1 .\" Copyright (c) 1985 Regents of the University of California.
2 .\" All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement
3 .\" specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution.
5 .\" @(#)ftpd.8c 6.4 (Berkeley) 5/28/86
9 ftpd, in.ftpd, setup.anonftp \- DARPA Internet File Transfer Protocol server
11 .B "ftp stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/in.ftpd in.ftpd"
13 .B "tcpd ftp /usr/sbin/in.ftpd"
16 is the DARPA Internet File Transfer Prototocol
17 server process. The server uses the TCP protocol
18 and listens at the port specified in the ``ftp''
19 service specification; see
22 The ftp server currently supports the following ftp
23 requests; case is not distinguished.
27 \fBRequest Description\fP
28 ABOR abort previous command
29 ACCT specify account (ignored)
30 ALLO allocate storage (vacuously)
32 CDUP change to parent of current working directory
33 CWD change working directory
35 HELP give help information
36 LIST give list files in a directory (``ls -lA'')
38 MODE specify data transfer \fImode\fP
39 NLST give name list of files in directory (``ls'')
42 PASV prepare for server-to-server transfer
43 PORT specify data connection port
44 PWD print the current working directory
45 QUIT terminate session
47 RMD remove a directory
48 RNFR specify rename-from file name
49 RNTO specify rename-to file name
51 STOU store a file with a unique name
52 STRU specify data transfer \fIstructure\fP
53 TYPE specify data transfer \fItype\fP
54 USER specify user name
55 XCUP change to parent of current working directory
56 XCWD change working directory
58 XPWD print the current working directory
59 XRMD remove a directory
62 The remaining ftp requests specified in Internet RFC 959 are
63 recognized, but not implemented.
65 The ftp server will abort an active file transfer only when the
66 ABOR command is preceded by a Telnet "Interrupt Process" (IP)
67 signal and a Telnet "Synch" signal in the command Telnet stream,
68 as described in Internet RFC 959.
71 interprets file names according to the ``globbing''
74 This allows users to utilize the metacharacters ``*?[]{}~''.
77 authenticates users according to three rules.
79 The user name must be in the password data base,
81 and not have a null password. In this case a password
82 must be provided by the client before any file operations
85 The user name must not appear in the file
88 If the user name is ``anonymous'' or ``ftp'', an
89 anonymous ftp account must be present in the password
90 file (user ``ftp''). In this case the user is allowed
91 to log in by specifying any password (by convention this
92 is given as the client host's name).
96 takes special measures to restrict the client's access privileges.
99 command to the home directory of the ``ftp'' user.
100 In order that system security is not breached, it is recommended
101 that the ``ftp'' subtree be constructed with care; the following
102 rules are recommended.
104 Make the home directory owned by ``ftp'' and unwritable by anyone.
106 Make this directory owned by the super-user and unwritable by
109 must be present to support the list commands. This
110 program should have mode 111.
112 This directory could be created, and could have
116 databases in it so that
118 can show file ownership, but outsiders will grab your password file and
119 misuse it to spam you. So don't bother.
121 Make this directory mode 755 and owned by the super-user. Create
122 directories in it owned by users if those users want to manage an
123 anonymous ftp directory.
124 .IP ~ftp/pub/incoming)
125 Optionally create this directory for anonymous uploads. Make it mode
126 777. The FTP daemon will create files with mode 266, so remote users
127 can write a file, but only local users can do something with it.
131 can be used to create or check an anonymous FTP tree.
135 The anonymous account is inherently dangerous and should
136 avoided when possible.
137 .ig \" MINIX 3 doesn't have privileged port numbers (yet?)
139 The server must run as the super-user
140 to create sockets with privileged port numbers. It maintains
141 an effective user id of the logged in user, reverting to
142 the super-user only when binding addresses to sockets. The
143 possible security holes have been extensively
144 scrutinized, but are possibly incomplete.