2 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
3 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
5 * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
6 * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
7 * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
8 * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
9 * authentication agent connections.
11 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
12 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
13 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
14 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
15 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
17 * SSH2 implementation:
18 * Privilege Separation:
20 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
21 * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
32 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
33 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
34 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
35 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
36 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
37 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
38 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
39 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
40 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
41 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
45 RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.308 2005/02/08 22:24:57 dtucker Exp $");
47 #include <openssl/dh.h>
48 #include <openssl/bn.h>
49 #include <openssl/md5.h>
50 #include <openssl/rand.h>
51 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
52 #include <sys/security.h>
73 #include "myproposal.h"
75 #include "pathnames.h"
84 #include "monitor_mm.h"
86 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
87 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
92 int allow_severity
= LOG_INFO
;
93 int deny_severity
= LOG_WARNING
;
101 #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
102 #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
103 #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
104 #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
106 extern char *__progname
;
108 /* Server configuration options. */
109 ServerOptions options
;
111 /* Name of the server configuration file. */
112 char *config_file_name
= _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE
;
115 * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
116 * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
117 * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
118 * the first connection.
122 /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
125 /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
128 /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
129 int no_daemon_flag
= 0;
131 /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
134 /* Saved arguments to main(). */
139 int rexeced_flag
= 0;
145 * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
148 #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
149 int listen_socks
[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS
];
150 int num_listen_socks
= 0;
153 * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
154 * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
156 char *client_version_string
= NULL
;
157 char *server_version_string
= NULL
;
159 /* for rekeying XXX fixme */
163 * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
164 * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
165 * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
166 * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
167 * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
168 * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
171 Key
*server_key
; /* ephemeral server key */
172 Key
*ssh1_host_key
; /* ssh1 host key */
173 Key
**host_keys
; /* all private host keys */
176 u_char ssh1_cookie
[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH
];
180 * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
181 * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
183 static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen
= 0;
185 /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
186 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup
= 0;
187 static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm
= 0;
189 /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
190 u_char session_id
[16];
193 u_char
*session_id2
= NULL
;
194 u_int session_id2_len
= 0;
196 /* record remote hostname or ip */
197 u_int utmp_len
= MAXHOSTNAMELEN
;
199 /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
200 int *startup_pipes
= NULL
;
201 int startup_pipe
; /* in child */
203 /* variables used for privilege separation */
205 struct monitor
*pmonitor
= NULL
;
207 /* global authentication context */
208 Authctxt
*the_authctxt
= NULL
;
210 /* message to be displayed after login */
213 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
214 void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
215 void demote_sensitive_data(void);
217 static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
218 static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
221 * Close all listening sockets
224 close_listen_socks(void)
228 for (i
= 0; i
< num_listen_socks
; i
++)
229 close(listen_socks
[i
]);
230 num_listen_socks
= -1;
234 close_startup_pipes(void)
239 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.max_startups
; i
++)
240 if (startup_pipes
[i
] != -1)
241 close(startup_pipes
[i
]);
245 * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
246 * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
250 sighup_handler(int sig
)
252 int save_errno
= errno
;
255 signal(SIGHUP
, sighup_handler
);
260 * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
261 * Restarts the server.
266 logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
267 close_listen_socks();
268 close_startup_pipes();
269 execv(saved_argv
[0], saved_argv
);
270 logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv
[0],
276 * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
279 sigterm_handler(int sig
)
281 received_sigterm
= sig
;
285 * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
286 * reap any zombies left by exited children.
289 main_sigchld_handler(int sig
)
291 int save_errno
= errno
;
295 while ((pid
= waitpid(-1, &status
, WNOHANG
)) > 0 ||
296 (pid
< 0 && errno
== EINTR
))
299 signal(SIGCHLD
, main_sigchld_handler
);
304 * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
307 grace_alarm_handler(int sig
)
309 /* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
311 if (use_privsep
&& pmonitor
!= NULL
&& pmonitor
->m_pid
> 0)
312 kill(pmonitor
->m_pid
, SIGALRM
);
314 /* Log error and exit. */
315 fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
319 * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
320 * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
321 * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
322 * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
326 generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
331 verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
332 sensitive_data
.server_key
? "new " : "", options
.server_key_bits
);
333 if (sensitive_data
.server_key
!= NULL
)
334 key_free(sensitive_data
.server_key
);
335 sensitive_data
.server_key
= key_generate(KEY_RSA1
,
336 options
.server_key_bits
);
337 verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
339 for (i
= 0; i
< SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH
; i
++) {
342 sensitive_data
.ssh1_cookie
[i
] = rnd
& 0xff;
349 key_regeneration_alarm(int sig
)
351 int save_errno
= errno
;
353 signal(SIGALRM
, SIG_DFL
);
359 sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
, int sock_out
)
362 int remote_major
, remote_minor
;
365 char buf
[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
366 char remote_version
[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
368 if ((options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_1
) &&
369 (options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_2
)) {
370 major
= PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1
;
372 } else if (options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_2
) {
373 major
= PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2
;
374 minor
= PROTOCOL_MINOR_2
;
376 major
= PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1
;
377 minor
= PROTOCOL_MINOR_1
;
379 snprintf(buf
, sizeof buf
, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", major
, minor
, SSH_VERSION
);
380 server_version_string
= xstrdup(buf
);
382 /* Send our protocol version identification. */
383 if (atomicio(vwrite
, sock_out
, server_version_string
,
384 strlen(server_version_string
))
385 != strlen(server_version_string
)) {
386 logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
390 /* Read other sides version identification. */
391 memset(buf
, 0, sizeof(buf
));
392 for (i
= 0; i
< sizeof(buf
) - 1; i
++) {
393 if (atomicio(read
, sock_in
, &buf
[i
], 1) != 1) {
394 logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
395 get_remote_ipaddr());
398 if (buf
[i
] == '\r') {
400 /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
402 strncmp(buf
, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
406 if (buf
[i
] == '\n') {
411 buf
[sizeof(buf
) - 1] = 0;
412 client_version_string
= xstrdup(buf
);
415 * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
416 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
418 if (sscanf(client_version_string
, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
419 &remote_major
, &remote_minor
, remote_version
) != 3) {
420 s
= "Protocol mismatch.\n";
421 (void) atomicio(vwrite
, sock_out
, s
, strlen(s
));
424 logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
425 client_version_string
, get_remote_ipaddr());
428 debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
429 remote_major
, remote_minor
, remote_version
);
431 compat_datafellows(remote_version
);
433 if (datafellows
& SSH_BUG_PROBE
) {
434 logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
435 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string
);
439 if (datafellows
& SSH_BUG_SCANNER
) {
440 logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
441 get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string
);
446 switch (remote_major
) {
448 if (remote_minor
== 99) {
449 if (options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_2
)
455 if (!(options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_1
)) {
459 if (remote_minor
< 3) {
460 packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
461 "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
462 } else if (remote_minor
== 3) {
463 /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
468 if (options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_2
) {
477 chop(server_version_string
);
478 debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string
);
481 s
= "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
482 (void) atomicio(vwrite
, sock_out
, s
, strlen(s
));
485 logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
487 server_version_string
, client_version_string
);
492 /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
494 destroy_sensitive_data(void)
498 if (sensitive_data
.server_key
) {
499 key_free(sensitive_data
.server_key
);
500 sensitive_data
.server_key
= NULL
;
502 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.num_host_key_files
; i
++) {
503 if (sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
]) {
504 key_free(sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
]);
505 sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
] = NULL
;
508 sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
= NULL
;
509 memset(sensitive_data
.ssh1_cookie
, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH
);
512 /* Demote private to public keys for network child */
514 demote_sensitive_data(void)
519 if (sensitive_data
.server_key
) {
520 tmp
= key_demote(sensitive_data
.server_key
);
521 key_free(sensitive_data
.server_key
);
522 sensitive_data
.server_key
= tmp
;
525 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.num_host_key_files
; i
++) {
526 if (sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
]) {
527 tmp
= key_demote(sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
]);
528 key_free(sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
]);
529 sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
] = tmp
;
530 if (tmp
->type
== KEY_RSA1
)
531 sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
= tmp
;
535 /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
539 privsep_preauth_child(void)
546 /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
547 privsep_challenge_enable();
549 for (i
= 0; i
< 256; i
++)
550 rnd
[i
] = arc4random();
551 RAND_seed(rnd
, sizeof(rnd
));
553 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
554 demote_sensitive_data();
556 if ((pw
= getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
)) == NULL
)
557 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
559 memset(pw
->pw_passwd
, 0, strlen(pw
->pw_passwd
));
562 /* Change our root directory */
563 if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
) == -1)
564 fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
,
566 if (chdir("/") == -1)
567 fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno
));
569 /* Drop our privileges */
570 debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int
)pw
->pw_uid
,
573 /* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
574 do_setusercontext(pw
);
576 gidset
[0] = pw
->pw_gid
;
577 if (setgroups(1, gidset
) < 0)
578 fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno
));
579 permanently_set_uid(pw
);
584 privsep_preauth(Authctxt
*authctxt
)
589 /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
590 pmonitor
= monitor_init();
591 /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
592 pmonitor
->m_pkex
= &xxx_kex
;
596 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
597 } else if (pid
!= 0) {
598 debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid
);
600 close(pmonitor
->m_recvfd
);
601 pmonitor
->m_pid
= pid
;
602 monitor_child_preauth(authctxt
, pmonitor
);
603 close(pmonitor
->m_sendfd
);
606 monitor_sync(pmonitor
);
608 /* Wait for the child's exit status */
609 while (waitpid(pid
, &status
, 0) < 0)
616 close(pmonitor
->m_sendfd
);
618 /* Demote the child */
619 if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
620 privsep_preauth_child();
621 setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
627 privsep_postauth(Authctxt
*authctxt
)
629 #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
632 if (authctxt
->pw
->pw_uid
== 0 || options
.use_login
) {
634 /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
635 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor
);
640 /* Authentication complete */
642 if (startup_pipe
!= -1) {
647 /* New socket pair */
648 monitor_reinit(pmonitor
);
650 pmonitor
->m_pid
= fork();
651 if (pmonitor
->m_pid
== -1)
652 fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
653 else if (pmonitor
->m_pid
!= 0) {
654 debug2("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor
->m_pid
);
655 close(pmonitor
->m_recvfd
);
656 buffer_clear(&loginmsg
);
657 monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor
);
663 close(pmonitor
->m_sendfd
);
665 /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
666 demote_sensitive_data();
668 /* Drop privileges */
669 do_setusercontext(authctxt
->pw
);
671 /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
672 monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor
);
676 list_hostkey_types(void)
684 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.num_host_key_files
; i
++) {
685 Key
*key
= sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
];
691 if (buffer_len(&b
) > 0)
692 buffer_append(&b
, ",", 1);
693 p
= key_ssh_name(key
);
694 buffer_append(&b
, p
, strlen(p
));
698 buffer_append(&b
, "\0", 1);
699 ret
= xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b
));
701 debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret
);
706 get_hostkey_by_type(int type
)
710 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.num_host_key_files
; i
++) {
711 Key
*key
= sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
];
712 if (key
!= NULL
&& key
->type
== type
)
719 get_hostkey_by_index(int ind
)
721 if (ind
< 0 || ind
>= options
.num_host_key_files
)
723 return (sensitive_data
.host_keys
[ind
]);
727 get_hostkey_index(Key
*key
)
731 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.num_host_key_files
; i
++) {
732 if (key
== sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
])
739 * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
740 * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
741 * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
742 * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
745 drop_connection(int startups
)
749 if (startups
< options
.max_startups_begin
)
751 if (startups
>= options
.max_startups
)
753 if (options
.max_startups_rate
== 100)
756 p
= 100 - options
.max_startups_rate
;
757 p
*= startups
- options
.max_startups_begin
;
758 p
/= options
.max_startups
- options
.max_startups_begin
;
759 p
+= options
.max_startups_rate
;
760 r
= arc4random() % 100;
762 debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p
, r
);
763 return (r
< p
) ? 1 : 0;
769 fprintf(stderr
, "%s, %s\n",
770 SSH_RELEASE
, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION
));
772 "usage: sshd [-46Ddeiqt] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
773 " [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
779 send_rexec_state(int fd
, Buffer
*conf
)
783 debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__
, fd
,
787 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
788 * string configuration
789 * u_int ephemeral_key_follows
790 * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
798 buffer_put_cstring(&m
, buffer_ptr(conf
));
800 if (sensitive_data
.server_key
!= NULL
&&
801 sensitive_data
.server_key
->type
== KEY_RSA1
) {
802 buffer_put_int(&m
, 1);
803 buffer_put_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->e
);
804 buffer_put_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
);
805 buffer_put_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->d
);
806 buffer_put_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->iqmp
);
807 buffer_put_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->p
);
808 buffer_put_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->q
);
810 buffer_put_int(&m
, 0);
812 if (ssh_msg_send(fd
, 0, &m
) == -1)
813 fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__
);
817 debug3("%s: done", __func__
);
821 recv_rexec_state(int fd
, Buffer
*conf
)
827 debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__
, fd
);
831 if (ssh_msg_recv(fd
, &m
) == -1)
832 fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__
);
833 if (buffer_get_char(&m
) != 0)
834 fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__
);
836 cp
= buffer_get_string(&m
, &len
);
838 buffer_append(conf
, cp
, len
+ 1);
841 if (buffer_get_int(&m
)) {
842 if (sensitive_data
.server_key
!= NULL
)
843 key_free(sensitive_data
.server_key
);
844 sensitive_data
.server_key
= key_new_private(KEY_RSA1
);
845 buffer_get_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->e
);
846 buffer_get_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
);
847 buffer_get_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->d
);
848 buffer_get_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->iqmp
);
849 buffer_get_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->p
);
850 buffer_get_bignum(&m
, sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->q
);
851 rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
852 sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
);
856 debug3("%s: done", __func__
);
860 * Main program for the daemon.
863 main(int ac
, char **av
)
867 int opt
, j
, i
, fdsetsz
, on
= 1;
868 int sock_in
= -1, sock_out
= -1, newsock
= -1;
872 struct sockaddr_storage from
;
873 const char *remote_ip
;
877 char ntop
[NI_MAXHOST
], strport
[NI_MAXSERV
];
879 int listen_sock
, maxfd
;
880 int startup_p
[2] = { -1 , -1 }, config_s
[2] = { -1 , -1 };
884 int ret
, key_used
= 0;
887 #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
888 (void)set_auth_parameters(ac
, av
);
890 __progname
= ssh_get_progname(av
[0]);
893 /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
896 saved_argv
= xmalloc(sizeof(*saved_argv
) * (ac
+ 1));
897 for (i
= 0; i
< ac
; i
++)
898 saved_argv
[i
] = xstrdup(av
[i
]);
899 saved_argv
[i
] = NULL
;
901 #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
902 /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
903 compat_init_setproctitle(ac
, av
);
907 if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL
) == -1)
908 debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno
));
910 /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
911 initialize_server_options(&options
);
913 /* Parse command-line arguments. */
914 while ((opt
= getopt(ac
, av
, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:dDeiqrtQR46")) != -1) {
917 options
.address_family
= AF_INET
;
920 options
.address_family
= AF_INET6
;
923 config_file_name
= optarg
;
926 if (debug_flag
== 0) {
928 options
.log_level
= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1
;
929 } else if (options
.log_level
< SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3
)
952 options
.log_level
= SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET
;
955 options
.server_key_bits
= atoi(optarg
);
958 options
.ports_from_cmdline
= 1;
959 if (options
.num_ports
>= MAX_PORTS
) {
960 fprintf(stderr
, "too many ports.\n");
963 options
.ports
[options
.num_ports
++] = a2port(optarg
);
964 if (options
.ports
[options
.num_ports
-1] == 0) {
965 fprintf(stderr
, "Bad port number.\n");
970 if ((options
.login_grace_time
= convtime(optarg
)) == -1) {
971 fprintf(stderr
, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
976 if ((options
.key_regeneration_time
= convtime(optarg
)) == -1) {
977 fprintf(stderr
, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
982 if (options
.num_host_key_files
>= MAX_HOSTKEYS
) {
983 fprintf(stderr
, "too many host keys.\n");
986 options
.host_key_files
[options
.num_host_key_files
++] = optarg
;
992 utmp_len
= atoi(optarg
);
993 if (utmp_len
> MAXHOSTNAMELEN
) {
994 fprintf(stderr
, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
999 line
= xstrdup(optarg
);
1000 if (process_server_config_line(&options
, line
,
1001 "command-line", 0) != 0)
1011 if (rexeced_flag
|| inetd_flag
)
1013 if (rexec_flag
&& (av
[0] == NULL
|| *av
[0] != '/'))
1014 fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
1016 closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD
);
1018 closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD
);
1020 SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
1023 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
1024 * key (unless started from inetd)
1026 log_init(__progname
,
1027 options
.log_level
== SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET
?
