- (djm) Release OpenSSH 4.0p1
[openssh-git.git] / sshd.c
blob11d618d11163f9df05ff75ecc4b97f56d8ea561e
1 /*
2 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
3 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
4 * All rights reserved
5 * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
6 * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
7 * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
8 * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
9 * authentication agent connections.
11 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
12 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
13 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
14 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
15 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
17 * SSH2 implementation:
18 * Privilege Separation:
20 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
21 * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
32 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
33 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
34 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
35 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
36 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
37 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
38 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
39 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
40 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
41 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
44 #include "includes.h"
45 RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.308 2005/02/08 22:24:57 dtucker Exp $");
47 #include <openssl/dh.h>
48 #include <openssl/bn.h>
49 #include <openssl/md5.h>
50 #include <openssl/rand.h>
51 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
52 #include <sys/security.h>
53 #include <prot.h>
54 #endif
56 #include "ssh.h"
57 #include "ssh1.h"
58 #include "ssh2.h"
59 #include "xmalloc.h"
60 #include "rsa.h"
61 #include "sshpty.h"
62 #include "packet.h"
63 #include "log.h"
64 #include "servconf.h"
65 #include "uidswap.h"
66 #include "compat.h"
67 #include "buffer.h"
68 #include "bufaux.h"
69 #include "cipher.h"
70 #include "kex.h"
71 #include "key.h"
72 #include "dh.h"
73 #include "myproposal.h"
74 #include "authfile.h"
75 #include "pathnames.h"
76 #include "atomicio.h"
77 #include "canohost.h"
78 #include "auth.h"
79 #include "misc.h"
80 #include "msg.h"
81 #include "dispatch.h"
82 #include "channels.h"
83 #include "session.h"
84 #include "monitor_mm.h"
85 #include "monitor.h"
86 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
87 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
89 #ifdef LIBWRAP
90 #include <tcpd.h>
91 #include <syslog.h>
92 int allow_severity = LOG_INFO;
93 int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
94 #endif /* LIBWRAP */
96 #ifndef O_NOCTTY
97 #define O_NOCTTY 0
98 #endif
100 /* Re-exec fds */
101 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
102 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
103 #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
104 #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
106 extern char *__progname;
108 /* Server configuration options. */
109 ServerOptions options;
111 /* Name of the server configuration file. */
112 char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
115 * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
116 * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
117 * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
118 * the first connection.
120 int debug_flag = 0;
122 /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
123 int test_flag = 0;
125 /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
126 int inetd_flag = 0;
128 /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
129 int no_daemon_flag = 0;
131 /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
132 int log_stderr = 0;
134 /* Saved arguments to main(). */
135 char **saved_argv;
136 int saved_argc;
138 /* re-exec */
139 int rexeced_flag = 0;
140 int rexec_flag = 1;
141 int rexec_argc = 0;
142 char **rexec_argv;
145 * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
146 * signal handler.
148 #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
149 int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
150 int num_listen_socks = 0;
153 * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
154 * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
156 char *client_version_string = NULL;
157 char *server_version_string = NULL;
159 /* for rekeying XXX fixme */
160 Kex *xxx_kex;
163 * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
164 * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
165 * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
166 * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
167 * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
168 * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
170 struct {
171 Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
172 Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
173 Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
174 int have_ssh1_key;
175 int have_ssh2_key;
176 u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
177 } sensitive_data;
180 * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
181 * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
183 static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
185 /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
186 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
187 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
189 /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
190 u_char session_id[16];
192 /* same for ssh2 */
193 u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
194 u_int session_id2_len = 0;
196 /* record remote hostname or ip */
197 u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
199 /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
200 int *startup_pipes = NULL;
201 int startup_pipe; /* in child */
203 /* variables used for privilege separation */
204 int use_privsep;
205 struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
207 /* global authentication context */
208 Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
210 /* message to be displayed after login */
211 Buffer loginmsg;
213 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
214 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
215 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
217 static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
218 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
221 * Close all listening sockets
223 static void
224 close_listen_socks(void)
226 int i;
228 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
229 close(listen_socks[i]);
230 num_listen_socks = -1;
233 static void
234 close_startup_pipes(void)
236 int i;
238 if (startup_pipes)
239 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
240 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
241 close(startup_pipes[i]);
245 * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
246 * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
247 * the server key).
