No empty .Rs/.Re

[netbsd-mini2440.git] / external / ibm-public / postfix / dist / src / tls / tls_client.c

/*      $NetBSD: tls_client.c,v 1.1.1.1 2009/06/23 10:08:57 tron Exp $  */

/*++
/* NAME
/*      tls_client
/* SUMMARY
/*      client-side TLS engine
/* SYNOPSIS
/*      #include <tls.h>
/*
/*      TLS_APPL_STATE *tls_client_init(init_props)
/*      const TLS_CLIENT_INIT_PROPS *init_props;
/*
/*      TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_client_start(start_props)
/*      const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *start_props;
/*
/*      void    tls_client_stop(app_ctx, stream, failure, TLScontext)
/*      TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx;
/*      VSTREAM *stream;
/*      int     failure;
/*      TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
/* DESCRIPTION
/*      This module is the interface between Postfix TLS clients,
/*      the OpenSSL library and the TLS entropy and cache manager.
/*
/*      The SMTP client will attempt to verify the server hostname
/*      against the names listed in the server certificate. When
/*      a hostname match is required, the verification fails
/*      on certificate verification or hostname mis-match errors.
/*      When no hostname match is required, hostname verification
/*      failures are logged but they do not affect the TLS handshake
/*      or the SMTP session.
/*
/*      The rules for peer name wild-card matching differ between
/*      RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS) and RFC 2830 (LDAP over TLS), while
/*      RFC RFC3207 (SMTP over TLS) does not specify a rule at all.
/*      Postfix uses a restrictive match algorithm. One asterisk
/*      ('*') is allowed as the left-most component of a wild-card
/*      certificate name; it matches the left-most component of
/*      the peer hostname.
/*
/*      Another area where RFCs aren't always explicit is the
/*      handling of dNSNames in peer certificates. RFC 3207 (SMTP
/*      over TLS) does not mention dNSNames. Postfix follows the
/*      strict rules in RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1: The
/*      Subject Alternative Name/dNSName has precedence over
/*      CommonName.  If at least one dNSName is provided, Postfix
/*      verifies those against the peer hostname and ignores the
/*      CommonName, otherwise Postfix verifies the CommonName
/*      against the peer hostname.
/*
/*      tls_client_init() is called once when the SMTP client
/*      initializes.
/*      Certificate details are also decided during this phase,
/*      so peer-specific certificate selection is not possible.
/*
/*      tls_client_start() activates the TLS session over an established
/*      stream. We expect that network buffers are flushed and
/*      the TLS handshake can begin immediately.
/*
/*      tls_client_stop() sends the "close notify" alert via
/*      SSL_shutdown() to the peer and resets all connection specific
/*      TLS data. As RFC2487 does not specify a separate shutdown, it
/*      is assumed that the underlying TCP connection is shut down
/*      immediately afterwards. Any further writes to the channel will
/*      be discarded, and any further reads will report end-of-file.
/*      If the failure flag is set, no SSL_shutdown() handshake is performed.
/*
/*      Once the TLS connection is initiated, information about the TLS
/*      state is available via the TLScontext structure:
/* .IP TLScontext->protocol
/*      the protocol name (SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1),
/* .IP TLScontext->cipher_name
/*      the cipher name (e.g. RC4/MD5),
/* .IP TLScontext->cipher_usebits
/*      the number of bits actually used (e.g. 40),
/* .IP TLScontext->cipher_algbits
/*      the number of bits the algorithm is based on (e.g. 128).
/* .PP
/*      The last two values may differ from each other when export-strength
/*      encryption is used.
/*
/*      If the peer offered a certificate, part of the certificate data are
/*      available as:
/* .IP TLScontext->peer_status
/*      A bitmask field that records the status of the peer certificate
/*      verification. This consists of one or more of
/*      TLS_CERT_FLAG_PRESENT, TLS_CERT_FLAG_ALTNAME, TLS_CERT_FLAG_TRUSTED
/*      and TLS_CERT_FLAG_MATCHED.
/* .IP TLScontext->peer_CN
/*      Extracted CommonName of the peer, or zero-length string if the
/*      information could not be extracted.
/* .IP TLScontext->issuer_CN
/*      Extracted CommonName of the issuer, or zero-length string if the
/*      information could not be extracted.
/* .IP TLScontext->peer_fingerprint
/*      At the fingerprint security level, if the peer presented a certificate
/*      the fingerprint of the certificate.
/* .PP
/*      If no peer certificate is presented the peer_status is set to 0.
/* LICENSE
/* .ad
/* .fi
/*      This software is free. You can do with it whatever you want.
/*      The original author kindly requests that you acknowledge
/*      the use of his software.
/* AUTHOR(S)
/*      Originally written by:
/*      Lutz Jaenicke
/*      BTU Cottbus
/*      Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
/*      Universitaetsplatz 3-4
/*      D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
/*
/*      Updated by:
/*      Wietse Venema
/*      IBM T.J. Watson Research
/*      P.O. Box 704
/*      Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
/*
/*      Victor Duchovni
/*      Morgan Stanley
/*--*/

/* System library. */

#include <sys_defs.h>

#ifdef USE_TLS
#include <string.h>

#ifdef STRCASECMP_IN_STRINGS_H
#include <strings.h>
#endif

/* Utility library. */

#include <argv.h>
#include <mymalloc.h>
#include <vstring.h>
#include <vstream.h>
#include <stringops.h>
#include <msg.h>

/* Global library. */

#include <mail_params.h>

/* TLS library. */

#include <tls_mgr.h>
#define TLS_INTERNAL
#include <tls.h>

/* Application-specific. */

#define STR     vstring_str
#define LEN     VSTRING_LEN

/* load_clnt_session - load session from client cache (non-callback) */

static SSL_SESSION *load_clnt_session(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
{
    const char *myname = "load_clnt_session";
    SSL_SESSION *session = 0;
    VSTRING *session_data = vstring_alloc(2048);

    /*
     * Prepare the query.
     */
    if (TLScontext->log_level >= 2)
        msg_info("looking for session %s in %s cache",
                 TLScontext->serverid, TLScontext->cache_type);

    /*
     * We only get here if the cache_type is not empty. This code is not
     * called unless caching is enabled and the cache_type is stored in the
     * server SSL context.
     */
    if (TLScontext->cache_type == 0)
        msg_panic("%s: null client session cache type in session lookup",
                  myname);

    /*
     * Look up and activate the SSL_SESSION object. Errors are non-fatal,
     * since caching is only an optimization.
     */
    if (tls_mgr_lookup(TLScontext->cache_type, TLScontext->serverid,
                       session_data) == TLS_MGR_STAT_OK) {
        session = tls_session_activate(STR(session_data), LEN(session_data));
        if (session) {
            if (TLScontext->log_level >= 2)
                msg_info("reloaded session %s from %s cache",
                         TLScontext->serverid, TLScontext->cache_type);
        }
    }

    /*
     * Clean up.
     */
    vstring_free(session_data);

    return (session);
}

/* new_client_session_cb - name new session and save it to client cache */

static int new_client_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
{
    const char *myname = "new_client_session_cb";
    TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
    VSTRING *session_data;

    /*
     * The cache name (if caching is enabled in tlsmgr(8)) and the cache ID
     * string for this session are stored in the TLScontext. It cannot be
     * null at this point.
     */
    if ((TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, TLScontext_index)) == 0)
        msg_panic("%s: null TLScontext in new session callback", myname);

    /*
     * We only get here if the cache_type is not empty. This callback is not
     * set unless caching is enabled and the cache_type is stored in the
     * server SSL context.
     */
    if (TLScontext->cache_type == 0)
        msg_panic("%s: null session cache type in new session callback",
                  myname);

    if (TLScontext->log_level >= 2)
        msg_info("save session %s to %s cache",
                 TLScontext->serverid, TLScontext->cache_type);

