Patrick Welche <prlw1@cam.ac.uk>

[netbsd-mini2440.git] / external / ibm-public / postfix / dist / src / tls / tls_verify.c

/*      $NetBSD$        */

/*++
/* NAME
/*      tls_verify 3
/* SUMMARY
/*      peer name and peer certificate verification
/* SYNOPSIS
/*      #define TLS_INTERNAL
/*      #include <tls.h>
/*
/*      char *tls_peer_CN(peercert, TLScontext)
/*      X509   *peercert;
/*      TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
/*
/*      char *tls_issuer_CN(peercert, TLScontext)
/*      X509   *peercert;
/*      TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
/*
/*      const char *tls_dns_name(gn, TLScontext)
/*      const GENERAL_NAME *gn;
/*      TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
/*
/*      char *tls_fingerprint(peercert, dgst)
/*      X509   *peercert;
/*      const char *dgst;
/*
/*      int     tls_verify_certificate_callback(ok, ctx)
/*      int     ok;
/*      X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
/* DESCRIPTION
/*      tls_peer_CN() returns the text CommonName for the peer
/*      certificate subject, or an empty string if no CommonName was
/*      found. The result is allocated with mymalloc() and must be
/*      freed by the caller; it contains UTF-8 without non-printable
/*      ASCII characters.
/*
/*      tls_issuer_CN() returns the text CommonName for the peer
/*      certificate issuer, or an empty string if no CommonName was
/*      found. The result is allocated with mymalloc() and must be
/*      freed by the caller; it contains UTF-8 without non-printable
/*      ASCII characters.
/*
/*      tls_dns_name() returns the string value of a GENERAL_NAME
/*      from a DNS subjectAltName extension. If non-printable characters
/*      are found, a null string is returned instead. Further sanity
/*      checks may be added if the need arises.
/*
/*      tls_fingerprint() returns a fingerprint of the the given
/*      certificate using the requested message digest. Panics if the
/*      (previously verified) digest algorithm is not found. The return
/*      value is dynamically allocated with mymalloc(), and the caller
/*      must eventually free it with myfree().
/*
/*      tls_verify_callback() is called several times (directly or
/*      indirectly) from crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. It is called as
/*      a final check, and if it returns "0", the handshake is
/*      immediately shut down and the connection fails.
/*
/*      Postfix/TLS has two modes, the "opportunistic" mode and
/*      the "enforce" mode:
/*
/*      In the "opportunistic" mode we never want the connection
/*      to fail just because there is something wrong with the
/*      peer's certificate. After all, we would have sent or received
/*      the mail even if TLS weren't available.  Therefore the
/*      return value is always "1".
/*
/*      The SMTP client or server may require TLS (e.g. to protect
/*      passwords), while peer certificates are optional.  In this
/*      case we must return "1" even when we are unhappy with the
/*      peer certificate.  Only when peer certificates are required,
/*      certificate verification failure will result in immediate
/*      termination (return 0).
/*
/*      The only error condition not handled inside the OpenSSL
/*      library is the case of a too-long certificate chain. We
/*      test for this condition only if "ok = 1", that is, if
/*      verification didn't fail because of some earlier problem.
/*
/*      Arguments:
/* .IP ok
/*      Result of prior verification: non-zero means success.  In
/*      order to reduce the noise level, some tests or error reports
/*      are disabled when verification failed because of some
/*      earlier problem.
/* .IP ctx
/*      SSL application context. This links to the Postfix TLScontext
/*      with enforcement and logging options.
/* .IP gn
/*      An OpenSSL GENERAL_NAME structure holding a DNS subjectAltName
/*      to be decoded and checked for validity.
/* .IP peercert
/*      Server or client X.509 certificate.
/* .IP dgst
/*      Name of a message digest algorithm suitable for computing secure
/*      (1st pre-image resistant) message digests of certificates. For now,
/*      md5, sha1, or member of SHA-2 family if supported by OpenSSL.
/* .IP TLScontext
/*      Server or client context for warning messages.
/* DIAGNOSTICS
/*      tls_peer_CN(), tls_issuer_CN() and tls_dns_name() log a warning
/*      when 1) the requested information is not available in the specified
/*      certificate, 2) the result exceeds a fixed limit, 3) the result
/*      contains NUL characters or the result contains non-printable or
/*      non-ASCII characters.
/* LICENSE
/* .ad
/* .fi
/*      This software is free. You can do with it whatever you want.
/*      The original author kindly requests that you acknowledge
/*      the use of his software.
/* AUTHOR(S)
/*      Originally written by:
/*      Lutz Jaenicke
/*      BTU Cottbus
/*      Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
/*      Universitaetsplatz 3-4
/*      D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
/*
/*      Updated by:
/*      Wietse Venema
/*      IBM T.J. Watson Research
/*      P.O. Box 704
/*      Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
/*
/*      Victor Duchovni
/*      Morgan Stanley
/*--*/

/* System library. */

#include <sys_defs.h>
#include <ctype.h>

#ifdef USE_TLS
#include <string.h>

/* Utility library. */

#include <msg.h>
#include <mymalloc.h>
#include <stringops.h>

/* TLS library. */

#define TLS_INTERNAL
#include <tls.h>

/* Application-specific. */

static const char hexcodes[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";

/* tls_verify_certificate_callback - verify peer certificate info */

int     tls_verify_certificate_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    char    buf[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
    X509   *cert;
    int     err;
    int     depth;
    SSL    *con;
    TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;

    depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
    cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
    con = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
    TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(con, TLScontext_index);

    /*
     * The callback function is called repeatedly, first with the root
     * certificate, and then with each intermediate certificate ending with
     * the peer certificate.
     * 
     * With each call, the validity of the current certificate (usage bits,
     * attributes, expiration, ... checked by the OpenSSL library) is
     * available in the "ok" argument. Error details are available via
     * X509_STORE_CTX API.
     * 
     * We never terminate the SSL handshake in the verification callback, rather
     * we allow the TLS handshake to continue, but mark the session as
     * unverified. The application is responsible for closing any sessions
     * with unverified credentials.
     * 
     * Certificate chain depth limit violations are mis-reported by the OpenSSL
     * library, from SSL_CTX_set_verify(3):
     * 
     * The certificate verification depth set with SSL[_CTX]_verify_depth()
     * stops the verification at a certain depth. The error message produced
     * will be that of an incomplete certificate chain and not
     * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG as may be expected.
     * 
     * We set a limit that is one higher than the user requested limit. If this
     * higher limit is reached, we raise an error even a trusted root CA is
     * present at this depth. This disambiguates trust chain truncation from
     * an incomplete trust chain.
     */
    if (depth >= SSL_get_verify_depth(con)) {
        ok = 0;
        X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
    }
    if (TLScontext->log_level >= 2) {
        X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
        msg_info("%s: certificate verification depth=%d verify=%d subject=%s",
                 TLScontext->namaddr, depth, ok, printable(buf, '?'));
    }

    /*
     * If no errors, or we are not logging verification errors, we are done.
     */
    if (ok || (TLScontext->peer_status & TLS_CERT_FLAG_LOGGED) != 0)
        return (1);

    /*
     * One counter-example is enough.
     */
    TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_LOGGED;

#define PURPOSE ((depth>0) ? "CA": TLScontext->am_server ? "client": "server")

    /*
     * Specific causes for verification failure.
     */
    switch (err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx)) {
    case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
        msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: "
                 "self-signed certificate", TLScontext->namaddr);
        break;
    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
    case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:

        /*
         * There is no difference between issuing cert not provided and
         * provided, but not found in CAfile/CApath. Either way, we don't
         * trust it.
         */
        X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),
                          buf, sizeof(buf));
        msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: untrusted issuer %s",
                 TLScontext->namaddr, printable(buf, '?'));
        break;
    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
        msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: certificate not"
                 " yet valid", PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr);
        break;
    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
        msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: certificate has"
                 " expired", PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr);
        break;
    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
        msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: not designated for "
                 "use as a %s certificate", TLScontext->namaddr, PURPOSE);
        break;
    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
        msg_info("certificate verification failed for %s: "
                 "certificate chain longer than limit(%d)",
                 TLScontext->namaddr, SSL_get_verify_depth(con) - 1);
        break;
    default:
        msg_info("%s certificate verification failed for %s: num=%d:%s",
                 PURPOSE, TLScontext->namaddr, err,
                 X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
        break;
    }

    return (1);
}

#ifndef DONT_GRIPE
#define DONT_GRIPE 0
#define DO_GRIPE 1
#endif

/* tls_text_name - extract certificate property value by name */

static char *tls_text_name(X509_NAME *name, int nid, const char *label,
                                const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, int gripe)
{
    const char *myname = "tls_text_name";
    int     pos;
    X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
    ASN1_STRING *entry_str;
    int     asn1_type;
    int     utf8_length;
    unsigned char *utf8_value;
    int     ch;
    unsigned char *cp;

    if (name == 0 || (pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) {
        if (gripe != DONT_GRIPE) {
            msg_warn("%s: %s: peer certificate has no %s",
                     myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
            tls_print_errors();
        }
        return (0);
    }
#if 0

    /*
     * If the match is required unambiguous, insist that that no other values
     * be present.
     */
    if (X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, pos) >= 0) {
        msg_warn("%s: %s: multiple %ss in peer certificate",
                 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
        return (0);
    }
#endif

    if ((entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, pos)) == 0) {
        /* This should not happen */
        msg_warn("%s: %s: error reading peer certificate %s entry",
                 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
        tls_print_errors();
        return (0);
    }
    if ((entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry)) == 0) {
        /* This should not happen */
        msg_warn("%s: %s: error reading peer certificate %s data",
                 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
        tls_print_errors();
        return (0);
    }

    /*
     * XXX Convert everything into UTF-8. This is a super-set of ASCII, so we
     * don't have to bother with separate code paths for ASCII-like content.
     * If the payload is ASCII then we won't waste lots of CPU cycles
     * converting it into UTF-8. It's up to OpenSSL to do something
     * reasonable when converting ASCII formats that contain non-ASCII
     * content.
     * 
     * XXX Don't bother optimizing the string length error check. It is not
     * worth the complexity.
     */
    asn1_type = ASN1_STRING_type(entry_str);
    if ((utf8_length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_value, entry_str)) < 0) {
        msg_warn("%s: %s: error decoding peer %s of ASN.1 type=%d",
                 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label, asn1_type);
        tls_print_errors();
        return (0);
    }

    /*
     * No returns without cleaning up. A good optimizer will replace multiple
     * blocks of identical code by jumps to just one such block.
     */
#define TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(x) do { \
        char *__tls_text_name_temp = (x); \
        OPENSSL_free(utf8_value); \
        return (__tls_text_name_temp); \
    } while (0)

    /*
     * Remove trailing null characters. They would give false alarms with the
     * length check and with the embedded null check.
     */
#define TRIM0(s, l) do { while ((l) > 0 && (s)[(l)-1] == 0) --(l); } while (0)

    TRIM0(utf8_value, utf8_length);

    /*
     * Enforce the length limit, because the caller will copy the result into
     * a fixed-length buffer.
     */
    if (utf8_length >= CCERT_BUFSIZ) {
        msg_warn("%s: %s: peer %s too long: %d",
                 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label, utf8_length);
        TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0);
    }

    /*
     * Reject embedded nulls in ASCII or UTF-8 names. OpenSSL is responsible
     * for producing properly-formatted UTF-8.
     */
    if (utf8_length != strlen((char *) utf8_value)) {
        msg_warn("%s: %s: NULL character in peer %s",
                 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
        TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0);
    }

    /*
     * Reject non-printable ASCII characters in UTF-8 content.
     * 
     * Note: the code below does not find control characters in illegal UTF-8
     * sequences. It's OpenSSL's job to produce valid UTF-8, and reportedly,
     * it does validation.
     */
    for (cp = utf8_value; (ch = *cp) != 0; cp++) {
        if (ISASCII(ch) && !ISPRINT(ch)) {
            msg_warn("%s: %s: non-printable content in peer %s",
                     myname, TLScontext->namaddr, label);
            TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(0);
        }
    }
    TLS_TEXT_NAME_RETURN(mystrdup((char *) utf8_value));
}

/* tls_dns_name - Extract valid DNS name from subjectAltName value */

const char *tls_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME * gn,
                                 const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
{
    const char *myname = "tls_dns_name";
    char   *cp;
    const char *dnsname;
    int     len;

    /*
     * Peername checks are security sensitive, carefully scrutinize the
     * input!
     */
    if (gn->type != GEN_DNS)
        msg_panic("%s: Non DNS input argument", myname);

    /*
     * We expect the OpenSSL library to construct GEN_DNS extesion objects as
     * ASN1_IA5STRING values. Check we got the right union member.
     */
    if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
        msg_warn("%s: %s: invalid ASN1 value type in subjectAltName",
                 myname, TLScontext->namaddr);
        return (0);
    }

    /*
     * Safe to treat as an ASCII string possibly holding a DNS name
     */
    dnsname = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
    len = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
    TRIM0(dnsname, len);

    /*
     * Per Dr. Steven Henson of the OpenSSL development team, ASN1_IA5STRING
     * values can have internal ASCII NUL values in this context because
     * their length is taken from the decoded ASN1 buffer, a trailing NUL is
     * always appended to make sure that the string is terminated, but the
     * ASN.1 length may differ from strlen().
     */
    if (len != strlen(dnsname)) {
        msg_warn("%s: %s: internal NUL in subjectAltName",
                 myname, TLScontext->namaddr);
        return 0;
    }

    /*
     * XXX: Should we be more strict and call valid_hostname()? So long as
     * the name is safe to handle, if it is not a valid hostname, it will not
     * compare equal to the expected peername, so being more strict than
     * "printable" is likely excessive...
     */
    if (*dnsname && !allprint(dnsname)) {
        cp = mystrdup(dnsname);
        msg_warn("%s: %s: non-printable characters in subjectAltName: %.100s",
                 myname, TLScontext->namaddr, printable(cp, '?'));
        myfree(cp);
        return 0;
    }
    return (dnsname);
}

/* tls_peer_CN - extract peer common name from certificate */

char   *tls_peer_CN(X509 *peercert, const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
{
    char   *cn;

    cn = tls_text_name(X509_get_subject_name(peercert), NID_commonName,
                       "subject CN", TLScontext, DO_GRIPE);
    return (cn ? cn : mystrdup(""));
}

/* tls_issuer_CN - extract issuer common name from certificate */

char   *tls_issuer_CN(X509 *peer, const TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
{
    X509_NAME *name;
    char   *cn;

    name = X509_get_issuer_name(peer);

    /*
     * If no issuer CN field, use Organization instead. CA certs without a CN
     * are common, so we only complain if the organization is also missing.
     */
    if ((cn = tls_text_name(name, NID_commonName,
                            "issuer CN", TLScontext, DONT_GRIPE)) == 0)
        cn = tls_text_name(name, NID_organizationName,
                           "issuer Organization", TLScontext, DO_GRIPE);
    return (cn ? cn : mystrdup(""));
}

/* tls_fingerprint - extract fingerprint from certificate */

char   *tls_fingerprint(X509 *peercert, const char *dgst)
{
    const char *myname = "tls_fingerprint";
    const EVP_MD *md_alg;
    unsigned char md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
    unsigned int md_len;
    int     i;
    char   *result = 0;

    /* Previously available in "init" routine. */
    if ((md_alg = EVP_get_digestbyname(dgst)) == 0)
        msg_panic("%s: digest algorithm \"%s\" not found", myname, dgst);

    /* Fails when serialization to ASN.1 runs out of memory */
    if (X509_digest(peercert, md_alg, md_buf, &md_len) == 0)
        msg_fatal("%s: error computing certificate %s digest (out of memory?)",
                  myname, dgst);

    /* Check for OpenSSL contract violation */
    if (md_len > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE || md_len >= INT_MAX / 3)
        msg_panic("%s: unexpectedly large %s digest size: %u",
                  myname, dgst, md_len);

    result = mymalloc(md_len * 3);
    for (i = 0; i < md_len; i++) {
        result[i * 3] = hexcodes[(md_buf[i] & 0xf0) >> 4U];
        result[(i * 3) + 1] = hexcodes[(md_buf[i] & 0x0f)];
        result[(i * 3) + 2] = (i + 1 != md_len) ? ':' : '\0';
    }
    return (result);
}

#endif