249 static void
250 sighup_handler(int sig)
252 int save_errno = errno;
254 received_sighup = 1;
255 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
256 errno = save_errno;
260 * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
261 * Restarts the server.
263 static void
264 sighup_restart(void)
266 logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
267 close_listen_socks();
268 close_startup_pipes();
269 execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
270 logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
271 strerror(errno));
272 exit(1);
276 * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
278 static void
279 sigterm_handler(int sig)
281 received_sigterm = sig;
285 * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
286 * reap any zombies left by exited children.
288 static void
289 main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
291 int save_errno = errno;
292 pid_t pid;
293 int status;
295 while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
296 (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
299 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
300 errno = save_errno;
304 * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
306 static void
307 grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
309 /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
311 if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
312 kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
314 /* Log error and exit. */
315 fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
319 * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
320 * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
321 * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
322 * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
323 * problems.
325 static void
326 generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
328 u_int32_t rnd = 0;
329 int i;
331 verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
332 sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
333 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
334 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
335 sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
336 options.server_key_bits);
337 verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
339 for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
340 if (i % 4 == 0)
341 rnd = arc4random();
342 sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
343 rnd >>= 8;
345 arc4random_stir();
348 static void
349 key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
351 int save_errno = errno;
353 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
354 errno = save_errno;
355 key_do_regen = 1;
358 static void
359 sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
361 int i, mismatch;
362 int remote_major, remote_minor;
363 int major, minor;
364 char *s;
365 char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
366 char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
368 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
369 (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
370 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
371 minor = 99;
372 } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
373 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
374 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
375 } else {
376 major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
377 minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
379 snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major, minor, SSH_VERSION);
380 server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
382 /* Send our protocol version identification. */
383 if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
384 strlen(server_version_string))
385 != strlen(server_version_string)) {
386 logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
387 cleanup_exit(255);
390 /* Read other sides version identification. */
391 memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
392 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
393 if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
394 logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
395 get_remote_ipaddr());
396 cleanup_exit(255);
398 if (buf[i] == '\r') {
399 buf[i] = 0;
400 /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
401 if (i == 12 &&
402 strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
403 break;
404 continue;
406 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
407 buf[i] = 0;
408 break;
411 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
412 client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
415 * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
416 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
418 if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
419 &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
420 s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
421 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
422 close(sock_in);
423 close(sock_out);
424 logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
425 client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
426 cleanup_exit(255);
428 debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
429 remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
431 compat_datafellows(remote_version);
433 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) {
434 logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
435 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
436 cleanup_exit(255);
439 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
440 logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
441 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
442 cleanup_exit(255);
445 mismatch = 0;
446 switch (remote_major) {
447 case 1:
448 if (remote_minor == 99) {
449 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
450 enable_compat20();
451 else
452 mismatch = 1;
453 break;
455 if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
456 mismatch = 1;
457 break;
459 if (remote_minor < 3) {
460 packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
461 "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
462 } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
463 /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
464 enable_compat13();
466 break;
467 case 2:
468 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
469 enable_compat20();
470 break;
472 /* FALLTHROUGH */
473 default:
474 mismatch = 1;
475 break;
477 chop(server_version_string);
478 debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
480 if (mismatch) {
481 s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
482 (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
483 close(sock_in);
484 close(sock_out);
485 logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
486 get_remote_ipaddr(),
487 server_version_string, client_version_string);
488 cleanup_exit(255);
492 /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
493 void
494 destroy_sensitive_data(void)
496 int i;
498 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
499 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
500 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
502 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
503 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
504 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
505 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
508 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
509 memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
512 /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
513 void
514 demote_sensitive_data(void)
516 Key *tmp;
517 int i;
519 if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
520 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
521 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
522 sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
525 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
526 if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
527 tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
528 key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
529 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
530 if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
531 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
535 /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
538 static void
539 privsep_preauth_child(void)
541 u_int32_t rnd[256];
542 gid_t gidset[1];
543 struct passwd *pw;
544 int i;
546 /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
547 privsep_challenge_enable();
549 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
550 rnd[i] = arc4random();
551 RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
553 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
554 demote_sensitive_data();
556 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
557 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
558 SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
559 memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
560 endpwent();
562 /* Change our root directory */
563 if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
564 fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
565 strerror(errno));
566 if (chdir("/") == -1)
567 fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
569 /* Drop our privileges */
570 debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
571 (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
572 #if 0
573 /* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
574 do_setusercontext(pw);
575 #else
576 gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
577 if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
578 fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
579 permanently_set_uid(pw);
580 #endif
583 static int
584 privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
586 int status;
587 pid_t pid;
589 /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
590 pmonitor = monitor_init();
591 /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
592 pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
594 pid = fork();
595 if (pid == -1) {
596 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
597 } else if (pid != 0) {
598 debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
600 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
601 pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
602 monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
603 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
605 /* Sync memory */
606 monitor_sync(pmonitor);
608 /* Wait for the child's exit status */
609 while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
610 if (errno != EINTR)
611 break;
612 return (1);
613 } else {
614 /* child */
616 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
618 /* Demote the child */
619 if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
620 privsep_preauth_child();
621 setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
623 return (0);
626 static void
627 privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
629 #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
630 if (1) {
631 #else
632 if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
633 #endif
634 /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
635 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
636 use_privsep = 0;
637 return;
640 /* Authentication complete */
641 alarm(0);
642 if (startup_pipe != -1) {
643 close(startup_pipe);
644 startup_pipe = -1;
647 /* New socket pair */
648 monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
650 pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
651 if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
652 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
653 else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
654 debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
655 close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
656 buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
657 monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
659 /* NEVERREACHED */
660 exit(0);
663 close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
665 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
666 demote_sensitive_data();
668 /* Drop privileges */
669 do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
671 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
672 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
675 static char *
676 list_hostkey_types(void)
678 Buffer b;
679 const char *p;
680 char *ret;
681 int i;
683 buffer_init(&b);
684 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
685 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
686 if (key == NULL)
687 continue;
688 switch (key->type) {
689 case KEY_RSA:
690 case KEY_DSA:
691 if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
692 buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
693 p = key_ssh_name(key);
694 buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
695 break;
698 buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
699 ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
700 buffer_free(&b);
701 debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret);
702 return ret;
705 Key *
706 get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
708 int i;
710 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
711 Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
712 if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
713 return key;
715 return NULL;
718 Key *
719 get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
721 if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
722 return (NULL);
723 return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
727 get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
729 int i;
731 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
732 if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
733 return (i);
735 return (-1);
739 * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
740 * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
741 * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
742 * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
744 static int
745 drop_connection(int startups)
747 int p, r;
749 if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
750 return 0;
751 if (startups >= options.max_startups)
752 return 1;
753 if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
754 return 1;
756 p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
757 p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
758 p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
759 p += options.max_startups_rate;
760 r = arc4random() % 100;
762 debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
763 return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
766 static void
767 usage(void)
769 fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
770 SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
771 fprintf(stderr,
772 "usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
773 " [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
775 exit(1);
778 static void
779 send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
781 Buffer m;
783 debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__, fd,
784 buffer_len(conf));
787 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
788 * string configuration
789 * u_int ephemeral_key_follows
790 * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
791 * bignum n "
792 * bignum d "
793 * bignum iqmp "
794 * bignum p "
795 * bignum q "
797 buffer_init(&m);
798 buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf));
800 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
801 sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
802 buffer_put_int(&m, 1);
803 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
804 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
805 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
806 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
807 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
808 buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
809 } else
810 buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
812 if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1)
813 fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
815 buffer_free(&m);
817 debug3("%s: done", __func__);
820 static void
821 recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
823 Buffer m;
824 char *cp;
825 u_int len;
827 debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
829 buffer_init(&m);
831 if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1)
832 fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
833 if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
834 fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
836 cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
837 if (conf != NULL)
838 buffer_append(conf, cp, len + 1);
839 xfree(cp);
841 if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
842 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
843 key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
844 sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
845 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
846 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
847 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
848 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
849 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
850 buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
851 rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
852 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa);
854 buffer_free(&m);
856 debug3("%s: done", __func__);
860 * Main program for the daemon.
863 main(int ac, char **av)
865 extern char *optarg;
866 extern int optind;
867 int opt, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
868 int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
869 pid_t pid;
870 socklen_t fromlen;
871 fd_set *fdset;
872 struct sockaddr_storage from;
873 const char *remote_ip;
874 int remote_port;
875 FILE *f;
876 struct addrinfo *ai;
877 char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
878 char *line;
879 int listen_sock, maxfd;
880 int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
881 int startups = 0;
882 Key *key;
883 Authctxt *authctxt;
884 int ret, key_used = 0;
885 Buffer cfg;
887 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
888 (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
889 #endif
890 __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
891 init_rng();
893 /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
894 saved_argc = ac;
895 rexec_argc = ac;
896 saved_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv) * (ac + 1));
897 for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
898 saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
899 saved_argv[i] = NULL;
901 #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
902 /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
903 compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
904 av = saved_argv;
905 #endif
907 if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
908 debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
910 /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
911 initialize_server_options(&options);
913 /* Parse command-line arguments. */
914 while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqrtQR46")) != -1) {
915 switch (opt) {
916 case '4':
917 options.address_family = AF_INET;
918 break;
919 case '6':
920 options.address_family = AF_INET6;
921 break;
922 case 'f':
923 config_file_name = optarg;
924 break;
925 case 'd':
926 if (debug_flag == 0) {
927 debug_flag = 1;
928 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
929 } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
930 options.log_level++;
931 break;
932 case 'D':
933 no_daemon_flag = 1;
934 break;
935 case 'e':
936 log_stderr = 1;
937 break;
938 case 'i':
939 inetd_flag = 1;
940 break;
941 case 'r':
942 rexec_flag = 0;
943 break;
944 case 'R':
945 rexeced_flag = 1;
946 inetd_flag = 1;
947 break;
948 case 'Q':
949 /* ignored */
950 break;
951 case 'q':
952 options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
953 break;
954 case 'b':
955 options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg);
956 break;
957 case 'p':
958 options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
959 if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
960 fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
961 exit(1);
963 options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
964 if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) {
965 fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
966 exit(1);
968 break;
969 case 'g':
970 if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
971 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
972 exit(1);
974 break;
975 case 'k':
976 if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
977 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
978 exit(1);
980 break;
981 case 'h':
982 if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
983 fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
984 exit(1);
986 options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
987 break;
988 case 't':
989 test_flag = 1;
990 break;
991 case 'u':
992 utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
993 if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) {
994 fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
995 exit(1);
997 break;
998 case 'o':
999 line = xstrdup(optarg);
1000 if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
1001 "command-line", 0) != 0)
1002 exit(1);
1003 xfree(line);
1004 break;
1005 case '?':
1006 default:
1007 usage();
1008 break;
1011 if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
1012 rexec_flag = 0;
1013 if (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))
1014 fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
1015 if (rexeced_flag)
1016 closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
1017 else
1018 closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
1020 SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
1023 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
1024 * key (unless started from inetd)
1026 log_init(__progname,
1027 options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
1028 SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
1029 options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
1030 SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
1031 log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
1034 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
1035 * root's environment
1037 if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
1038 unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
1040 #ifdef _UNICOS
1041 /* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
1042 * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
1044 drop_cray_privs();
1045 #endif
1047 seed_rng();
1049 sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
1050 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
1051 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
1052 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
1054 /* Fetch our configuration */
1055 buffer_init(&cfg);
1056 if (rexeced_flag)
1057 recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg);
1058 else
1059 load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
1061 parse_server_config(&options,
1062 rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, &cfg);
1064 if (!rexec_flag)
1065 buffer_free(&cfg);
1067 /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
1068 fill_default_server_options(&options);
1070 /* set default channel AF */
1071 channel_set_af(options.address_family);
1073 /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
1074 if (optind < ac) {
1075 fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
1076 exit(1);
1079 debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE);
1081 /* load private host keys */
1082 sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files *
1083 sizeof(Key *));
1084 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
1085 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
1087 for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
1088 key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
1089 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
1090 if (key == NULL) {
1091 error("Could not load host key: %s",
1092 options.host_key_files[i]);
1093 sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
1094 continue;
1096 switch (key->type) {
1097 case KEY_RSA1:
1098 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
1099 sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