#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L)

    /*
     * Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify result in
     * sessions for the client side. We modify the session directly which is
     * version specific, but this bug is version specific, too.
     * 
     * READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before beta1 have this
     * bug, it has been fixed during development of 0.9.6a. The development
     * version of 0.9.7 can have this bug, too. It has been fixed on
     * 2000/11/29.
     */
    session->verify_result = SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con);
#endif

    /*
     * Passivate and save the session object. Errors are non-fatal, since
     * caching is only an optimization.
     */
    if ((session_data = tls_session_passivate(session)) != 0) {
        tls_mgr_update(TLScontext->cache_type, TLScontext->serverid,
                       STR(session_data), LEN(session_data));
        vstring_free(session_data);
    }

    /*
     * Clean up.
     */
    SSL_SESSION_free(session);                  /* 200502 */

    return (1);
}

/* uncache_session - remove session from the external cache */

static void uncache_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext)
{
    SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(TLScontext->con);

    SSL_CTX_remove_session(ctx, session);
    if (TLScontext->cache_type == 0 || TLScontext->serverid == 0)
        return;

    if (TLScontext->log_level >= 2)
        msg_info("remove session %s from client cache", TLScontext->serverid);

    tls_mgr_delete(TLScontext->cache_type, TLScontext->serverid);
}

/* tls_client_init - initialize client-side TLS engine */

TLS_APPL_STATE *tls_client_init(const TLS_CLIENT_INIT_PROPS *props)
{
    long    off = 0;
    int     cachable;
    SSL_CTX *client_ctx;
    TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx;
    const EVP_MD *md_alg;
    unsigned int md_len;

    if (props->log_level >= 2)
        msg_info("initializing the client-side TLS engine");

    /*
     * Load (mostly cipher related) TLS-library internal main.cf parameters.
     */
    tls_param_init();

    /*
     * Detect mismatch between compile-time headers and run-time library.
     */
    tls_check_version();

    /*
     * Initialize the OpenSSL library by the book! To start with, we must
     * initialize the algorithms. We want cleartext error messages instead of
     * just error codes, so we load the error_strings.
     */
    SSL_load_error_strings();
    OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();

    /*
     * Create an application data index for SSL objects, so that we can
     * attach TLScontext information; this information is needed inside
     * tls_verify_certificate_callback().
     */
    if (TLScontext_index < 0) {
        if ((TLScontext_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) < 0) {
            msg_warn("Cannot allocate SSL application data index: "
                     "disabling TLS support");
            return (0);
        }
    }

    /*
     * If the administrator specifies an unsupported digest algorithm, fail
     * now, rather than in the middle of a TLS handshake.
     */
    if ((md_alg = EVP_get_digestbyname(props->fpt_dgst)) == 0) {
        msg_warn("Digest algorithm \"%s\" not found: disabling TLS support",
                 props->fpt_dgst);
        return (0);
    }

    /*
     * Sanity check: Newer shared libraries may use larger digests.
     */
    if ((md_len = EVP_MD_size(md_alg)) > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
        msg_warn("Digest algorithm \"%s\" output size %u too large:"
                 " disabling TLS support", props->fpt_dgst, md_len);
        return (0);
    }

    /*
     * Initialize the PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator) with some seed
     * from external and internal sources. Don't enable TLS without some real
     * entropy.
     */
    if (tls_ext_seed(var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes) < 0) {
        msg_warn("no entropy for TLS key generation: disabling TLS support");
        return (0);
    }
    tls_int_seed();

    /*
     * The SSL/TLS specifications require the client to send a message in the
     * oldest specification it understands with the highest level it
     * understands in the message. RFC2487 is only specified for TLSv1, but
     * we want to be as compatible as possible, so we will start off with a
     * SSLv2 greeting allowing the best we can offer: TLSv1. We can restrict
     * this with the options setting later, anyhow.
     */
    ERR_clear_error();
    if ((client_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method())) == 0) {
        msg_warn("cannot allocate client SSL_CTX: disabling TLS support");
        tls_print_errors();
        return (0);
    }

