1 This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
4 Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
5 filexfer protocol described in:
7 http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
9 Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
10 are individually implemented as extensions described below.
12 The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
15 1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com"
17 This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
18 (rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
21 http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
23 2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com"
25 This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
26 algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
27 start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
28 avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
30 The method is documented in:
32 http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
34 3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com" and
35 "ssh-dsa-cert-v00@openssh.com"
37 OpenSSH introduces two new public key algorithms to support certificate
38 authentication for users and hostkeys. These methods are documented in
39 the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
41 4. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
43 The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
44 message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
45 more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
46 an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
47 while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
50 This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
51 otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
52 processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
55 OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
56 signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
57 an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
58 experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
60 byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
61 uint32 recipient channel
62 string "eow@openssh.com"
65 On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
66 the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
67 originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
69 As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
70 remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
71 still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
72 window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
74 NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
75 of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
76 message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
77 Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message
80 5. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
81 "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
83 Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
84 attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
85 additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
86 request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
88 When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
89 (i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
90 will send the following global request:
92 byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
93 string "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
96 On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
97 future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
100 Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
101 (that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
103 NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
104 of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
105 servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
106 whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
108 6. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
110 OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
111 channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
112 with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
113 interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
114 requested by the client with the following packet:
116 byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
117 string "tun@openssh.com"
118 uint32 sender channel
119 uint32 initial window size
120 uint32 maximum packet size
122 uint32 remote unit number
124 The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
125 layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
127 SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 1 /* layer 3 packets */
128 SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 2 /* layer 2 frames */
130 The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
131 be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically chose an interface. A
132 server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse
133 the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful
134 open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
136 Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
137 over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
138 and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
139 are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
140 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
142 byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
143 uint32 recipient channel
146 The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
149 uint32 address family
150 byte[packet length - 4] packet data
152 The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
155 SSH_TUN_AF_INET 2 /* IPv4 */
156 SSH_TUN_AF_INET6 24 /* IPv6 */
158 The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
159 without any link layer header.
161 The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
164 byte[packet length] frame
166 The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
169 7. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
171 When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
172 to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
173 the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
174 fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
175 current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
176 SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
182 8. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
184 OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
185 standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
188 uint32 3 /* protocol version */
197 Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
198 string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
199 ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
200 extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
201 check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
203 9. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com"
205 This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
206 are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
207 draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
208 SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
211 string "posix-rename@openssh.com"
215 On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
216 rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
217 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
220 10. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and
221 "fstatvfs@openssh.com"
223 These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
224 interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
225 pathname, and is formatted as follows:
228 string "statvfs@openssh.com"
231 The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
234 string "fstatvfs@openssh.com"
237 These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
238 return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
241 uint64 f_bsize /* file system block size */
242 uint64 f_frsize /* fundamental fs block size */
243 uint64 f_blocks /* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
244 uint64 f_bfree /* free blocks in file system */
245 uint64 f_bavail /* free blocks for non-root */
246 uint64 f_files /* total file inodes */
247 uint64 f_ffree /* free file inodes */
248 uint64 f_favail /* free file inodes for to non-root */
249 uint64 f_fsid /* file system id */
250 uint64 f_flag /* bit mask of f_flag values */
251 uint64 f_namemax /* maximum filename length */
253 The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
255 #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x1 /* read-only */
256 #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x2 /* no setuid */
258 Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are
259 advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
261 $OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.15 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $