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[netbsd-mini2440.git] / crypto / external / bsd / openssl / dist / ssl / s3_srvr.c
blob5c74f1750bdb6cb2ee9aa77a854b12b582497531
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
183 ssl3_accept,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
186
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
188 {
189 BUF_MEM *buf;
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
192 long num1;
193 int ret= -1;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
195
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
197 ERR_clear_error();
198 clear_sys_error();
199
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
201 cb=s->info_callback;
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
204
205 /* init things to blank */
206 s->in_handshake++;
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
208
209 if (s->cert == NULL)
210 {
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
212 return(-1);
213 }
214
215 for (;;)
216 {
217 state=s->state;
218
219 switch (s->state)
220 {
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
222 s->new_session=1;
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
224
225 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
226 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
229
230 s->server=1;
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
232
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
234 {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
236 return -1;
237 }
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
239
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
241 {
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
243 {
244 ret= -1;
245 goto end;
246 }
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
248 {
249 ret= -1;
250 goto end;
251 }
252 s->init_buf=buf;
253 }
254
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
256 {
257 ret= -1;
258 goto end;
259 }
260
261 s->init_num=0;
262
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
264 {
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
267 */
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
269
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
273 }
274 else
275 {
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
280 }
281 break;
282
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
285
286 s->shutdown=0;
287 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
288 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
289 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
291 s->init_num=0;
292
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
294 break;
295
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
297 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
298 break;
299
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
303
304 s->shutdown=0;
305 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
306 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
307
308 s->new_session = 2;
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
310 s->init_num=0;
311 break;
312
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
314 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
315 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
316 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
318 if (s->hit)
319 {
320 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
322 else
323 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
324 }
325 #else
326 if (s->hit)
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
328 #endif
329 else
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
331 s->init_num=0;
332 break;
333
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
336 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
337 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
338 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
339 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
340 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
341 {
342 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
343 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
345 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
347 else
348 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
349 }
350 else
351 {
352 skip = 1;
353 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
354 }
355 #else
356 }
357 else
358 skip=1;
359
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
361 #endif
362 s->init_num=0;
363 break;
364
365 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
367 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
368
369 /* clear this, it may get reset by
370 * send_server_key_exchange */
371 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
373 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
374 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
375 )
376 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
377 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
378 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
379 * be able to handle this) */
380 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
381 else
382 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
383
384
385 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
386 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
387 *
388 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
389 *
390 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
391 * message only if the cipher suite is either
392 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
393 * server certificate contains the server's
394 * public key for key exchange.
395 */
396 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
397 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
398 * hint if provided */
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
400 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
401 #endif
402 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
403 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
404 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
405 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
406 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
407 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
408 )
409 )
410 )
411 )
412 {
413 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
414 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
415 }
416 else
417 skip=1;
418
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
420 s->init_num=0;
421 break;
422
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
425 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
426 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
427 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
428 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
429 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
430 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
431 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
432 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
433 * and in RFC 2246): */
434 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
435 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
436 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
438 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
439 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
440 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
441 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
442 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
443 {
444 /* no cert request */
445 skip=1;
446 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
447 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
448 }
449 else
450 {
451 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
452 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
453 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
454 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
455 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
456 #else
457 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
458 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
459 #endif
460 s->init_num=0;
461 }
462 break;
463
464 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
465 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
466 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
467 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
468 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
470 s->init_num=0;
471 break;
472
473 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
474 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
475 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_WPENDING,0,NULL);
476 if (num1 > 0)
477 {
478 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
479 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
480 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
481 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
482 }
483
484 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
485 break;
486
487 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
488 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
489 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
490 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
491 if (ret <= 0)
492 goto end;
493 if (ret == 2)
494 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
495 else {
496 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
497 {
498 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
499 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
500 }
501 s->init_num=0;
502 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
503 }
504 break;
505
506 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
508 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
509 if (ret <= 0)
510 goto end;
511 if (ret == 2)
512 {
513 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
514 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
515 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
516 * message is not sent.
517 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
518 * the client uses its key from the certificate
519 * for key exchange.
520 */
521 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
522 s->init_num = 0;
523 }
524 else
525 {
526 int offset=0;
527 int dgst_num;
528
529 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
530 s->init_num=0;
531
532 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
533 * a client cert, it can be verified
534 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
535 * should be generalized. But it is next step
536 */
537 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
538 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
539 return -1;
540 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
541 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
542 {
543 int dgst_size;
544
545 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
546 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
547 if (dgst_size < 0)
548 {
549 ret = -1;
550 goto end;
551 }
552 offset+=dgst_size;
553 }
554 }
555 break;
556
557 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
558 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
559
560 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
561 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
562 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
563
564 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
565 s->init_num=0;
566 break;
567
568 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
569 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
570 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
571 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
572 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
574 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
575 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
576 else if (s->hit)
577 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
578 #else
579 if (s->hit)
580 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
581 #endif
582 else
583 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
584 s->init_num=0;
585 break;
586
587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
588 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
589 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
590 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
591 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
592 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
593 s->init_num=0;
594 break;
595
596 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
597 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
598 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
599 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
600 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
601 s->init_num=0;
602 break;
603
604 #endif
605
606 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
607 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
608
609 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
610 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
611 { ret= -1; goto end; }
612
613 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
614 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
615
616 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
618 s->init_num=0;
619
620 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
621 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
622 {
623 ret= -1;
624 goto end;
625 }
626
627 break;
628
629 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
630 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
631 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
632 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
633 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
634 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
635 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
636 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
637 if (s->hit)
638 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
639 else
640 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
641 s->init_num=0;
642 break;
643
644 case SSL_ST_OK:
645 /* clean a few things up */
646 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
647
648 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
649 s->init_buf=NULL;
650
651 /* remove buffering on output */
652 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
653
654 s->init_num=0;
655
656 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
657 {
658 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
659 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
660
661 s->new_session=0;
662
663 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
664
665 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
666 /* s->server=1; */
667 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
668
669 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
670 }
671
672 ret = 1;
673 goto end;
674 /* break; */
675
676 default:
677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
678 ret= -1;
679 goto end;
680 /* break; */
681 }
682
683 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
684 {
685 if (s->debug)
686 {
687 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
688 goto end;
689 }
690
691
692 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
693 {
694 new_state=s->state;
695 s->state=state;
696 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
697 s->state=new_state;
698 }
699 }
700 skip=0;
701 }
702 end:
703 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
704
705 s->in_handshake--;
706 if (cb != NULL)
707 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
708 return(ret);
709 }
710
711 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
712 {
713 unsigned char *p;
714
715 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
716 {
717 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
718 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
719 *(p++)=0;
720 *(p++)=0;
721 *(p++)=0;
722
723 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
724 /* number of bytes to write */
725 s->init_num=4;
726 s->init_off=0;
727 }
728
729 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
730 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
731 }
732
733 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
734 {
735 int ok;
736 long n;
737
738 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
739 * so permit appropriate message length */
740 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
741 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
742 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
743 -1,
744 s->max_cert_list,
745 &ok);
746 if (!ok) return((int)n);
747 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
748 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
749 {
750 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
751 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
752 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
753 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
755 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
756 {
757 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
758 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
759 }
760 #endif
761 return 2;
762 }
763 return 1;
764 }
765
766 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
767 {
768 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
769 unsigned int cookie_len;
770 long n;
771 unsigned long id;
772 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
773 SSL_CIPHER *c;
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
775 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
776 #endif
777 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
778
779 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
780 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
781 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
782 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
783 * TLSv1.
784 */
785 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
786 {
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
788 }
789 s->first_packet=1;
790 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
791 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
792 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
793 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
794 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
795 &ok);
796
797 if (!ok) return((int)n);
798 s->first_packet=0;
799 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
800
801 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
802 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
803 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
804 p+=2;
805
806 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
807 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
808 {
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
810 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
811 {
812 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
813 s->version = s->client_version;
814 }
815 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
816 goto f_err;
817 }
818
819 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
820 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
821 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
822 */
823 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
824 {
825 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
826
827 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
828 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
829
830 if (cookie_length == 0)
831 return 1;
832 }
833
834 /* load the client random */
835 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
836 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
837
838 /* get the session-id */
839 j= *(p++);
840
841 s->hit=0;
842 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
843 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
844 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
845 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
846 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
847 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
848 * an earlier library version)
849 */
850 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
851 {
852 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
853 goto err;
854 }
855 else
856 {
857 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
858 if (i == 1)
859 { /* previous session */
860 s->hit=1;
861 }
862 else if (i == -1)
863 goto err;
864 else /* i == 0 */
865 {
866 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
867 goto err;
868 }
869 }
870
871 p+=j;
872
873 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
874 {
875 /* cookie stuff */
876 cookie_len = *(p++);
877
878 /*
879 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
880 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
881 * does not cause an overflow.
