powerpc/book3s64: Fix link stack flush on context switch

powerpc/book3s64: Fix link stack flush on context switch

commit 39e72bf96f5847ba87cc5bd7a3ce0fed813dc9ad upstream.

In commit ee13cb249fab ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count
cache flush"), I added support for software to flush the count
cache (indirect branch cache) on context switch if firmware told us
that was the required mitigation for Spectre v2.

As part of that code we also added a software flush of the link
stack (return address stack), which protects against Spectre-RSB
between user processes.

That is all correct for CPUs that activate that mitigation, which is
currently Power9 Nimbus DD2.3.

What I got wrong is that on older CPUs, where firmware has disabled
the count cache, we also need to flush the link stack on context
switch.

To fix it we create a new feature bit which is not set by firmware,
which tells us we need to flush the link stack. We set that when
firmware tells us that either of the existing Spectre v2 mitigations
are enabled.

Then we adjust the patching code so that if we see that feature bit we
enable the link stack flush. If we're also told to flush the count
cache in software then we fall through and do that also.

On the older CPUs we don't need to do do the software count cache
flush, firmware has disabled it, so in that case we patch in an early
return after the link stack flush.

The naming of some of the functions is awkward after this patch,
because they're called "count cache" but they also do link stack. But
we'll fix that up in a later commit to ease backporting.

This is the fix for CVE-2019-18660.

Reported-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Fixes: ee13cb249fab ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count cache flush")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
[dja: straightforward backport to v4.14]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>