    /*
     * See the verify callback in tls_verify.c
     */
    SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(client_ctx, props->verifydepth + 1);

    /*
     * Protocol selection is destination dependent, so we delay the protocol
     * selection options to the per-session SSL object.
     */
    off |= tls_bug_bits();
    SSL_CTX_set_options(client_ctx, off);

    /*
     * Set the call-back routine for verbose logging.
     */
    if (props->log_level >= 2)
        SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(client_ctx, tls_info_callback);

    /*
     * Load the CA public key certificates for both the client cert and for
     * the verification of server certificates. As provided by OpenSSL we
     * support two types of CA certificate handling: One possibility is to
     * add all CA certificates to one large CAfile, the other possibility is
     * a directory pointed to by CApath, containing separate files for each
     * CA with softlinks named after the hash values of the certificate. The
     * first alternative has the advantage that the file is opened and read
     * at startup time, so that you don't have the hassle to maintain another
     * copy of the CApath directory for chroot-jail.
     */
    if (tls_set_ca_certificate_info(client_ctx,
                                    props->CAfile, props->CApath) < 0) {
        /* tls_set_ca_certificate_info() already logs a warning. */
        SSL_CTX_free(client_ctx);               /* 200411 */
        return (0);
    }

    /*
     * We do not need a client certificate, so the certificates are only
     * loaded (and checked) if supplied. A clever client would handle
     * multiple client certificates and decide based on the list of
     * acceptable CAs, sent by the server, which certificate to submit.
     * OpenSSL does however not do this and also has no call-back hooks to
     * easily implement it.
     * 
     * Load the client public key certificate and private key from file and
     * check whether the cert matches the key. We can use RSA certificates
     * ("cert") DSA certificates ("dcert") or ECDSA certificates ("eccert").
     * All three can be made available at the same time. The CA certificates
     * for all three are handled in the same setup already finished. Which
     * one is used depends on the cipher negotiated (that is: the first
     * cipher listed by the client which does match the server). The client
     * certificate is presented after the server chooses the session cipher,
     * so we will just present the right cert for the chosen cipher (if it
     * uses certificates).
     */
    if (tls_set_my_certificate_key_info(client_ctx,
                                        props->cert_file,
                                        props->key_file,
                                        props->dcert_file,
                                        props->dkey_file,
                                        props->eccert_file,
                                        props->eckey_file) < 0) {
        /* tls_set_my_certificate_key_info() already logs a warning. */
        SSL_CTX_free(client_ctx);               /* 200411 */
        return (0);
    }

    /*
     * According to the OpenSSL documentation, temporary RSA key is needed
     * export ciphers are in use. We have to provide one, so well, we just do
     * it.
     */
    SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(client_ctx, tls_tmp_rsa_cb);

    /*
     * Finally, the setup for the server certificate checking, done "by the
     * book".
     */
    SSL_CTX_set_verify(client_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE,
                       tls_verify_certificate_callback);

    /*
     * Initialize the session cache.
     * 
     * Since the client does not search an internal cache, we simply disable it.
     * It is only useful for expiring old sessions, but we do that in the
     * tlsmgr(8).
     * 
     * This makes SSL_CTX_remove_session() not useful for flushing broken
     * sessions from the external cache, so we must delete them directly (not
     * via a callback).
     */
    if (tls_mgr_policy(props->cache_type, &cachable) != TLS_MGR_STAT_OK)
        cachable = 0;

    /*
     * Allocate an application context, and populate with mandatory protocol
     * and cipher data.
     */
    app_ctx = tls_alloc_app_context(client_ctx);

    /*
     * The external session cache is implemented by the tlsmgr(8) process.
     */
    if (cachable) {

        app_ctx->cache_type = mystrdup(props->cache_type);

        /*
         * OpenSSL does not use callbacks to load sessions from a client
         * cache, so we must invoke that function directly. Apparently,
         * OpenSSL does not provide a way to pass session names from here to
         * call-back routines that do session lookup.
         * 
         * OpenSSL can, however, automatically save newly created sessions for
         * us by callback (we create the session name in the call-back
         * function).
         * 
         * XXX gcc 2.95 can't compile #ifdef .. #endif in the expansion of
         * SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE |
         * SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR.
         */
#ifndef SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE
#define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE 0
#endif

        SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(client_ctx,
                                       SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT |
                                       SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE |
                                       SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
        SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(client_ctx, new_client_session_cb);
    }
    return (app_ctx);
}

/* match_hostname -  match hostname against pattern */

static int match_hostname(const char *peerid,
                                  const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props)
{
    const ARGV *cmatch_argv = props->matchargv;
    const char *nexthop = props->nexthop;
    const char *hname = props->host;
    const char *pattern;
    const char *pattern_left;
    int     sub;
    int     i;
    int     idlen;
    int     patlen;

    /*
     * Match the peerid against each pattern until we find a match.
     */
    for (i = 0; i < cmatch_argv->argc; ++i) {
        sub = 0;
        if (!strcasecmp(cmatch_argv->argv[i], "nexthop"))
            pattern = nexthop;
        else if (!strcasecmp(cmatch_argv->argv[i], "hostname"))
            pattern = hname;
        else if (!strcasecmp(cmatch_argv->argv[i], "dot-nexthop")) {
            pattern = nexthop;
            sub = 1;
        } else {
            pattern = cmatch_argv->argv[i];
            if (*pattern == '.' && pattern[1] != '\0') {
                ++pattern;
                sub = 1;
            }
        }

        /*
         * Sub-domain match: peerid is any sub-domain of pattern.
         */
        if (sub) {
            if ((idlen = strlen(peerid)) > (patlen = strlen(pattern)) + 1
                && peerid[idlen - patlen - 1] == '.'
                && !strcasecmp(peerid + (idlen - patlen), pattern))
                return (1);
            else
                continue;
        }

        /*
         * Exact match and initial "*" match. The initial "*" in a peerid
         * matches exactly one hostname component, under the condition that
         * the peerid contains multiple hostname components.
         */
        if (!strcasecmp(peerid, pattern)
            || (peerid[0] == '*' && peerid[1] == '.' && peerid[2] != 0
                && (pattern_left = strchr(pattern, '.')) != 0
                && strcasecmp(pattern_left + 1, peerid + 2) == 0))
            return (1);
    }
    return (0);
}

/* verify_extract_name - verify peer name and extract peer information */

static void verify_extract_name(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, X509 *peercert,
                                        const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props)
{
    int     i;
    int     r;
    int     matched = 0;
    const char *dnsname;
    const GENERAL_NAME *gn;

    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) * gens;

    /*
     * On exit both peer_CN and issuer_CN should be set.
     */
    TLScontext->issuer_CN = tls_issuer_CN(peercert, TLScontext);

    /*
     * Is the certificate trust chain valid and trusted?
     */
    if (SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con) == X509_V_OK)
        TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_TRUSTED;

    if (TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) && props->tls_level >= TLS_LEV_VERIFY) {

        /*
         * Verify the dNSName(s) in the peer certificate against the nexthop
         * and hostname.
         * 
         * If DNS names are present, we use the first matching (or else simply
         * the first) DNS name as the subject CN. The CommonName in the
         * issuer DN is obsolete when SubjectAltName is available. This
         * yields much less surprising logs, because we log the name we
         * verified or a name we checked and failed to match.
         * 
         * XXX: The nexthop and host name may both be the same network address
         * rather than a DNS name. In this case we really should be looking
         * for GEN_IPADD entries, not GEN_DNS entries.
         * 
         * XXX: In ideal world the caller who used the address to build the
         * connection would tell us that the nexthop is the connection
         * address, but if that is not practical, we can parse the nexthop
         * again here.
         */
        gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(peercert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0);
        if (gens) {
            r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens);
            for (i = 0; i < r && !matched; ++i) {
                gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
                if (gn->type != GEN_DNS)
                    continue;

