1 /* $NetBSD: fix_options.c,v 1.9 2002/05/24 06:05:31 itojun Exp $ */
4 * Routine to disable IP-level socket options. This code was taken from 4.4BSD
5 * rlogind and kernel source, but all mistakes in it are my fault.
7 * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
10 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
13 static char sccsid
[] = "@(#) fix_options.c 1.6 97/04/08 02:29:19";
15 __RCSID("$NetBSD: fix_options.c,v 1.9 2002/05/24 06:05:31 itojun Exp $");
19 #include <sys/types.h>
20 #include <sys/param.h>
21 #include <sys/socket.h>
22 #include <netinet/in.h>
23 #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
24 #include <netinet/ip.h>
32 #define IPOPT_OPTVAL 0
38 #define BUFFER_SIZE 512 /* Was: BUFSIZ */
40 /* fix_options - get rid of IP-level socket options */
44 struct request_info
*request
;
47 unsigned char optbuf
[BUFFER_SIZE
/ 3], *cp
;
48 char lbuf
[BUFFER_SIZE
], *lp
;
50 socklen_t optsize
= sizeof(optbuf
);
53 int len
= sizeof lbuf
;
57 struct sockaddr_storage ss
;
61 * check if this is AF_INET socket
65 if (getsockname(fd
, (struct sockaddr
*)(void *)&ss
, &sslen
) < 0) {
66 syslog(LOG_ERR
, "getsockname: %m");
69 if (ss
.ss_family
!= AF_INET
)
72 if ((ip
= getprotobyname("ip")) != 0)
73 ipproto
= ip
->p_proto
;
77 if (getsockopt(fd
, ipproto
, IP_OPTIONS
, optbuf
, &optsize
) == 0
81 * Horror! 4.[34] BSD getsockopt() prepends the first-hop destination
82 * address to the result IP options list when source routing options
83 * are present (see <netinet/ip_var.h>), but produces no output for
84 * other IP options. Solaris 2.x getsockopt() does produce output for
85 * non-routing IP options, and uses the same format as BSD even when
86 * the space for the destination address is unused. The code below
87 * does the right thing with 4.[34]BSD derivatives and Solaris 2, but
88 * may occasionally miss source routing options on incompatible
89 * systems such as Linux. Their choice.
91 * Look for source routing options. Drop the connection when one is
92 * found. Just wiping the IP options is insufficient: we would still
93 * help the attacker by providing a real TCP sequence number, and the
94 * attacker would still be able to send packets (blind spoofing). I
95 * discussed this attack with Niels Provos, half a year before the
96 * attack was described in open mailing lists.
98 * It would be cleaner to just return a yes/no reply and let the caller
99 * decide how to deal with it. Resident servers should not terminate.
100 * However I am not prepared to make changes to internal interfaces
103 #define ADDR_LEN sizeof(dummy.s_addr)
105 for (cp
= optbuf
+ ADDR_LEN
; cp
< optbuf
+ optsize
; cp
+= optlen
) {
106 opt
= cp
[IPOPT_OPTVAL
];
107 if (opt
== IPOPT_LSRR
|| opt
== IPOPT_SSRR
) {
109 "refused connect from %s with IP source routing options",
110 eval_client(request
));
114 if (opt
== IPOPT_EOL
)
116 if (opt
== IPOPT_NOP
) {
118 } else if (&cp
[IPOPT_OLEN
] < optbuf
+ optsize
) {
119 optlen
= cp
[IPOPT_OLEN
];
120 if (optlen
< 2 || cp
+ optlen
>= optbuf
+ optsize
) {
122 "refused connect from %s with malformed IP options",
123 eval_client(request
));
129 "refused connect from %s with malformed IP options",
130 eval_client(request
));
136 for (cp
= optbuf
; optsize
> 0; cp
++, optsize
--, lp
+= 3)
137 len
-= snprintf(lp
, len
, " %2.2x", *cp
);
139 "connect from %s with IP options (ignored):%s",
140 eval_client(request
), lbuf
);
141 if (setsockopt(fd
, ipproto
, IP_OPTIONS
, (char *) 0, optsize
) != 0) {
142 syslog(LOG_ERR
, "setsockopt IP_OPTIONS NULL: %m");