm_power_off)
382 cmd = LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT;
384 lock_kernel();
385 switch (cmd) {
386 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART:
387 kernel_restart(NULL);
388 break;
390 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON:
391 C_A_D = 1;
392 break;
394 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF:
395 C_A_D = 0;
396 break;
398 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT:
399 kernel_halt();
400 unlock_kernel();
401 do_exit(0);
402 panic("cannot halt");
404 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF:
405 kernel_power_off();
406 unlock_kernel();
407 do_exit(0);
408 break;
410 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2:
411 if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer[0], arg, sizeof(buffer) - 1) < 0) {
412 unlock_kernel();
413 return -EFAULT;
415 buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0';
417 kernel_restart(buffer);
418 break;
420 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
421 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC:
422 ret = kernel_kexec();
423 break;
424 #endif
426 #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
427 case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_SW_SUSPEND:
428 ret = hibernate();
429 break;
430 #endif
432 default:
433 ret = -EINVAL;
434 break;
436 unlock_kernel();
437 return ret;
440 static void deferred_cad(struct work_struct *dummy)
442 kernel_restart(NULL);
446 * This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt.
447 * As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice
448 * is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del.
450 void ctrl_alt_del(void)
452 static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad);
454 if (C_A_D)
455 schedule_work(&cad_work);
456 else
457 kill_cad_pid(SIGINT, 1);
461 * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
462 * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
464 * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
465 * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
467 * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
468 * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
469 * a security audit over a program.
471 * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
472 * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be
473 * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
475 * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
476 * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
478 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
480 const struct cred *old;
481 struct cred *new;
482 int retval;
484 new = prepare_creds();
485 if (!new)
486 return -ENOMEM;
487 old = current_cred();
489 retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
490 if (retval)
491 goto error;
493 retval = -EPERM;
494 if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
495 if (old->gid == rgid ||
496 old->egid == rgid ||
497 capable(CAP_SETGID))
498 new->gid = rgid;
499 else
500 goto error;
502 if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
503 if (old->gid == egid ||
504 old->egid == egid ||
505 old->sgid == egid ||
506 capable(CAP_SETGID))
507 new->egid = egid;
508 else
509 goto error;
512 if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
513 (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid))
514 new->sgid = new->egid;
515 new->fsgid = new->egid;
517 return commit_creds(new);
519 error:
520 abort_creds(new);
521 return retval;
525 * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS
527 * SMP: Same implicit races as above.
529 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
531 const struct cred *old;
532 struct cred *new;
533 int retval;
535 new = prepare_creds();
536 if (!new)
537 return -ENOMEM;
538 old = current_cred();
540 retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
541 if (retval)
542 goto error;
544 retval = -EPERM;
545 if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
546 new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid;
547 else if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->sgid)
548 new->egid = new->fsgid = gid;
549 else
550 goto error;
552 return commit_creds(new);
554 error:
555 abort_creds(new);
556 return retval;
560 * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID
562 static int set_user(struct cred *new)
564 struct user_struct *new_user;
566 new_user = alloc_uid(current_user_ns(), new->uid);
567 if (!new_user)
568 return -EAGAIN;
570 if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >=
571 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur &&
572 new_user != INIT_USER) {
573 free_uid(new_user);
574 return -EAGAIN;
577 free_uid(new->user);
578 new->user = new_user;
579 return 0;
583 * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
584 * or vice versa. (BSD-style)
586 * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
587 * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
589 * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
590 * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
591 * a security audit over a program.
593 * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
594 * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be
595 * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
597 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
599 const struct cred *old;
600 struct cred *new;
601 int retval;
603 new = prepare_creds();
604 if (!new)
605 return -ENOMEM;
606 old = current_cred();
608 retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
609 if (retval)
610 goto error;
612 retval = -EPERM;
613 if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
614 new->uid = ruid;
615 if (old->uid != ruid &&
616 old->euid != ruid &&
617 !capable(CAP_SETUID))
618 goto error;
621 if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
622 new->euid = euid;
623 if (old->uid != euid &&
624 old->euid != euid &&
625 old->suid != euid &&
626 !capable(CAP_SETUID))
627 goto error;
630 if (new->uid != old->uid) {
631 retval = set_user(new);
632 if (retval < 0)
633 goto error;
635 if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
636 (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid))
637 new->suid = new->euid;
638 new->fsuid = new->euid;
640 retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
641 if (retval < 0)
642 goto error;
644 return commit_creds(new);
646 error:
647 abort_creds(new);
648 return retval;
652 * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
654 * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
655 * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal
656 * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
657 * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people
658 * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
659 * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
660 * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.
662 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
664 const struct cred *old;
665 struct cred *new;
666 int retval;
668 new = prepare_creds();
669 if (!new)
670 return -ENOMEM;
671 old = current_cred();
673 retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
674 if (retval)
675 goto error;
677 retval = -EPERM;
678 if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
679 new->suid = new->uid = uid;
680 if (uid != old->uid) {
681 retval = set_user(new);
682 if (retval < 0)
683 goto error;
685 } else if (uid != old->uid && uid != new->suid) {
686 goto error;
689 new->fsuid = new->euid = uid;
691 retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
692 if (retval < 0)
693 goto error;
695 return commit_creds(new);
697 error:
698 abort_creds(new);
699 return retval;
704 * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
705 * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
707 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
709 const struct cred *old;
710 struct cred *new;
711 int retval;
713 new = prepare_creds();
714 if (!new)
715 return -ENOMEM;
717 retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
718 if (retval)
719 goto error;
720 old = current_cred();
722 retval = -EPERM;
723 if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
724 if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && ruid != old->uid &&
725 ruid != old->euid && ruid != old->suid)
726 goto error;
727 if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid &&
728 euid != old->euid && euid != old->suid)
729 goto error;
730 if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && suid != old->uid &&
731 suid != old->euid && suid != old->suid)
732 goto error;
735 if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
736 new->uid = ruid;
737 if (ruid != old->uid) {
738 retval = set_user(new);
739 if (retval < 0)
740 goto error;
743 if (euid != (uid_t) -1)
744 new->euid = euid;
745 if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
746 new->suid = suid;
747 new->fsuid = new->euid;
749 retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
750 if (retval < 0)
751 goto error;
753 return commit_creds(new);
755 error:
756 abort_creds(new);
757 return retval;
760 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruid, uid_t __user *, euid, uid_t __user *, suid)
762 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
763 int retval;
765 if (!(retval = put_user(cred->uid, ruid)) &&
766 !(retval = put_user(cred->euid, euid)))
767 retval = put_user(cred->suid, suid);
769 return retval;
773 * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
775 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
777 const struct cred *old;
778 struct cred *new;
779 int retval;
781 new = prepare_creds();
782 if (!new)
783 return -ENOMEM;
784 old = current_cred();
786 retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES);
787 if (retval)
788 goto error;
790 retval = -EPERM;
791 if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
792 if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid &&
793 rgid != old->egid && rgid != old->sgid)
794 goto error;
795 if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid &&
796 egid != old->egid && egid != old->sgid)
797 goto error;
798 if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && sgid != old->gid &&
799 sgid != old->egid && sgid != old->sgid)
800 goto error;
803 if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
804 new->gid = rgid;
805 if (egid != (gid_t) -1)
806 new->egid = egid;
807 if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
808 new->sgid = sgid;
809 new->fsgid = new->egid;
811 return commit_creds(new);
813 error:
814 abort_creds(new);
815 return retval;
818 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgid, gid_t __user *, egid, gid_t __user *, sgid)
820 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
821 int retval;
823 if (!(retval = put_user(cred->gid, rgid)) &&
824 !(retval = put_user(cred->egid, egid)))
825 retval = put_user(cred->sgid, sgid);
827 return retval;
832 * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
833 * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
834 * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
835 * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
837 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
839 const struct cred *old;
840 struct cred *new;
841 uid_t old_fsuid;
843 new = prepare_creds();
844 if (!new)
845 return current_fsuid();
846 old = current_cred();
847 old_fsuid = old->fsuid;
849 if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS) < 0)
850 goto error;
852 if (uid == old->uid || uid == old->euid ||
853 uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid ||
854 capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
855 if (uid != old_fsuid) {
856 new->fsuid = uid;
857 if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
858 goto change_okay;
862 error:
863 abort_creds(new);
864 return old_fsuid;
866 change_okay:
867 commit_creds(new);
868 return old_fsuid;
872 * Samma på svenska..