1028 SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO
: options
.log_level
,
1029 options
.log_facility
== SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET
?
1030 SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH
: options
.log_facility
,
1031 log_stderr
|| !inetd_flag
);
1034 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
1035 * root's environment
1037 if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL
)
1038 unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
1041 /* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
1042 * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
1049 sensitive_data
.server_key
= NULL
;
1050 sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
= NULL
;
1051 sensitive_data
.have_ssh1_key
= 0;
1052 sensitive_data
.have_ssh2_key
= 0;
1054 /* Fetch our configuration */
1057 recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD
, &cfg
);
1059 load_server_config(config_file_name
, &cfg
);
1061 parse_server_config(&options
,
1062 rexeced_flag
? "rexec" : config_file_name
, &cfg
);
1067 /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
1068 fill_default_server_options(&options
);
1070 /* set default channel AF */
1071 channel_set_af(options
.address_family
);
1073 /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
1075 fprintf(stderr
, "Extra argument %s.\n", av
[optind
]);
1079 debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_RELEASE
);
1081 /* load private host keys */
1082 sensitive_data
.host_keys
= xmalloc(options
.num_host_key_files
*
1084 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.num_host_key_files
; i
++)
1085 sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
] = NULL
;
1087 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.num_host_key_files
; i
++) {
1088 key
= key_load_private(options
.host_key_files
[i
], "", NULL
);
1089 sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
] = key
;
1091 error("Could not load host key: %s",
1092 options
.host_key_files
[i
]);
1093 sensitive_data
.host_keys
[i
] = NULL
;
1096 switch (key
->type
) {
1098 sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
= key
;
1099 sensitive_data
.have_ssh1_key
= 1;
1103 sensitive_data
.have_ssh2_key
= 1;
1106 debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i
, key
->type
,
1109 if ((options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_1
) && !sensitive_data
.have_ssh1_key
) {
1110 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
1111 options
.protocol
&= ~SSH_PROTO_1
;
1113 if ((options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_2
) && !sensitive_data
.have_ssh2_key
) {
1114 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
1115 options
.protocol
&= ~SSH_PROTO_2
;
1117 if (!(options
.protocol
& (SSH_PROTO_1
|SSH_PROTO_2
))) {
1118 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
1122 /* Check certain values for sanity. */
1123 if (options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_1
) {
1124 if (options
.server_key_bits
< 512 ||
1125 options
.server_key_bits
> 32768) {
1126 fprintf(stderr
, "Bad server key size.\n");
1130 * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
1131 * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
1132 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
1134 if (options
.server_key_bits
>
1135 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
) -
1136 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED
&& options
.server_key_bits
<
1137 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
) +
1138 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED
) {
1139 options
.server_key_bits
=
1140 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
) +
1141 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED
;
1142 debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
1143 options
.server_key_bits
);
1151 if ((pw
= getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
)) == NULL
)
1152 fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
1154 if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
, &st
) == -1) ||
1155 (S_ISDIR(st
.st_mode
) == 0))
1156 fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
1157 _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
);
1160 if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
) &&
1161 (st
.st_uid
!= getuid () ||
1162 (st
.st_mode
& (S_IWGRP
|S_IWOTH
)) != 0))
1164 if (st
.st_uid
!= 0 || (st
.st_mode
& (S_IWGRP
|S_IWOTH
)) != 0)
1166 fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
1167 "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
);
1170 /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
1175 * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
1176 * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
1177 * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
1178 * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
1179 * module which might be used).