1100 break;
1101 case KEY_RSA:
1102 case KEY_DSA:
1103 sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
1104 break;
1106 debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
1107 key_type(key));
1109 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
1110 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
1111 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
1113 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
1114 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
1115 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
1117 if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
1118 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
1119 exit(1);
1122 /* Check certain values for sanity. */
1123 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
1124 if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
1125 options.server_key_bits > 32768) {
1126 fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
1127 exit(1);
1130 * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
1131 * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
1132 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
1134 if (options.server_key_bits >
1135 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
1136 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
1137 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1138 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1139 options.server_key_bits =
1140 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
1141 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
1142 debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
1143 options.server_key_bits);
1147 if (use_privsep) {
1148 struct passwd *pw;
1149 struct stat st;
1151 if ((pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL)
1152 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
1153 SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
1154 if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
1155 (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
1156 fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
1157 _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1159 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
1160 if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
1161 (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
1162 (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
1163 #else
1164 if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
1165 #endif
1166 fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
1167 "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
1170 /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
1171 if (test_flag)
1172 exit(0);
1175 * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
1176 * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
1177 * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
1178 * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
1179 * module which might be used).
1181 if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
1182 debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1184 if (rexec_flag) {
1185 rexec_argv = xmalloc(sizeof(char *) * (rexec_argc + 2));
1186 for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) {
1187 debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
1188 rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
1190 rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
1191 rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
1194 /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
1195 if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
1196 log_stderr = 1;
1197 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1200 * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
1201 * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
1202 * exits.
1204 if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
1205 #ifdef TIOCNOTTY
1206 int fd;
1207 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1208 if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
1209 fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
1211 /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
1212 #ifdef TIOCNOTTY
1213 fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
1214 if (fd >= 0) {
1215 (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
1216 close(fd);
1218 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1220 /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
1221 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1223 /* Initialize the random number generator. */
1224 arc4random_stir();
1226 /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
1227 unmounted if desired. */
1228 chdir("/");
1230 /* ignore SIGPIPE */
1231 signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
1233 /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
1234 if (inetd_flag) {
1235 int fd;
1237 startup_pipe = -1;
1238 if (rexeced_flag) {
1239 close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
1240 sock_in = sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
1241 if (!debug_flag) {
1242 startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1243 close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1245 } else {
1246 sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
1247 sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
1250 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
1251 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
1252 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
1254 if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
1255 dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
1256 dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
1257 if (fd > STDOUT_FILENO)
1258 close(fd);
1260 debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
1261 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
1262 sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
1263 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1264 } else {
1265 for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
1266 if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
1267 continue;
1268 if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
1269 fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
1270 "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
1271 if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
1272 ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
1273 NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
1274 error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
1275 (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) :
1276 strerror(errno));
1277 continue;
1279 /* Create socket for listening. */
1280 listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
1281 ai->ai_protocol);
1282 if (listen_sock < 0) {
1283 /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
1284 verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1285 continue;
1287 if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
1288 close(listen_sock);
1289 continue;
1292 * Set socket options.
