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netfilter: x_tables: remove size check
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / net / bluetooth / smp.c
blob01117ae84f1d3f1246626396fbcf66ee2a532792
1 /*
2 BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
3 Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
4
5 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 published by the Free Software Foundation;
8
9 THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
10 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
11 FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
12 IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
13 CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
14 WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
15 ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
16 OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
17
18 ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
19 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
20 SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
21 */
22
23 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
24 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
25 #include <linux/crypto.h>
26 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
27 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
28 #include <crypto/hash.h>
29 #include <crypto/kpp.h>
30
31 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
32 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
33 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
34 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
35
36 #include "ecdh_helper.h"
37 #include "smp.h"
38
39 #define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
40 ((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
41
42 /* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
43 * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
44 * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
45 */
46 #ifdef DEBUG
47 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
48 ##__VA_ARGS__)
49 #else
50 #define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
51 ##__VA_ARGS__)
52 #endif
53
54 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
55
56 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
57 #define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
58
59 #define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
60
61 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev) (hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
62 0x3f : 0x07)
63 #define KEY_DIST_MASK 0x07
64
65 /* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
66 #define CMAC_MSG_MAX 80
67
68 enum {
69 SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
70 SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING,
71 SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
72 SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
73 SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
74 SMP_FLAG_SC,
75 SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
76 SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
77 SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
78 SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
79 SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB,
80 SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB,
81 SMP_FLAG_CT2,
82 };
83
84 struct smp_dev {
85 /* Secure Connections OOB data */
86 u8 local_pk[64];
87 u8 local_rand[16];
88 bool debug_key;
89
90 u8 min_key_size;
91 u8 max_key_size;
92
93 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
94 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
95 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
96 };
97
98 struct smp_chan {
99 struct l2cap_conn *conn;
100 struct delayed_work security_timer;
101 unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
102
103 u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
104 u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
105 u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
106 u8 rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
107 u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
108 u8 tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
109 u8 rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
110 u8 lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
111 u8 enc_key_size;
112 u8 remote_key_dist;
113 bdaddr_t id_addr;
114 u8 id_addr_type;
115 u8 irk[16];
116 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
117 struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk;
118 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
119 struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk;
120 struct smp_irk *remote_irk;
121 u8 *link_key;
122 unsigned long flags;
123 u8 method;
124 u8 passkey_round;
125
126 /* Secure Connections variables */
127 u8 local_pk[64];
128 u8 remote_pk[64];
129 u8 dhkey[32];
130 u8 mackey[16];
131
132 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
133 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
134 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
135 };
136
137 /* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
138 * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
139 * private debug key.
140 */
141 static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
142 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
143 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
144 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
145 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
146
147 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
148 0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
149 0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
150 0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
151 };
152
153 static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
154 0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
155 0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
156 0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
157 0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
158 };
159
160 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
161 {
162 size_t i;
163
164 for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
165 dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
166 }
167
168 /* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
169 * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
170 */
171
172 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
173 size_t len, u8 mac[16])
174 {
175 uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
176 SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
177 int err;
178
179 if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
180 return -EFBIG;
181
182 if (!tfm) {
183 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
184 return -EINVAL;
185 }
186
187 desc->tfm = tfm;
188 desc->flags = 0;
189
190 /* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
191 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
192 swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
193
194 SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
195 SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
196
197 err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
198 if (err) {
199 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
200 return err;
201 }
202
203 err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
204 shash_desc_zero(desc);
205 if (err) {
206 BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
207 return err;
208 }
209
210 swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
211
212 SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
213
214 return 0;
215 }
216
217 static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
218 const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
219 {
220 u8 m[65];
221 int err;
222
223 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
224 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
225 SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
226
227 m[0] = z;
228 memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
229 memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
230
231 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
232 if (err)
233 return err;
234
235 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
236
237 return err;
238 }
239
240 static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
241 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
242 const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
243 {
244 /* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
245 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
246 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
247 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
248 * endian format.
249 */
250 const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
251 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
252 0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
253 const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
254 u8 m[53], t[16];
255 int err;
256
257 SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
258 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
259 SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
260
261 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
262 if (err)
263 return err;
264
265 SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
266
267 memcpy(m, length, 2);
268 memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
269 memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
270 memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
271 memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
272 memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
273
274 m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
275
276 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
277 if (err)
278 return err;
279
280 SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
281
282 m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
283
284 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
285 if (err)
286 return err;
287
288 SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
289
290 return 0;
291 }
292
293 static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
294 const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
295 const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
296 u8 res[16])
297 {
298 u8 m[65];
299 int err;
300
301 SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
302 SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
303 SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
304
305 memcpy(m, a2, 7);
306 memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
307 memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
308 memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
309 memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
310 memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
311
312 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
313 if (err)
314 return err;
315
316 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
317
318 return err;
319 }
320
321 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
322 const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
323 {
324 u8 m[80], tmp[16];
325 int err;
326
327 SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
328 SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
329 SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
330
331 memcpy(m, y, 16);
332 memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
333 memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
334
335 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
336 if (err)
337 return err;
338
339 *val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
340 *val %= 1000000;
341
342 SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
343
344 return 0;
345 }
346
347 static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
348 const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
349 {
350 int err;
351
352 SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
353
354 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
355 if (err)
356 return err;
357
358 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
359
360 return err;
361 }
362
363 static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
364 const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16])
365 {
366 int err;
367
368 SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt);
369
370 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res);
371 if (err)
372 return err;
373
374 SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
375
376 return err;
377 }
378
379 /* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
380 * s1 and ah.
381 */
382
383 static int smp_e(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
384 {
385 uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
386 int err;
387
388 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
389
390 if (!tfm) {
391 BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
392 return -EINVAL;
393 }
394
395 /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
396 swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
397
398 err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
399 if (err) {
400 BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
401 return err;
402 }
403
404 /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
405 swap_buf(r, data, 16);
406
407 crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, data, data);
408
409 /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
410 swap_buf(data, r, 16);
411
412 SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
413
414 return err;
415 }
416
417 static int smp_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
418 const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
419 const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
420 {
421 u8 p1[16], p2[16];
422 int err;
423
424 SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
425 SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
426 SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
427
428 memset(p1, 0, 16);
429
430 /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
431 p1[0] = _iat;
432 p1[1] = _rat;
433 memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
434 memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
435
436 SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
437
438 /* res = r XOR p1 */
439 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
440
441 /* res = e(k, res) */
442 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
443 if (err) {
444 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
445 return err;
446 }
447
448 /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
449 memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
450 memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
451 memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
452
453 SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
454
455 /* res = res XOR p2 */
456 u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
457
458 /* res = e(k, res) */
459 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
460 if (err)
461 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
462
463 return err;
464 }
465
466 static int smp_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
467 const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
468 {
469 int err;
470
471 /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
472 memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
473 memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
474
475 err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
476 if (err)
477 BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
478
479 return err;
480 }
481
482 static int smp_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16],
483 const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
484 {
485 u8 _res[16];
486 int err;
487
488 /* r' = padding || r */
489 memcpy(_res, r, 3);
490 memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
491
492 err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
493 if (err) {
494 BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
495 return err;
496 }
497
498 /* The output of the random address function ah is:
499 * ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
500 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
501 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
502 * result of ah.
503 */
504 memcpy(res, _res, 3);
505
506 return 0;
507 }
508
509 bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
510 const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
511 {
512 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
513 struct smp_dev *smp;
514 u8 hash[3];
515 int err;
516
517 if (!chan || !chan->data)
518 return false;
519
520 smp = chan->data;
521
522 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
523
524 err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
525 if (err)
526 return false;
527
528 return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
529 }
530
531 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
532 {
533 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
534 struct smp_dev *smp;
535 int err;
536
537 if (!chan || !chan->data)
538 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
539
540 smp = chan->data;
541
542 get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
543
544 rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
545 rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
546
547 err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
548 if (err < 0)
549 return err;
550
551 BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
552
553 return 0;
554 }
555
556 int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
557 {
558 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
559 struct smp_dev *smp;
560 int err;
561
562 if (!chan || !chan->data)
563 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
564
565 smp = chan->data;
566
567 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
568 BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
569 err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
570 if (err)
571 return err;
572 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
573 smp->debug_key = true;
574 } else {
575 while (true) {
576 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
577 err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
578 if (err)
579 return err;
580
581 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
582 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
583 */
584 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
585 break;
586 }
587 smp->debug_key = false;
588 }
589
590 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
591 SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
592
593 get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
594
595 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
596 smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
597 if (err < 0)
598 return err;
599
600 memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
601
602 return 0;
603 }
604
605 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
606 {
607 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
608 struct smp_chan *smp;
609 struct kvec iv[2];
610 struct msghdr msg;
611
612 if (!chan)
613 return;
614
615 BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
616
617 iv[0].iov_base = &code;
618 iv[0].iov_len = 1;
619
620 iv[1].iov_base = data;
621 iv[1].iov_len = len;
622
623 memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
624
625 iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, iv, 2, 1 + len);
626
627 l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
628
629 if (!chan->data)
630 return;
631
632 smp = chan->data;
633
634 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
635 schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
636 }
637
638 static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
639 {
640 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
641 if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
642 return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
643 else
644 return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
645 } else {
646 return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
647 }
648 }
649
650 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
651 {
652 switch (sec_level) {
653 case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
654 case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
655 return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
656 case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
657 return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
658 default:
659 return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
660 }
661 }
662
663 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
664 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
665 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
666 {
667 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
668 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
669 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
670 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
671 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
672
673 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
674 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
675 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
676 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
677 } else {
678 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
679 }
680
681 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
682 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
683
684 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
685 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
686
687 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
688 (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
689 struct oob_data *oob_data;
690 u8 bdaddr_type;
691
692 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
693 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
694 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
695 }
696
697 if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
698 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
699 else
700 bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
701
702 oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
703 bdaddr_type);
704 if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
705 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
706 oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
707 memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
708 memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
709 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
710 SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
711 }
712
713 } else {
714 authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
715 }
716
717 if (rsp == NULL) {
718 req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
719 req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
720 req->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
721 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
722 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
723 req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
724
725 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
726 return;
727 }
728
729 rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
730 rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
731 rsp->max_key_size = SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size;
732 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
733 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
734 rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
735
736 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
737 }
738
739 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
740 {
741 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
742 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
743 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
744
745 if (max_key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
746 max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
747 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
748
749 smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
750
751 return 0;
752 }
753
754 static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
755 {
756 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
757 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
758 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
759 bool complete;
760
761 BUG_ON(!smp);
762
763 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
764
765 complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
766 mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
767
768 kzfree(smp->csrk);
769 kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
770 kzfree(smp->link_key);
771
772 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
773 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
774 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
775
776 /* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
777 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
778 */
779 if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
780 !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
781 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
782 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
783 smp->ltk = NULL;
784 }
785
786 /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
787 if (!complete) {
788 if (smp->ltk) {
789 list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
790 kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
791 }
792
793 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
794 list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
795 kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
796 }
797
798 if (smp->remote_irk) {
799 list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
800 kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
801 }
802 }
803
804 chan->data = NULL;
805 kzfree(smp);
806 hci_conn_drop(hcon);
807 }
808
809 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
810 {
811 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
812 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
813
814 if (reason)
815 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
816 &reason);
817
818 mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
819
820 if (chan->data)
821 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
822 }
823
824 #define JUST_WORKS 0x00
825 #define JUST_CFM 0x01
826 #define REQ_PASSKEY 0x02
827 #define CFM_PASSKEY 0x03
828 #define REQ_OOB 0x04
829 #define DSP_PASSKEY 0x05
830 #define OVERLAP 0xFF
831
832 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
833 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
834 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
835 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
836 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
837 { CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
838 };
839
840 static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
841 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
842 { JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
843 { DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
844 { JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM, JUST_WORKS, JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM },
845 { DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
846 };
847
848 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
849 {
850 /* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
851 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
852 */
853 if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
854 remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
855 return JUST_CFM;
856
857 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
858 return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
859
860 return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
861 }
862
863 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
864 u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
865 {
866 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
867 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
868 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
869 u32 passkey = 0;
870 int ret = 0;
871
872 /* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
873 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
874 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
875
876 BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
877
878 /* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
879 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
880 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
881 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
882 * table.
883 */
884 if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
885 smp->method = JUST_CFM;
886 else
887 smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
888
889 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
890 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
891 &smp->flags))
892 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
893
894 /* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
895 if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
896 hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
897 smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
898
899 /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
900 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
901 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
902 return 0;
903 }
904
905 /* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
906 * can only recover the just-works case.
907 */
908 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
909 return -EINVAL;
910
911 /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
912 if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
913 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
914 if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
915 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
916 }
917
918 /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
919 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
920 */
921 if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
922 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
923 smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
924 else
925 smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
926 }
927
928 /* Generate random passkey. */
929 if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
930 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
931 get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
932 passkey %= 1000000;
933 put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
934 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
935 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
936 }
937
938 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
939 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
940 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
941 else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
942 ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
943 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
944 passkey, 1);
945 else
946 ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
947 hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
948 passkey, 0);
949
950 return ret;
951 }
952
953 static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
954 {
955 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
956 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
957 int ret;
958
959 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
960
961 ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
962 conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
963 conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
964 cp.confirm_val);
965 if (ret)
966 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
967
968 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
969
970 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
971
972 if (conn->hcon->out)
973 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
974 else
975 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
976
977 return 0;
978 }
979
980 static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
981 {
982 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
983 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
984 u8 confirm[16];
985 int ret;
986
987 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
988 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
989
990 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
991
992 ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
993 hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
994 hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
995 if (ret)
996 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
997
998 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) {
999 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed "
1000 "(confirmation values mismatch)");
1001 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1002 }
1003
1004 if (hcon->out) {
1005 u8 stk[16];
1006 __le64 rand = 0;
1007 __le16 ediv = 0;
1008
1009 smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
1010
1011 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
1012 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1013
1014 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
1015 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
1016 set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
1017 } else {
1018 u8 stk[16], auth;
1019 __le64 rand = 0;
1020 __le16 ediv = 0;
1021
1022 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
1023 smp->prnd);
1024
1025 smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
1026
1027 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1028 auth = 1;
1029 else
1030 auth = 0;
1031
1032 /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the
1033 * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master
1034 * STK never needs to be stored).
1035 */
1036 hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1037 SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1038 }
1039
1040 return 0;
1041 }
1042
1043 static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1044 {
1045 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1046 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1047 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1048 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1049 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1050 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1051 bool persistent;
1052
1053 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1054 if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1055 persistent = false;
1056 else
1057 persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
1058 &hcon->flags);
1059 } else {
1060 /* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
1061 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
1062 * authentication requests.
1063 */
1064 persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
1065 SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
1066 }
1067
1068 if (smp->remote_irk) {
1069 mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
1070
1071 /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
1072 * identity address track the connection based on it
1073 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
1074 */
1075 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
1076 bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
1077 hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
1078 queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
1079 }
1080 }
1081
1082 if (smp->csrk) {
1083 smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1084 bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1085 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
1086 }
1087
1088 if (smp->slave_csrk) {
1089 smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1090 bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1091 mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
1092 }
1093
1094 if (smp->ltk) {
1095 smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1096 bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1097 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
1098 }
1099
1100 if (smp->slave_ltk) {
1101 smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
1102 bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
1103 mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
1104 }
1105
1106 if (smp->link_key) {
1107 struct link_key *key;
1108 u8 type;
1109
1110 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1111 type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
1112 else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1113 type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1114 else
1115 type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
1116
1117 key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
1118 smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
1119 if (key) {
1120 mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
1121
1122 /* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
1123 * flag is not set.
1124 */
1125 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
1126 key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
1127 list_del_rcu(&key->list);
1128 kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
1129 }
1130 }
1131 }
1132 }
1133
1134 static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1135 {
1136 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1137 u8 key_type, auth;
1138
1139 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
1140 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
1141 else
1142 key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
1143
1144 if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
1145 auth = 1;
1146 else
1147 auth = 0;
1148
1149 smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1150 key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
1151 0, 0);
1152 }
1153
1154 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1155 {
1156 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */
1157 const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
1158
1159 smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
1160 if (!smp->link_key)
1161 return;
1162
1163 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1164 /* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
1165 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1166
1167 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
1168 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1169 smp->link_key = NULL;
1170 return;
1171 }
1172 } else {
1173 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */
1174 const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1175
1176 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
1177 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1178 smp->link_key = NULL;
1179 return;
1180 }
1181 }
1182
1183 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
1184 kzfree(smp->link_key);
1185 smp->link_key = NULL;
1186 return;
1187 }
1188 }
1189
1190 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
1191 {
1192 /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
1193 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
1194 * them in the correct order.
1195 */
1196 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
1197 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
1198 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
1199 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
1200 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
1201 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
1202 }
1203
1204 static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
1205 {
1206 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */
1207 const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
1208 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1209 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1210 struct link_key *key;
1211
1212 key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
1213 if (!key) {
1214 bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK");
1215 return;
1216 }
1217
1218 if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
1219 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1220
1221 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
1222 /* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
1223 const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1224
1225 if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
1226 return;
1227 } else {
1228 /* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */
1229 const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
1230
1231 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
1232 return;
1233 }
1234
1235 if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
1236 return;
1237
1238 sc_add_ltk(smp);
1239 }
1240
1241 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
1242 {
1243 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
1244 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1245 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1246 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1247 __u8 *keydist;
1248
1249 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1250
1251 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
1252
1253 /* The responder sends its keys first */
1254 if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
1255 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1256 return;
1257 }
1258
1259 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1260
1261 if (hcon->out) {
1262 keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
1263 *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
1264 } else {
1265 keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
1266 *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
1267 }
1268
1269 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1270 if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
1271 sc_generate_link_key(smp);
1272 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
1273 sc_generate_ltk(smp);
1274
1275 /* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
1276 *keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1277 }
1278
1279 BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
1280
1281 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
1282 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
1283 struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
1284 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
1285 u8 authenticated;
1286 __le16 ediv;
1287 __le64 rand;
1288
1289 /* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
1290 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
1291 * of the value to zeroes.
1292 */
1293 get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
1294 memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
1295 sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
1296
1297 get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
1298 get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
1299
1300 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
1301
1302 authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1303 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
1304 SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
1305 smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
1306 smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
1307
1308 ident.ediv = ediv;
1309 ident.rand = rand;
1310
1311 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
1312
1313 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
1314 }
1315
1316 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
1317 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
1318 struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
1319
1320 memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
1321
1322 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
1323
1324 /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
1325 * after the connection has been established.
1326 *
1327 * This is true even when the connection has been
1328 * established using a resolvable random address.
1329 */
1330 bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
1331 addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
1332
1333 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
1334 &addrinfo);
1335
1336 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1337 }
1338
1339 if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
1340 struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
1341 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
1342
1343 /* Generate a new random key */
1344 get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
1345
1346 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
1347 if (csrk) {
1348 if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
1349 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
1350 else
1351 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
1352 memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
1353 }
1354 smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
1355
1356 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
1357
1358 *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1359 }
1360
1361 /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
1362 if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
1363 smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
1364 return;
1365 }
1366
1367 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
1368 smp_notify_keys(conn);
1369
1370 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
1371 }
1372
1373 static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
1374 {
1375 struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
1376 security_timer.work);
1377 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1378
1379 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1380
1381 hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
1382 }
1383
1384 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
1385 {
1386 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1387 struct smp_chan *smp;
1388
1389 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
1390 if (!smp)
1391 return NULL;
1392
1393 smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
1394 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
1395 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
1396 goto zfree_smp;
1397 }
1398
1399 smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
1400 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
1401 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
1402 goto free_cipher;
1403 }
1404
1405 smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
1406 if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
1407 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
1408 goto free_shash;
1409 }
1410
1411 smp->conn = conn;
1412 chan->data = smp;
1413
1414 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
1415
1416 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
1417
1418 hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
1419
1420 return smp;
1421
1422 free_shash:
1423 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
1424 free_cipher:
1425 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
1426 zfree_smp:
1427 kzfree(smp);
1428 return NULL;
1429 }
1430
1431 static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
1432 {
1433 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1434 u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
1435
1436 if (hcon->out) {
1437 na = smp->prnd;
1438 nb = smp->rrnd;
1439 } else {
1440 na = smp->rrnd;
1441 nb = smp->prnd;
1442 }
1443
1444 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1445 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1446 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1447 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1448
1449 return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
1450 }
1451
1452 static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
1453 {
1454 struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
1455 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
1456 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
1457 u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
1458
1459 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
1460 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
1461 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
1462 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
1463
1464 if (hcon->out) {
1465 local_addr = a;
1466 remote_addr = b;
1467 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
1468 } else {
1469 local_addr = b;
1470 remote_addr = a;
1471 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
1472 }
1473
1474 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
1475
1476 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
1477 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
1478
1479 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
1480 memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
1481
1482 smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
1483 local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
1484
1485 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
1486 }
1487
1488 static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
1489 {
1490 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1491 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1492 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
1493 u8 r;
1494
1495 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1496 r |= 0x80;
1497
1498 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1499
1500 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
1501 cfm.confirm_val))
1502 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1503
1504 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
1505
1506 return 0;
1507 }
1508
1509 static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
1510 {
1511 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1512 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1513 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
1514 u8 cfm[16], r;
1515
1516 /* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
1517 if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
1518 return 0;
1519
1520 switch (smp_op) {
1521 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
1522 r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
1523 r |= 0x80;
1524
1525 if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
1526 smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
1527 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1528
1529 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
1530 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
1531
1532 smp->passkey_round++;
1533
1534 if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
1535 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
1536 if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
1537 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1538 }
1539
1540 /* The round is only complete when the initiator
1541 * receives pairing random.
1542 */
1543 if (!hcon->out) {
1544 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1545 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1546 if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
1547 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1548 else
1549 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1550 return 0;
1551 }
1552
1553 /* Start the next round */
1554 if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
1555 return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
1556
1557 /* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
1558 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1559 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1560
1561 break;
1562
1563 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
1564 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
1565 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
1566 return 0;
1567 }
1568
1569 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
1570
1571 if (hcon->out) {
1572 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
1573 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
1574 return 0;
1575 }
1576
1577 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1578
1579 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
1580 default:
1581 /* Initiating device starts the round */
1582 if (!hcon->out)
1583 return 0;
1584
1585 BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
1586 smp->passkey_round + 1);
1587
1588 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1589
1590 return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
1591 }
1592
1593 return 0;
1594 }
1595
1596 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1597 {
1598 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1599 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
1600 u8 smp_op;
1601
1602 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
1603
1604 switch (mgmt_op) {
1605 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1606 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1607 return 0;
1608 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1609 smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
1610 return 0;
1611 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1612 hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1613 smp->passkey_round = 0;
1614
1615 if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
1616 smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
1617 else
1618 smp_op = 0;
1619
1620 if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
1621 return -EIO;
1622
1623 return 0;
1624 }
1625
1626 /* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
1627 if (hcon->out) {
1628 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1629 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
1630 } else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1631 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
1632 sc_add_ltk(smp);
1633 }
1634
1635 return 0;
1636 }
1637
1638 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
1639 {
1640 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
1641 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
1642 struct smp_chan *smp;
1643 u32 value;
1644 int err;
1645
1646 BT_DBG("");
1647
1648 if (!conn)
1649 return -ENOTCONN;
1650
1651 chan = conn->smp;
1652 if (!chan)
1653 return -ENOTCONN;
1654
1655 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
1656 if (!chan->data) {
1657 err = -ENOTCONN;
1658 goto unlock;
1659 }
1660
1661 smp = chan->data;
1662
1663 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1664 err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
1665 goto unlock;
1666 }
1667
1668 switch (mgmt_op) {
1669 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
1670 value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
1671 memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
1672 BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
1673 put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
1674 /* Fall Through */
1675 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
1676 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
1677 break;
1678 case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
1679 case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
1680 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1681 err = 0;
1682 goto unlock;
1683 default:
1684 smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
1685 err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
1686 goto unlock;
1687 }
1688
1689 err = 0;
1690
1691 /* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
1692 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
1693 u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
1694 if (rsp)
1695 smp_failure(conn, rsp);
1696 }
1697
1698 unlock:
1699 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
1700 return err;
1701 }
1702
1703 static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
1704 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
1705 struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
1706 {
1707 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
1708 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1709 u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
1710
1711 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
1712 local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1713 remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
1714 }
1715
1716 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
1717 remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1718
1719 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
1720 local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
1721
1722 if (!rsp) {
1723 memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
1724
1725 req->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1726 req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
1727 req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
1728 req->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1729
1730 smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
1731
1732 return;
1733 }
1734
1735 memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
1736
1737 rsp->auth_req = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
1738 rsp->max_key_size = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
1739 rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
1740 rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
1741
1742 smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
1743 }
1744
1745 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1746 {
1747 struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
1748 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1749 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1750 struct smp_chan *smp;
1751 u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
1752 int ret;
1753
1754 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1755
1756 if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
1757 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1758
1759 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
1760 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1761
1762 if (!chan->data)
1763 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
1764 else
1765 smp = chan->data;
1766
1767 if (!smp)
1768 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1769
1770 /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
1771 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1772
1773 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
1774 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
1775 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
1776
1777 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1778 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1779
1780 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
1781 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
1782 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
1783
1784 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1785 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1786 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1787 */
1788 if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
1789 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1790
1791 /* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
1792 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1793 /* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
1794 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
1795 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
1796 return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
1797
1798 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1799
1800 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
1801
1802 if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1803 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1804
1805 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1806 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1807 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1808
1809 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1810 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1811
1812 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1813 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1814 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1815
1816 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1817 return 0;
1818 }
1819
1820 build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
1821
1822 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) {
1823 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1824
1825 if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
1826 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1827 }
1828
1829 if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
1830 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
1831 else
1832 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
1833
1834 if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
1835 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
1836
1837 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1838 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1839 u8 method;
1840
1841 method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
1842 req->io_capability);
1843 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
1844 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1845 }
1846
1847 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
1848 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1849 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1850
1851 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
1852
1853 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1854 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
1855
1856 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
1857
1858 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
1859
1860 /* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
1861 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
1862 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
1863 * positive SC enablement.
1864 */
1865 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
1866
1867 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
1868 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
1869 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1870 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1871 /* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
1872 return 0;
1873 }
1874
1875 /* Request setup of TK */
1876 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
1877 if (ret)
1878 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1879
1880 return 0;
1881 }
1882
1883 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
1884 {
1885 struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
1886
1887 BT_DBG("");
1888
1889 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
1890 struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
1891 struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
1892
1893 if (!chan || !chan->data)
1894 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1895
1896 smp_dev = chan->data;
1897
1898 memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
1899 memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
1900
1901 if (smp_dev->debug_key)
1902 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1903
1904 goto done;
1905 }
1906
1907 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
1908 BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
1909 if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
1910 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1911 memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
1912 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
1913 } else {
1914 while (true) {
1915 /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
1916 if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
1917 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
1918
1919 /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
1920 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
1921 */
1922 if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
1923 break;
1924 }
1925 }
1926
1927 done:
1928 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
1929 SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
1930
1931 smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
1932
1933 return 0;
1934 }
1935
1936 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
1937 {
1938 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
1939 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
1940 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
1941 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
1942 u8 key_size, auth;
1943 int ret;
1944
1945 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
1946
1947 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
1948 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
1949
1950 if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
1951 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
1952
1953 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
1954
1955 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
1956
1957 key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
1958 if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
1959 return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
1960
1961 auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
1962
1963 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1964 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
1965
1966 /* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
1967 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
1968 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
1969 */
1970 if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
1971 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
1972
1973 smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
1974 memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
1975
1976 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
1977 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
1978 */
1979 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
1980
1981 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2))
1982 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
1983
1984 /* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
1985 if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
1986 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
1987 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
1988 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
1989 return 0;
1990 }
1991
1992 if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
1993 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
1994 else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
1995 conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
1996
1997 /* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
1998 if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
1999 u8 method;
2000
2001 method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
2002 rsp->io_capability);
2003 if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
2004 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2005 }
2006
2007 get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
2008
2009 /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
2010 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
2011 */
2012 smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
2013
2014 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2015 /* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
2016 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
2017 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2018 return sc_send_public_key(smp);
2019 }
2020
2021 auth |= req->auth_req;
2022
2023 ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
2024 if (ret)
2025 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2026
2027 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2028
2029 /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
2030 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2031 return smp_confirm(smp);
2032
2033 return 0;
2034 }
2035
2036 static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
2037 {
2038 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2039
2040 BT_DBG("");
2041
2042 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2043 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2044
2045 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2046 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2047 smp->prnd);
2048 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2049 }
2050
2051 return 0;
2052 }
2053
2054 /* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
2055 * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
2056 * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
2057 */
2058 static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
2059 {
2060 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2061 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2062 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2063 struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
2064 u8 auth;
2065
2066 /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
2067 if (hcon->out)
2068 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2069
2070 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
2071 bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
2072 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2073 }
2074
2075 bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
2076
2077 req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2078 rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2079
2080 /* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
2081 smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
2082
2083 auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2084
2085 if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
2086 bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
2087 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2088 }
2089
2090 clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
2091
2092 return 0;
2093 }
2094
2095 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2096 {
2097 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2098 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2099
2100 BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
2101
2102 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
2103 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2104
2105 memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2106 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
2107
2108 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
2109 int ret;
2110
2111 /* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
2112 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
2113 return sc_check_confirm(smp);
2114
2115 BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
2116
2117 ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
2118 if (ret)
2119 return ret;
2120 }
2121
2122 if (conn->hcon->out) {
2123 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2124 smp->prnd);
2125 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2126 return 0;
2127 }
2128
2129 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
2130 return smp_confirm(smp);
2131
2132 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2133
2134 return 0;
2135 }
2136
2137 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2138 {
2139 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2140 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2141 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2142 u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
2143 u32 passkey;
2144 int err;
2145
2146 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2147
2148 if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
2149 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2150
2151 memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2152 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
2153
2154 if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
2155 return smp_random(smp);
2156
2157 if (hcon->out) {
2158 pkax = smp->local_pk;
2159 pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
2160 na = smp->prnd;
2161 nb = smp->rrnd;
2162 } else {
2163 pkax = smp->remote_pk;
2164 pkbx = smp->local_pk;
2165 na = smp->rrnd;
2166 nb = smp->prnd;
2167 }
2168
2169 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2170 if (!hcon->out)
2171 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2172 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2173 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2174 goto mackey_and_ltk;
2175 }
2176
2177 /* Passkey entry has special treatment */
2178 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2179 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2180
2181 if (hcon->out) {
2182 u8 cfm[16];
2183
2184 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
2185 smp->rrnd, 0, cfm);
2186 if (err)
2187 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2188
2189 if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
2190 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2191 } else {
2192 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
2193 smp->prnd);
2194 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2195 }
2196
2197 mackey_and_ltk:
2198 /* Generate MacKey and LTK */
2199 err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
2200 if (err)
2201 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2202
2203 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2204 if (hcon->out) {
2205 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2206 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
2207 }
2208 return 0;
2209 }
2210
2211 err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
2212 if (err)
2213 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2214
2215 err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2216 hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
2217 if (err)
2218 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2219
2220 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2221
2222 return 0;
2223 }
2224
2225 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
2226 {
2227 struct smp_ltk *key;
2228 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2229
2230 key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
2231 if (!key)
2232 return false;
2233
2234 if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
2235 return false;
2236
2237 if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
2238 return true;
2239
2240 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
2241 hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
2242
2243 /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */
2244 clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
2245
2246 return true;
2247 }
2248
2249 bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
2250 enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
2251 {
2252 if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
2253 return true;
2254
2255 /* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
2256 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
2257 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
2258 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
2259 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
2260 */
2261 if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
2262 test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
2263 hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
2264 return false;
2265
2266 if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
2267 return true;
2268
2269 return false;
2270 }
2271
2272 static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2273 {
2274 struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2275 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2276 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2277 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2278 struct smp_chan *smp;
2279 u8 sec_level, auth;
2280
2281 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2282
2283 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2284 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2285
2286 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2287 return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2288
2289 auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
2290
2291 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
2292 return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
2293
2294 if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
2295 sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2296 else
2297 sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
2298
2299 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2300 return 0;
2301
2302 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2303 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2304
2305 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2306 return 0;
2307
2308 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2309 if (!smp)
2310 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2311
2312 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
2313 (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
2314 return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2315
2316 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2317
2318 memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
2319 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
2320
2321 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2322 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2323
2324 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2325 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2326
2327 return 0;
2328 }
2329
2330 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
2331 {
2332 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2333 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2334 struct smp_chan *smp;
2335 __u8 authreq;
2336 int ret;
2337
2338 BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
2339
2340 /* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
2341 if (!conn)
2342 return 1;
2343
2344 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
2345 return 1;
2346
2347 if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
2348 return 1;
2349
2350 if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
2351 hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
2352
2353 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2354 if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
2355 return 0;
2356
2357 chan = conn->smp;
2358 if (!chan) {
2359 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available");
2360 return 1;
2361 }
2362
2363 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2364
2365 /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
2366 if (chan->data) {
2367 ret = 0;
2368 goto unlock;
2369 }
2370
2371 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
2372 if (!smp) {
2373 ret = 1;
2374 goto unlock;
2375 }
2376
2377 authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
2378
2379 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) {
2380 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
2381 if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED))
2382 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
2383 }
2384
2385 /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
2386 * requires it.
2387 */
2388 if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
2389 hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2390 authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
2391
2392 if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
2393 struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
2394
2395 build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
2396 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
2397 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
2398
2399 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2400 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
2401 } else {
2402 struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
2403 cp.auth_req = authreq;
2404 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
2405 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
2406 }
2407
2408 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
2409 ret = 0;
2410
2411 unlock:
2412 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2413 return ret;
2414 }
2415
2416 void smp_cancel_pairing(struct hci_conn *hcon)
2417 {
2418 struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
2419 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
2420 struct smp_chan *smp;
2421
2422 if (!conn)
2423 return;
2424
2425 chan = conn->smp;
2426 if (!chan)
2427 return;
2428
2429 l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
2430
2431 smp = chan->data;
2432 if (smp) {
2433 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
2434 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2435 else
2436 smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
2437 }
2438
2439 l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
2440 }
2441
2442 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2443 {
2444 struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2445 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2446 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2447
2448 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2449
2450 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2451 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2452
2453 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
2454
2455 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2456
2457 memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
2458
2459 return 0;
2460 }
2461
2462 static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2463 {
2464 struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2465 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2466 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2467 struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
2468 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2469 struct smp_ltk *ltk;
2470 u8 authenticated;
2471
2472 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2473
2474 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2475 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2476
2477 /* Mark the information as received */
2478 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
2479
2480 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
2481 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
2482 else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2483 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2484
2485 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2486
2487 authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
2488 ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
2489 authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
2490 rp->ediv, rp->rand);
2491 smp->ltk = ltk;
2492 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2493 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2494
2495 return 0;
2496 }
2497
2498 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2499 {
2500 struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2501 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2502 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2503
2504 BT_DBG("");
2505
2506 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2507 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2508
2509 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
2510
2511 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2512
2513 memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
2514
2515 return 0;
2516 }
2517
2518 static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2519 struct sk_buff *skb)
2520 {
2521 struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
2522 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2523 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2524 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2525 bdaddr_t rpa;
2526
2527 BT_DBG("");
2528
2529 if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
2530 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2531
2532 /* Mark the information as received */
2533 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
2534
2535 if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
2536 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
2537
2538 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
2539
2540 /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
2541 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
2542 * as "identity information". However, since such
2543 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
2544 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
2545 * received an IRK for such a device.
2546 *
2547 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
2548 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
2549 */
2550 if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
2551 !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
2552 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address");
2553 goto distribute;
2554 }
2555
2556 bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
2557 smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
2558
2559 if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
2560 bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
2561 else
2562 bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
2563
2564 smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
2565 smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
2566
2567 distribute:
2568 if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
2569 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2570
2571 return 0;
2572 }
2573
2574 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2575 {
2576 struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
2577 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2578 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2579 struct smp_csrk *csrk;
2580
2581 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2582
2583 if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
2584 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2585
2586 /* Mark the information as received */
2587 smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
2588
2589 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
2590
2591 csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
2592 if (csrk) {
2593 if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
2594 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
2595 else
2596 csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
2597 memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
2598 }
2599 smp->csrk = csrk;
2600 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
2601
2602 return 0;
2603 }
2604
2605 static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
2606 {
2607 struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
2608 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2609 struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
2610 u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
2611
2612 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
2613 test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
2614 return REQ_OOB;
2615
2616 /* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
2617 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
2618 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
2619 * first byte which contains the opcode.
2620 */
2621 if (hcon->out) {
2622 local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2623 remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2624 } else {
2625 local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
2626 remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
2627 }
2628
2629 local_io = local->io_capability;
2630 remote_io = remote->io_capability;
2631
2632 local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2633 remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
2634
2635 /* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
2636 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
2637 */
2638 if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
2639 method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
2640 else
2641 method = JUST_WORKS;
2642
2643 /* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
2644 if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
2645 method = JUST_WORKS;
2646
2647 return method;
2648 }
2649
2650 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2651 {
2652 struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
2653 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2654 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2655 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2656 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2657 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
2658 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
2659 int err;
2660
2661 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2662
2663 if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
2664 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2665
2666 memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
2667
2668 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2669 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
2670 smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2671 if (err)
2672 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2673
2674 if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
2675 return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
2676 }
2677
2678 /* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
2679 * the key from the initiating device.
2680 */
2681 if (!hcon->out) {
2682 err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
2683 if (err)
2684 return err;
2685 }
2686
2687 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
2688 SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
2689
2690 /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
2691 * key was set/generated.
2692 */
2693 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
2694 struct smp_dev *smp_dev = chan->data;
2695
2696 tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
2697 } else {
2698 tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
2699 }
2700
2701 if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
2702 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2703
2704 SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
2705
2706 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
2707
2708 smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
2709
2710 BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
2711
2712 /* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
2713 if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
2714 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
2715 else
2716 hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
2717
2718 if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
2719 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
2720
2721 if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
2722 get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
2723 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
2724 hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
2725 hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
2726 smp->passkey_round = 0;
2727 if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2728 hcon->dst_type,
2729 hcon->passkey_notify,
2730 hcon->passkey_entered))
2731 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2732 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2733 return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
2734 }
2735
2736 if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
2737 if (hcon->out)
2738 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
2739 sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
2740
2741 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2742
2743 return 0;
2744 }
2745
2746 if (hcon->out)
2747 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2748
2749 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
2750 if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
2751 hcon->dst_type))
2752 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2753 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
2754 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
2755 return 0;
2756 }
2757
2758 /* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
2759 * send the confirm value.
2760 */
2761 if (conn->hcon->out)
2762 return 0;
2763
2764 err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
2765 0, cfm.confirm_val);
2766 if (err)
2767 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2768
2769 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
2770 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
2771
2772 return 0;
2773 }
2774
2775 static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
2776 {
2777 struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
2778 struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
2779 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2780 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
2781 u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
2782 u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
2783 int err;
2784
2785 BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
2786
2787 if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
2788 return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
2789
2790 memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
2791 memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
2792 a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
2793 b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
2794
2795 if (hcon->out) {
2796 local_addr = a;
2797 remote_addr = b;
2798 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
2799 } else {
2800 local_addr = b;
2801 remote_addr = a;
2802 memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
2803 }
2804
2805 memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
2806
2807 if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
2808 put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
2809 else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
2810 memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
2811
2812 err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
2813 io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
2814 if (err)
2815 return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
2816
2817 if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
2818 return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
2819
2820 if (!hcon->out) {
2821 if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
2822 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
2823 return 0;
2824 }
2825
2826 /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
2827 sc_dhkey_check(smp);
2828 }
2829
2830 sc_add_ltk(smp);
2831
2832 if (hcon->out) {
2833 hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
2834 hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
2835 }
2836
2837 return 0;
2838 }
2839
2840 static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
2841 struct sk_buff *skb)
2842 {
2843 struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
2844
2845 BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
2846
2847 return 0;
2848 }
2849
2850 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
2851 {
2852 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2853 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2854 struct smp_chan *smp;
2855 __u8 code, reason;
2856 int err = 0;
2857
2858 if (skb->len < 1)
2859 return -EILSEQ;
2860
2861 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
2862 reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
2863 goto done;
2864 }
2865
2866 code = skb->data[0];
2867 skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
2868
2869 smp = chan->data;
2870
2871 if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
2872 goto drop;
2873
2874 if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
2875 goto drop;
2876
2877 /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
2878 * pairing request and security request.
2879 */
2880 if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
2881 goto drop;
2882
2883 switch (code) {
2884 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
2885 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
2886 break;
2887
2888 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
2889 smp_failure(conn, 0);
2890 err = -EPERM;
2891 break;
2892
2893 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
2894 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
2895 break;
2896
2897 case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
2898 reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
2899 break;
2900
2901 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
2902 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
2903 break;
2904
2905 case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
2906 reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
2907 break;
2908
2909 case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
2910 reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
2911 break;
2912
2913 case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
2914 reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
2915 break;
2916
2917 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
2918 reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
2919 break;
2920
2921 case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
2922 reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
2923 break;
2924
2925 case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
2926 reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
2927 break;
2928
2929 case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
2930 reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
2931 break;
2932
2933 case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
2934 reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
2935 break;
2936
2937 case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
2938 reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
2939 break;
2940
2941 default:
2942 BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
2943 reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
2944 goto done;
2945 }
2946
2947 done:
2948 if (!err) {
2949 if (reason)
2950 smp_failure(conn, reason);
2951 kfree_skb(skb);
2952 }
2953
2954 return err;
2955
2956 drop:
2957 bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR",
2958 code, &hcon->dst);
2959 kfree_skb(skb);
2960 return 0;
2961 }
2962
2963 static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
2964 {
2965 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2966
2967 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
2968
2969 if (chan->data)
2970 smp_chan_destroy(conn);
2971
2972 conn->smp = NULL;
2973 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
2974 }
2975
2976 static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
2977 {
2978 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
2979 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
2980 struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
2981 struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
2982 struct smp_chan *smp;
2983
2984 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
2985
2986 /* Only new pairings are interesting */
2987 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
2988 return;
2989
2990 /* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
2991 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
2992 return;
2993
2994 /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
2995 if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
2996 return;
2997
2998 /* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
2999 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
3000 return;
3001
3002 /* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
3003 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
3004 !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3005 return;
3006
3007 /* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
3008 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
3009 return;
3010
3011 /* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
3012 if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
3013 return;
3014
3015 /* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
3016 if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
3017 return;
3018
3019 /* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
3020 if (chan->data)
3021 return;
3022
3023 smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
3024 if (!smp) {
3025 bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR");
3026 return;
3027 }
3028
3029 set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
3030
3031 BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
3032
3033 /* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
3034 build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
3035
3036 smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
3037 memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
3038
3039 smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
3040 SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
3041 }
3042
3043 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3044 {
3045 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3046 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3047 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3048
3049 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3050
3051 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
3052 bredr_pairing(chan);
3053 return;
3054 }
3055
3056 if (!smp)
3057 return;
3058
3059 if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3060 return;
3061
3062 cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
3063
3064 smp_distribute_keys(smp);
3065 }
3066
3067 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3068 {
3069 struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
3070 struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
3071
3072 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3073
3074 /* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
3075 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
3076 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
3077 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
3078 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
3079 */
3080 conn->smp = chan;
3081
3082 if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
3083 bredr_pairing(chan);
3084 }
3085
3086 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
3087 {
3088 int err;
3089
3090 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3091
3092 err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
3093 if (err) {
3094 struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
3095
3096 if (smp)
3097 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
3098
3099 hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
3100 }
3101
3102 return err;
3103 }
3104
3105 static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
3106 unsigned long hdr_len,
3107 unsigned long len, int nb)
3108 {
3109 struct sk_buff *skb;
3110
3111 skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
3112 if (!skb)
3113 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3114
3115 skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
3116 bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
3117
3118 return skb;
3119 }
3120
3121 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
3122 .name = "Security Manager",
3123 .ready = smp_ready_cb,
3124 .recv = smp_recv_cb,
3125 .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
3126 .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
3127 .resume = smp_resume_cb,
3128
3129 .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
3130 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3131 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3132 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3133 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3134 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3135 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3136 };
3137
3138 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
3139 {
3140 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3141
3142 BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
3143
3144 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3145 if (!chan)
3146 return NULL;
3147
3148 chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
3149 chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
3150 chan->scid = pchan->scid;
3151 chan->dcid = chan->scid;
3152 chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
3153 chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
3154 chan->mode = pchan->mode;
3155
3156 /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
3157 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
3158 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
3159 * warnings.
3160 */
3161 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
3162
3163 BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
3164
3165 return chan;
3166 }
3167
3168 static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
3169 .name = "Security Manager Root",
3170 .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
3171
3172 /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
3173 .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
3174 .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
3175 .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
3176 .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
3177 .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
3178 .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
3179 .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
3180 .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
3181 .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
3182 .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
3183 .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
3184 };
3185
3186 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
3187 {
3188 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3189 struct smp_dev *smp;
3190 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
3191 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3192 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3193
3194 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
3195 smp = NULL;
3196 goto create_chan;
3197 }
3198
3199 smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
3200 if (!smp)
3201 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3202
3203 tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3204 if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
3205 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
3206 kzfree(smp);
3207 return ERR_CAST(tfm_aes);
3208 }
3209
3210 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
3211 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3212 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3213 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3214 kzfree(smp);
3215 return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
3216 }
3217
3218 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
3219 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3220 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3221 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3222 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3223 kzfree(smp);
3224 return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
3225 }
3226
3227 smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
3228 smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
3229 smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
3230 smp->min_key_size = SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
3231 smp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
3232
3233 create_chan:
3234 chan = l2cap_chan_create();
3235 if (!chan) {
3236 if (smp) {
3237 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
3238 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3239 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3240 kzfree(smp);
3241 }
3242 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
3243 }
3244
3245 chan->data = smp;
3246
3247 l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
3248
3249 l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
3250
3251 if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
3252 u8 bdaddr_type;
3253
3254 hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
3255
3256 if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
3257 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
3258 else
3259 chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
3260 } else {
3261 bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
3262 chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
3263 }
3264
3265 chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
3266 chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
3267 chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
3268 chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
3269
3270 /* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
3271 atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
3272
3273 return chan;
3274 }
3275
3276 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
3277 {
3278 struct smp_dev *smp;
3279
3280 BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
3281
3282 smp = chan->data;
3283 if (smp) {
3284 chan->data = NULL;
3285 crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
3286 crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
3287 crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
3288 kzfree(smp);
3289 }
3290
3291 l2cap_chan_put(chan);
3292 }
3293
3294 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
3295 char __user *user_buf,
3296 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3297 {
3298 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3299 char buf[3];
3300
3301 buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
3302 buf[1] = '\n';
3303 buf[2] = '\0';
3304 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
3305 }
3306
3307 static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
3308 const char __user *user_buf,
3309 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3310 {
3311 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3312 char buf[32];
3313 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf)-1));
3314 bool enable;
3315
3316 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3317 return -EFAULT;
3318
3319 buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3320 if (strtobool(buf, &enable))
3321 return -EINVAL;
3322
3323 if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3324 return -EALREADY;
3325
3326 if (enable) {
3327 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3328
3329 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3330 if (IS_ERR(chan))
3331 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3332
3333 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3334 } else {
3335 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3336
3337 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3338 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3339 smp_del_chan(chan);
3340 }
3341
3342 hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
3343
3344 return count;
3345 }
3346
3347 static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = {
3348 .open = simple_open,
3349 .read = force_bredr_smp_read,
3350 .write = force_bredr_smp_write,
3351 .llseek = default_llseek,
3352 };
3353
3354 static ssize_t le_min_key_size_read(struct file *file,
3355 char __user *user_buf,
3356 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3357 {
3358 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3359 char buf[4];
3360
3361 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size);
3362
3363 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
3364 }
3365
3366 static ssize_t le_min_key_size_write(struct file *file,
3367 const char __user *user_buf,
3368 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3369 {
3370 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3371 char buf[32];
3372 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
3373 u8 key_size;
3374
3375 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3376 return -EFAULT;
3377
3378 buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3379
3380 sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
3381
3382 if (key_size > SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size ||
3383 key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
3384 return -EINVAL;
3385
3386 SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size = key_size;
3387
3388 return count;
3389 }
3390
3391 static const struct file_operations le_min_key_size_fops = {
3392 .open = simple_open,
3393 .read = le_min_key_size_read,
3394 .write = le_min_key_size_write,
3395 .llseek = default_llseek,
3396 };
3397
3398 static ssize_t le_max_key_size_read(struct file *file,
3399 char __user *user_buf,
3400 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3401 {
3402 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3403 char buf[4];
3404
3405 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size);
3406
3407 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
3408 }
3409
3410 static ssize_t le_max_key_size_write(struct file *file,
3411 const char __user *user_buf,
3412 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3413 {
3414 struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
3415 char buf[32];
3416 size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
3417 u8 key_size;
3418
3419 if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
3420 return -EFAULT;
3421
3422 buf[buf_size] = '\0';
3423
3424 sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
3425
3426 if (key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE ||
3427 key_size < SMP_DEV(hdev)->min_key_size)
3428 return -EINVAL;
3429
3430 SMP_DEV(hdev)->max_key_size = key_size;
3431
3432 return count;
3433 }
3434
3435 static const struct file_operations le_max_key_size_fops = {
3436 .open = simple_open,
3437 .read = le_max_key_size_read,
3438 .write = le_max_key_size_write,
3439 .llseek = default_llseek,
3440 };
3441
3442 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3443 {
3444 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3445
3446 BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
3447
3448 /* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
3449 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
3450 */
3451 if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
3452 return 0;
3453
3454 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
3455 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3456 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3457 smp_del_chan(chan);
3458 }
3459
3460 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
3461 if (IS_ERR(chan))
3462 return PTR_ERR(chan);
3463
3464 hdev->smp_data = chan;
3465
3466 debugfs_create_file("le_min_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
3467 &le_min_key_size_fops);
3468 debugfs_create_file("le_max_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
3469 &le_max_key_size_fops);
3470
3471 /* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
3472 * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
3473 *
3474 * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs
3475 * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting
3476 * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections.
