1 DNS Extensions working group V.Dolmatov, Ed.
2 Internet-Draft Cryptocom Ltd.
3 Intended status: Standards Track November 30, 2009
7 Use of GOST signature algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
9 draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-05
13 This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
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36 Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
37 document authors. All rights reserved.
39 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
40 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
41 publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
42 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
43 and restrictions with respect to this document.
47 This document describes how to produce signature and hash using
48 GOST algorithms [DRAFT1, DRAFT2, DRAFT3] for DNSKEY, RRSIG and DS
49 resource records for use in the Domain Name System Security
50 Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035).
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56 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
57 2. DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
58 2.1. Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries. . 3
59 2.2. GOST DNSKEY RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
60 3. RRSIG Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
61 3.1 RRSIG RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
62 4. DS Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
63 4.1 DS RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
64 5. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
65 5.1. Key Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
66 5.2. Signature Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
67 5.3. Digest Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
68 6. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
69 6.1. Support for GOST signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
70 6.2. Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence . . . . . . . . . . . 5
71 6.3. Byte order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
72 7. Security consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
73 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
74 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
75 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
76 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
77 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
78 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
82 The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical distributed
83 database for Internet Naming. The DNS has been extended to use
84 cryptographic keys and digital signatures for the verification of the
85 authenticity and integrity of its data. RFC 4033 [RFC4033], RFC 4034
86 [RFC4034], and RFC 4035 [RFC4035] describe these DNS Security
87 Extensions, called DNSSEC.
89 RFC 4034 describes how to store DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records,
90 and specifies a list of cryptographic algorithms to use. This
91 document extends that list with the signature and hash algorithms
92 GOST [GOST3410, GOST3411],
93 and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce
94 RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms.
96 Familiarity with DNSSEC and GOST signature and hash
97 algorithms is assumed in this document.
99 The term "GOST" is not officially defined, but is usually used to
100 refer to the collection of the Russian cryptographic algorithms
101 GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST R 34.11-94, GOST 28147-89.
102 Since GOST 28147-89 is not used in DNSSEC, "GOST" will only refer to
103 the GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 in this document.
105 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
106 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
107 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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111 2. DNSKEY Resource Records
113 The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
115 GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys are stored with the algorithm number
118 The wire format of the public key is compatible with
121 According to [GOST3410], a public key is a point on the elliptic
124 The wire representation of a public key MUST contain 66 octets,
125 where the first octet designates public key parameters, the second
126 octet designates digest parameters next 32 octets contain the
127 little-endian representation of x and the second 32 octets contain
128 the little-endian representation of y.
129 This corresponds to the binary representation of (<y>256||<x>256)
130 from [GOST3410], ch. 5.3.
132 The only valid value for both parameters octets is 0.
133 Other parameters octets values are reserved for future use.
135 Corresponding public key parameters are those identified by
136 id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet (1.2.643.2.2.35.1) [RFC4357],
137 and the digest parameters are those identified by
138 id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet (1.2.643.2.2.30.1) [RFC4357].
140 2.1. Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries
142 Existing GOST-aware cryptographic libraries at the time of this
143 document writing are capable to read GOST public keys via a generic
144 X509 API if the key is encoded according to RFC 4491 [RFC4491],
147 To make this encoding from the wire format of a GOST public key
148 with the parameters used in this document, prepend the last 64 octets
149 of key data (in other words, substitute first two parameter octets)
150 with the following 37-byte sequence:
152 0x30 0x63 0x30 0x1c 0x06 0x06 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x13 0x30
153 0x12 0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x23 0x01 0x06 0x07 0x2a
154 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x1e 0x01 0x03 0x43 0x00 0x04 0x40
156 2.2. GOST DNSKEY RR Example
158 Given a private key with the following value (the value of GostAsn1
159 field is split here into two lines to simplify reading; in the
160 private key file it must be in one line):
162 Private-key-format: v1.2
163 Algorithm: {TBA1} (GOST)
164 GostAsn1: MEUCAQAwHAYGKoUDAgITMBIGByqFAwICIwEGByqFAwICHgEEIgQgV/S
165 2FXdMtzKJBehZvjF4lVSx6m66TwqSe/MFwKSH/3E=
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169 The following DNSKEY RR stores a DNS zone key for example.net
171 example.net. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 {TBA1} (
172 AADMrbi2vAs4hklTmmzGE3WWNtJ8Dll0u0jq
173 tGRbNKeJguZQj/9EpGWmQK9hekPiPlzH2Ph6
177 3. RRSIG Resource Records
179 The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR follows RFC 4490
180 [RFC4490] and is calculated as follows. The values for the RDATA
181 fields that precede the signature data are specified
182 in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
184 hash = GOSTR3411(data)
186 where "data" is the wire format data of the resource record set
187 that is signed, as specified in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
189 Hash MUST be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters identified
190 by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].
192 Signature is calculated from the hash according to the
193 GOST R 34.10-2001 standard and its wire format is compatible with
198 "The signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 generates a digital
199 signature in the form of two 256-bit numbers, r and s. Its octet
200 string representation consists of 64 octets, where the first 32
201 octets contain the big-endian representation of s and the second 32
202 octets contain the big-endian representation of r."
204 3.1. RRSIG RR Example
206 With the private key from section 2.2 sign the following RRSet,
207 consisting of one A record:
209 www.example.net. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.1
211 Setting the inception date to 2000-01-01 00:00:00 UTC and the
212 expiration date to 2030-01-01 00:00:00 UTC, the following signature
213 should be created (assuming {TBA1}==249 until proper code is
216 www.example.net. 3600 IN RRSIG A {TBA1} 3 3600 20300101000000 (
217 20000101000000 15820 example.net.
218 2MIsZWtEx6pcfQrdl376B8sFg0qxsR8XMHpl
219 jHh+V6U7Qte7WwI4C3Z1nFMRVf//C9rO2dGB
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224 Note: Several GOST signatures calculated for the same message text
225 differ because of using of a random element is used in signature
228 4. DS Resource Records
230 GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm is denoted in DS RRs by the digest
231 type {TBA2}.The wire format of a digest value is compatible with
232 RFC4490 [RFC4490], that is digest is in little-endian representation.
235 The digest MUST always be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters
236 identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].
240 For key signing key (assuming {TBA1}==249 until proper code is
243 example.net. 86400 DNSKEY 257 3 {TBA1} (
244 AAADr5vmKVdXo780hSRU1YZYWuMZUbEe9R7C
245 RRLc7Wj2osDXv2XbCnIpTUx8dVLnLKmDBquu
251 example.net. 3600 IN DS 21649 {TBA1} {TBA2} (
252 A8146F448569F30B91255BA8E98DE14B18569A524C49593ADCA4103A
255 5. Deployment Considerations
259 According to RFC4357 [RFC4357], the key size of GOST public keys
264 According to the GOST signature algorithm specification [GOST3410],
265 the size of a GOST signature is 512 bits.
269 According to the GOST R 34.11-94 [GOST3411], the size of a GOST
272 6. Implementation Considerations
274 6.1. Support for GOST signatures
276 DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to support RRSIG and
277 DNSKEY resource records created with the GOST algorithms as
278 defined in this document.
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282 6.2. Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence
284 Any DNSSEC-GOST implementation is required to have either NSEC or
289 Due to the fact that all existing industry implementations of GOST
290 cryptographic libraries are returning GOST blobs in little-endian
291 format and in order to avoid the necessity for DNSSEC developers
292 to handle different cryptographic algorithms differently, it was
293 chosen to send these blobs on the wire "as is" without
294 transformation of endianness.
296 7. Security considerations
298 Currently, the cryptographic resistance of the GOST 34.10-2001
299 digital signature algorithm is estimated as 2**128 operations
300 of multiple elliptic curve point computations on prime modulus
304 Currently, the cryptographic resistance of GOST 34.11-94 hash
305 algorithm is estimated as 2**128 operations of computations of a
306 step hash function. (There is known method to reduce this
307 estimate to 2**105 operations, but it demands padding the
308 colliding message with 1024 random bit blocks each of 256 bit
309 length, thus it cannot be used in any practical implementation).
311 8. IANA Considerations
313 This document updates the IANA registry "DNS Security Algorithm
315 (http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers).
316 The following entries are added to the registry:
318 Value Algorithm Mnemonic Signing Sec. References Status
319 {TBA1} GOST R 34.10-2001 GOST Y * (this memo) OPTIONAL
321 This document updates the RFC 4034 Digest Types assignment
322 (section A.2)by adding the value and status for the GOST R 34.11-94
325 Value Algorithm Status
326 {TBA2} GOST R 34.11-94 OPTIONAL
330 This document is a minor extension to RFC 4034 [RFC4034]. Also, we
331 tried to follow the documents RFC 3110 [RFC3110], RFC 4509 [RFC4509],
332 and RFC 4357 [RFC4357] for consistency. The authors of and
333 contributors to these documents are gratefully acknowledged for
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338 The following people provided additional feedback and text: Dmitry
339 Burkov, Jaap Akkerhuis, Olafur Gundmundsson, Jelte Jansen
340 and Wouter Wijngaards.
345 10.1. Normative References
347 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
348 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
350 [RFC3110] Eastlake D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain
351 Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
353 [RFC4033] Arends R., Austein R., Larson M., Massey D., and S.
354 Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
355 RFC 4033, March 2005.
357 [RFC4034] Arends R., Austein R., Larson M., Massey D., and S.
358 Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
359 RFC 4034, March 2005.
361 [RFC4035] Arends R., Austein R., Larson M., Massey D., and S.
362 Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
363 Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
365 [GOST3410] "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
366 Signature and verification processes of [electronic]
367 digital signature.", GOST R 34.10-2001, Gosudarstvennyi
368 Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
369 the Russia for Standards, 2001. (In Russian)
371 [GOST3411] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
372 Hashing function.", GOST R 34.11-94, Gosudarstvennyi
373 Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
374 the Russia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian)
376 [RFC4357] Popov V., Kurepkin I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional
377 Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89,
378 GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
379 Algorithms", RFC 4357, January 2006.
381 [RFC4490] S. Leontiev and G. Chudov, "Using the GOST 28147-89,
382 GOST R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R 34.10-2001
383 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
386 [RFC4491] S. Leontiev and D. Shefanovski, "Using the GOST
387 R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
388 Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key
389 Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491,
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395 10.2. Informative References
397 [RFC4509] Hardaker W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
398 (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.
400 [DRAFT1] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Vyshensky S.,
401 "GOST R 34.10-2001 digital signature algorithm"
402 draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost34102001-06, 11.10.09
406 [DRAFT2] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Vyshensky S.,
407 "GOST R 34.11-94 Hash function algorithm"
408 draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost341194-04, 11.10.09
411 [DRAFT3] Dolmatov V., Kabelev D., Ustinov I., Emelyanova I.,
412 "GOST 28147-89 encryption, decryption and MAC algorithms"
413 draft-dolmatov-cryptocom-gost2814789-04, 11.10.09
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425 Moscow, 117218, Russian Federation
427 EMail: dol@cryptocom.ru
432 Moscow, 117218, Russian Federation
434 EMail: ran@cryptocom.ru
439 Moscow, 117218, Russian Federation
441 EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru
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