1293 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
1295 if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
1296 &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1297 error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
1299 debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
1301 /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
1302 if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
1303 if (!ai->ai_next)
1304 error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
1305 strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
1306 close(listen_sock);
1307 continue;
1309 listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
1310 num_listen_socks++;
1312 /* Start listening on the port. */
1313 logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
1314 if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
1315 fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1318 freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
1320 if (!num_listen_socks)
1321 fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
1323 if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
1324 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1327 * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs
1328 * listen_sock.
1330 signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
1332 signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
1333 signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
1335 /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
1336 signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
1338 /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
1339 if (!debug_flag) {
1341 * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
1342 * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to
1343 * do this before the bind above because the bind will
1344 * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
1345 * overwrite any old pid in the file.
1347 f = fopen(options.pid_file, "wb");
1348 if (f == NULL) {
1349 error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
1350 options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
1351 } else {
1352 fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
1353 fclose(f);
1357 /* setup fd set for listen */
1358 fdset = NULL;
1359 maxfd = 0;
1360 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1361 if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
1362 maxfd = listen_socks[i];
1363 /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
1364 startup_pipes = xmalloc(options.max_startups * sizeof(int));
1365 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1366 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1369 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
1370 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
1372 for (;;) {
1373 if (received_sighup)
1374 sighup_restart();
1375 if (fdset != NULL)
1376 xfree(fdset);
1377 fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
1378 fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
1379 memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
1381 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
1382 FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
1383 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1384 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
1385 FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
1387 /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
1388 ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1389 if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
1390 error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1391 if (received_sigterm) {
1392 logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
1393 (int) received_sigterm);
1394 close_listen_socks();
1395 unlink(options.pid_file);
1396 exit(255);
1398 if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
1399 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1400 key_used = 0;
1401 key_do_regen = 0;
1403 if (ret < 0)
1404 continue;
1406 for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
1407 if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
1408 FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
1410 * the read end of the pipe is ready
1411 * if the child has closed the pipe
1412 * after successful authentication
1413 * or if the child has died
1415 close(startup_pipes[i]);
1416 startup_pipes[i] = -1;
1417 startups--;
1419 for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
1420 if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
1421 continue;
1422 fromlen = sizeof(from);
1423 newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from,
1424 &fromlen);
1425 if (newsock < 0) {
1426 if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
1427 error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1428 continue;
1430 if (unset_nonblock(newsock) == -1) {
1431 close(newsock);
1432 continue;
1434 if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
1435 debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
1436 close(newsock);
1437 continue;
1439 if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
1440 close(newsock);
1441 continue;
1444 if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
1445 SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
1446 error("reexec socketpair: %s",
1447 strerror(errno));
1448 close(newsock);
1449 close(startup_p[0]);
1450 close(startup_p[1]);
1451 continue;
1454 for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
1455 if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
1456 startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
1457 if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
1458 maxfd = startup_p[0];
1459 startups++;
1460 break;
1464 * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
1465 * we are in debugging mode.
1467 if (debug_flag) {
1469 * In debugging mode. Close the listening
1470 * socket, and start processing the
1471 * connection without forking.
1473 debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
1474 close_listen_socks();
1475 sock_in = newsock;
1476 sock_out = newsock;
1477 close(startup_p[0]);
1478 close(startup_p[1]);
1479 startup_pipe = -1;
1480 pid = getpid();
1481 if (rexec_flag) {
1482 send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
1483 &cfg);
1484 close(config_s[0]);
1486 break;
1487 } else {
1489 * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
1490 * the child process the connection. The
1491 * parent continues listening.
1493 if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
1495 * Child. Close the listening and max_startup
1496 * sockets. Start using the accepted socket.
1497 * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
1498 * changed). We break out of the loop to handle
1499 * the connection.