3477 */
3478 if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
3479 debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs,
3480 hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops);
3481
3482 /* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */
3483 if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
3484 return 0;
3485 }
3486
3487 if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
3488 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3489 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3490 smp_del_chan(chan);
3491 }
3492
3493 chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
3494 if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
3495 int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
3496 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3497 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3498 smp_del_chan(chan);
3499 return err;
3500 }
3501
3502 hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
3503
3504 return 0;
3505 }
3506
3507 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
3508 {
3509 struct l2cap_chan *chan;
3510
3511 if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
3512 chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
3513 hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
3514 smp_del_chan(chan);
3515 }
3516
3517 if (hdev->smp_data) {
3518 chan = hdev->smp_data;
3519 hdev->smp_data = NULL;
3520 smp_del_chan(chan);
3521 }
3522 }
3523
3524 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
3525
3526 static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3527 {
3528 u8 pk[64];
3529 int err;
3530
3531 err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
3532 if (err)
3533 return err;
3534
3535 err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
3536 if (err)
3537 return err;
3538
3539 if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
3540 return -EINVAL;
3541
3542 return 0;
3543 }
3544
3545 static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
3546 {
3547 const u8 irk[16] = {
3548 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3549 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3550 const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
3551 const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
3552 u8 res[3];
3553 int err;
3554
3555 err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res);
3556 if (err)
3557 return err;
3558
3559 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3))
3560 return -EINVAL;
3561
3562 return 0;
3563 }
3564
3565 static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
3566 {
3567 const u8 k[16] = {
3568 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3569 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3570 const u8 r[16] = {
3571 0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
3572 0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
3573 const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
3574 const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
3575 const u8 _iat = 0x01;
3576 const u8 _rat = 0x00;
3577 const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
3578 const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
3579 const u8 exp[16] = {
3580 0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
3581 0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
3582 u8 res[16];
3583 int err;
3584
3585 err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
3586 if (err)
3587 return err;
3588
3589 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3590 return -EINVAL;
3591
3592 return 0;
3593 }
3594
3595 static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
3596 {
3597 const u8 k[16] = {
3598 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
3599 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
3600 const u8 r1[16] = {
3601 0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
3602 const u8 r2[16] = {
3603 0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
3604 const u8 exp[16] = {
3605 0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
3606 0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
3607 u8 res[16];
3608 int err;
3609
3610 err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res);
3611 if (err)
3612 return err;
3613
3614 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3615 return -EINVAL;
3616
3617 return 0;
3618 }
3619
3620 static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3621 {
3622 const u8 u[32] = {
3623 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3624 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3625 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3626 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3627 const u8 v[32] = {
3628 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3629 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3630 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3631 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3632 const u8 x[16] = {
3633 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3634 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3635 const u8 z = 0x00;
3636 const u8 exp[16] = {
3637 0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
3638 0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
3639 u8 res[16];
3640 int err;
3641
3642 err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
3643 if (err)
3644 return err;
3645
3646 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3647 return -EINVAL;
3648
3649 return 0;
3650 }
3651
3652 static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3653 {
3654 const u8 w[32] = {
3655 0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
3656 0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
3657 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3658 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3659 const u8 n1[16] = {
3660 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3661 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3662 const u8 n2[16] = {
3663 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3664 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3665 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3666 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3667 const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
3668 0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
3669 0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
3670 const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
3671 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3672 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3673 u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
3674 int err;
3675
3676 err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
3677 if (err)
3678 return err;
3679
3680 if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
3681 return -EINVAL;
3682
3683 if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
3684 return -EINVAL;
3685
3686 return 0;
3687 }
3688
3689 static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3690 {
3691 const u8 w[16] = {
3692 0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
3693 0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
3694 const u8 n1[16] = {
3695 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3696 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3697 const u8 n2[16] = {
3698 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3699 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3700 const u8 r[16] = {
3701 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
3702 0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
3703 const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
3704 const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
3705 const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
3706 const u8 exp[16] = {
3707 0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
3708 0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
3709 u8 res[16];
3710 int err;
3711
3712 err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
3713 if (err)
3714 return err;
3715
3716 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3717 return -EINVAL;
3718
3719 return 0;
3720 }
3721
3722 static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3723 {
3724 const u8 u[32] = {
3725 0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
3726 0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
3727 0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
3728 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
3729 const u8 v[32] = {
3730 0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
3731 0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
3732 0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
3733 0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
3734 const u8 x[16] = {
3735 0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
3736 0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
3737 const u8 y[16] = {
3738 0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
3739 0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
3740 const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
3741 u32 val;
3742 int err;
3743
3744 err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
3745 if (err)
3746 return err;
3747
3748 if (val != exp_val)
3749 return -EINVAL;
3750
3751 return 0;
3752 }
3753
3754 static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
3755 {
3756 const u8 w[16] = {
3757 0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
3758 0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
3759 const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
3760 const u8 exp[16] = {
3761 0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
3762 0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
3763 u8 res[16];
3764 int err;
3765
3766 err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
3767 if (err)
3768 return err;
3769
3770 if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
3771 return -EINVAL;
3772
3773 return 0;
3774 }
3775
3776 static char test_smp_buffer[32];
3777
3778 static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
3779 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
3780 {
3781 return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
3782 strlen(test_smp_buffer));
3783 }
3784
3785 static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
3786 .open = simple_open,
3787 .read = test_smp_read,
3788 .llseek = default_llseek,
3789 };
3790
3791 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes,
3792 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
3793 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
3794 {
3795 ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
3796 unsigned long long duration;
3797 int err;
3798
3799 calltime = ktime_get();
3800
3801 err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh);
3802 if (err) {
3803 BT_ERR("debug_key test failed");
3804 goto done;
3805 }
3806
3807 err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
3808 if (err) {
3809 BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
3810 goto done;
3811 }
3812
3813 err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
3814 if (err) {
3815 BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
3816 goto done;
3817 }
3818
3819 err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
3820 if (err) {
3821 BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
3822 goto done;
3823 }
3824
3825 err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
3826 if (err) {
3827 BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
3828 goto done;
3829 }
3830
3831 err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
3832 if (err) {
3833 BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
3834 goto done;
3835 }
3836
3837 err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
3838 if (err) {
3839 BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
3840 goto done;
3841 }
3842
3843 err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
3844 if (err) {
3845 BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
3846 goto done;
3847 }
3848
3849 err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
3850 if (err) {
3851 BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
3852 goto done;
3853 }
3854
3855 rettime = ktime_get();
3856 delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
3857 duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
3858
3859 BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
3860
3861 done:
3862 if (!err)
3863 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
3864 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
3865 else
3866 snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
3867
3868 debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
3869 &test_smp_fops);
3870
3871 return err;
3872 }
3873
3874 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
3875 {
3876 struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
3877 struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
3878 struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
3879 int err;
3880
3881 tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3882 if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
3883 BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
3884 return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
3885 }
3886
3887 tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
3888 if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
3889 BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
3890 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3891 return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
3892 }
3893
3894 tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
3895 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
3896 BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
3897 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3898 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3899 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
3900 }
3901
3902 err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
3903
3904 crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
3905 crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
3906 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);
3907
3908 return err;
3909 }
3910
3911 #endif
Linux with added FPC-III support