2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
10 * - initialize default measure policy rules
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/security.h>
16 #include <linux/magic.h>
17 #include <linux/parser.h>
18 #include <linux/slab.h>
19 #include <linux/genhd.h>
23 /* flags definitions */
24 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
25 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
26 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
27 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
28 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
29 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
30 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
31 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080
34 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
35 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
36 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
37 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
40 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
41 enum lsm_rule_types
{ LSM_OBJ_USER
, LSM_OBJ_ROLE
, LSM_OBJ_TYPE
,
42 LSM_SUBJ_USER
, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE
, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
45 struct ima_rule_entry
{
46 struct list_head list
;
51 unsigned long fsmagic
;
56 void *rule
; /* LSM file metadata specific */
57 void *args_p
; /* audit value */
58 int type
; /* audit type */
63 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
64 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
68 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
69 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
70 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
71 * and running executables.
73 static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules
[] = {
74 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
,.fsmagic
= PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
75 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
,.fsmagic
= SYSFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
76 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
,.fsmagic
= DEBUGFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
77 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
,.fsmagic
= TMPFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
78 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
,.fsmagic
= DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
79 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
,.fsmagic
= BINFMTFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
80 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
,.fsmagic
= SECURITYFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
81 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
,.fsmagic
= SELINUX_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
82 {.action
= MEASURE
,.func
= MMAP_CHECK
,.mask
= MAY_EXEC
,
83 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
},
84 {.action
= MEASURE
,.func
= BPRM_CHECK
,.mask
= MAY_EXEC
,
85 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
},
86 {.action
= MEASURE
,.func
= FILE_CHECK
,.mask
= MAY_READ
,.uid
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
,
87 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
| IMA_UID
},
88 {.action
= MEASURE
,.func
= MODULE_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
91 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules
[] = {
92 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
,.fsmagic
= PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
93 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
,.fsmagic
= SYSFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
94 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
,.fsmagic
= DEBUGFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
95 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
,.fsmagic
= TMPFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
96 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
,.fsmagic
= RAMFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
97 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
,.fsmagic
= DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
98 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
,.fsmagic
= BINFMTFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
99 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
,.fsmagic
= SECURITYFS_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
100 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
,.fsmagic
= SELINUX_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
101 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
,.fsmagic
= CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
,.flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
102 {.action
= APPRAISE
,.fowner
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
,.flags
= IMA_FOWNER
},
105 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules
);
106 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules
);
107 static struct list_head
*ima_rules
;
109 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex
);
111 static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata
;
112 static int __init
default_measure_policy_setup(char *str
)
117 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup
);
119 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata
;
120 static int __init
default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str
)
122 ima_use_appraise_tcb
= 1;
125 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup
);
128 * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
129 * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
132 * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
133 * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
135 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
137 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
, *tmp
;
141 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex
);
142 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry
, tmp
, &ima_policy_rules
, list
) {
143 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++) {
144 if (!entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
)
146 result
= security_filter_rule_init(entry
->lsm
[i
].type
,
148 entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
,
149 &entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
);
150 BUG_ON(!entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
);
153 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex
);
157 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
158 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
159 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
160 * @func: LIM hook identifier
161 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
163 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
165 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry
*rule
,
166 struct inode
*inode
, enum ima_hooks func
, int mask
)
168 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
169 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
172 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FUNC
) && rule
->func
!= func
)
174 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_MASK
) && rule
->mask
!= mask
)
176 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_INMASK
) &&
177 (!(rule
->mask
& mask
) && func
!= POST_SETATTR
))
179 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FSMAGIC
)
180 && rule
->fsmagic
!= inode
->i_sb
->s_magic
)
182 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FSUUID
) &&
183 memcmp(rule
->fsuuid
, inode
->i_sb
->s_uuid
, sizeof(rule
->fsuuid
)))
185 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_UID
) && !uid_eq(rule
->uid
, cred
->uid
))
187 if (rule
->flags
& IMA_EUID
) {
188 if (has_capability_noaudit(current
, CAP_SETUID
)) {
189 if (!uid_eq(rule
->uid
, cred
->euid
)
190 && !uid_eq(rule
->uid
, cred
->suid
)
191 && !uid_eq(rule
->uid
, cred
->uid
))
193 } else if (!uid_eq(rule
->uid
, cred
->euid
))
197 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FOWNER
) && !uid_eq(rule
->fowner
, inode
->i_uid
))
199 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++) {
204 if (!rule
->lsm
[i
].rule
)
211 security_inode_getsecid(inode
, &osid
);
212 rc
= security_filter_rule_match(osid
,
221 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &sid
);
222 rc
= security_filter_rule_match(sid
,
230 if ((rc
< 0) && (!retried
)) {
232 ima_lsm_update_rules();
242 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
243 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
245 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry
*rule
, int func
)
247 if (!(rule
->flags
& IMA_FUNC
))
248 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE
;
252 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE
;
254 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE
;
256 return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE
;
259 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE
;
264 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
265 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
266 * @func: IMA hook identifier
267 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
269 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
272 * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
273 * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
276 int ima_match_policy(struct inode
*inode
, enum ima_hooks func
, int mask
,
279 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
280 int action
= 0, actmask
= flags
| (flags
<< 1);
282 list_for_each_entry(entry
, ima_rules
, list
) {
284 if (!(entry
->action
& actmask
))
287 if (!ima_match_rules(entry
, inode
, func
, mask
))
290 action
|= entry
->flags
& IMA_ACTION_FLAGS
;
292 action
|= entry
->action
& IMA_DO_MASK
;
293 if (entry
->action
& IMA_APPRAISE
)
294 action
|= get_subaction(entry
, func
);
296 if (entry
->action
& IMA_DO_MASK
)
297 actmask
&= ~(entry
->action
| entry
->action
<< 1);
299 actmask
&= ~(entry
->action
| entry
->action
>> 1);
309 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
311 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
312 * the new ima_policy_rules.