882 */
883 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
884 {
885 /* too much data */
886 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
888 goto f_err;
889 }
890
891 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
892 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
893 cookie_len > 0)
894 {
895 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
896
897 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
898 {
899 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
900 cookie_len) == 0)
901 {
902 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
904 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
905 goto f_err;
906 }
907 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
908 }
909 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
910 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
911 {
912 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
914 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
915 goto f_err;
916 }
917
918 ret = 2;
919 }
920
921 p += cookie_len;
922 }
923
924 n2s(p,i);
925 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
926 {
927 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
928 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
930 goto f_err;
931 }
932 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
933 {
934 /* not enough data */
935 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
937 goto f_err;
938 }
939 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
940 == NULL))
941 {
942 goto err;
943 }
944 p+=i;
945
946 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
947 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
948 {
949 j=0;
950 id=s->session->cipher->id;
951
952 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
953 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
954 #endif
955 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
956 {
957 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
958 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
959 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
960 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
961 #endif
962 if (c->id == id)
963 {
964 j=1;
965 break;
966 }
967 }
968 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
969 {
970 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
971 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
972 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
973 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
974 * enabled, though. */
975 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
976 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
977 {
978 s->session->cipher = c;
979 j = 1;
980 }
981 }
982 if (j == 0)
983 {
984 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
985 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
986 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
988 goto f_err;
989 }
990 }
991
992 /* compression */
993 i= *(p++);
994 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
995 {
996 /* not enough data */
997 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
999 goto f_err;
1000 }
1001 q=p;
1002 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1003 {
1004 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1005 }
1006
1007 p+=i;
1008 if (j >= i)
1009 {
1010 /* no compress */
1011 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1013 goto f_err;
1014 }
1015
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1017 /* TLS extensions*/
1018 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1019 {
1020 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1021 {
1022 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1024 goto f_err;
1025 }
1026 }
1027 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1029 goto err;
1030 }
1031
1032 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1033 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1034 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1035 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1036 {
1037 unsigned long Time;
1038 unsigned char *pos;
1039 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1040 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1041 l2n(Time,pos);
1042 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1043 {
1044 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1045 goto f_err;
1046 }
1047 }
1048
1049 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1050 {
1051 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1052
1053 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1054 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1055 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1056 {
1057 s->hit=1;
1058 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1059 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1060
1061 ciphers=NULL;
1062
1063 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1064 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1065 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1066 {
1067 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1069 goto f_err;
1070 }
1071
1072 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1073
1074 if (s->cipher_list)
1075 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1076
1077 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1078 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1079
1080 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1081 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1082 }
1083 }
1084 #endif
1085
1086 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1087 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1088 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1089 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1091 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1092 { /* See if we have a match */
1093 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1094
1095 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1096 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1097 {
1098 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1099 v=comp->id;
1100 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1101 {
1102 if (v == q[o])
1103 {
1104 done=1;
1105 break;
1106 }
1107 }
1108 if (done) break;
1109 }
1110 if (done)
1111 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1112 else
1113 comp=NULL;
1114 }
1115 #endif
1116
1117 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1118 * pick a cipher */
1119
1120 if (!s->hit)
1121 {
1122 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1123 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1124 #else
1125 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1126 #endif
1127 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1128 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1129 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1130 if (ciphers == NULL)
1131 {
1132 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1134 goto f_err;
1135 }
1136 ciphers=NULL;
1137 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1138 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1139
1140 if (c == NULL)
1141 {
1142 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1144 goto f_err;
1145 }
1146 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1147 }
1148 else
1149 {
1150 /* Session-id reuse */
1151 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1152 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1153 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1154 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1155
1156 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1157 {
1158 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1159 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1160 {
1161 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1162 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1163 nc=c;
1164 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1165 ec=c;
1166 }
1167 if (nc != NULL)
1168 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1169 else if (ec != NULL)
1170 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1171 else
1172 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1173 }
1174 else
1175 #endif
1176 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1177 }
1178
1179 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1180 goto f_err;
1181
1182 /* we now have the following setup.
1183 * client_random
1184 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1185 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1186 * compression - basically ignored right now
1187 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1188 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1189 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1190 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1191 */
1192
1193 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1194 if (0)
1195 {
1196 f_err:
1197 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1198 }
1199 err:
1200 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1201 return(ret);
1202 }
1203
1204 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1205 {
1206 unsigned char *buf;
1207 unsigned char *p,*d;
1208 int i,sl;
1209 unsigned long l;
1210 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1211 unsigned long Time;
1212 #endif
1213
1214 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1215 {
1216 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1217 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1218 p=s->s3->server_random;
1219 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1220 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1221 l2n(Time,p);
1222 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1223 return -1;
1224 #endif
1225 /* Do the message type and length last */
1226 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1227
1228 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1229 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1230
1231 /* Random stuff */
1232 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1233 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1234
1235 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1236 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1237 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1238 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1239 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1240 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1241 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1242 *
1243 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1244 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1245 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1246 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1247 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1248 * is unaffected.
1249 */
1250 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1251 && !s->hit)
1252 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1253
1254 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1255 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1256 {
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 return -1;
1259 }
1260 *(p++)=sl;
1261 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1262 p+=sl;
1263
1264 /* put the cipher */
1265 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1266 p+=i;
1267
1268 /* put the compression method */
1269 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1270 *(p++)=0;
1271 #else
1272 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1273 *(p++)=0;
1274 else
1275 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1276 #endif
1277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1278 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1279 {
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1281 return -1;
1282 }
1283 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1284 {
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 return -1;
1287 }
1288 #endif
1289 /* do the header */
1290 l=(p-d);
1291 d=buf;
1292 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1293 l2n3(l,d);
1294
1295 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1296 /* number of bytes to write */
1297 s->init_num=p-buf;
1298 s->init_off=0;
1299 }
1300
1301 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1302 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1303 }
1304
1305 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1306 {
1307 unsigned char *p;
1308
1309 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1310 {
1311 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1312
1313 /* do the header */
1314 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1315 *(p++)=0;
1316 *(p++)=0;
1317 *(p++)=0;
1318
1319 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1320 /* number of bytes to write */
1321 s->init_num=4;
1322 s->init_off=0;
1323 }
1324
1325 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1326 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1327 }
1328
1329 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1330 {
1331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1332 unsigned char *q;
1333 int j,num;
1334 RSA *rsa;
1335 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1336 unsigned int u;
1337 #endif
1338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1339 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1340 #endif
1341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1342 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1343 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1344 int encodedlen = 0;
1345 int curve_id = 0;
1346 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1347 #endif
1348 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1349 unsigned char *p,*d;
1350 int al,i;
1351 unsigned long type;
1352 int n;
1353 CERT *cert;
1354 BIGNUM *r[4];
1355 int nr[4],kn;
1356 BUF_MEM *buf;
1357 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1358
1359 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1360 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1361 {
1362 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1363 cert=s->cert;
1364
1365 buf=s->init_buf;
1366
1367 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1368 n=0;
1369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1370 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1371 {
1372 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1373 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1374 {
1375 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1376 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1377 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1378 if(rsa == NULL)
1379 {
1380 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1382 goto f_err;
1383 }
1384 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1385 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1386 }
1387 if (rsa == NULL)
1388 {
1389 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1391 goto f_err;
1392 }
1393 r[0]=rsa->n;
1394 r[1]=rsa->e;
1395 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1396 }
1397 else
1398 #endif
1399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1400 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1401 {
1402 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1403 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1404 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1405 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1406 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1407 if (dhp == NULL)
1408 {
1409 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1411 goto f_err;
1412 }
1413
1414 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1415 {
1416 DH_free(dh);
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1418 goto err;
1419 }
1420
1421 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1422 {
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1424 goto err;
1425 }
1426
1427 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1428 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1429 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1430 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1431 {
1432 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1433 {
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1435 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1436 goto err;
1437 }
1438 }
1439 else
1440 {
1441 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1442 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1443 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1444 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1445 {
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1447 goto err;
1448 }
1449 }
1450 r[0]=dh->p;
1451 r[1]=dh->g;
1452 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1453 }
1454 else
1455 #endif
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1457 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1458 {
1459 const EC_GROUP *group;
1460
1461 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1462 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1463 {
1464 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1465 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1466 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1467 }
1468 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1469 {
1470 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1472 goto f_err;
1473 }
1474
1475 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1476 {
1477 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1479 goto err;
1480 }
1481
1482 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1483 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1484 {
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1486 goto err;
1487 }
1488 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1489 {
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1491 goto err;
1492 }
1493 ecdh = ecdhp;
1494
1495 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1496 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1497 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1498 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1499 {
1500 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1501 {
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1503 goto err;
1504 }
1505 }
1506
1507 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1508 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1509 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1510 {
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1512 goto err;
1513 }
1514
1515 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1516 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1517 {
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1519 goto err;
1520 }
1521
1522 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1523 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1524 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1525 */
1526 if ((curve_id =
1527 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1528 == 0)
1529 {
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1531 goto err;
1532 }
1533
1534 /* Encode the public key.
1535 * First check the size of encoding and
1536 * allocate memory accordingly.
1537 */
1538 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1539 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1540 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1541 NULL, 0, NULL);
1542
1543 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1544 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1545 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1546 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1547 {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1549 goto err;
1550 }
1551
1552
1553 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1554 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1555 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1556 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1557
1558 if (encodedlen == 0)
1559 {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1561 goto err;
1562 }
1563
1564 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1565
1566 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1567 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1568 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1569 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1570 * structure.
1571 */
1572 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1573
1574 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1575 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1576 */
1577 r[0]=NULL;
1578 r[1]=NULL;
1579 r[2]=NULL;
1580 r[3]=NULL;
1581 }
1582 else
1583 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1585 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1586 {
1587 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1588 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1589 }
1590 else
1591 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1592 {
1593 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1595 goto f_err;
1596 }
1597 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1598 {
1599 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1600 n+=2+nr[i];
1601 }
1602
1603 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1604 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1605 {
1606 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1607 == NULL)
1608 {
1609 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1610 goto f_err;
1611 }
1612 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1613 }
1614 else
1615 {
1616 pkey=NULL;
1617 kn=0;
1618 }
1619
1620 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1621 {
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1623 goto err;
1624 }
1625 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1626 p= &(d[4]);
1627
1628 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1629 {
1630 s2n(nr[i],p);
1631 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1632 p+=nr[i];
1633 }
1634
1635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1636 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1637 {
1638 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1639 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1640 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1641 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1642 * the actual encoded point itself
1643 */
1644 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1645 p += 1;
1646 *p = 0;
1647 p += 1;
1648 *p = curve_id;
1649 p += 1;
1650 *p = encodedlen;
1651 p += 1;
1652 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1653 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1654 encodedlen);
1655 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1656 p += encodedlen;
1657 }
1658 #endif
1659
1660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1661 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1662 {
1663 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1664 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1665 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1666 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1667 }
1668 #endif
1669
1670 /* not anonymous */
1671 if (pkey != NULL)
1672 {
1673 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1674 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1676 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1677 {
1678 q=md_buf;
1679 j=0;
1680 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1681 {
1682 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1683 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1684 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1685 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1686 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1687 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1688 (unsigned int *)&i);
1689 q+=i;
1690 j+=i;
1691 }
1692 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1693 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1694 {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1696 goto err;
1697 }
1698 s2n(u,p);
1699 n+=u+2;
1700 }
1701 else
1702 #endif
1703 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1704 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1705 {
1706 /* lets do DSS */
1707 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1708 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1709 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1710 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1711 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1712 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1713 {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1715 goto err;
1716 }
1717 s2n(i,p);
1718 n+=i+2;
1719 }
1720 else
1721 #endif
1722 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1723 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1724 {
1725 /* let's do ECDSA */
1726 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1727 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1728 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1729 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1730 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1731 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1732 {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1734 goto err;
1735 }
1736 s2n(i,p);
1737 n+=i+2;
1738 }
1739 else
1740 #endif
1741 {
1742 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1743 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1745 goto f_err;
1746 }
1747 }
1748
1749 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1750 l2n3(n,d);
1751
1752 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1753 * it off */
1754 s->init_num=n+4;
1755 s->init_off=0;
1756 }
1757
1758 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1759 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1760 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1761 f_err:
1762 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1763 err:
1764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1765 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1766 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1767 #endif
1768 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1769 return(-1);
1770 }
1771
1772 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1773 {
1774 unsigned char *p,*d;
1775 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1776 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1777 X509_NAME *name;
1778 BUF_MEM *buf;
1779
1780 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1781 {
1782 buf=s->init_buf;
1783
1784 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1785
1786 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1787 p++;
1788 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1789 d[0]=n;
1790 p+=n;
1791 n++;
1792
1793 off=n;
1794 p+=2;
1795 n+=2;
1796
1797 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1798 nl=0;
1799 if (sk != NULL)
1800 {
1801 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1802 {
1803 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1804 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1805 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1806 {
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1808 goto err;
1809 }
1810 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1811 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1812 {
1813 s2n(j,p);
1814 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1815 n+=2+j;
1816 nl+=2+j;
1817 }
1818 else
1819 {
1820 d=p;
1821 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1822 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1823 n+=j;
1824 nl+=j;
1825 }
1826 }
1827 }
1828 /* else no CA names */
1829 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1830 s2n(nl,p);
1831
1832 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1833 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1834 l2n3(n,d);
1835
1836 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1837 * it off */
1838
1839 s->init_num=n+4;
1840 s->init_off=0;
1841 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1842 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1843
1844 /* do the header */
1845 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1846 *(p++)=0;
1847 *(p++)=0;
1848 *(p++)=0;
1849 s->init_num += 4;
1850 #endif
1851
1852 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1853 }
1854
1855 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1856 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1857 err:
1858 return(-1);
1859 }
1860
1861 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1862 {
1863 int i,al,ok;
1864 long n;
1865 unsigned long alg_k;
1866 unsigned char *p;
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1868 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1869 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1870 #endif
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1872 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1873 DH *dh_srvr;
1874 #endif
1875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1876 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1877 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1878
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1880 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1881 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1882 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1883 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1884 #endif
1885
1886 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1887 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1888 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1889 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1890 2048, /* ??? */
1891 &ok);
1892
1893 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1894 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1895
1896 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1897
1898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1899 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1900 {
1901 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1902 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1903 {
1904 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1905 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1906 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1907 * be sent already */
1908 if (rsa == NULL)
1909 {
1910 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1912 goto f_err;
1913
1914 }
1915 }
1916 else
1917 {
1918 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1919 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1920 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1921 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1922 {
1923 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1925 goto f_err;
1926 }
1927 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1928 }
1929
1930 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
1931 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1932 {
1933 n2s(p,i);
1934 if (n != i+2)
1935 {
1936 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1937 {
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1939 goto err;
1940 }
1941 else
1942 p-=2;
1943 }
1944 else
1945 n=i;
1946 }
1947
1948 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1949
1950 al = -1;
1951
1952 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1953 {
1954 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1955 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1956 }
1957
1958 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1959 {
1960 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1961 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1962 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1963 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1964 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1965 * protocol version.
1966 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1967 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1968 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1969 {
1970 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1971 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1972
1973 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1974 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1975 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1976 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1977 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1978 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1979 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1980 }
1981 }
1982
1983 if (al != -1)
1984 {
1985 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1986 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1987 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1988 ERR_clear_error();
1989 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1990 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1991 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1992 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1993 goto err;
1994 }
1995
1996 s->session->master_key_length=
1997 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1998 s->session->master_key,
1999 p,i);
2000 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2001 }
2002 else
2003 #endif
2004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2005 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2006 {
2007 n2s(p,i);
2008 if (n != i+2)
2009 {
2010 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2011 {
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2013 goto err;
2014 }
2015 else
2016 {
2017 p-=2;
2018 i=(int)n;
2019 }
2020 }
2021
2022 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2023 {
2024 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2026 goto f_err;
2027 }
2028 else
2029 {
2030 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2031 {
2032 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2034 goto f_err;
2035 }
2036 else
2037 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2038 }
2039
2040 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2041 if (pub == NULL)
2042 {
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2044 goto err;
2045 }
2046
2047 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2048
2049 if (i <= 0)
2050 {
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2052 goto err;
2053 }
2054
2055 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2056 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2057
2058 BN_clear_free(pub);
2059 pub=NULL;
2060 s->session->master_key_length=
2061 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2062 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2063 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2064 }
2065 else
2066 #endif
2067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2068 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2069 {
2070 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2071 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2072 krb5_data authenticator;
2073 krb5_data enc_pms;
2074 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2075 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2076 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2077 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2078 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2079 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2080 int padl, outl;
2081 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2082 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2083
2084 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2085
2086 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2087
2088 n2s(p,i);
2089 enc_ticket.length = i;
2090
2091 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2092 {
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2094 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2095 goto err;
2096 }
2097
2098 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2099 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2100
2101 n2s(p,i);
2102 authenticator.length = i;
2103
2104 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2105 {
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2107 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2108 goto err;
2109 }
2110
2111 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2112 p+=authenticator.length;
2113
2114 n2s(p,i);
2115 enc_pms.length = i;
2116 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2117 p+=enc_pms.length;
2118
2119 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2120 ** after decryption
2121 */
2122 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2123 {
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2125 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2126 goto err;
2127 }
2128
2129 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2130 enc_pms.length + 6))
2131 {
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2133 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2134 goto err;
2135 }
2136
2137 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2138 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2139 {
2140 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2141 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2142 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2143 if (kssl_err.text)
2144 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2145 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2147 kssl_err.reason);
2148 goto err;
2149 }
2150
2151 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2152 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2153 */
2154 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2155 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2156 {
2157 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2158 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2159 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2160 if (kssl_err.text)
2161 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2162 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2164 kssl_err.reason);
2165 goto err;
2166 }
2167
2168 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2169 {
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2171 goto err;
2172 }
2173
2174 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2175 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2176 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2177
2178 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2179 if (enc == NULL)
2180 goto err;
2181
2182 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2183
2184 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2185 {
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2187 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2188 goto err;
2189 }
2190 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2191 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2192 {
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2194 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2195 goto err;
2196 }
2197 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2198 {
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2200 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2201 goto err;
2202 }
2203 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2204 {
2205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2206 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2207 goto err;
2208 }
2209 outl += padl;
2210 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2211 {
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2213 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2214 goto err;
2215 }
2216 if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2217 {
2218 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2219 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2220 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2221 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2222 * the protocol version.
2223 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2224 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2225 */
2226 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2227 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2228 {
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2230 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2231 goto err;
2232 }
2233 }
2234
2235 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2236
2237 s->session->master_key_length=
2238 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2239 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2240
2241 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2242 {
2243 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2244 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2245 {
2246 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2247 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2248 }
2249 }
2250
2251
2252 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2253 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2254 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2255 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2256 */
2257 }
2258 else
2259 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2260
2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2262 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2263 {
2264 int ret = 1;
2265 int field_size = 0;
2266 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2267 const EC_GROUP *group;
2268 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2269
2270 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2271 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2272 {
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2274 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2275 goto err;
2276 }
2277
2278 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2279 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2280 {
2281 /* use the certificate */
2282 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2283 }
2284 else
2285 {
2286 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2287 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2288 */
2289 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2290 }
2291
2292 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2293 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2294
2295 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2296 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2297 {
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2299 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2300 goto err;
2301 }
2302
2303 /* Let's get client's public key */
2304 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2305 {
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2307 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2308 goto err;
2309 }
2310
2311 if (n == 0L)
2312 {
2313 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2314
2315 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2316 {
2317 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2319 goto f_err;
2320 }
2321 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2322 == NULL) ||
2323 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2324 {
2325 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2326 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2327 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2328 * never executed. When that support is
2329 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2330 * received in the certificate is
2331 * authorized for key agreement.
2332 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2333 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2334 * group.
2335 */
2336 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2338 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2339 goto f_err;
2340 }
2341
2342 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2343 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2344 {
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2347 goto err;
2348 }
2349 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2350 }
2351 else
2352 {
2353 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2354 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2355 */
2356 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2357 {
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2359 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2360 goto err;
2361 }
2362
2363 /* Get encoded point length */
2364 i = *p;
2365 p += 1;
2366 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2367 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2368 {
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2370 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2371 goto err;
2372 }
2373 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2374 * currently, so set it to the start
2375 */
2376 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2377 }
2378
2379 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2380 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2381 if (field_size <= 0)
2382 {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2384 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2385 goto err;
2386 }
2387 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2388 if (i <= 0)
2389 {
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2391 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2392 goto err;
2393 }
2394
2395 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2396 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2397 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2398 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2399 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2400 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2401
2402 /* Compute the master secret */
2403 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2404 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2405
2406 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2407 return (ret);
2408 }
2409 else
2410 #endif
2411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2412 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2413 {
2414 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2415 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2416 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2417 int psk_err = 1;
2418 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2419
2420 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2421
2422 n2s(p,i);
2423 if (n != i+2)
2424 {
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2427 goto psk_err;
2428 }
2429 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2430 {
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2433 goto psk_err;
2434 }
2435 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2436 {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2439 goto psk_err;
2440 }
2441
2442 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2443 * string for the callback */
2444 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2445 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2446 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2447 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2448 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2449
2450 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2451 {
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2454 goto psk_err;
2455 }
2456 else if (psk_len == 0)
2457 {
2458 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2460 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2461 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2462 goto psk_err;
2463 }
2464
2465 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2466 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2467 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2468 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2469 s2n(psk_len, t);
2470 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2471 t+=psk_len;
2472 s2n(psk_len, t);
2473
2474 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2475 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2476 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2477 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2478 {
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2480 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2481 goto psk_err;
2482 }
2483
2484 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2485 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2486 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2487 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2488 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2489 {
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2491 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2492 goto psk_err;
2493 }
2494
2495 s->session->master_key_length=
2496 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2497 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2498 psk_err = 0;
2499 psk_err:
2500 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2501 if (psk_err != 0)
2502 goto f_err;
2503 }
2504 else
2505 #endif
2506 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2507 {
2508 int ret = 0;
2509 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2510 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL;
2511 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2512 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2513
2514 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2515 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
2516 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2517 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2518 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2519 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2520 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2521 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2522 if (client_pub_pkey)
2523 {
2524 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2525 ERR_clear_error();
2526 }
2527 /* Decrypt session key */
2528 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2529 {
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2531 goto gerr;
2532 }
2533 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2534 {
2535 start = p+3;
2536 inlen = p[2];
2537 }
2538 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2539 {
2540 start = p+2;
2541 inlen = p[1];
2542 }
2543 else
2544 {
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2546 goto gerr;
2547 }
2548 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2549
2550 {
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2552 goto gerr;
2553 }
2554 /* Generate master secret */
2555 s->session->master_key_length=
2556 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2557 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2558 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2559 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2560 ret = 2;
2561 else
2562 ret = 1;
2563 gerr:
2564 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2565 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2566 if (ret)
2567 return ret;
2568 else
2569 goto err;
2570 }
2571 else
2572 {
2573 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2575 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2576 goto f_err;
2577 }
2578
2579 return(1);
2580 f_err:
2581 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2582 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2583 err:
2584 #endif
2585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2586 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2587 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2588 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2589 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2590 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2591 #endif
2592 return(-1);
2593 }
2594
2595 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2596 {
2597 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2598 unsigned char *p;
2599 int al,ok,ret=0;
2600 long n;
2601 int type=0,i,j;
2602 X509 *peer;
2603
2604 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2605 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2606 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2607 -1,
2608 514, /* 514? */
2609 &ok);
2610
2611 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2612
2613 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2614 {
2615 peer=s->session->peer;
2616 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2617 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2618 }
2619 else
2620 {
2621 peer=NULL;
2622 pkey=NULL;
2623 }
2624
2625 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2626 {
2627 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2628 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2629 {
2630 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2632 goto f_err;
2633 }
2634 ret=1;
2635 goto end;
2636 }
2637
2638 if (peer == NULL)
2639 {
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2641 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2642 goto f_err;
2643 }
2644
2645 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2646 {
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2648 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2649 goto f_err;
2650 }
2651
2652 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2653 {
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2655 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2656 goto f_err;
2657 }
2658
2659 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2660 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2661 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2662 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2663 * signature without length field */
2664 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2665 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2666 {
2667 i=64;
2668 }
2669 else
2670 {
2671 n2s(p,i);
2672 n-=2;
2673 if (i > n)
2674 {
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2676 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2677 goto f_err;
2678 }
2679 }
2680 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2681 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2682 {
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2684 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2685 goto f_err;
2686 }
2687
2688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2689 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2690 {
2691 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2692 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2693 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2694 if (i < 0)
2695 {
2696 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2698 goto f_err;
2699 }
2700 if (i == 0)
2701 {
2702 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2704 goto f_err;
2705 }
2706 }
2707 else
2708 #endif
2709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2710 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2711 {
2712 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2713 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2714 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2715 if (j <= 0)
2716 {
2717 /* bad signature */
2718 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2720 goto f_err;
2721 }
2722 }
2723 else
2724 #endif
2725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2726 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2727 {
2728 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2729 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2730 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2731 if (j <= 0)
2732 {
2733 /* bad signature */
2734 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2736 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2737 goto f_err;
2738 }
2739 }
2740 else
2741 #endif
2742 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2743 { unsigned char signature[64];
2744 int idx;
2745 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2746 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2747 if (i!=64) {
2748 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2749 }
2750 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2751 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2752 }
2753 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2754 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2755 if (j<=0)
2756 {
2757 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2759 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2760 goto f_err;
2761 }
2762 }
2763 else
2764 {
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2766 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2767 goto f_err;
2768 }
2769
2770
2771 ret=1;
2772 if (0)
2773 {
2774 f_err:
2775 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2776 }
2777 end:
2778 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2779 return(ret);
2780 }
2781
2782 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2783 {
2784 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2785 X509 *x=NULL;
2786 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2787 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2788 unsigned char *d;
2789 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2790
2791 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2792 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2793 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2794 -1,
2795 s->max_cert_list,
2796 &ok);
2797
2798 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2799
2800 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2801 {
2802 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2803 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2804 {
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2806 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2807 goto f_err;
2808 }
2809 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2810 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2811 {
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2813 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2814 goto f_err;
2815 }
2816 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2817 return(1);
2818 }
2819
2820 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2821 {
2822 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2824 goto f_err;
2825 }
2826 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2827
2828 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2829 {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2831 goto err;
2832 }
2833
2834 n2l3(p,llen);
2835 if (llen+3 != n)
2836 {
2837 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2839 goto f_err;
2840 }
2841 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2842 {
2843 n2l3(p,l);
2844 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2845 {
2846 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2848 goto f_err;
2849 }
2850
2851 q=p;
2852 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2853 if (x == NULL)
2854 {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2856 goto err;
2857 }
2858 if (p != (q+l))
2859 {
2860 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2862 goto f_err;
2863 }
2864 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2865 {
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2867 goto err;
2868 }
2869 x=NULL;
2870 nc+=l+3;
2871 }
2872
2873 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2874 {
2875 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2876 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2877 {
2878 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2880 goto f_err;
2881 }
2882 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2883 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2884 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2885 {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2887 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2888 goto f_err;
2889 }
2890 }
2891 else
2892 {
2893 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2894 if (i <= 0)
2895 {
2896 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2898 goto f_err;
2899 }
2900 }
2901
2902 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2903 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2904 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2905 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2906
2907 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2908 * when we arrive here. */
2909 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2910 {
2911 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2912 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2913 {
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2915 goto err;
2916 }
2917 }
2918 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2919 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2920 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2921 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2922 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2923
2924 sk=NULL;
2925
2926 ret=1;
2927 if (0)
2928 {
2929 f_err:
2930 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2931 }
2932 err:
2933 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2934 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2935 return(ret);
2936 }
2937
2938 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2939 {
2940 unsigned long l;
2941 X509 *x;
2942
2943 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2944 {
2945 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2946 if (x == NULL)
2947 {
2948 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2949 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
2950 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
2951 {
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 return(0);
2954 }
2955 }
2956
2957 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2958 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2959 s->init_num=(int)l;
2960 s->init_off=0;
2961 }
2962
2963 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2964 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2965 }
2966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2967 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2968 {
2969 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2970 {
2971 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2972 int len, slen;
2973 unsigned int hlen;
2974 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2975 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2976 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2977 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2978 unsigned char key_name[16];
2979
2980 /* get session encoding length */
2981 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2982 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2983 * too long
2984 */
2985 if (slen > 0xFF00)
2986 return -1;
2987 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2988 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2989 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2990 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2991 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2992 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2993 */
2994 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2995 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2996 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2997 return -1;
2998 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2999 if (!senc)
3000 return -1;
3001 p = senc;
3002 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3003
3004 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3005 /* do the header */
3006 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3007 /* Skip message length for now */
3008 p += 3;
3009 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3010 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3011 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3012 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3013 * from parent ctx.
3014 */
3015 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3016 {
3017 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3018 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3019 {
3020 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3021 return -1;
3022 }
3023 }
3024 else
3025 {
3026 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3027 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3028 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3029 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3030 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3031 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3032 }
3033 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3034 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3035 p += 2;
3036 /* Output key name */
3037 macstart = p;
3038 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3039 p += 16;
3040 /* output IV */
3041 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3042 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3043 /* Encrypt session data */
3044 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3045 p += len;
3046 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3047 p += len;
3048 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3049
3050 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3051 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3052 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3053
3054 p += hlen;
3055 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3056 /* Total length */
3057 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3058 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3059 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3060 p += 4;
3061 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3062
3063 /* number of bytes to write */
3064 s->init_num= len;
3065 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3066 s->init_off=0;
3067 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3068 }
3069
3070 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3071 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3072 }
3073
3074 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3075 {
3076 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3077 {
3078 unsigned char *p;
3079 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3080 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3081 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3082 * + (ocsp response)
3083 */
3084 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3085 return -1;
3086
3087 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3088
3089 /* do the header */
3090 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3091 /* message length */
3092 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3093 /* status type */
3094 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3095 /* length of OCSP response */
3096 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3097 /* actual response */
3098 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3099 /* number of bytes to write */
3100 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3101 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3102 s->init_off = 0;
3103 }
3104
3105 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3106 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3107 }
3108 #endif
NetBSD on the FriendlyARM MINI2440