7 Network Working Group R. Austein
8 Request for Comments: 3364 Bourgeois Dilettant
9 Updates: 2673, 2874 August 2002
10 Category: Informational
13 Tradeoffs in Domain Name System (DNS) Support
14 for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)
18 This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
19 not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
24 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
28 The IETF has two different proposals on the table for how to do DNS
29 support for IPv6, and has thus far failed to reach a clear consensus
30 on which approach is better. This note attempts to examine the pros
31 and cons of each approach, in the hope of clarifying the debate so
32 that we can reach closure and move on.
36 RFC 1886 [RFC1886] specified straightforward mechanisms to support
37 IPv6 addresses in the DNS. These mechanisms closely resemble the
38 mechanisms used to support IPv4, with a minor improvement to the
39 reverse mapping mechanism based on experience with CIDR. RFC 1886 is
40 currently listed as a Proposed Standard.
42 RFC 2874 [RFC2874] specified enhanced mechanisms to support IPv6
43 addresses in the DNS. These mechanisms provide new features that
44 make it possible for an IPv6 address stored in the DNS to be broken
45 up into multiple DNS resource records in ways that can reflect the
46 network topology underlying the address, thus making it possible for
47 the data stored in the DNS to reflect certain kinds of network
48 topology changes or routing architectures that are either impossible
49 or more difficult to represent without these mechanisms. RFC 2874 is
50 also currently listed as a Proposed Standard.
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60 RFC 3364 Tradeoffs in DNS Support for IPv6 August 2002
63 Both of these Proposed Standards were the output of the IPNG Working
64 Group. Both have been implemented, although implementation of
65 [RFC1886] is more widespread, both because it was specified earlier
66 and because it's simpler to implement.
68 There's little question that the mechanisms proposed in [RFC2874] are
69 more general than the mechanisms proposed in [RFC1886], and that
70 these enhanced mechanisms might be valuable if IPv6's evolution goes
71 in certain directions. The questions are whether we really need the
72 more general mechanism, what new usage problems might come along with
73 the enhanced mechanisms, and what effect all this will have on IPv6
76 The one thing on which there does seem to be widespread agreement is
77 that we should make up our minds about all this Real Soon Now.
79 Main Advantages of Going with A6
81 While the A6 RR proposed in [RFC2874] is very general and provides a
82 superset of the functionality provided by the AAAA RR in [RFC1886],
83 many of the features of A6 can also be implemented with AAAA RRs via
84 preprocessing during zone file generation.
86 There is one specific area where A6 RRs provide something that cannot
87 be provided using AAAA RRs: A6 RRs can represent addresses in which a
88 prefix portion of the address can change without any action (or
89 perhaps even knowledge) by the parties controlling the DNS zone
90 containing the terminal portion (least significant bits) of the
91 address. This includes both so-called "rapid renumbering" scenarios
92 (where an entire network's prefix may change very quickly) and
93 routing architectures such as the former "GSE" proposal [GSE] (where
94 the "routing goop" portion of an address may be subject to change
95 without warning). A6 RRs do not completely remove the need to update
96 leaf zones during all renumbering events (for example, changing ISPs
97 would usually require a change to the upward delegation pointer), but
98 careful use of A6 RRs could keep the number of RRs that need to
99 change during such an event to a minimum.
101 Note that constructing AAAA RRs via preprocessing during zone file
102 generation requires exactly the sort of information that A6 RRs store
103 in the DNS. This begs the question of where the hypothetical
104 preprocessor obtains that information if it's not getting it from the
107 Note also that the A6 RR, when restricted to its zero-length-prefix
108 form ("A6 0"), is semantically equivalent to an AAAA RR (with one
109 "wasted" octet in the wire representation), so anything that can be
110 done with an AAAA RR can also be done with an A6 RR.
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119 Main Advantages of Going with AAAA
121 The AAAA RR proposed in [RFC1886], while providing only a subset of
122 the functionality provided by the A6 RR proposed in [RFC2874], has
123 two main points to recommend it:
125 - AAAA RRs are essentially identical (other than their length) to
126 IPv4's A RRs, so we have more than 15 years of experience to help
127 us predict the usage patterns, failure scenarios and so forth
128 associated with AAAA RRs.