314 void __init
ima_init_policy(void)
316 int i
, measure_entries
, appraise_entries
;
318 /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
319 measure_entries
= ima_use_tcb
? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules
) : 0;
320 appraise_entries
= ima_use_appraise_tcb
?
321 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules
) : 0;
323 for (i
= 0; i
< measure_entries
+ appraise_entries
; i
++) {
324 if (i
< measure_entries
)
325 list_add_tail(&default_rules
[i
].list
,
328 int j
= i
- measure_entries
;
330 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules
[j
].list
,
335 ima_rules
= &ima_default_rules
;
339 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
341 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
342 * policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
343 * added to the policy.
345 void ima_update_policy(void)
347 const char *op
= "policy_update";
348 const char *cause
= "already exists";
352 if (ima_rules
== &ima_default_rules
) {
353 ima_rules
= &ima_policy_rules
;
357 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS
, NULL
,
358 NULL
, op
, cause
, result
, audit_info
);
363 Opt_measure
= 1, Opt_dont_measure
,
364 Opt_appraise
, Opt_dont_appraise
,
366 Opt_obj_user
, Opt_obj_role
, Opt_obj_type
,
367 Opt_subj_user
, Opt_subj_role
, Opt_subj_type
,
368 Opt_func
, Opt_mask
, Opt_fsmagic
,
369 Opt_uid
, Opt_euid
, Opt_fowner
,
370 Opt_appraise_type
, Opt_fsuuid
, Opt_permit_directio
373 static match_table_t policy_tokens
= {
374 {Opt_measure
, "measure"},
375 {Opt_dont_measure
, "dont_measure"},
376 {Opt_appraise
, "appraise"},
377 {Opt_dont_appraise
, "dont_appraise"},
378 {Opt_audit
, "audit"},
379 {Opt_obj_user
, "obj_user=%s"},
380 {Opt_obj_role
, "obj_role=%s"},
381 {Opt_obj_type
, "obj_type=%s"},
382 {Opt_subj_user
, "subj_user=%s"},
383 {Opt_subj_role
, "subj_role=%s"},
384 {Opt_subj_type
, "subj_type=%s"},
385 {Opt_func
, "func=%s"},
386 {Opt_mask
, "mask=%s"},
387 {Opt_fsmagic
, "fsmagic=%s"},
388 {Opt_fsuuid
, "fsuuid=%s"},
390 {Opt_euid
, "euid=%s"},
391 {Opt_fowner
, "fowner=%s"},
392 {Opt_appraise_type
, "appraise_type=%s"},
393 {Opt_permit_directio
, "permit_directio"},
397 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
,
398 substring_t
*args
, int lsm_rule
, int audit_type
)
402 if (entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].rule
)
405 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
= match_strdup(args
);
406 if (!entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
)
409 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].type
= audit_type
;
410 result
= security_filter_rule_init(entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].type
,
412 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
,
413 &entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].rule
);
414 if (!entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].rule
) {
415 kfree(entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
);
422 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *key
, char *value
)
424 audit_log_format(ab
, "%s=", key
);
425 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, value
);
426 audit_log_format(ab
, " ");
429 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule
, struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
)
431 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
436 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE
);
438 entry
->uid
= INVALID_UID
;
439 entry
->fowner
= INVALID_UID
;
440 entry
->action
= UNKNOWN
;
441 while ((p
= strsep(&rule
, " \t")) != NULL
) {
442 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
448 if ((*p
== '\0') || (*p
== ' ') || (*p
== '\t'))
450 token
= match_token(p
, policy_tokens
, args
);
453 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "measure");
455 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
458 entry
->action
= MEASURE
;
460 case Opt_dont_measure
:
461 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "dont_measure");
463 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
466 entry
->action
= DONT_MEASURE
;
469 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "appraise");
471 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
474 entry
->action
= APPRAISE
;
476 case Opt_dont_appraise
:
477 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "dont_appraise");
479 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
482 entry
->action
= DONT_APPRAISE
;
485 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "audit");
487 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
490 entry
->action
= AUDIT
;
493 ima_log_string(ab
, "func", args
[0].from
);
498 if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
499 entry
->func
= FILE_CHECK
;
500 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
501 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
502 entry
->func
= FILE_CHECK
;
503 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
504 entry
->func
= MODULE_CHECK
;
505 else if ((strcmp(args
[0].from
, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
506 || (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
507 entry
->func
= MMAP_CHECK
;
508 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
509 entry
->func
= BPRM_CHECK
;
513 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FUNC
;
516 ima_log_string(ab
, "mask", args
[0].from
);
525 if ((strcmp(from
, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
526 entry
->mask
= MAY_EXEC
;
527 else if (strcmp(from
, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
528 entry
->mask
= MAY_WRITE
;
529 else if (strcmp(from
, "MAY_READ") == 0)
530 entry
->mask
= MAY_READ
;
531 else if (strcmp(from
, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
532 entry
->mask
= MAY_APPEND
;
536 entry
->flags
|= (*args
[0].from
== '^')
537 ? IMA_INMASK
: IMA_MASK
;
540 ima_log_string(ab
, "fsmagic", args
[0].from
);
542 if (entry
->fsmagic
) {
547 result
= strict_strtoul(args
[0].from
, 16,
550 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FSMAGIC
;
553 ima_log_string(ab
, "fsuuid", args
[0].from
);
555 if (memchr_inv(entry
->fsuuid
, 0x00,
556 sizeof(entry
->fsuuid
))) {
561 result
= blk_part_pack_uuid(args
[0].from
,
564 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FSUUID
;
567 ima_log_string(ab
, "uid", args
[0].from
);
569 if (token
== Opt_euid
)
570 ima_log_string(ab
, "euid", args
[0].from
);
572 if (uid_valid(entry
->uid
)) {
577 result
= strict_strtoul(args
[0].from
, 10, &lnum
);
579 entry
->uid
= make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
581 if (!uid_valid(entry
->uid
) ||
585 entry
->flags
|= (token
== Opt_uid
)
586 ? IMA_UID
: IMA_EUID
;
590 ima_log_string(ab
, "fowner", args
[0].from
);
592 if (uid_valid(entry
->fowner
)) {
597 result
= strict_strtoul(args
[0].from
, 10, &lnum
);
599 entry
->fowner
= make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t
)lnum
);
600 if (!uid_valid(entry
->fowner
) || (((uid_t
)lnum
) != lnum
))
603 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FOWNER
;
607 ima_log_string(ab
, "obj_user", args
[0].from
);
608 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
613 ima_log_string(ab
, "obj_role", args
[0].from
);
614 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
619 ima_log_string(ab
, "obj_type", args
[0].from
);
620 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
625 ima_log_string(ab
, "subj_user", args
[0].from
);
626 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
631 ima_log_string(ab
, "subj_role", args
[0].from
);
632 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
637 ima_log_string(ab
, "subj_type", args
[0].from
);
638 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
642 case Opt_appraise_type
:
643 if (entry
->action
!= APPRAISE
) {
648 ima_log_string(ab
, "appraise_type", args
[0].from
);
649 if ((strcmp(args
[0].from
, "imasig")) == 0)
650 entry
->flags
|= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
;
654 case Opt_permit_directio
:
655 entry
->flags
|= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO
;
658 ima_log_string(ab
, "UNKNOWN", p
);
663 if (!result
&& (entry
->action
== UNKNOWN
))
665 else if (entry
->func
== MODULE_CHECK
)
666 ima_appraise
|= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES
;
667 audit_log_format(ab
, "res=%d", !result
);
673 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
674 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
676 * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
677 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
679 ssize_t
ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule
)
681 const char *op
= "update_policy";
683 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
687 /* Prevent installed policy from changing */
688 if (ima_rules
!= &ima_default_rules
) {
689 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS
, NULL
,
690 NULL
, op
, "already exists",
691 -EACCES
, audit_info
);
695 entry
= kzalloc(sizeof(*entry
), GFP_KERNEL
);
697 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS
, NULL
,
698 NULL
, op
, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM
, audit_info
);
702 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry
->list
);
704 p
= strsep(&rule
, "\n");
712 result
= ima_parse_rule(p
, entry
);
715 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS
, NULL
,
716 NULL
, op
, "invalid policy", result
,
721 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex
);
722 list_add_tail(&entry
->list
, &ima_policy_rules
);
723 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex
);
728 /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
729 void ima_delete_rules(void)
731 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
, *tmp
;
734 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex
);
735 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry
, tmp
, &ima_policy_rules
, list
) {
736 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++)
737 kfree(entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
739 list_del(&entry
->list
);
742 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex
);