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2 Hardware-assisted AddressSanitizer Design Documentation
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5 This page is a design document for
6 **hardware-assisted AddressSanitizer** (or **HWASAN**)
7 a tool similar to :doc:`AddressSanitizer`,
8 but based on partial hardware assistance.
14 :doc:`AddressSanitizer`
15 tags every 8 bytes of the application memory with a 1 byte tag (using *shadow memory*),
16 uses *redzones* to find buffer-overflows and
17 *quarantine* to find use-after-free.
18 The redzones, the quarantine, and, to a less extent, the shadow, are the
19 sources of AddressSanitizer's memory overhead.
20 See the `AddressSanitizer paper`_ for details.
22 AArch64 has the `Address Tagging`_ (or top-byte-ignore, TBI), a hardware feature that allows
23 software to use 8 most significant bits of a 64-bit pointer as
24 a tag. HWASAN uses `Address Tagging`_
25 to implement a memory safety tool, similar to :doc:`AddressSanitizer`,
26 but with smaller memory overhead and slightly different (mostly better)
31 * Every heap/stack/global memory object is forcibly aligned by `TG` bytes
32 (`TG` is e.g. 16 or 64). We call `TG` the **tagging granularity**.
33 * For every such object a random `TS`-bit tag `T` is chosen (`TS`, or tag size, is e.g. 4 or 8)
34 * The pointer to the object is tagged with `T`.
35 * The memory for the object is also tagged with `T` (using a `TG=>1` shadow memory)
36 * Every load and store is instrumented to read the memory tag and compare it
37 with the pointer tag, exception is raised on tag mismatch.
39 For a more detailed discussion of this approach see https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.09517.pdf
44 A short granule is a granule of size between 1 and `TG-1` bytes. The size
45 of a short granule is stored at the location in shadow memory where the
46 granule's tag is normally stored, while the granule's actual tag is stored
47 in the last byte of the granule. This means that in order to verify that a
48 pointer tag matches a memory tag, HWASAN must check for two possibilities:
50 * the pointer tag is equal to the memory tag in shadow memory, or
51 * the shadow memory tag is actually a short granule size, the value being loaded
52 is in bounds of the granule and the pointer tag is equal to the last byte of
55 Pointer tags between 1 to `TG-1` are possible and are as likely as any other
56 tag. This means that these tags in memory have two interpretations: the full
57 tag interpretation (where the pointer tag is between 1 and `TG-1` and the
58 last byte of the granule is ordinary data) and the short tag interpretation
59 (where the pointer tag is stored in the granule).
61 When HWASAN detects an error near a memory tag between 1 and `TG-1`, it
62 will show both the memory tag and the last byte of the granule. Currently,
63 it is up to the user to disambiguate the two possibilities.
70 All memory accesses are prefixed with an inline instruction sequence that
71 verifies the tags. Currently, the following sequence is used:
75 // int foo(int *a) { return *a; }
76 // clang -O2 --target=aarch64-linux -fsanitize=hwaddress -fsanitize-recover=hwaddress -c load.c
78 0: 90000008 adrp x8, 0 <__hwasan_shadow>
79 4: f9400108 ldr x8, [x8] // shadow base (to be resolved by the loader)
80 8: d344dc09 ubfx x9, x0, #4, #52 // shadow offset
81 c: 38696909 ldrb w9, [x8, x9] // load shadow tag
82 10: d378fc08 lsr x8, x0, #56 // extract address tag
83 14: 6b09011f cmp w8, w9 // compare tags
84 18: 54000061 b.ne 24 <foo+0x24> // jump to short tag handler on mismatch
85 1c: b9400000 ldr w0, [x0] // original load
87 24: 7100413f cmp w9, #0x10 // is this a short tag?
88 28: 54000142 b.cs 50 <foo+0x50> // if not, trap
89 2c: 12000c0a and w10, w0, #0xf // find the address's position in the short granule
90 30: 11000d4a add w10, w10, #0x3 // adjust to the position of the last byte loaded
91 34: 6b09015f cmp w10, w9 // check that position is in bounds
92 38: 540000c2 b.cs 50 <foo+0x50> // if not, trap
93 3c: 9240dc09 and x9, x0, #0xffffffffffffff
94 40: b2400d29 orr x9, x9, #0xf // compute address of last byte of granule
95 44: 39400129 ldrb w9, [x9] // load tag from it
96 48: 6b09011f cmp w8, w9 // compare with pointer tag
97 4c: 54fffe80 b.eq 1c <foo+0x1c> // if so, continue
98 50: d4212440 brk #0x922 // otherwise trap
99 54: b9400000 ldr w0, [x0] // tail duplicated original load (to handle recovery)
102 Alternatively, memory accesses are prefixed with a function call.
103 On AArch64, a function call is used by default in trapping mode. The code size
104 and performance overhead of the call is reduced by using a custom calling
105 convention that preserves most registers and is specialized to the register
106 containing the address and the type and size of the memory access.
111 Tagging the heap memory/pointers is done by `malloc`.
112 This can be based on any malloc that forces all objects to be TG-aligned.
113 `free` tags the memory with a different tag.
118 Stack frames are instrumented by aligning all non-promotable allocas
119 by `TG` and tagging stack memory in function prologue and epilogue.
121 Tags for different allocas in one function are **not** generated
122 independently; doing that in a function with `M` allocas would require
123 maintaining `M` live stack pointers, significantly increasing register
124 pressure. Instead we generate a single base tag value in the prologue,
125 and build the tag for alloca number `M` as `ReTag(BaseTag, M)`, where
126 ReTag can be as simple as exclusive-or with constant `M`.
128 Stack instrumentation is expected to be a major source of overhead,
129 but could be optional.
139 Errors are generated by the `HLT` instruction and are handled by a signal handler.
144 HWASAN uses its own LLVM IR Attribute `sanitize_hwaddress` and a matching
145 C function attribute. An alternative would be to re-use ASAN's attribute
146 `sanitize_address`. The reasons to use a separate attribute are:
148 * Users may need to disable ASAN but not HWASAN, or vise versa,
149 because the tools have different trade-offs and compatibility issues.
150 * LLVM (ideally) does not use flags to decide which pass is being used,
151 ASAN or HWASAN are being applied, based on the function attributes.
153 This does mean that users of HWASAN may need to add the new attribute
154 to the code that already uses the old attribute.
157 Comparison with AddressSanitizer
158 ================================
161 * Is less portable than :doc:`AddressSanitizer`
162 as it relies on hardware `Address Tagging`_ (AArch64).
163 Address Tagging can be emulated with compiler instrumentation,
164 but it will require the instrumentation to remove the tags before
165 any load or store, which is infeasible in any realistic environment
166 that contains non-instrumented code.
167 * May have compatibility problems if the target code uses higher
168 pointer bits for other purposes.
169 * May require changes in the OS kernels (e.g. Linux seems to dislike
170 tagged pointers passed from address space:
171 https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.txt).
172 * **Does not require redzones to detect buffer overflows**,
173 but the buffer overflow detection is probabilistic, with roughly
174 `1/(2**TS)` chance of missing a bug (6.25% or 0.39% with 4 and 8-bit TS
176 * **Does not require quarantine to detect heap-use-after-free,
177 or stack-use-after-return**.
178 The detection is similarly probabilistic.
180 The memory overhead of HWASAN is expected to be much smaller
181 than that of AddressSanitizer:
182 `1/TG` extra memory for the shadow
183 and some overhead due to `TG`-aligning all objects.
185 Supported architectures
186 =======================
187 HWASAN relies on `Address Tagging`_ which is only available on AArch64.
188 For other 64-bit architectures it is possible to remove the address tags
189 before every load and store by compiler instrumentation, but this variant
190 will have limited deployability since not all of the code is
191 typically instrumented.
193 The HWASAN's approach is not applicable to 32-bit architectures.
198 * `SPARC ADI`_ implements a similar tool mostly in hardware.
199 * `Effective and Efficient Memory Protection Using Dynamic Tainting`_ discusses
200 similar approaches ("lock & key").
201 * `Watchdog`_ discussed a heavier, but still somewhat similar
202 "lock & key" approach.
203 * *TODO: add more "related work" links. Suggestions are welcome.*
206 .. _Watchdog: https://www.cis.upenn.edu/acg/papers/isca12_watchdog.pdf
207 .. _Effective and Efficient Memory Protection Using Dynamic Tainting: https://www.cc.gatech.edu/~orso/papers/clause.doudalis.orso.prvulovic.pdf
208 .. _SPARC ADI: https://lazytyped.blogspot.com/2017/09/getting-started-with-adi.html
209 .. _AddressSanitizer paper: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/atc12/atc12-final39.pdf
210 .. _Address Tagging: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.den0024a/ch12s05s01.html