130 - The AAAA RR is "optimized for read", in the sense that, by storing
131 a complete address rather than making the resolver fetch the
132 address in pieces, it minimizes the effort involved in fetching
133 addresses from the DNS (at the expense of increasing the effort
134 involved in injecting new data into the DNS).
136 Less Compelling Arguments in Favor of A6
138 Since the A6 RR allows a zone administrator to write zone files whose
139 description of addresses maps to the underlying network topology, A6
140 RRs can be construed as a "better" way of representing addresses than
141 AAAA. This may well be a useful capability, but in and of itself
142 it's more of an argument for better tools for zone administrators to
143 use when constructing zone files than a justification for changing
144 the resolution protocol used on the wire.
146 Less Compelling Arguments in Favor of AAAA
148 Some of the pressure to go with AAAA instead of A6 appears to be
149 based on the wider deployment of AAAA. Since it is possible to
150 construct transition tools (see discussion of AAAA synthesis, later
151 in this note), this does not appear to be a compelling argument if A6
152 provides features that we really need.
154 Another argument in favor of AAAA RRs over A6 RRs appears to be that
155 the A6 RR's advanced capabilities increase the number of ways in
156 which a zone administrator could build a non-working configuration.
157 While operational issues are certainly important, this is more of
158 argument that we need better tools for zone administrators than it is
159 a justification for turning away from A6 if A6 provides features that
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175 Potential Problems with A6
177 The enhanced capabilities of the A6 RR, while interesting, are not in
178 themselves justification for choosing A6 if we don't really need
179 those capabilities. The A6 RR is "optimized for write", in the sense
180 that, by making it possible to store fragmented IPv6 addresses in the
181 DNS, it makes it possible to reduce the effort that it takes to
182 inject new data into the DNS (at the expense of increasing the effort
183 involved in fetching data from the DNS). This may be justified if we
184 expect the effort involved in maintaining AAAA-style DNS entries to
185 be prohibitive, but in general, we expect the DNS data to be read
186 more frequently than it is written, so we need to evaluate this
187 particular tradeoff very carefully.
189 There are also several potential issues with A6 RRs that stem
190 directly from the feature that makes them different from AAAA RRs:
191 the ability to build up address via chaining.
193 Resolving a chain of A6 RRs involves resolving a series of what are
194 almost independent queries, but not quite. Each of these sub-queries
195 takes some non-zero amount of time, unless the answer happens to be
196 in the resolver's local cache already. Assuming that resolving an
197 AAAA RR takes time T as a baseline, we can guess that, on the
198 average, it will take something approaching time N*T to resolve an
199 N-link chain of A6 RRs, although we would expect to see a fairly good
200 caching factor for the A6 fragments representing the more significant
201 bits of an address. This leaves us with two choices, neither of
202 which is very good: we can decrease the amount of time that the
203 resolver is willing to wait for each fragment, or we can increase the
204 amount of time that a resolver is willing to wait before returning
205 failure to a client. What little data we have on this subject
206 suggests that users are already impatient with the length of time it
207 takes to resolve A RRs in the IPv4 Internet, which suggests that they
208 are not likely to be patient with significantly longer delays in the
209 IPv6 Internet. At the same time, terminating queries prematurely is
210 both a waste of resources and another source of user frustration.
211 Thus, we are forced to conclude that indiscriminate use of long A6
212 chains is likely to lead to problems.
214 To make matters worse, the places where A6 RRs are likely to be most
215 critical for rapid renumbering or GSE-like routing are situations
216 where the prefix name field in the A6 RR points to a target that is
217 not only outside the DNS zone containing the A6 RR, but is
218 administered by a different organization (for example, in the case of
219 an end user's site, the prefix name will most likely point to a name
220 belonging to an ISP that provides connectivity for the site). While
221 pointers out of zone are not a problem per se, pointers to other
222 organizations are somewhat more difficult to maintain and less
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228 RFC 3364 Tradeoffs in DNS Support for IPv6 August 2002
231 susceptible to automation than pointers within a single organization
232 would be. Experience both with glue RRs and with PTR RRs in the IN-
233 ADDR.ARPA tree suggests that many zone administrators do not really
234 understand how to set up and maintain these pointers properly, and we
235 have no particular reason to believe that these zone administrators
236 will do a better job with A6 chains than they do today. To be fair,
237 however, the alternative case of building AAAA RRs via preprocessing
238 before loading zones has many of the same problems; at best, one can
239 claim that using AAAA RRs for this purpose would allow DNS clients to
240 get the wrong answer somewhat more efficiently than with A6 RRs.
242 Finally, assuming near total ignorance of how likely a query is to
243 fail, the probability of failure with an N-link A6 chain would appear
244 to be roughly proportional to N, since each of the queries involved
245 in resolving an A6 chain would have the same probability of failure
246 as a single AAAA query. Note again that this comment applies to
247 failures in the the process of resolving a query, not to the data
248 obtained via that process. Arguably, in an ideal world, A6 RRs would
249 increase the probability of the answer a client (finally) gets being
250 right, assuming that nothing goes wrong in the query process, but we
251 have no real idea how to quantify that assumption at this point even
252 to the hand-wavey extent used elsewhere in this note.
254 One potential problem that has been raised in the past regarding A6
255 RRs turns out not to be a serious issue. The A6 design includes the
256 possibility of there being more than one A6 RR matching the prefix
257 name portion of a leaf A6 RR. That is, an A6 chain may not be a
258 simple linked list, it may in fact be a tree, where each branch
259 represents a possible prefix. Some critics of A6 have been concerned
260 that this will lead to a wild expansion of queries, but this turns
261 out not to be a problem if a resolver simply follows the "bounded
262 work per query" rule described in RFC 1034 (page 35). That rule
263 applies to all work resulting from attempts to process a query,
264 regardless of whether it's a simple query, a CNAME chain, an A6 tree,
265 or an infinite loop. The client may not get back a useful answer in
266 cases where the zone has been configured badly, but a proper
267 implementation should not produce a query explosion as a result of
268 processing even the most perverse A6 tree, chain, or loop.
270 Interactions with DNSSEC
272 One of the areas where AAAA and A6 RRs differ is in the precise
273 details of how they interact with DNSSEC. The following comments
274 apply only to non-zero-prefix A6 RRs (A6 0 RRs, once again, are
275 semantically equivalent to AAAA RRs).
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284 RFC 3364 Tradeoffs in DNS Support for IPv6 August 2002
287 Other things being equal, the time it takes to re-sign all of the
288 addresses in a zone after a renumbering event is longer with AAAA RRs
289 than with A6 RRs (because each address record has to be re-signed
290 rather than just signing a common prefix A6 RR and a few A6 0 RRs
291 associated with the zone's name servers). Note, however, that in
292 general this does not present a serious scaling problem, because the
293 re-signing is performed in the leaf zones.
295 Other things being equal, there's more work involved in verifying the
296 signatures received back for A6 RRs, because each address fragment
297 has a separate associated signature. Similarly, a DNS message
298 containing a set of A6 address fragments and their associated
299 signatures will be larger than the equivalent packet with a single
300 AAAA (or A6 0) and a single associated signature.
302 Since AAAA RRs cannot really represent rapid renumbering or GSE-style
303 routing scenarios very well, it should not be surprising that DNSSEC
304 signatures of AAAA RRs are also somewhat problematic. In cases where
305 the AAAA RRs would have to be changing very quickly to keep up with
306 prefix changes, the time required to re-sign the AAAA RRs may be
309 Empirical testing by Bill Sommerfeld [Sommerfeld] suggests that
310 333MHz Celeron laptop with 128KB L2 cache and 64MB RAM running the
311 BIND-9 dnssec-signzone program under NetBSD can generate roughly 40
312 1024-bit RSA signatures per second. Extrapolating from this,
313 assuming one A RR, one AAAA RR, and one NXT RR per host, this
314 suggests that it would take this laptop a few hours to sign a zone
315 listing 10**5 hosts, or about a day to sign a zone listing 10**6
316 hosts using AAAA RRs.