1181 if (setgroups(0, NULL
) < 0)
1182 debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno
));
1185 rexec_argv
= xmalloc(sizeof(char *) * (rexec_argc
+ 2));
1186 for (i
= 0; i
< rexec_argc
; i
++) {
1187 debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i
, saved_argv
[i
]);
1188 rexec_argv
[i
] = saved_argv
[i
];
1190 rexec_argv
[rexec_argc
] = "-R";
1191 rexec_argv
[rexec_argc
+ 1] = NULL
;
1194 /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
1195 if (debug_flag
&& (!inetd_flag
|| rexeced_flag
))
1197 log_init(__progname
, options
.log_level
, options
.log_facility
, log_stderr
);
1200 * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
1201 * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
1204 if (!(debug_flag
|| inetd_flag
|| no_daemon_flag
)) {
1207 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1208 if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
1209 fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno
));
1211 /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
1213 fd
= open(_PATH_TTY
, O_RDWR
| O_NOCTTY
);
1215 (void) ioctl(fd
, TIOCNOTTY
, NULL
);
1218 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1220 /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
1221 log_init(__progname
, options
.log_level
, options
.log_facility
, log_stderr
);
1223 /* Initialize the random number generator. */
1226 /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
1227 unmounted if desired. */
1230 /* ignore SIGPIPE */
1231 signal(SIGPIPE
, SIG_IGN
);
1233 /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
1239 close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD
);
1240 sock_in
= sock_out
= dup(STDIN_FILENO
);
1242 startup_pipe
= dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD
);
1243 close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD
);
1246 sock_in
= dup(STDIN_FILENO
);
1247 sock_out
= dup(STDOUT_FILENO
);
1250 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
1251 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
1252 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
1254 if ((fd
= open(_PATH_DEVNULL
, O_RDWR
, 0)) != -1) {
1255 dup2(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
);
1256 dup2(fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
);
1257 if (fd
> STDOUT_FILENO
)
1260 debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in
, sock_out
);
1261 if ((options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_1
) &&
1262 sensitive_data
.server_key
== NULL
)
1263 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1265 for (ai
= options
.listen_addrs
; ai
; ai
= ai
->ai_next
) {
1266 if (ai
->ai_family
!= AF_INET
&& ai
->ai_family
!= AF_INET6
)
1268 if (num_listen_socks
>= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS
)
1269 fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
1270 "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
1271 if ((ret
= getnameinfo(ai
->ai_addr
, ai
->ai_addrlen
,
1272 ntop
, sizeof(ntop
), strport
, sizeof(strport
),
1273 NI_NUMERICHOST
|NI_NUMERICSERV
)) != 0) {
1274 error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
1275 (ret
!= EAI_SYSTEM
) ? gai_strerror(ret
) :
1279 /* Create socket for listening. */
1280 listen_sock
= socket(ai
->ai_family
, ai
->ai_socktype
,
1282 if (listen_sock
< 0) {
1283 /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
1284 verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno
));
1287 if (set_nonblock(listen_sock
) == -1) {
1292 * Set socket options.
1293 * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
1295 if (setsockopt(listen_sock
, SOL_SOCKET
, SO_REUSEADDR
,
1296 &on
, sizeof(on
)) == -1)
1297 error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno
));
1299 debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport
, ntop
);
1301 /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
1302 if (bind(listen_sock
, ai
->ai_addr
, ai
->ai_addrlen
) < 0) {
1304 error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
1305 strport
, ntop
, strerror(errno
));
1309 listen_socks
[num_listen_socks
] = listen_sock
;
1312 /* Start listening on the port. */
1313 logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop
, strport
);
1314 if (listen(listen_sock
, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG
) < 0)
1315 fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno
));
1318 freeaddrinfo(options
.listen_addrs
);
1320 if (!num_listen_socks
)
1321 fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
1323 if (options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_1
)
1324 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1327 * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs
1330 signal(SIGHUP
, sighup_handler
);
1332 signal(SIGTERM
, sigterm_handler
);
1333 signal(SIGQUIT
, sigterm_handler
);
1335 /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
1336 signal(SIGCHLD
, main_sigchld_handler
);
1338 /* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
1341 * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
1342 * easier to kill the correct sshd. We don't want to
1343 * do this before the bind above because the bind will
1344 * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
1345 * overwrite any old pid in the file.
