1 /* Linux host-specific hook definitions.
2 Copyright (C) 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
4 This file is part of GCC.
6 GCC is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
7 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
8 by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your
9 option) any later version.
11 GCC is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
12 ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
13 or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public
14 License for more details.
16 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 along with GCC; see the file COPYING. If not, write to the
18 Free Software Foundation, 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston,
19 MA 02110-1301, USA. */
23 #include "coretypes.h"
26 #include "hosthooks.h"
27 #include "hosthooks-def.h"
30 /* Linux has a feature called exec-shield-randomize that perturbs the
31 address of non-fixed mapped segments by a (relatively) small amount.
32 The feature is intended to make it harder to attack the system with
33 buffer overflow attacks, since every invocation of a program will
34 have its libraries and data segments at slightly different addresses.
36 This feature causes us problems with PCH because it makes it that
37 much harder to acquire a stable location at which to map our PCH
40 [ The feature causes other points of non-determinism within the
41 compiler as well, so we'd *really* like to be able to have the
42 driver disable exec-shield-randomize for the process group, but
43 that isn't possible at present. ]
45 We're going to try several things:
47 * Select an architecture specific address as "likely" and see
48 if that's free. For our 64-bit hosts, we can easily choose
49 an address in Never Never Land.
51 * If exec-shield-randomize is disabled, then just use the
52 address chosen by mmap in step one.
54 * If exec-shield-randomize is enabled, then temporarily allocate
55 32M of memory as a buffer, then allocate PCH memory, then
56 free the buffer. The theory here is that the perturbation is
57 no more than 16M, and so by allocating our buffer larger than
58 that we make it considerably more likely that the address will
59 be free when we want to load the data back.
62 #undef HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_GET_ADDRESS
63 #define HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_GET_ADDRESS linux_gt_pch_get_address
65 #undef HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_USE_ADDRESS
66 #define HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_USE_ADDRESS linux_gt_pch_use_address
68 /* For various ports, try to guess a fixed spot in the vm space
69 that's probably free. */
71 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x10000000000
73 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x2000000100000000
74 #elif defined(__x86_64)
75 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x1000000000
77 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
78 #elif defined(__powerpc__)
79 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
80 #elif defined(__s390x__)
81 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x8000000000
82 #elif defined(__s390__)
83 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
84 #elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__LP64__)
85 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x8000000000
86 #elif defined(__sparc__)
87 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000
89 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0
92 /* Determine a location where we might be able to reliably allocate SIZE
93 bytes. FD is the PCH file, though we should return with the file
97 linux_gt_pch_get_address (size_t size
, int fd
)
99 size_t buffer_size
= 32 * 1024 * 1024;
104 addr
= mmap ((void *)TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE
, size
, PROT_READ
| PROT_WRITE
,
107 /* If we failed the map, that means there's *no* free space. */
108 if (addr
== (void *) MAP_FAILED
)
110 /* Unmap the area before returning. */
113 /* If we got the exact area we requested, then that's great. */
114 if (TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE
&& addr
== (void *) TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE
)
117 /* If we didn't, then we need to look to see if virtual address
118 randomization is on. That is recorded in
119 kernel.randomize_va_space. An older implementation used
120 kernel.exec-shield-randomize. */
121 f
= fopen ("/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space", "r");
123 f
= fopen ("/proc/sys/kernel/exec-shield-randomize", "r");
124 randomize_on
= false;
130 c
= fread (buf
, 1, sizeof buf
- 1, f
);
134 randomize_on
= (atoi (buf
) > 0);
139 /* If it isn't, then accept the address that mmap selected as fine. */
143 /* Otherwise, we need to try again with buffer space. */
144 buffer
= mmap (0, buffer_size
, PROT_NONE
, MAP_PRIVATE
| MAP_ANON
, -1, 0);
145 addr
= mmap (0, size
, PROT_READ
| PROT_WRITE
, MAP_PRIVATE
, fd
, 0);
146 if (buffer
!= (void *) MAP_FAILED
)
147 munmap (buffer
, buffer_size
);
148 if (addr
== (void *) MAP_FAILED
)
155 /* Map SIZE bytes of FD+OFFSET at BASE. Return 1 if we succeeded at
156 mapping the data at BASE, -1 if we couldn't.
158 It's not possibly to reliably mmap a file using MAP_PRIVATE to
159 a specific START address on either hpux or linux. First we see
160 if mmap with MAP_PRIVATE works. If it does, we are off to the
161 races. If it doesn't, we try an anonymous private mmap since the
162 kernel is more likely to honor the BASE address in anonymous maps.
163 We then copy the data to the anonymous private map. This assumes
164 of course that we don't need to change the data in the PCH file
167 This approach obviously causes a performance penalty but there is
168 little else we can do given the current PCH implementation. */
171 linux_gt_pch_use_address (void *base
, size_t size
, int fd
, size_t offset
)
175 /* We're called with size == 0 if we're not planning to load a PCH
176 file at all. This allows the hook to free any static space that
177 we might have allocated at link time. */
181 /* Try to map the file with MAP_PRIVATE. */
182 addr
= mmap (base
, size
, PROT_READ
| PROT_WRITE
, MAP_PRIVATE
, fd
, offset
);
187 if (addr
!= (void *) MAP_FAILED
)
190 /* Try to make an anonymous private mmap at the desired location. */
191 addr
= mmap (base
, size
, PROT_READ
| PROT_WRITE
,
192 MAP_PRIVATE
| MAP_ANONYMOUS
, -1, 0);
196 if (addr
!= (void *) MAP_FAILED
)
201 if (lseek (fd
, offset
, SEEK_SET
) == (off_t
)-1)
208 nbytes
= read (fd
, base
, MIN (size
, SSIZE_MAX
));
211 base
= (char *) base
+ nbytes
;
219 const struct host_hooks host_hooks
= HOST_HOOKS_INITIALIZER
;