                /*
                 * Even if we have an invalid DNS name, we still ultimately
                 * ignore the CommonName, because subjectAltName:DNS is
                 * present (though malformed). Replace any previous peer_CN
                 * if empty or we get a match.
                 * 
                 * We always set at least an empty peer_CN if the ALTNAME cert
                 * flag is set. If not, we set peer_CN from the cert
                 * CommonName below, so peer_CN is always non-null on return.
                 */
                TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_ALTNAME;
                dnsname = tls_dns_name(gn, TLScontext);
                if (dnsname && *dnsname) {
                    matched = match_hostname(dnsname, props);
                    if (TLScontext->peer_CN
                        && (matched || *TLScontext->peer_CN == 0)) {
                        myfree(TLScontext->peer_CN);
                        TLScontext->peer_CN = 0;
                    }
                }
                if (TLScontext->peer_CN == 0)
                    TLScontext->peer_CN = mystrdup(dnsname ? dnsname : "");
            }

            /*
             * (Sam Rushing, Ironport) Free stack *and* member GENERAL_NAME
             * objects
             */
            sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free);
        }

        /*
         * No subjectAltNames, peer_CN is taken from CommonName.
         */
        if (TLScontext->peer_CN == 0) {
            TLScontext->peer_CN = tls_peer_CN(peercert, TLScontext);
            if (*TLScontext->peer_CN)
                matched = match_hostname(TLScontext->peer_CN, props);
        }
        if (matched)
            TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_MATCHED;

        /*
         * - Matched: Trusted and peername matches - Trusted: Signed by
         * trusted CA(s), but peername not matched - Untrusted: Can't verify
         * the trust chain, reason already logged.
         */
        if (TLScontext->log_level >= 2)
            msg_info("%s: %s subject_CN=%s, issuer_CN=%s", props->namaddr,
                     TLS_CERT_IS_MATCHED(TLScontext) ? "Matched" :
                  TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted",
                     TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
    } else
        TLScontext->peer_CN = tls_peer_CN(peercert, TLScontext);

    /*
     * Give them a clue. Problems with trust chain verification were logged
     * when the session was first negotiated, before the session was stored
     * into the cache. We don't want mystery failures, so log the fact the
     * real problem is to be found in the past.
     */
    if (TLScontext->session_reused
        && !TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext)
        && TLScontext->log_level >= 1)
        msg_info("%s: re-using session with untrusted certificate, "
                 "look for details earlier in the log", props->namaddr);
}

/* verify_extract_print - extract and verify peer fingerprint */

static void verify_extract_print(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext, X509 *peercert,
                                         const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props)
{
    char  **cpp;

    /* Non-null by contract */
    TLScontext->peer_fingerprint = tls_fingerprint(peercert, props->fpt_dgst);

    if (props->tls_level != TLS_LEV_FPRINT)
        return;

    /*
     * Compare the fingerprint against each acceptable value, ignoring
     * upper/lower case differences.
     */
    for (cpp = props->matchargv->argv; *cpp; ++cpp)
        if (strcasecmp(TLScontext->peer_fingerprint, *cpp) == 0) {
            TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_MATCHED;
            break;
        }
    if (props->log_level >= 2)
        msg_info("%s %s%s fingerprint %s", props->namaddr,
                 TLS_CERT_IS_MATCHED(TLScontext) ? "Matched " : "",
                 props->fpt_dgst, TLScontext->peer_fingerprint);
}

 /*
  * This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect that the
  * buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was received by us,
  * so that we can immediately start the TLS handshake process.
  */
TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_client_start(const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props)
{
    int     sts;
    int     protomask;
    const char *cipher_list;
    SSL_SESSION *session;
    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
    X509   *peercert;
    TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
    TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx = props->ctx;
    VSTRING *myserverid;

    if (props->log_level >= 1)
        msg_info("setting up TLS connection to %s", props->namaddr);

    /*
     * First make sure we have valid protocol and cipher parameters
     * 
     * The cipherlist will be applied to the global SSL context, where it can be
     * repeatedly reset if necessary, but the protocol restrictions will be
     * is applied to the SSL connection, because protocol restrictions in the
     * global context cannot be cleared.
     */

    /*
     * OpenSSL will ignore cached sessions that use the wrong protocol. So we
     * do not need to filter out cached sessions with the "wrong" protocol,
     * rather OpenSSL will simply negotiate a new session.
     * 
     * Still, we salt the session lookup key with the protocol list, so that
     * sessions found in the cache are always acceptable.
     */
    protomask = tls_protocol_mask(props->protocols);
    if (protomask == TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID) {
        /* tls_protocol_mask() logs no warning. */
        msg_warn("%s: Invalid TLS protocol list \"%s\": aborting TLS session",
                 props->namaddr, props->protocols);
        return (0);
    }
    myserverid = vstring_alloc(100);
    vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "%s&p=%d", props->serverid, protomask);

    /*
     * Per session cipher selection for sessions with mandatory encryption
     * 
     * By the time a TLS client is negotiating ciphers it has already offered to
     * re-use a session, it is too late to renege on the offer. So we must
     * not attempt to re-use sessions whose ciphers are too weak. We salt the
     * session lookup key with the cipher list, so that sessions found in the
     * cache are always acceptable.
     */
    cipher_list = tls_set_ciphers(app_ctx, "TLS", props->cipher_grade,
                                  props->cipher_exclusions);
    if (cipher_list == 0) {
        msg_warn("%s: %s: aborting TLS session",
                 props->namaddr, vstring_str(app_ctx->why));
        vstring_free(myserverid);
        return (0);
    }
    if (props->log_level >= 2)
        msg_info("%s: TLS cipher list \"%s\"", props->namaddr, cipher_list);
    vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "&c=%s", cipher_list);

    /*
     * Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
     * structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later retrieve
     * the information inside the tls_verify_certificate_callback().
     * 
     * If session caching was enabled when TLS was initialized, the cache type
     * is stored in the client SSL context.
     */
    TLScontext = tls_alloc_sess_context(props->log_level, props->namaddr);
    TLScontext->cache_type = app_ctx->cache_type;

    TLScontext->serverid = vstring_export(myserverid);

    if ((TLScontext->con = SSL_new(app_ctx->ssl_ctx)) == NULL) {
        msg_warn("Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()");
        tls_print_errors();
        tls_free_context(TLScontext);
        return (0);
    }
    if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
        msg_warn("Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'");
        tls_print_errors();
        tls_free_context(TLScontext);
        return (0);
    }

    /*
     * Apply session protocol restrictions.
     */
    if (protomask != 0)
        SSL_set_options(TLScontext->con,
                   ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1) ? SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 : 0L)
                 | ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv3) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 : 0L)
               | ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv2) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 : 0L));

    /*
     * The TLS connection is realized by a BIO_pair, so obtain the pair.
     * 
     * XXX There is no need to make internal_bio a member of the TLScontext
     * structure. It will be attached to TLScontext->con, and destroyed along
     * with it. The network_bio, however, needs to be freed explicitly.
     */
    if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&TLScontext->internal_bio, TLS_BIO_BUFSIZE,
                          &TLScontext->network_bio, TLS_BIO_BUFSIZE)) {
        msg_warn("Could not obtain BIO_pair");
        tls_print_errors();
        tls_free_context(TLScontext);
        return (0);
    }

    /*
     * XXX To avoid memory leaks we must always call SSL_SESSION_free() after
     * calling SSL_set_session(), regardless of whether or not the session
     * will be reused.
     */
    if (TLScontext->cache_type) {
        session = load_clnt_session(TLScontext);
        if (session) {
            SSL_set_session(TLScontext->con, session);
            SSL_SESSION_free(session);          /* 200411 */
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L)

            /*
             * Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify
             * result in sessions for the client side. We modify the session
             * directly which is version specific, but this bug is version
             * specific, too.
             * 
             * READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before beta1
             * have this bug, it has been fixed during development of 0.9.6a.
             * The development version of 0.9.7 can have this bug, too. It
             * has been fixed on 2000/11/29.
             */
            SSL_set_verify_result(TLScontext->con, session->verify_result);
#endif

        }
    }

    /*
     * Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
     * more.
     */
    tls_int_seed();
    (void) tls_ext_seed(var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);

    /*
     * Initialize the SSL connection to connect state. This should not be
     * necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
     * and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
     */
    SSL_set_connect_state(TLScontext->con);

    /*
     * Connect the SSL connection with the Postfix side of the BIO-pair for
     * reading and writing.
     */
    SSL_set_bio(TLScontext->con, TLScontext->internal_bio,
                TLScontext->internal_bio);

    /*
     * If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is dumped:
     * 3 will dump the SSL negotiation, 4 will dump everything.
     * 
     * We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
     * Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
     * created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
     */
    if (props->log_level >= 3)
        BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), tls_bio_dump_cb);

    /*
     * Start TLS negotiations. This process is a black box that invokes our
     * call-backs for certificate verification.
     * 
     * Error handling: If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message
     * and remove all TLS state concerning this session.
     */
    sts = tls_bio_connect(vstream_fileno(props->stream), props->timeout,
                          TLScontext);
    if (sts <= 0) {
        msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: %d", props->namaddr, sts);
        tls_print_errors();
        uncache_session(app_ctx->ssl_ctx, TLScontext);
        tls_free_context(TLScontext);
        return (0);
    }
    /* Only log_level==4 dumps everything */
    if (props->log_level < 4)
        BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), 0);

    /*
     * The caller may want to know if this session was reused or if a new
     * session was negotiated.
     */
    TLScontext->session_reused = SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con);
    if (props->log_level >= 2 && TLScontext->session_reused)
        msg_info("%s: Reusing old session", TLScontext->namaddr);

    /*
     * Do peername verification if requested and extract useful information
     * from the certificate for later use.
     */
    if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con)) != 0) {
        TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_PRESENT;

        /*
         * Peer name or fingerprint verification as requested.
         * Unconditionally set peer_CN, issuer_CN and peer_fingerprint.
         */
        verify_extract_name(TLScontext, peercert, props);
        verify_extract_print(TLScontext, peercert, props);
        X509_free(peercert);
    } else {
        TLScontext->issuer_CN = mystrdup("");
        TLScontext->peer_CN = mystrdup("");
        TLScontext->peer_fingerprint = mystrdup("");
    }

    /*
     * Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
     */
    TLScontext->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
    cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
    TLScontext->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
    TLScontext->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
                                             &(TLScontext->cipher_algbits));

    /*
     * The TLS engine is active. Switch to the tls_timed_read/write()
     * functions and make the TLScontext available to those functions.
     */
    tls_stream_start(props->stream, TLScontext);

    /*
     * All the key facts in a single log entry.
     */
    if (props->log_level >= 1)
        msg_info("%s TLS connection established to %s: %s with cipher %s "
              "(%d/%d bits)", TLS_CERT_IS_MATCHED(TLScontext) ? "Verified" :
                 TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted",
              props->namaddr, TLScontext->protocol, TLScontext->cipher_name,
                 TLScontext->cipher_usebits, TLScontext->cipher_algbits);

    tls_int_seed();

    return (TLScontext);
}

#endif                                  /* USE_TLS */