1501 startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
1502 close_startup_pipes();
1503 close_listen_socks();
1504 sock_in = newsock;
1505 sock_out = newsock;
1506 log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1507 if (rexec_flag)
1508 close(config_s[0]);
1509 break;
1513 /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
1514 if (pid < 0)
1515 error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1516 else
1517 debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
1519 close(startup_p[1]);
1521 if (rexec_flag) {
1522 send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
1523 close(config_s[0]);
1524 close(config_s[1]);
1527 /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
1528 if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
1529 key_used == 0) {
1530 /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
1531 signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
1532 alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
1533 key_used = 1;
1536 arc4random_stir();
1538 /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
1539 close(newsock);
1541 /* child process check (or debug mode) */
1542 if (num_listen_socks < 0)
1543 break;
1547 /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
1548 setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
1551 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
1552 * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
1553 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
1555 #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
1557 * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
1558 * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
1559 * controlling tty" errors.
1561 if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
1562 error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1563 #endif
1565 if (rexec_flag) {
1566 int fd;
1568 debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
1569 sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
1570 dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
1571 dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
1572 if (startup_pipe == -1)
1573 close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1574 else
1575 dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
1577 dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
1578 close(config_s[1]);
1579 if (startup_pipe != -1)
1580 close(startup_pipe);
1582 execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
1584 /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
1585 error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
1586 recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
1587 log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
1588 options.log_facility, log_stderr);
1590 /* Clean up fds */
1591 startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
1592 close(config_s[1]);
1593 close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
1594 newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
1595 if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
1596 dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
1597 dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
1598 if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
1599 close(fd);
1601 debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
1602 sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
1606 * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
1607 * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
1608 * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
1610 alarm(0);
1611 signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
1612 signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
1613 signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
1614 signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
1615 signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
1616 signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
1618 /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
1619 if (options.tcp_keep_alive &&
1620 setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on,
1621 sizeof(on)) < 0)
1622 error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1625 * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
1626 * not have a key.
1628 packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
1630 remote_port = get_remote_port();
1631 remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
1633 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1634 audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
1635 #endif
1636 #ifdef LIBWRAP
1637 /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
1638 if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1639 struct request_info req;
1641 request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
1642 fromhost(&req);
1644 if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
1645 debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
1646 refuse(&req);
1647 /* NOTREACHED */
1648 fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
1651 #endif /* LIBWRAP */
1653 /* Log the connection. */
1654 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
1657 * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
1658 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
1659 * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
1660 * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
1661 * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
1662 * are about to discover the bug.
1664 signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
1665 if (!debug_flag)
1666 alarm(options.login_grace_time);
1668 sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
1670 packet_set_nonblocking();
1672 /* allocate authentication context */
1673 authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
1674 memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
1676 /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
1677 the_authctxt = authctxt;
1679 /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
1680 buffer_init(&loginmsg);
1682 if (use_privsep)
1683 if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
1684 goto authenticated;
1686 /* perform the key exchange */
1687 /* authenticate user and start session */
1688 if (compat20) {
1689 do_ssh2_kex();
1690 do_authentication2(authctxt);
1691 } else {
1692 do_ssh1_kex();
1693 do_authentication(authctxt);
1696 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
1697 * the current keystate and exits
1699 if (use_privsep) {
1700 mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
1701 exit(0);
1704 authenticated:
1705 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1706 audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
1707 #endif
1710 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
1711 * file descriptor passing.
1713 if (use_privsep) {
1714 privsep_postauth(authctxt);
1715 /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
1716 if (!compat20)
1717 destroy_sensitive_data();
1720 /* Start session. */
1721 do_authenticated(authctxt);
1723 /* The connection has been terminated. */
1724 verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
1726 #ifdef USE_PAM
1727 if (options.use_pam)
1728 finish_pam();
1729 #endif /* USE_PAM */
1731 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1732 PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
1733 #endif
1735 packet_close();
1737 if (use_privsep)
1738 mm_terminate();
1740 exit(0);
1744 * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
1745 * (key with larger modulus first).
1748 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
1750 int rsafail = 0;
1752 if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
1753 /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
1754 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
1755 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1756 fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1757 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1758 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1759 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1760 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1762 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1763 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
1764 rsafail++;
1765 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1766 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
1767 rsafail++;
1768 } else {
1769 /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
1770 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
1771 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1772 fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1773 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1774 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
1775 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1776 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1778 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1779 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
1780 rsafail++;
1781 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1782 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
1783 rsafail++;
1785 return (rsafail);
1788 * SSH1 key exchange
1790 static void
1791 do_ssh1_kex(void)
1793 int i, len;
1794 int rsafail = 0;
1795 BIGNUM *session_key_int;
1796 u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
1797 u_char cookie[8];
1798 u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
1799 u_int32_t rnd = 0;
1802 * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
1803 * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
1804 * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
1805 * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
1806 * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
1807 * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
1808 * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
1810 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
1811 if (i % 4 == 0)
1812 rnd = arc4random();
1813 cookie[i] = rnd & 0xff;
1814 rnd >>= 8;
1818 * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
1819 * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
1820 * spoofing.
1822 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
1823 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1824 packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
1826 /* Store our public server RSA key. */
1827 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
1828 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
1829 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
1831 /* Store our public host RSA key. */
1832 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1833 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
1834 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
1836 /* Put protocol flags. */
1837 packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
1839 /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
1840 packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
1842 /* Declare supported authentication types. */
1843 auth_mask = 0;
1844 if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
1845 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
1846 if (options.rsa_authentication)
1847 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
1848 if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
1849 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
1850 if (options.password_authentication)
1851 auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
1852 packet_put_int(auth_mask);
1854 /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
1855 packet_send();
1856 packet_write_wait();
1858 debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
1859 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
1860 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
1862 /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
1863 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
1865 /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
1866 cipher_type = packet_get_char();
1868 if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
1869 packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
1871 /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
1872 sent earlier with the public key packet. */
1873 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1874 if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
1875 packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
1877 debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
1879 /* Get the encrypted integer. */
1880 if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
1881 fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
1882 packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
1884 protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
1885 packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
1886 packet_check_eom();
1888 /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
1889 rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int));
1892 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
1893 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
1894 * key is in the highest bits.
1896 if (!rsafail) {
1897 BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
1898 len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1899 if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
1900 error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
1901 "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
1902 get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
1903 rsafail++;
1904 } else {
1905 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1906 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
1907 session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
1909 derive_ssh1_session_id(
1910 sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
1911 sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
1912 cookie, session_id);
1914 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
1915 * session id.
1917 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1918 session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
1921 if (rsafail) {
1922 int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1923 u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
1924 MD5_CTX md;
1926 logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
1927 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
1928 MD5_Init(&md);
1929 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1930 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1931 MD5_Final(session_key, &md);
1932 MD5_Init(&md);
1933 MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16);
1934 MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
1935 MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
1936 MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
1937 memset(buf, 0, bytes);
1938 xfree(buf);
1939 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1940 session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
1942 /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
1943 destroy_sensitive_data();
1945 if (use_privsep)
1946 mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
1948 /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
1949 BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
1951 /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
1952 packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
1954 /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
1955 memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1957 debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
1959 /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
1960 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
1961 packet_send();
1962 packet_write_wait();
1966 * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
1968 static void
1969 do_ssh2_kex(void)
1971 Kex *kex;
1973 if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
1974 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1975 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
1977 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1978 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
1979 myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
1980 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
1982 if (options.macs != NULL) {
1983 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
1984 myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
1986 if (!options.compression) {
1987 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
1988 myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
1990 myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
1992 /* start key exchange */
1993 kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
1994 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1995 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1996 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1997 kex->server = 1;
1998 kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
1999 kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
2000 kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
2001 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
2003 xxx_kex = kex;
2005 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
2007 session_id2 = kex->session_id;
2008 session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
2010 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
2011 /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
2012 packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
2013 packet_put_cstring("markus");
2014 packet_send();
2015 packet_write_wait();
2016 #endif
2017 debug("KEX done");
2020 /* server specific fatal cleanup */
2021 void
2022 cleanup_exit(int i)
2024 if (the_authctxt)
2025 do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
2026 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
2027 /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
2028 if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
2029 audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
2030 #endif
2031 _exit(i);