1 /* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.74 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
3 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
4 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
6 * RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login
7 * based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check
8 * validity of the host key.
10 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
11 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
12 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
13 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
14 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
19 #include <sys/types.h>
22 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
23 #include <openssl/md5.h>
37 #include "auth-options.h"
38 #include "pathnames.h"
47 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
52 extern ServerOptions options
;
55 * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
56 * responses to a particular session.
58 extern u_char session_id
[16];
61 * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
63 * options bits e n comment
64 * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
65 * and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum
66 * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters. See sshd(8) for a
67 * description of the options.
71 auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key
*key
)
76 if ((challenge
= BN_new()) == NULL
)
77 fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
78 /* Generate a random challenge. */
79 if (BN_rand(challenge
, 256, 0, 0) == 0)
80 fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed");
81 if ((ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
82 fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed");
83 if (BN_mod(challenge
, challenge
, key
->rsa
->n
, ctx
) == 0)
84 fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed");
91 auth_rsa_verify_response(Key
*key
, BIGNUM
*challenge
, u_char response
[16])
93 u_char buf
[32], mdbuf
[16];
97 if (auth_key_is_revoked(key
))
100 /* don't allow short keys */
101 if (BN_num_bits(key
->rsa
->n
) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE
) {
102 error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
103 BN_num_bits(key
->rsa
->n
), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE
);
107 /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
108 len
= BN_num_bytes(challenge
);
109 if (len
<= 0 || len
> 32)
110 fatal("auth_rsa_verify_response: bad challenge length %d", len
);
112 BN_bn2bin(challenge
, buf
+ 32 - len
);
114 MD5_Update(&md
, buf
, 32);
115 MD5_Update(&md
, session_id
, 16);
116 MD5_Final(mdbuf
, &md
);
118 /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
119 if (memcmp(response
, mdbuf
, 16) != 0) {
123 /* Correct answer. */
128 * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
129 * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
130 * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
134 auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key
*key
)
136 BIGNUM
*challenge
, *encrypted_challenge
;
140 if ((encrypted_challenge
= BN_new()) == NULL
)
141 fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
143 challenge
= PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key
));
145 /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
146 rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge
, challenge
, key
->rsa
);
148 /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
149 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE
);
150 packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge
);
152 BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge
);
155 /* Wait for a response. */
156 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE
);
157 for (i
= 0; i
< 16; i
++)
158 response
[i
] = (u_char
)packet_get_char();
161 success
= PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key
, challenge
, response
));
162 BN_clear_free(challenge
);
167 * check if there's user key matching client_n,
168 * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
172 auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd
*pw
, BIGNUM
*client_n
, Key
**rkey
)
174 char line
[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES
], *file
;
181 /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
182 temporarily_use_uid(pw
);
184 /* The authorized keys. */
185 file
= authorized_keys_file(pw
);
186 debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file
);
187 f
= auth_openkeyfile(file
, pw
, options
.strict_modes
);
194 /* Flag indicating whether the key is allowed. */
197 key
= key_new(KEY_RSA1
);
200 * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
201 * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
202 * user really has the corresponding private key.
204 while (read_keyfile_line(f
, file
, line
, sizeof(line
), &linenum
) != -1) {
209 /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
210 for (cp
= line
; *cp
== ' ' || *cp
== '\t'; cp
++)
212 if (!*cp
|| *cp
== '\n' || *cp
== '#')
216 * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
217 * save their starting address and skip the option part
218 * for now. If there are no options, set the starting
221 if (*cp
< '0' || *cp
> '9') {
224 for (; *cp
&& (quoted
|| (*cp
!= ' ' && *cp
!= '\t')); cp
++) {
225 if (*cp
== '\\' && cp
[1] == '"')
226 cp
++; /* Skip both */
233 /* Parse the key from the line. */
234 if (hostfile_read_key(&cp
, &bits
, key
) == 0) {
235 debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
239 /* cp now points to the comment part. */
241 /* Check if the we have found the desired key (identified by its modulus). */
242 if (BN_cmp(key
->rsa
->n
, client_n
) != 0)
245 /* check the real bits */
246 keybits
= BN_num_bits(key
->rsa
->n
);
247 if (keybits
< 0 || bits
!= (u_int
)keybits
)
248 logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
249 "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
250 file
, linenum
, BN_num_bits(key
->rsa
->n
), bits
);
252 /* We have found the desired key. */
254 * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
255 * do not send challenge.
257 if (!auth_parse_options(pw
, key_options
, file
, linenum
))
260 /* break out, this key is allowed */
265 /* Restore the privileged uid. */
268 /* Close the file. */
272 /* return key if allowed */
273 if (allowed
&& rkey
!= NULL
)
281 * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns
282 * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
283 * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
286 auth_rsa(Authctxt
*authctxt
, BIGNUM
*client_n
)
290 struct passwd
*pw
= authctxt
->pw
;
293 if (!authctxt
->valid
)
296 if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw
, client_n
, &key
))) {
297 auth_clear_options();
301 /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
302 if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key
)) {
303 /* Wrong response. */
304 verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
305 packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
307 * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
308 * another challenge and break the protocol.
314 * Correct response. The client has been successfully
315 * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
316 * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
317 * authentication to be rejected.
319 fp
= key_fingerprint(key
, SSH_FP_MD5
, SSH_FP_HEX
);
320 verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
325 packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");