1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
3 #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
4 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
6 #include <linux/static_key.h>
8 #include <asm/alternative.h>
9 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
10 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
11 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
14 * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
16 * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
17 * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
19 * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
20 * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
21 * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
22 * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
23 * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
25 * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
26 * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
27 * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
30 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
31 #define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */
34 * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
35 * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
36 * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
38 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
42 773: /* speculation trap */ \
48 775: /* speculation trap */ \
55 add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
60 * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells
61 * objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control
62 * flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the
65 .macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
67 .pushsection
.discard
.nospec
68 .long .Lannotate_\@
- .
73 * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
74 * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
77 .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
79 .pushsection
.discard
.retpoline_safe
80 _ASM_PTR
.Lannotate_\@
85 * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
86 * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
87 * invocation below less ugly.
89 .macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg
:req
101 * This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg
102 * returns to the instruction after the macro.
104 .macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg
:req
106 .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
:
109 call
.Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
113 * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
114 * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
117 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg
:req
118 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
119 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
120 ALTERNATIVE_2
__stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
; jmp
*\reg
), \
121 __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP
\reg
), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
, \
122 __stringify(lfence
; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
; jmp
*\reg
), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
128 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg
:req
129 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
130 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
131 ALTERNATIVE_2
__stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
; call
*\reg
), \
132 __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL
\reg
), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
,\
133 __stringify(lfence
; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
; call
*\reg
), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
140 * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
141 * monstrosity above, manually.
143 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg
:req nr
:req ftr
:req
144 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
145 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
146 ALTERNATIVE
"jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
147 __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg
,\nr
,%_ASM_SP
)) \
153 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
155 #define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
157 ".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t" \
158 ".long 999b - .\n\t" \
161 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
163 ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t" \
164 _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \
167 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
171 * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
172 * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
174 # define CALL_NOSPEC \
175 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
177 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
178 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
179 "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \
180 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
182 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
183 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
184 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
185 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
187 #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
189 * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
190 * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
193 # define CALL_NOSPEC \
194 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
196 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
197 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
200 "901: call 903f;\n" \
205 "903: addl $4, %%esp;\n" \
206 " pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \
209 "904: call 901b;\n", \
210 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
212 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
213 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
214 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
216 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
218 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
219 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
220 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
223 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
224 enum spectre_v2_mitigation
{
226 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC
,
227 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD
,
228 SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED
,
231 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
232 enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation
{
233 SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE
,
234 SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT
,
235 SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED
,
236 SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL
,
237 SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP
,
240 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
241 enum ssb_mitigation
{
242 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE
,
243 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE
,
244 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL
,
245 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP
,
248 extern char __indirect_thunk_start
[];
249 extern char __indirect_thunk_end
[];
252 * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
253 * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
254 * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
255 * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
257 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
259 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
262 asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
263 ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
264 __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS
, %1)),
265 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
)
267 : "=r" (loops
), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
272 static __always_inline
273 void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr
, u64 val
, unsigned int feature
)
275 asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c
[feature
])
278 "d" ((u32
)(val
>> 32)),
279 [feature
] "i" (feature
)
283 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
285 u64 val
= PRED_CMD_IBPB
;
287 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD
, val
, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB
);
290 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
291 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base
;
294 * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
295 * before calling into firmware.
297 * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
299 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \
301 u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \
304 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
305 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
308 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \
310 u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \
312 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
313 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
317 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp
);
318 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb
);
319 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb
);
321 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
324 * Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence
325 * for the following assembly:
327 * With retpolines configured:
335 * mov %rax,(%rsp) for x86_64
336 * mov %edx,(%esp) for x86_32
339 * Without retpolines configured:
341 * jmp *%rax for x86_64
342 * jmp *%edx for x86_32
344 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
345 # ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
346 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 17
347 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT() \
349 EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* callq do_rop */ \
351 EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
352 EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
353 EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
355 EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x04, 0x24); /* mov %rax,(%rsp) */ \
356 EMIT1(0xC3); /* retq */ \
358 # else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
359 # define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \
361 EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* call do_rop */ \
363 EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
364 EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
365 EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
367 EMIT3(0x89, 0x14, 0x24); /* mov %edx,(%esp) */ \
368 EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ \
371 #else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
372 # ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
373 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 2
374 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT() \
375 EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0); /* jmp *%rax */
376 # else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
377 # define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \
378 EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2) /* jmp *%edx */
382 #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */