1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
176 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
178 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
186 ssl_undefined_function
, ssl3_get_server_method
)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
191 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
193 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
195 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
196 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
197 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
205 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
215 unsigned long alg_k
, Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
216 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
218 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
224 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
225 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
226 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
227 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
))
234 if (s
->cert
== NULL
) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
245 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
261 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
265 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
267 if ((s
->version
>> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
269 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
272 s
->type
= SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
274 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
275 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
277 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
283 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
291 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
296 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
297 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
303 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 1)) {
310 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
315 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
316 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
317 } else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
328 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
336 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
344 ret
= ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
347 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
348 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
355 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
363 if (s
->rwstate
!= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
) {
364 ret
= ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
371 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
378 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
386 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
388 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
395 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
400 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
401 ret
= ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
407 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
409 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
413 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
416 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
422 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
423 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
|
428 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
429 ret
= ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
433 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
434 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
436 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
439 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
445 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
451 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
452 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
455 * clear this, it may get reset by
456 * send_server_key_exchange
458 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 0;
461 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
462 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
463 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
464 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
465 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
470 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
480 || (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
| SSL_kEDH
))
481 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
482 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
483 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
486 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
) *
487 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
492 ret
= ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
498 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
504 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
507 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
508 * during re-negotiation:
510 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
511 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
513 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
514 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
517 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
519 * ... except when the application insists on
520 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
523 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
525 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
527 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) ||
528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
529 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
531 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
534 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
535 /* no cert request */
537 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
538 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
539 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
540 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
541 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
546 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
547 ret
= ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
553 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
554 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
562 ret
= ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
565 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
566 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
573 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
574 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
575 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
576 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
577 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
582 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
586 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
588 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
593 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
594 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
598 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
600 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
601 ret
= ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
606 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
611 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
612 ret
= ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
617 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
618 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
619 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
620 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
622 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
623 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
625 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
626 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
628 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
631 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
632 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
634 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
637 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
638 * digest cached records.
640 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
642 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
645 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
647 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
654 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
658 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
659 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
660 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
663 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
665 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
669 for (dgst_num
= 0; dgst_num
< SSL_MAX_DIGEST
; dgst_num
++)
670 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]) {
673 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
682 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
684 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
695 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
699 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
700 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
702 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
703 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
705 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
710 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
712 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
714 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
715 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
716 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
718 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
719 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
720 * the client's Finished message is read.
722 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
723 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
725 ret
= ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
729 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
734 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
736 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
737 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
738 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
739 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
740 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
741 * the client's Finished message is read.
743 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
744 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
745 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
746 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
750 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
752 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
753 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
756 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
763 ret
= ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
766 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
771 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
772 ret
= ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
775 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
784 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
785 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
787 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
791 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
793 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
797 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
800 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
804 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
811 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
812 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,
814 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
816 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
818 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
821 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
823 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
824 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
826 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
827 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
829 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
832 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
837 /* clean a few things up */
838 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
840 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
843 /* remove buffering on output */
844 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
848 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
853 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
855 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
857 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_accept
;
860 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
875 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
877 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
881 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
882 new_state
= s
->state
;
884 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
, 1);
885 s
->state
= new_state
;
891 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
895 cb(s
, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
, ret
);
899 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
903 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) {
904 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
905 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
910 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
911 /* number of bytes to write */
916 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
917 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
920 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
925 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
927 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
) {
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
933 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
934 * so permit appropriate message length
936 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
939 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
942 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
943 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
945 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
948 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
) {
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
,
950 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
954 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
955 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
958 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
) {
959 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
960 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
964 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
) {
965 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
966 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
969 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
975 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
977 int i
, j
, ok
, al
, ret
= -1;
978 unsigned int cookie_len
;
981 unsigned char *p
, *d
, *q
;
983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
984 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
986 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
989 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
990 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
991 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
992 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
994 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
995 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
998 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
999 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
1000 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
1001 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1002 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
1006 s
->first_packet
= 0;
1007 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1010 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
1011 * for session id length
1013 if (n
< 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ 1) {
1014 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1020 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1021 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1023 s
->client_version
= (((int)p
[0]) << 8) | (int)p
[1];
1026 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
1027 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
)) {
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1029 if ((s
->client_version
>> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&&
1030 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
) {
1032 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1035 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1037 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1042 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1043 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1046 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1047 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
1049 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1051 if (p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1 >= d
+ n
) {
1052 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1056 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
1058 if (cookie_length
== 0)
1062 /* load the client random */
1063 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1064 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1066 /* get the session-id */
1069 if (p
+ j
> d
+ n
) {
1070 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1077 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1078 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1079 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1080 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1081 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1082 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1083 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1084 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1085 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1086 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1089 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1090 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1093 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1095 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1097 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1098 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1099 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1100 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1101 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1103 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) { /* previous
1110 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1117 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
1119 if (p
+ 1 > d
+ n
) {
1120 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1124 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1126 if (p
+ cookie_len
> d
+ n
) {
1127 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1133 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1134 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1135 * does not cause an overflow.
1137 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
)) {
1139 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1144 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1145 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) && cookie_len
> 0) {
1146 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1148 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1149 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1151 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1153 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1156 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1158 /* default verification */
1159 else if (memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1160 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1161 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1172 if (p
+ 2 > d
+ n
) {
1173 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1180 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1185 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1186 if ((p
+ i
+ 1) > (d
+ n
)) {
1187 /* not enough data */
1188 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1192 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, p
, i
, &(ciphers
)) == NULL
) {
1197 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1200 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1203 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1204 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1206 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1207 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1209 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1210 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1218 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1222 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1223 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1)) {
1225 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1226 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1227 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1228 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1229 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1231 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1232 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0) {
1233 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1240 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1243 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1245 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1252 if ((p
+ i
) > (d
+ n
)) {
1253 /* not enough data */
1254 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1259 for (j
= 0; j
< i
; j
++) {
1267 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1272 /* TLS extensions */
1273 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1274 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
, &al
)) {
1275 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1280 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s
) <= 0) {
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1286 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1287 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1288 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1289 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1293 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1294 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1295 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1300 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1301 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1303 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1304 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1305 &s
->session
->master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1307 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1309 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1310 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1314 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1316 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1321 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1322 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1327 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1330 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1332 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1333 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1335 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1336 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1342 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1343 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1344 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1346 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1348 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1349 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1350 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1351 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1352 /* Can't disable compression */
1353 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) {
1354 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1356 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1359 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1360 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1361 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1362 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1363 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1367 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1368 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1370 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1373 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1374 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++) {
1375 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1379 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1381 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1386 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1387 /* See if we have a match */
1388 int m
, nn
, o
, v
, done
= 0;
1390 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1391 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1392 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1394 for (o
= 0; o
< i
; o
++) {
1404 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1410 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1411 * using compression.
1413 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1414 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1421 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1425 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1426 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1428 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1430 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1431 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1432 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1433 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1434 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1439 c
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1442 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1446 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1448 /* Session-id reuse */
1449 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1450 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1451 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
= NULL
;
1452 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
= NULL
;
1454 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) {
1455 sk
= s
->session
->ciphers
;
1456 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
1457 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
1458 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1460 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1464 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= nc
;
1465 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1466 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= ec
;
1468 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1471 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1474 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1475 || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1476 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
1477 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1483 * we now have the following setup.
1485 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1486 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1487 * compression - basically ignored right now
1488 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1489 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1490 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1491 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1494 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1495 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1496 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1506 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1508 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1511 if (ciphers
!= NULL
)
1512 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1516 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1519 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1523 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
) {
1524 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1525 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1526 p
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1527 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1528 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1532 /* Do the message type and length last */
1535 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1536 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1539 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1540 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1543 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1544 * back in the server hello:
1545 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1546 * we send back the old session ID.
1547 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1548 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1549 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1550 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1552 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1553 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1554 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1555 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1558 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1560 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1562 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1563 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1565 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1569 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
);
1572 /* put the cipher */
1573 i
= ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, p
);
1576 /* put the compression method */
1577 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1580 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1583 *(p
++) = s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1586 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1588 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1592 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
,
1593 buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) ==
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1596 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1603 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1606 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1607 /* number of bytes to write */
1608 s
->init_num
= p
- buf
;
1612 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1613 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1616 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1620 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
) {
1621 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1624 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1629 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1630 /* number of bytes to write */
1635 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1636 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1639 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1645 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1649 DH
*dh
= NULL
, *dhp
;
1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1652 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1653 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1656 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1659 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1660 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1670 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1671 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
1672 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1677 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1680 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1681 rsa
= cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1682 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1683 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1684 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1686 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1689 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1691 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1695 cert
->rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1698 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1700 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1705 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
= 1;
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1709 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
) {
1711 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1712 dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1713 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1715 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->
1718 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1720 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1724 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
) {
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1726 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1730 if ((dh
= DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
) {
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1736 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1737 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1738 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
))) {
1739 if (!DH_generate_key(dh
)) {
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1744 dh
->pub_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1745 dh
->priv_key
= BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1746 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) || (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
)) {
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1757 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1758 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1760 ecdhp
= cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1761 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1762 ecdhp
= s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1763 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->
1765 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->
1766 s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1768 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1769 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1771 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1775 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
) {
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1777 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1781 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1782 if (ecdhp
== NULL
) {
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1786 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
) {
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1791 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= ecdh
;
1792 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1793 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1794 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
)) {
1795 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
)) {
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1802 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1803 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1804 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
)) {
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1809 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1810 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1812 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1817 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1818 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1822 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1825 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1830 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1831 * allocate memory accordingly.
1833 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1834 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1835 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1838 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1839 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
* sizeof(unsigned char));
1840 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1841 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1843 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1847 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1848 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1849 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1850 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1852 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1857 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1861 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1862 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1863 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1869 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1870 * can set these to NULLs
1877 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1879 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1881 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1883 n
+= 2 + strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1885 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1887 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1888 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1889 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1890 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1892 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1895 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1896 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1897 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1898 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1902 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1904 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1907 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1908 nr
[i
] = BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1910 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1917 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
1918 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1919 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1921 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1924 kn
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1930 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, n
+ 4 + kn
)) {
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1934 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1937 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1939 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1950 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1952 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1953 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1954 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1955 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1957 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1965 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
,
1966 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
, encodedlen
);
1967 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1968 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1974 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1975 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1976 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1977 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
1978 strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1979 p
+= strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1986 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1987 * points to the space at the end.
1989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1990 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
1991 && TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
1994 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1995 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1996 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1997 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1998 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1999 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2001 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2003 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(d
[4]), n
);
2004 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, (unsigned int *)&i
);
2008 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
2009 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_RSA
);
2019 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
2021 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2022 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
2023 /* Should never happen */
2024 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2032 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2034 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
2035 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2037 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2039 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(d
[4]), n
);
2040 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
, &(p
[2]),
2041 (unsigned int *)&i
, pkey
)) {
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_EVP
);
2047 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2050 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2051 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2053 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2058 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
2062 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2064 s
->init_num
= n
+ 4;
2068 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2069 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2070 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2072 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2075 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
2076 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2077 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2079 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2080 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2084 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2086 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
2087 int i
, j
, nl
, off
, n
;
2088 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2092 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
) {
2095 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
2097 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2099 n
= ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, p
);
2104 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
2105 nl
= tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s
, p
+ 2);
2115 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2118 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2119 name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2120 j
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
);
2121 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, 4 + n
+ j
+ 2)) {
2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2126 p
= (unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4 + n
]);
2127 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
)) {
2129 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2134 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2143 /* else no CA names */
2144 p
= (unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4 + off
]);
2147 d
= (unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
2148 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
2152 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2155 s
->init_num
= n
+ 4;
2157 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2158 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, s
->init_num
+ 4)) {
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2162 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2165 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2172 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2175 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2176 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2178 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2182 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2186 unsigned long alg_k
;
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2190 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2198 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2201 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2202 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2203 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2204 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2207 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2208 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2209 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2210 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, 2048, &ok
);
2214 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2216 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2219 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2220 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2222 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2225 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2226 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
) {
2227 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2228 rsa
= s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2230 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2233 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2235 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2240 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2241 if ((pkey
== NULL
) ||
2242 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2243 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2245 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2248 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2251 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2252 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2255 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
)) {
2256 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2258 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2267 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2268 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2269 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2270 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2271 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2273 if (n
< SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2274 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2276 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2281 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2282 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2283 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2284 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2285 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2289 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2291 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2292 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2295 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
, p
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2299 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2300 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2303 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2306 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2307 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2308 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2309 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2310 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2311 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2314 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2316 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2319 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2320 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2321 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2322 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2323 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2324 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2327 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2328 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2330 constant_time_eq_8(p
[0], (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2332 constant_time_eq_8(p
[1], (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2333 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2337 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2338 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2340 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2343 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2344 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2345 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2346 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2348 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2349 p
[j
] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
, p
[j
],
2350 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2353 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2354 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2356 session
->master_key
,
2359 (rand_premaster_secret
));
2360 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
));
2363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2364 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2367 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
)) {
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2369 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2377 if (n
== 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
2378 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2380 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
2383 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
) {
2384 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2386 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2389 dh_srvr
= s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2392 pub
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
);
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2398 i
= DH_compute_key(p
, pub
, dh_srvr
);
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2406 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2407 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
2411 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2412 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2414 session
->master_key
,
2416 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2420 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2421 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2422 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2423 krb5_data authenticator
;
2425 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2426 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2427 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2428 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2429 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2431 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2432 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2435 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2438 kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2441 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2443 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6)) {
2444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2445 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2449 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2450 p
+= enc_ticket
.length
;
2453 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2455 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6)) {
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2457 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2461 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2462 p
+= authenticator
.length
;
2466 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2467 p
+= enc_pms
.length
;
2470 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2472 if (enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
) {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2474 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2478 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2479 enc_pms
.length
+ 6)) {
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2481 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2485 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2488 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2489 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2491 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2492 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2498 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2499 * return authtime == 0.
2501 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2502 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0) {
2504 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2505 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2507 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2508 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2513 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0) {
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2518 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2519 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2521 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2525 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2527 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
)) {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2529 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2532 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
, &outl
,
2533 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2536 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2540 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2542 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2546 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(pms
[outl
]), &padl
)) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2548 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2553 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2555 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2559 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>> 8))
2560 && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff)))) {
2562 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2563 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2564 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2565 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2566 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2567 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2568 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2571 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
)) {
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2573 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2579 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2581 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2582 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2584 session
->master_key
,
2587 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
) {
2588 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2589 if (len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
) {
2590 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2591 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
, kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,
2596 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2597 * but it caused problems for apache.
2598 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2599 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2603 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms
, sizeof(pms
));
2607 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2610 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2614 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2615 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2617 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2618 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2623 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2624 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2625 /* use the certificate */
2626 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2629 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2630 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2632 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2635 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2636 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2638 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2639 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2644 /* Let's get client's public key */
2645 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) {
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2651 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2653 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
2654 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2656 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2659 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2660 == NULL
) || (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)) {
2662 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2663 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2664 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2665 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2666 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2667 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2669 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2671 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2675 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2676 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2681 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2684 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2685 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2687 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) {
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2689 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2693 /* Get encoded point length */
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2700 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2705 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2708 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2711 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2712 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2713 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2717 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+ 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
,
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2724 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2725 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2726 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2727 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2728 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2729 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2731 /* Compute the master secret */
2732 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2733 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2735 session
->master_key
,
2738 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2743 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2744 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2745 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4];
2746 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2748 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2750 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2757 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2759 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2762 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2764 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2769 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2771 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2772 memset(tmp_id
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
2773 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2775 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2776 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1);
2778 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2781 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2783 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2786 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2787 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2791 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2792 pre_ms_len
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2794 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+ psk_len
+ 4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2796 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2800 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2801 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2802 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strndup((char *)p
, i
);
2803 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2808 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2809 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2810 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2811 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2812 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2817 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2818 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2820 session
->master_key
,
2825 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2831 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2836 if (param_len
> n
) {
2837 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2839 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2842 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2846 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2847 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2848 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2850 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2853 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2854 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2855 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2856 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2861 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2862 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,
2863 s
->session
->master_key
)) < 0) {
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2870 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2871 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2873 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2874 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2875 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2876 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2877 unsigned long alg_a
;
2881 /* Get our certificate private key */
2882 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2883 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2884 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2885 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2886 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2888 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2889 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2891 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2892 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2893 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2894 * client certificate for authorization only.
2896 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2897 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2898 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2901 /* Decrypt session key */
2903 ((const unsigned char **)&p
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
, &Tclass
,
2904 n
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|| Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2905 || Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2907 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2912 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2913 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2915 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2918 /* Generate master secret */
2919 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2920 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2922 session
->master_key
,
2923 premaster_secret
, 32);
2924 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret
, sizeof(premaster_secret
));
2925 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2926 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2927 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2932 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2933 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2939 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2946 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2947 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2951 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2952 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2953 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2954 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2955 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2957 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2961 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2963 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2965 int al
, ok
, ret
= 0;
2969 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2971 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2974 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2975 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2976 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2977 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2978 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2979 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2981 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2986 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2987 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2988 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2989 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
,
2990 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &ok
);
2995 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2996 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2997 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
2999 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3001 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
3002 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3006 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3007 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3008 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3010 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3013 if (n
== 64 && (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
3014 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)) {
3017 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
3018 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
3019 /* Should never happen */
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3022 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3025 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3026 if (sigalg
!= (int)p
[1]) {
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3028 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3029 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3032 md
= tls12_get_hash(p
[0]);
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
3035 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3039 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3048 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3052 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3053 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3055 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3059 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
3062 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3063 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3065 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3069 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3072 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3073 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3075 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3079 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
3080 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3086 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3087 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3088 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3091 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3096 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3103 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3104 j
= DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3105 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3106 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3109 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3116 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3117 j
= ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3118 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3119 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3122 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3128 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3129 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3130 unsigned char signature
[64];
3132 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3133 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3135 fprintf(stderr
, "GOST signature length is %d", i
);
3137 for (idx
= 0; idx
< 64; idx
++) {
3138 signature
[63 - idx
] = p
[idx
];
3140 j
= EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
, signature
, 64, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3142 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3144 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3150 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3157 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3158 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3161 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3162 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3163 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3164 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3166 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3167 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3171 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3173 int i
, ok
, al
, ret
= -1;
3175 unsigned long l
, nc
, llen
, n
;
3176 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
3178 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3180 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3183 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3188 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
3189 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3190 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3192 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3193 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3197 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3199 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3201 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3202 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3205 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3209 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
3210 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3214 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3216 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3222 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
3223 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3227 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
3229 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
3230 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3232 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3237 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &p
, l
);
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3243 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3245 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3248 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3256 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3257 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3258 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3259 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3261 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3264 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3265 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3266 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3268 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3269 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3272 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3273 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
3274 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3278 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3280 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3282 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3287 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3288 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3289 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3290 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3293 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3296 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3297 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3298 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3303 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3304 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3305 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
= sk
;
3307 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3308 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3316 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3318 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3324 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3328 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3333 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
) {
3334 x
= ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
3336 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3337 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3338 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
)) {
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
3340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3341 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3346 l
= ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, x
);
3348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3349 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3352 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3353 s
->init_num
= (int)l
;
3357 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3358 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3362 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3363 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3365 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3369 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
) {
3370 unsigned char *p
, *macstart
;
3371 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3372 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3375 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3376 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3377 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3379 /* get session encoding length */
3380 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3382 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3385 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3386 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3389 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3391 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3396 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3399 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3403 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3406 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3409 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3411 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3412 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3413 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3417 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3418 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3421 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3424 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3425 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3426 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3427 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3428 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3429 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3431 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3432 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3433 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3436 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3438 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3439 /* Skip message length for now */
3442 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3443 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3445 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3446 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3450 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, 16) <= 0)
3452 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3453 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3455 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3456 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
))
3458 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3462 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3463 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3464 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3466 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3468 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3470 /* Output key name */
3472 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3475 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3476 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3477 /* Encrypt session data */
3478 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
))
3481 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
))
3485 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
))
3487 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
))
3490 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3491 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3494 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3496 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3497 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3498 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3500 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3502 /* number of bytes to write */
3504 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3509 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3510 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3514 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3515 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3516 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3520 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3522 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
) {
3525 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3526 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3527 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3530 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
)) {
3531 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3535 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3538 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3539 /* message length */
3540 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3542 *(p
++) = s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3543 /* length of OCSP response */
3544 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3545 /* actual response */
3546 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3547 /* number of bytes to write */
3548 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3549 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3553 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3554 return (ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3557 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3559 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3560 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3562 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3565 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3567 const unsigned char *p
;
3570 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3571 * extension in their ClientHello
3573 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
3574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,
3575 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3576 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3580 /* See the payload format below */
3581 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3582 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3583 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3584 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
, 514, &ok
);
3590 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3591 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3592 * ssl3_get_finished).
3594 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3596 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3601 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3602 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3605 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3608 * The payload looks like:
3610 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3611 * uint8 padding_len;
3612 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3615 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
) {
3616 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3619 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3620 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
) {
3621 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3625 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3626 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
) {
3627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3628 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3631 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3632 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;