1347 f
= fopen(options
.pid_file
, "wb");
1349 error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
1350 options
.pid_file
, strerror(errno
));
1352 fprintf(f
, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
1357 /* setup fd set for listen */
1360 for (i
= 0; i
< num_listen_socks
; i
++)
1361 if (listen_socks
[i
] > maxfd
)
1362 maxfd
= listen_socks
[i
];
1363 /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
1364 startup_pipes
= xmalloc(options
.max_startups
* sizeof(int));
1365 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.max_startups
; i
++)
1366 startup_pipes
[i
] = -1;
1369 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
1370 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
1373 if (received_sighup
)
1377 fdsetsz
= howmany(maxfd
+1, NFDBITS
) * sizeof(fd_mask
);
1378 fdset
= (fd_set
*)xmalloc(fdsetsz
);
1379 memset(fdset
, 0, fdsetsz
);
1381 for (i
= 0; i
< num_listen_socks
; i
++)
1382 FD_SET(listen_socks
[i
], fdset
);
1383 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.max_startups
; i
++)
1384 if (startup_pipes
[i
] != -1)
1385 FD_SET(startup_pipes
[i
], fdset
);
1387 /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
1388 ret
= select(maxfd
+1, fdset
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
1389 if (ret
< 0 && errno
!= EINTR
)
1390 error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno
));
1391 if (received_sigterm
) {
1392 logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
1393 (int) received_sigterm
);
1394 close_listen_socks();
1395 unlink(options
.pid_file
);
1398 if (key_used
&& key_do_regen
) {
1399 generate_ephemeral_server_key();
1406 for (i
= 0; i
< options
.max_startups
; i
++)
1407 if (startup_pipes
[i
] != -1 &&
1408 FD_ISSET(startup_pipes
[i
], fdset
)) {
1410 * the read end of the pipe is ready
1411 * if the child has closed the pipe
1412 * after successful authentication
1413 * or if the child has died
1415 close(startup_pipes
[i
]);
1416 startup_pipes
[i
] = -1;
1419 for (i
= 0; i
< num_listen_socks
; i
++) {
1420 if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks
[i
], fdset
))
1422 fromlen
= sizeof(from
);
1423 newsock
= accept(listen_socks
[i
], (struct sockaddr
*)&from
,
1426 if (errno
!= EINTR
&& errno
!= EWOULDBLOCK
)
1427 error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno
));
1430 if (unset_nonblock(newsock
) == -1) {
1434 if (drop_connection(startups
) == 1) {
1435 debug("drop connection #%d", startups
);
1439 if (pipe(startup_p
) == -1) {
1444 if (rexec_flag
&& socketpair(AF_UNIX
,
1445 SOCK_STREAM
, 0, config_s
) == -1) {
1446 error("reexec socketpair: %s",
1449 close(startup_p
[0]);
1450 close(startup_p
[1]);
1454 for (j
= 0; j
< options
.max_startups
; j
++)
1455 if (startup_pipes
[j
] == -1) {
1456 startup_pipes
[j
] = startup_p
[0];
1457 if (maxfd
< startup_p
[0])
1458 maxfd
= startup_p
[0];
1464 * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
1465 * we are in debugging mode.
1469 * In debugging mode. Close the listening
1470 * socket, and start processing the
1471 * connection without forking.
1473 debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
1474 close_listen_socks();
1477 close(startup_p
[0]);
1478 close(startup_p
[1]);
1482 send_rexec_state(config_s
[0],
1489 * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
1490 * the child process the connection. The
1491 * parent continues listening.
1493 if ((pid
= fork()) == 0) {
1495 * Child. Close the listening and max_startup
1496 * sockets. Start using the accepted socket.
1497 * Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
1498 * changed). We break out of the loop to handle
1501 startup_pipe
= startup_p
[1];
1502 close_startup_pipes();
1503 close_listen_socks();
1506 log_init(__progname
, options
.log_level
, options
.log_facility
, log_stderr
);
1513 /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
1515 error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno
));
1517 debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid
);
1519 close(startup_p
[1]);
1522 send_rexec_state(config_s
[0], &cfg
);
1527 /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
1528 if ((options
.protocol
& SSH_PROTO_1
) &&
1530 /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
1531 signal(SIGALRM
, key_regeneration_alarm
);
1532 alarm(options
.key_regeneration_time
);
1538 /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
1541 /* child process check (or debug mode) */
1542 if (num_listen_socks
< 0)
1547 /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
1548 setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
1551 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
1552 * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
1553 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
1555 #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
1557 * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
1558 * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
1559 * controlling tty" errors.