874 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
876 const struct cred *old;
877 struct cred *new;
878 gid_t old_fsgid;
880 new = prepare_creds();
881 if (!new)
882 return current_fsgid();
883 old = current_cred();
884 old_fsgid = old->fsgid;
886 if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
887 goto error;
889 if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->egid ||
890 gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid ||
891 capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
892 if (gid != old_fsgid) {
893 new->fsgid = gid;
894 goto change_okay;
898 error:
899 abort_creds(new);
900 return old_fsgid;
902 change_okay:
903 commit_creds(new);
904 return old_fsgid;
907 void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms)
909 cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime;
911 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
912 thread_group_times(current, &tgutime, &tgstime);
913 cutime = current->signal->cutime;
914 cstime = current->signal->cstime;
915 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
916 tms->tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgutime);
917 tms->tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgstime);
918 tms->tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime);
919 tms->tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime);
922 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf)
924 if (tbuf) {
925 struct tms tmp;
927 do_sys_times(&tmp);
928 if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
929 return -EFAULT;
931 force_successful_syscall_return();
932 return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
936 * This needs some heavy checking ...
937 * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
938 * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
940 * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
941 * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
942 * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91
944 * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX.
945 * LBT 04.03.94
947 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid)
949 struct task_struct *p;
950 struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
951 struct pid *pgrp;
952 int err;
954 if (!pid)
955 pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader);
956 if (!pgid)
957 pgid = pid;
958 if (pgid < 0)
959 return -EINVAL;
960 rcu_read_lock();
962 /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock
963 * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
965 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
967 err = -ESRCH;
968 p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
969 if (!p)
970 goto out;
972 err = -EINVAL;
973 if (!thread_group_leader(p))
974 goto out;
976 if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) {
977 err = -EPERM;
978 if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader))
979 goto out;
980 err = -EACCES;
981 if (p->did_exec)
982 goto out;
983 } else {
984 err = -ESRCH;
985 if (p != group_leader)
986 goto out;
989 err = -EPERM;
990 if (p->signal->leader)
991 goto out;
993 pgrp = task_pid(p);
994 if (pgid != pid) {
995 struct task_struct *g;
997 pgrp = find_vpid(pgid);
998 g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID);
999 if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader))
1000 goto out;
1003 err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid);
1004 if (err)
1005 goto out;
1007 if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp)
1008 change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp);
1010 err = 0;
1011 out:
1012 /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */
1013 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1014 rcu_read_unlock();
1015 return err;
1018 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid)
1020 struct task_struct *p;
1021 struct pid *grp;
1022 int retval;
1024 rcu_read_lock();
1025 if (!pid)
1026 grp = task_pgrp(current);
1027 else {
1028 retval = -ESRCH;
1029 p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
1030 if (!p)
1031 goto out;
1032 grp = task_pgrp(p);
1033 if (!grp)
1034 goto out;
1036 retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
1037 if (retval)
1038 goto out;
1040 retval = pid_vnr(grp);
1041 out:
1042 rcu_read_unlock();
1043 return retval;
1046 #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
1048 SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp)
1050 return sys_getpgid(0);
1053 #endif
1055 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid)
1057 struct task_struct *p;
1058 struct pid *sid;
1059 int retval;
1061 rcu_read_lock();
1062 if (!pid)
1063 sid = task_session(current);
1064 else {
1065 retval = -ESRCH;
1066 p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
1067 if (!p)
1068 goto out;
1069 sid = task_session(p);
1070 if (!sid)
1071 goto out;
1073 retval = security_task_getsid(p);
1074 if (retval)
1075 goto out;
1077 retval = pid_vnr(sid);
1078 out:
1079 rcu_read_unlock();
1080 return retval;
1083 SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid)
1085 struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
1086 struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader);
1087 pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid);
1088 int err = -EPERM;
1090 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1091 /* Fail if I am already a session leader */
1092 if (group_leader->signal->leader)
1093 goto out;
1095 /* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the
1096 * proposed session id.
