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7.
<acronym class=
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</acronym> 9 Security Considerations
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42 <div class=
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"en">
43 <div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title">
44 <a name=
"Bv9ARM.ch07"></a>Chapter
7.
<acronym class=
"acronym">BIND
</acronym> 9 Security Considerations
</h2></div></div></div>
46 <p><b>Table of Contents
</b></p>
48 <dt><span class=
"sect1"><a href=
"Bv9ARM.ch07.html#Access_Control_Lists">Access Control Lists
</a></span></dt>
49 <dt><span class=
"sect1"><a href=
"Bv9ARM.ch07.html#id2601054"><span><strong class=
"command">Chroot
</strong></span> and
<span><strong class=
"command">Setuid
</strong></span></a></span></dt>
51 <dt><span class=
"sect2"><a href=
"Bv9ARM.ch07.html#id2601136">The
<span><strong class=
"command">chroot
</strong></span> Environment
</a></span></dt>
52 <dt><span class=
"sect2"><a href=
"Bv9ARM.ch07.html#id2601195">Using the
<span><strong class=
"command">setuid
</strong></span> Function
</a></span></dt>
54 <dt><span class=
"sect1"><a href=
"Bv9ARM.ch07.html#dynamic_update_security">Dynamic Update Security
</a></span></dt>
57 <div class=
"sect1" lang=
"en">
58 <div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both">
59 <a name=
"Access_Control_Lists"></a>Access Control Lists
</h2></div></div></div>
61 Access Control Lists (ACLs) are address match lists that
62 you can set up and nickname for future use in
<span><strong class=
"command">allow-notify
</strong></span>,
63 <span><strong class=
"command">allow-query
</strong></span>,
<span><strong class=
"command">allow-query-on
</strong></span>,
64 <span><strong class=
"command">allow-recursion
</strong></span>,
<span><strong class=
"command">allow-recursion-on
</strong></span>,
65 <span><strong class=
"command">blackhole
</strong></span>,
<span><strong class=
"command">allow-transfer
</strong></span>,
69 Using ACLs allows you to have finer control over who can access
70 your name server, without cluttering up your config files with huge
71 lists of IP addresses.
74 It is a
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>good idea
</em></span> to use ACLs, and to
75 control access to your server. Limiting access to your server by
76 outside parties can help prevent spoofing and denial of service (DoS) attacks against
80 Here is an example of how to properly apply ACLs:
82 <pre class=
"programlisting">
83 // Set up an ACL named
"bogusnets" that will block
84 // RFC1918 space and some reserved space, which is
85 // commonly used in spoofing attacks.
87 0.0.0.0/
8;
1.0.0.0/
8;
2.0.0.0/
8;
192.0.2.0/
24;
88 224.0.0.0/
3;
10.0.0.0/
8;
172.16.0.0/
12;
92 // Set up an ACL called our-nets. Replace this with the
94 acl our-nets { x.x.x.x/
24; x.x.x.x/
21; };
98 allow-query { our-nets; };
99 allow-recursion { our-nets; };
101 blackhole { bogusnets; };
107 file
"m/example.com";
108 allow-query { any; };
112 This allows recursive queries of the server from the outside
113 unless recursion has been previously disabled.
116 For more information on how to use ACLs to protect your server,
117 see the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>AUSCERT
</em></span> advisory at:
120 <a href=
"ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AL-1999.004.dns_dos" target=
"_top">ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AL-
1999.004.dns_dos
</a>
123 <div class=
"sect1" lang=
"en">
124 <div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both">
125 <a name=
"id2601054"></a><span><strong class=
"command">Chroot
</strong></span> and
<span><strong class=
"command">Setuid
</strong></span>
126 </h2></div></div></div>
128 On UNIX servers, it is possible to run
<acronym class=
"acronym">BIND
</acronym>
129 in a
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>chrooted
</em></span> environment (using
130 the
<span><strong class=
"command">chroot()
</strong></span> function) by specifying
131 the
"<code class="option
">-t</code>" option for
<span><strong class=
"command">named
</strong></span>.
132 This can help improve system security by placing
133 <acronym class=
"acronym">BIND
</acronym> in a
"sandbox", which will limit
134 the damage done if a server is compromised.
137 Another useful feature in the UNIX version of
<acronym class=
"acronym">BIND
</acronym> is the
138 ability to run the daemon as an unprivileged user (
<code class=
"option">-u
</code> <em class=
"replaceable"><code>user
</code></em> ).
139 We suggest running as an unprivileged user when using the
<span><strong class=
"command">chroot
</strong></span> feature.
142 Here is an example command line to load
<acronym class=
"acronym">BIND
</acronym> in a
<span><strong class=
"command">chroot
</strong></span> sandbox,
143 <span><strong class=
"command">/var/named
</strong></span>, and to run
<span><strong class=
"command">named
</strong></span> <span><strong class=
"command">setuid
</strong></span> to
147 <strong class=
"userinput"><code>/usr/local/sbin/named -u
202 -t /var/named
</code></strong>
149 <div class=
"sect2" lang=
"en">
150 <div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title">
151 <a name=
"id2601136"></a>The
<span><strong class=
"command">chroot
</strong></span> Environment
</h3></div></div></div>
153 In order for a
<span><strong class=
"command">chroot
</strong></span> environment
155 work properly in a particular directory
156 (for example,
<code class=
"filename">/var/named
</code>),
157 you will need to set up an environment that includes everything
158 <acronym class=
"acronym">BIND
</acronym> needs to run.
159 From
<acronym class=
"acronym">BIND
</acronym>'s point of view,
<code class=
"filename">/var/named
</code> is
160 the root of the filesystem. You will need to adjust the values of
162 like
<span><strong class=
"command">directory
</strong></span> and
<span><strong class=
"command">pid-file
</strong></span> to account
166 Unlike with earlier versions of BIND, you typically will
167 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>not
</em></span> need to compile
<span><strong class=
"command">named
</strong></span>
168 statically nor install shared libraries under the new root.
169 However, depending on your operating system, you may need
170 to set up things like
171 <code class=
"filename">/dev/zero
</code>,
172 <code class=
"filename">/dev/random
</code>,
173 <code class=
"filename">/dev/log
</code>, and
174 <code class=
"filename">/etc/localtime
</code>.
177 <div class=
"sect2" lang=
"en">
178 <div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title">
179 <a name=
"id2601195"></a>Using the
<span><strong class=
"command">setuid
</strong></span> Function
</h3></div></div></div>
181 Prior to running the
<span><strong class=
"command">named
</strong></span> daemon,
183 the
<span><strong class=
"command">touch
</strong></span> utility (to change file
185 modification times) or the
<span><strong class=
"command">chown
</strong></span>
187 set the user id and/or group id) on files
188 to which you want
<acronym class=
"acronym">BIND
</acronym>
191 <div class=
"note" style=
"margin-left: 0.5in; margin-right: 0.5in;">
192 <h3 class=
"title">Note
</h3>
193 Note that if the
<span><strong class=
"command">named
</strong></span> daemon is running as an
194 unprivileged user, it will not be able to bind to new restricted
195 ports if the server is reloaded.
199 <div class=
"sect1" lang=
"en">
200 <div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both">
201 <a name=
"dynamic_update_security"></a>Dynamic Update Security
</h2></div></div></div>
203 Access to the dynamic
204 update facility should be strictly limited. In earlier versions of
205 <acronym class=
"acronym">BIND
</acronym>, the only way to do this was
207 address of the host requesting the update, by listing an IP address
209 network prefix in the
<span><strong class=
"command">allow-update
</strong></span>
211 This method is insecure since the source address of the update UDP
213 is easily forged. Also note that if the IP addresses allowed by the
214 <span><strong class=
"command">allow-update
</strong></span> option include the
216 server which performs forwarding of dynamic updates, the master can
218 trivially attacked by sending the update to the slave, which will
219 forward it to the master with its own source IP address causing the
220 master to approve it without question.
223 For these reasons, we strongly recommend that updates be
224 cryptographically authenticated by means of transaction signatures
225 (TSIG). That is, the
<span><strong class=
"command">allow-update
</strong></span>
227 list only TSIG key names, not IP addresses or network
228 prefixes. Alternatively, the new
<span><strong class=
"command">update-policy
</strong></span>
232 Some sites choose to keep all dynamically-updated DNS data
233 in a subdomain and delegate that subdomain to a separate zone. This
234 way, the top-level zone containing critical data such as the IP
236 of public web and mail servers need not allow dynamic update at
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