staging: wlan-ng: properly check endpoint types
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / kernel / kcmp.c
blobb3ff9288c6cc91360db86fe25407204d5ab6ebd1
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 #include <linux/kernel.h>
3 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
4 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
5 #include <linux/string.h>
6 #include <linux/random.h>
7 #include <linux/module.h>
8 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
9 #include <linux/init.h>
10 #include <linux/errno.h>
11 #include <linux/cache.h>
12 #include <linux/bug.h>
13 #include <linux/err.h>
14 #include <linux/kcmp.h>
15 #include <linux/capability.h>
16 #include <linux/list.h>
17 #include <linux/eventpoll.h>
18 #include <linux/file.h>
20 #include <asm/unistd.h>
23 * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons.
24 * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we
25 * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead.
27 * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
28 * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
29 * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
30 * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
31 * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
32 * relative prime to 2^n).
34 * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed
35 * it can be changed to an alternate scheme.
37 static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
39 static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
41 return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
45 * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2
46 * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2
47 * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2
48 * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
50 static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type)
52 long t1, t2;
54 t1 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type);
55 t2 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type);
57 return (t1 < t2) | ((t1 > t2) << 1);
60 /* The caller must have pinned the task */
61 static struct file *
62 get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx)
64 struct file *file = NULL;
66 task_lock(task);
67 rcu_read_lock();
69 if (task->files)
70 file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx);
72 rcu_read_unlock();
73 task_unlock(task);
75 return file;
78 static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
80 if (likely(m2 != m1))
81 mutex_unlock(m2);
82 mutex_unlock(m1);
85 static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
87 int err;
89 if (m2 > m1)
90 swap(m1, m2);
92 err = mutex_lock_killable(m1);
93 if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) {
94 err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
95 if (err)
96 mutex_unlock(m1);
99 return err;
102 #ifdef CONFIG_EPOLL
103 static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1,
104 struct task_struct *task2,
105 unsigned long idx1,
106 struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot)
108 struct file *filp, *filp_epoll, *filp_tgt;
109 struct kcmp_epoll_slot slot;
110 struct files_struct *files;
112 if (copy_from_user(&slot, uslot, sizeof(slot)))
113 return -EFAULT;
115 filp = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
116 if (!filp)
117 return -EBADF;
119 files = get_files_struct(task2);
120 if (!files)
121 return -EBADF;
123 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
124 filp_epoll = fcheck_files(files, slot.efd);
125 if (filp_epoll)
126 get_file(filp_epoll);
127 else
128 filp_tgt = ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
129 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
130 put_files_struct(files);
132 if (filp_epoll) {
133 filp_tgt = get_epoll_tfile_raw_ptr(filp_epoll, slot.tfd, slot.toff);
134 fput(filp_epoll);
137 if (IS_ERR(filp_tgt))
138 return PTR_ERR(filp_tgt);
140 return kcmp_ptr(filp, filp_tgt, KCMP_FILE);
142 #else
143 static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1,
144 struct task_struct *task2,
145 unsigned long idx1,
146 struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot)
148 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
150 #endif
152 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
153 unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2)
155 struct task_struct *task1, *task2;
156 int ret;
158 rcu_read_lock();
161 * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only.
163 task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1);
164 task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2);
165 if (!task1 || !task2)
166 goto err_no_task;
168 get_task_struct(task1);
169 get_task_struct(task2);
171 rcu_read_unlock();
174 * One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
176 ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->exec_update_mutex,
177 &task2->signal->exec_update_mutex);
178 if (ret)
179 goto err;
180 if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) ||
181 !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
182 ret = -EPERM;
183 goto err_unlock;
186 switch (type) {
187 case KCMP_FILE: {
188 struct file *filp1, *filp2;
190 filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
191 filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2);
193 if (filp1 && filp2)
194 ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE);
195 else
196 ret = -EBADF;
197 break;
199 case KCMP_VM:
200 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM);
201 break;
202 case KCMP_FILES:
203 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES);
204 break;
205 case KCMP_FS:
206 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS);
207 break;
208 case KCMP_SIGHAND:
209 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND);
210 break;
211 case KCMP_IO:
212 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO);
213 break;
214 case KCMP_SYSVSEM:
215 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
216 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list,
217 task2->sysvsem.undo_list,
218 KCMP_SYSVSEM);
219 #else
220 ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
221 #endif
222 break;
223 case KCMP_EPOLL_TFD:
224 ret = kcmp_epoll_target(task1, task2, idx1, (void *)idx2);
225 break;
226 default:
227 ret = -EINVAL;
228 break;
231 err_unlock:
232 kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->exec_update_mutex,
233 &task2->signal->exec_update_mutex);
234 err:
235 put_task_struct(task1);
236 put_task_struct(task2);
238 return ret;
240 err_no_task:
241 rcu_read_unlock();
242 return -ESRCH;
245 static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void)
247 int i;
249 get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies));
251 for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++)
252 cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1);
254 return 0;
256 arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init);