318 This suggests that the additional effort of re-signing a large zone
319 full of AAAA RRs during a re-numbering event, while noticeable, is
320 only likely to be prohibitive in the rapid renumbering case where
321 AAAA RRs don't work well anyway.
323 Interactions with Dynamic Update
325 DNS dynamic update appears to work equally well for AAAA or A6 RRs,
326 with one minor exception: with A6 RRs, the dynamic update client
327 needs to know the prefix length and prefix name. At present, no
328 mechanism exists to inform a dynamic update client of these values,
329 but presumably such a mechanism could be provided via an extension to
330 DHCP, or some other equivalent could be devised.
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340 RFC 3364 Tradeoffs in DNS Support for IPv6 August 2002
343 Transition from AAAA to A6 Via AAAA Synthesis
345 While AAAA is at present more widely deployed than A6, it is possible
346 to transition from AAAA-aware DNS software to A6-aware DNS software.
347 A rough plan for this was presented at IETF-50 in Minneapolis and has
348 been discussed on the ipng mailing list. So if the IETF concludes
349 that A6's enhanced capabilities are necessary, it should be possible
350 to transition from AAAA to A6.
352 The details of this transition have been left to a separate document,
353 but the general idea is that the resolver that is performing
354 iterative resolution on behalf of a DNS client program could
355 synthesize AAAA RRs representing the result of performing the
356 equivalent A6 queries. Note that in this case it is not possible to
357 generate an equivalent DNSSEC signature for the AAAA RR, so clients
358 that care about performing DNSSEC validation for themselves would
359 have to issue A6 queries directly rather than relying on AAAA
364 While the differences between AAAA and A6 RRs have generated most of
365 the discussion to date, there are also two proposed mechanisms for
366 building the reverse mapping tree (the IPv6 equivalent of IPv4's IN-
369 [RFC1886] proposes a mechanism very similar to the IN-ADDR.ARPA
370 mechanism used for IPv4 addresses: the RR name is the hexadecimal
371 representation of the IPv6 address, reversed and concatenated with a
372 well-known suffix, broken up with a dot between each hexadecimal
373 digit. The resulting DNS names are somewhat tedious for humans to
374 type, but are very easy for programs to generate. Making each
375 hexadecimal digit a separate label means that delegation on arbitrary
376 bit boundaries will result in a maximum of 16 NS RRsets per label
377 level; again, the mechanism is somewhat tedious for humans, but is
378 very easy to program. As with IPv4's IN-ADDR.ARPA tree, the one
379 place where this scheme is weak is in handling delegations in the
380 least significant label; however, since there appears to be no real
381 need to delegate the least significant four bits of an IPv6 address,
382 this does not appear to be a serious restriction.
384 [RFC2874] proposed a radically different way of naming entries in the
385 reverse mapping tree: rather than using textual representations of
386 addresses, it proposes to use a new kind of DNS label (a "bit label")
387 to represent binary addresses directly in the DNS. This has the
388 advantage of being significantly more compact than the textual
389 representation, and arguably might have been a better solution for
390 DNS to use for this purpose if it had been designed into the protocol
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396 RFC 3364 Tradeoffs in DNS Support for IPv6 August 2002
399 from the outset. Unfortunately, experience to date suggests that
400 deploying a new DNS label type is very hard: all of the DNS name
401 servers that are authoritative for any portion of the name in
402 question must be upgraded before the new label type can be used, as
403 must any resolvers involved in the resolution process. Any name
404 server that has not been upgraded to understand the new label type
405 will reject the query as being malformed.
407 Since the main benefit of the bit label approach appears to be an
408 ability that we don't really need (delegation in the least
409 significant four bits of an IPv6 address), and since the upgrade
410 problem is likely to render bit labels unusable until a significant
411 portion of the DNS code base has been upgraded, it is difficult to
412 escape the conclusion that the textual solution is good enough.
416 [RFC2874] also proposes using DNAME RRs as a way of providing the
417 equivalent of A6's fragmented addresses in the reverse mapping tree.
