1 /* $NetBSD: fix_options.c,v 1.11 2012/03/21 10:10:37 matt Exp $ */
4 * Routine to disable IP-level socket options. This code was taken from 4.4BSD
5 * rlogind and kernel source, but all mistakes in it are my fault.
7 * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
10 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
13 static char sccsid
[] = "@(#) fix_options.c 1.6 97/04/08 02:29:19";
15 __RCSID("$NetBSD: fix_options.c,v 1.11 2012/03/21 10:10:37 matt Exp $");
19 #include <sys/types.h>
20 #include <sys/param.h>
21 #include <sys/socket.h>
22 #include <netinet/in.h>
23 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
24 #include <netinet/ip.h>
32 #define IPOPT_OPTVAL 0
38 #define BUFFER_SIZE 512 /* Was: BUFSIZ */
40 /* fix_options - get rid of IP-level socket options */
43 fix_options(struct request_info
*request
)
46 unsigned char optbuf
[BUFFER_SIZE
/ 3], *cp
;
47 char lbuf
[BUFFER_SIZE
], *lp
;
49 socklen_t optsize
= sizeof(optbuf
);
52 int len
= sizeof lbuf
;
56 struct sockaddr_storage ss
;
60 * check if this is AF_INET socket
64 if (getsockname(fd
, (struct sockaddr
*)(void *)&ss
, &sslen
) < 0) {
65 syslog(LOG_ERR
, "getsockname: %m");
68 if (ss
.ss_family
!= AF_INET
)
71 if ((ip
= getprotobyname("ip")) != 0)
72 ipproto
= ip
->p_proto
;
76 if (getsockopt(fd
, ipproto
, IP_OPTIONS
, optbuf
, &optsize
) == 0
80 * Horror! 4.[34] BSD getsockopt() prepends the first-hop destination
81 * address to the result IP options list when source routing options
82 * are present (see <netinet/ip_var.h>), but produces no output for
83 * other IP options. Solaris 2.x getsockopt() does produce output for
84 * non-routing IP options, and uses the same format as BSD even when
85 * the space for the destination address is unused. The code below
86 * does the right thing with 4.[34]BSD derivatives and Solaris 2, but
87 * may occasionally miss source routing options on incompatible
88 * systems such as Linux. Their choice.
90 * Look for source routing options. Drop the connection when one is
91 * found. Just wiping the IP options is insufficient: we would still
92 * help the attacker by providing a real TCP sequence number, and the
93 * attacker would still be able to send packets (blind spoofing). I
94 * discussed this attack with Niels Provos, half a year before the
95 * attack was described in open mailing lists.
97 * It would be cleaner to just return a yes/no reply and let the caller
98 * decide how to deal with it. Resident servers should not terminate.
99 * However I am not prepared to make changes to internal interfaces
102 #define ADDR_LEN sizeof(dummy.s_addr)
104 for (cp
= optbuf
+ ADDR_LEN
; cp
< optbuf
+ optsize
; cp
+= optlen
) {
105 opt
= cp
[IPOPT_OPTVAL
];
106 if (opt
== IPOPT_LSRR
|| opt
== IPOPT_SSRR
) {
108 "refused connect from %s with IP source routing options",
109 eval_client(request
));
113 if (opt
== IPOPT_EOL
)
115 if (opt
== IPOPT_NOP
) {
117 } else if (&cp
[IPOPT_OLEN
] < optbuf
+ optsize
) {
118 optlen
= cp
[IPOPT_OLEN
];
119 if (optlen
< 2 || cp
+ optlen
>= optbuf
+ optsize
) {
121 "refused connect from %s with malformed IP options",
122 eval_client(request
));
128 "refused connect from %s with malformed IP options",
129 eval_client(request
));
135 for (cp
= optbuf
; optsize
> 0; cp
++, optsize
--, lp
+= 3)
136 len
-= snprintf(lp
, len
, " %2.2x", *cp
);
138 "connect from %s with IP options (ignored):%s",
139 eval_client(request
), lbuf
);
140 if (setsockopt(fd
, ipproto
, IP_OPTIONS
, (char *) 0, optsize
) != 0) {
141 syslog(LOG_ERR
, "setsockopt IP_OPTIONS NULL: %m");