1098 if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID))
1099 goto out;
1101 group_leader->signal->leader = 1;
1102 __set_special_pids(sid);
1104 proc_clear_tty(group_leader);
1106 err = session;
1107 out:
1108 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1109 if (err > 0)
1110 proc_sid_connector(group_leader);
1111 return err;
1114 DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem);
1116 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name)
1118 int errno = 0;
1120 down_read(&uts_sem);
1121 if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof *name))
1122 errno = -EFAULT;
1123 up_read(&uts_sem);
1124 return errno;
1127 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
1129 int errno;
1130 char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
1132 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1133 return -EPERM;
1134 if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
1135 return -EINVAL;
1136 down_write(&uts_sem);
1137 errno = -EFAULT;
1138 if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
1139 struct new_utsname *u = utsname();
1141 memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len);
1142 memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len);
1143 errno = 0;
1145 up_write(&uts_sem);
1146 return errno;
1149 #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME
1151 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
1153 int i, errno;
1154 struct new_utsname *u;
1156 if (len < 0)
1157 return -EINVAL;
1158 down_read(&uts_sem);
1159 u = utsname();
1160 i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename);
1161 if (i > len)
1162 i = len;
1163 errno = 0;
1164 if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i))
1165 errno = -EFAULT;
1166 up_read(&uts_sem);
1167 return errno;
1170 #endif
1173 * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
1174 * uname()
1176 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len)
1178 int errno;
1179 char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
1181 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
1182 return -EPERM;
1183 if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
1184 return -EINVAL;
1186 down_write(&uts_sem);
1187 errno = -EFAULT;
1188 if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
1189 struct new_utsname *u = utsname();
1191 memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len);
1192 memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len);
1193 errno = 0;
1195 up_write(&uts_sem);
1196 return errno;
1199 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
1201 if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
1202 return -EINVAL;
1203 else {
1204 struct rlimit value;
1205 task_lock(current->group_leader);
1206 value = current->signal->rlim[resource];
1207 task_unlock(current->group_leader);
1208 return copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
1212 #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
1215 * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
1218 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
1219 struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
1221 struct rlimit x;
1222 if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
1223 return -EINVAL;
1225 task_lock(current->group_leader);
1226 x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
1227 task_unlock(current->group_leader);
1228 if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
1229 x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
1230 if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
1231 x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
1232 return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0;
1235 #endif
1237 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
1239 struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim;
1240 int retval;
1242 if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
1243 return -EINVAL;
1244 if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
1245 return -EFAULT;
1246 if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > new_rlim.rlim_max)
1247 return -EINVAL;
1248 old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
1249 if ((new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max) &&
1250 !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
1251 return -EPERM;
1252 if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim.rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open)
1253 return -EPERM;
1255 retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim);
1256 if (retval)
1257 return retval;
1259 if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim.rlim_cur == 0) {
1261 * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU
1262 * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was
1263 * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second
1264 * instead
1266 new_rlim.rlim_cur = 1;
1269 task_lock(current->group_leader);
1270 *old_rlim = new_rlim;
1271 task_unlock(current->group_leader);
1273 if (resource != RLIMIT_CPU)
1274 goto out;
1277 * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error
1278 * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a
1279 * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of
1280 * applications, so we live with it
1282 if (new_rlim.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
1283 goto out;
1285 update_rlimit_cpu(new_rlim.rlim_cur);
1286 out:
1287 return 0;
1291 * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
1292 * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After
1293 * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
1294 * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information
1295 * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
1296 * measuring them yet).
1298 * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have
1299 * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word
1300 * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't
1301 * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading
1302 * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those
1303 * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a
1304 * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping.
1306 * Locking:
1307 * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH
1308 * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded
1309 * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with
1310 * the siglock held.
1311 * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and
1312 * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one
1313 * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else
1314 * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the
1315 * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just
1316 * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock.
1317 * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal
1318 * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal->
1319 * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple.
1323 static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r)
1325 r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw;
1326 r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw;
1327 r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt;
1328 r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt;
1329 r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t);
1330 r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t);
1333 static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r)
1335 struct task_struct *t;
1336 unsigned long flags;
1337 cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime;
1338 unsigned long maxrss = 0;
1340 memset((char *) r, 0, sizeof *r);
1341 utime = stime = cputime_zero;
1343 if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) {
1344 utime = task_utime(current);
1345 stime = task_stime(current);
1346 accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r);
1347 maxrss = p->signal->maxrss;
1348 goto out;
1351 if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags))
1352 return;
1354 switch (who) {
1355 case RUSAGE_BOTH:
1356 case RUSAGE_CHILDREN:
1357 utime = p->signal->cutime;
1358 stime = p->signal->cstime;
1359 r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw;
1360 r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw;
1361 r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt;
1362 r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt;
1363 r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock;
1364 r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock;
1365 maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss;
1367 if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
1368 break;
1370 case RUSAGE_SELF:
1371 thread_group_times(p, &tgutime, &tgstime);
1372 utime = cputime_add(utime, tgutime);
1373 stime = cputime_add(stime, tgstime);
1374 r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw;
1375 r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw;
1376 r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt;
1377 r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt;
1378 r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock;
1379 r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock;
1380 if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss)
1381 maxrss = p->signal->maxrss;
1382 t = p;
1383 do {
1384 accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r);
1385 t = next_thread(t);
1386 } while (t != p);
1387 break;
1389 default:
1390 BUG();
1392 unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
1394 out:
1395 cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime);
1396 cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime);
1398 if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) {
1399 struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p);
1400 if (mm) {
1401 setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm);
1402 mmput(mm);
1405 r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */
1408 int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru)
1410 struct rusage r;
1411 k_getrusage(p, who, &r);
1412 return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
1415 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru)
1417 if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
1418 who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
1419 return -EINVAL;
1420 return getrusage(current, who, ru);
1423 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask)
1425 mask = xchg(&current->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
1426 return mask;
1429 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
1430 unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
1432 struct task_struct *me = current;
1433 unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
1434 long error;
1436 error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
1437 if (error != -ENOSYS)
1438 return error;
1440 error = 0;
1441 switch (option) {
1442 case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
1443 if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
1444 error = -EINVAL;
1445 break;
1447 me->pdeath_signal = arg2;
1448 error = 0;
1449 break;
1450 case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
1451 error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
1452 break;
1453 case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
1454 error = get_dumpable(me->mm);
1455 break;
1456 case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
1457 if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 1) {
1458 error = -EINVAL;
1459 break;
1461 set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