418 That is, by using DNAME RRs, one can write zone files for the reverse
419 mapping tree that have the same ability to cope with rapid
420 renumbering or GSE-style routing that the A6 RR offers in the main
421 portion of the DNS tree. Consequently, the need to use DNAME in the
422 reverse mapping tree appears to be closely tied to the need to use
423 fragmented A6 in the main tree: if one is necessary, so is the other,
424 and if one isn't necessary, the other isn't either.
426 Other uses have also been proposed for the DNAME RR, but since they
427 are outside the scope of the IPv6 address discussion, they will not
432 Distilling the above feature comparisons down to their key elements,
433 the important questions appear to be:
435 (a) Is IPv6 going to do rapid renumbering or GSE-like routing?
437 (b) Is the reverse mapping tree for IPv6 going to require delegation
438 in the least significant four bits of the address?
440 Question (a) appears to be the key to the debate. This is really a
441 decision for the IPv6 community to make, not the DNS community.
443 Question (b) is also for the IPv6 community to make, but it seems
444 fairly obvious that the answer is "no".
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452 RFC 3364 Tradeoffs in DNS Support for IPv6 August 2002
455 Recommendations based on these questions:
457 (1) If the IPv6 working groups seriously intend to specify and deploy
458 rapid renumbering or GSE-like routing, we should transition to
459 using the A6 RR in the main tree and to using DNAME RRs as
460 necessary in the reverse tree.
462 (2) Otherwise, we should keep the simpler AAAA solution in the main
463 tree and should not use DNAME RRs in the reverse tree.
465 (3) In either case, the reverse tree should use the textual
466 representation described in [RFC1886] rather than the bit label
467 representation described in [RFC2874].
469 (4) If we do go to using A6 RRs in the main tree and to using DNAME
470 RRs in the reverse tree, we should write applicability statements
471 and implementation guidelines designed to discourage excessively
472 complex uses of these features; in general, any network that can
473 be described adequately using A6 0 RRs and without using DNAME
474 RRs should be described that way, and the enhanced features
475 should be used only when absolutely necessary, at least until we
476 have much more experience with them and have a better
477 understanding of their failure modes.
479 Security Considerations
481 This note compares two mechanisms with similar security
482 characteristics, but there are a few security implications to the
483 choice between these two mechanisms:
485 (1) The two mechanisms have similar but not identical interactions
486 with DNSSEC. Please see the section entitled "Interactions with
487 DNSSEC" (above) for a discussion of these issues.
489 (2) To the extent that operational complexity is the enemy of
490 security, the tradeoffs in operational complexity discussed
491 throughout this note have an impact on security.
493 (3) To the extent that protocol complexity is the enemy of security,
494 the additional protocol complexity of [RFC2874] as compared to
495 [RFC1886] has some impact on security.
499 None, since all of these RR types have already been allocated.
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508 RFC 3364 Tradeoffs in DNS Support for IPv6 August 2002
513 This note is based on a number of discussions both public and private
514 over a period of (at least) eight years, but particular thanks go to
515 Alain Durand, Bill Sommerfeld, Christian Huitema, Jun-ichiro itojun
516 Hagino, Mark Andrews, Matt Crawford, Olafur Gudmundsson, Randy Bush,
517 and Sue Thomson, none of whom are responsible for what the author did
522 [RFC1886] Thomson, S. and C. Huitema, "DNS Extensions to support
523 IP version 6", RFC 1886, December 1995.
525 [RFC2874] Crawford, M. and C. Huitema, "DNS Extensions to Support
526 IPv6 Address Aggregation and Renumbering", RFC 2874,
529 [Sommerfeld] Private message to the author from Bill Sommerfeld dated
530 21 March 2001, summarizing the result of experiments he
531 performed on a copy of the MIT.EDU zone.
533 [GSE] "GSE" was an evolution of the so-called "8+8" proposal
534 discussed by the IPng working group in 1996 and 1997.
535 The GSE proposal itself was written up as an Internet-
536 Draft, which has long since expired. Readers interested
537 in the details and history of GSE should review the IPng
538 working group's mailing list archives and minutes from
545 EMail: sra@hactrn.net
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567 Full Copyright Statement
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