1462 error = 0;
1463 break;
1465 case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
1466 error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
1467 break;
1468 case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
1469 error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
1470 break;
1471 case PR_SET_FPEMU:
1472 error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
1473 break;
1474 case PR_GET_FPEMU:
1475 error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
1476 break;
1477 case PR_SET_FPEXC:
1478 error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
1479 break;
1480 case PR_GET_FPEXC:
1481 error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
1482 break;
1483 case PR_GET_TIMING:
1484 error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
1485 break;
1486 case PR_SET_TIMING:
1487 if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
1488 error = -EINVAL;
1489 else
1490 error = 0;
1491 break;
1493 case PR_SET_NAME:
1494 comm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0;
1495 if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2,
1496 sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0)
1497 return -EFAULT;
1498 set_task_comm(me, comm);
1499 return 0;
1500 case PR_GET_NAME:
1501 get_task_comm(comm, me);
1502 if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm,
1503 sizeof(comm)))
1504 return -EFAULT;
1505 return 0;
1506 case PR_GET_ENDIAN:
1507 error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
1508 break;
1509 case PR_SET_ENDIAN:
1510 error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
1511 break;
1513 case PR_GET_SECCOMP:
1514 error = prctl_get_seccomp();
1515 break;
1516 case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
1517 error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2);
1518 break;
1519 case PR_GET_TSC:
1520 error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
1521 break;
1522 case PR_SET_TSC:
1523 error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
1524 break;
1525 case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE:
1526 error = perf_event_task_disable();
1527 break;
1528 case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE:
1529 error = perf_event_task_enable();
1530 break;
1531 case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK:
1532 error = current->timer_slack_ns;
1533 break;
1534 case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK:
1535 if (arg2 <= 0)
1536 current->timer_slack_ns =
1537 current->default_timer_slack_ns;
1538 else
1539 current->timer_slack_ns = arg2;
1540 error = 0;
1541 break;
1542 case PR_MCE_KILL:
1543 if (arg4 | arg5)
1544 return -EINVAL;
1545 switch (arg2) {
1546 case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR:
1547 if (arg3 != 0)
1548 return -EINVAL;
1549 current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS;
1550 break;
1551 case PR_MCE_KILL_SET:
1552 current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS;
1553 if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY)
1554 current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY;
1555 else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE)
1556 current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY;
1557 else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT)
1558 current->flags &=
1559 ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS);
1560 else
1561 return -EINVAL;
1562 break;
1563 default:
1564 return -EINVAL;
1566 error = 0;
1567 break;
1568 case PR_MCE_KILL_GET:
1569 if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
1570 return -EINVAL;
1571 if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS)
1572 error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ?
1573 PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE;
1574 else
1575 error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT;
1576 break;
1577 default:
1578 error = -EINVAL;
1579 break;
1581 return error;
1584 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep,
1585 struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused)
1587 int err = 0;
1588 int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
1589 if (cpup)
1590 err |= put_user(cpu, cpup);
1591 if (nodep)
1592 err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep);
1593 return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
1596 char poweroff_cmd[POWEROFF_CMD_PATH_LEN] = "/sbin/poweroff";
1598 static void argv_cleanup(char **argv, char **envp)
1600 argv_free(argv);
1604 * orderly_poweroff - Trigger an orderly system poweroff
1605 * @force: force poweroff if command execution fails
1607 * This may be called from any context to trigger a system shutdown.
1608 * If the orderly shutdown fails, it will force an immediate shutdown.
1610 int orderly_poweroff(bool force)
1612 int argc;
1613 char **argv = argv_split(GFP_ATOMIC, poweroff_cmd, &argc);
1614 static char *envp[] = {
1615 "HOME=/",
1616 "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin",
1617 NULL
1619 int ret = -ENOMEM;
1620 struct subprocess_info *info;
1622 if (argv == NULL) {
1623 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s failed to allocate memory for \"%s\"\n",
1624 __func__, poweroff_cmd);
1625 goto out;
1628 info = call_usermodehelper_setup(argv[0], argv, envp, GFP_ATOMIC);
1629 if (info == NULL) {
1630 argv_free(argv);
1631 goto out;
1634 call_usermodehelper_setcleanup(info, argv_cleanup);
1636 ret = call_usermodehelper_exec(info, UMH_NO_WAIT);
1638 out:
1639 if (ret && force) {
1640 printk(KERN_WARNING "Failed to start orderly shutdown: "
1641 "forcing the issue\n");
1643 /* I guess this should try to kick off some daemon to
1644 sync and poweroff asap. Or not even bother syncing
1645 if we're doing an emergency shutdown? */
1646 emergency_sync();
1647 kernel_power_off();
1650 return ret;
1652 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(orderly_poweroff);