1561 if (!debug_flag
&& !inetd_flag
&& setsid() < 0)
1562 error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno
));
1568 debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
1569 sock_in
, sock_out
, newsock
, startup_pipe
, config_s
[0]);
1570 dup2(newsock
, STDIN_FILENO
);
1571 dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, STDOUT_FILENO
);
1572 if (startup_pipe
== -1)
1573 close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD
);
1575 dup2(startup_pipe
, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD
);
1577 dup2(config_s
[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD
);
1579 if (startup_pipe
!= -1)
1580 close(startup_pipe
);
1582 execv(rexec_argv
[0], rexec_argv
);
1584 /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
1585 error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv
[0], strerror(errno
));
1586 recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD
, NULL
);
1587 log_init(__progname
, options
.log_level
,
1588 options
.log_facility
, log_stderr
);
1591 startup_pipe
= REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD
;
1593 close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD
);
1594 newsock
= sock_out
= sock_in
= dup(STDIN_FILENO
);
1595 if ((fd
= open(_PATH_DEVNULL
, O_RDWR
, 0)) != -1) {
1596 dup2(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
);
1597 dup2(fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
);
1598 if (fd
> STDERR_FILENO
)
1601 debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
1602 sock_in
, sock_out
, newsock
, startup_pipe
, config_s
[0]);
1606 * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
1607 * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
1608 * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
1611 signal(SIGALRM
, SIG_DFL
);
1612 signal(SIGHUP
, SIG_DFL
);
1613 signal(SIGTERM
, SIG_DFL
);
1614 signal(SIGQUIT
, SIG_DFL
);
1615 signal(SIGCHLD
, SIG_DFL
);
1616 signal(SIGINT
, SIG_DFL
);
1618 /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
1619 if (options
.tcp_keep_alive
&&
1620 setsockopt(sock_in
, SOL_SOCKET
, SO_KEEPALIVE
, &on
,
1622 error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno
));
1625 * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
1628 packet_set_connection(sock_in
, sock_out
);
1630 remote_port
= get_remote_port();
1631 remote_ip
= get_remote_ipaddr();
1633 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1634 audit_connection_from(remote_ip
, remote_port
);
1637 /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
1638 if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1639 struct request_info req
;
1641 request_init(&req
, RQ_DAEMON
, __progname
, RQ_FILE
, sock_in
, 0);
1644 if (!hosts_access(&req
)) {
1645 debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
1648 fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
1651 #endif /* LIBWRAP */
1653 /* Log the connection. */
1654 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip
, remote_port
);
1657 * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
1658 * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
1659 * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
1660 * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
1661 * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
1662 * are about to discover the bug.
1664 signal(SIGALRM
, grace_alarm_handler
);
1666 alarm(options
.login_grace_time
);
1668 sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in
, sock_out
);
1670 packet_set_nonblocking();
1672 /* allocate authentication context */
1673 authctxt
= xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt
));
1674 memset(authctxt
, 0, sizeof(*authctxt
));
1676 /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
1677 the_authctxt
= authctxt
;
1679 /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
1680 buffer_init(&loginmsg
);
1683 if (privsep_preauth(authctxt
) == 1)
1686 /* perform the key exchange */
1687 /* authenticate user and start session */
1690 do_authentication2(authctxt
);
1693 do_authentication(authctxt
);
1696 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
1697 * the current keystate and exits
1700 mm_send_keystate(pmonitor
);
1705 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1706 audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS
);
1710 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
1711 * file descriptor passing.
1714 privsep_postauth(authctxt
);
1715 /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
1717 destroy_sensitive_data();
1720 /* Start session. */
1721 do_authenticated(authctxt
);
1723 /* The connection has been terminated. */
1724 verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip
);
1727 if (options
.use_pam
)
1729 #endif /* USE_PAM */
1731 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1732 PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE
));
1744 * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
1745 * (key with larger modulus first).
1748 ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM
*session_key_int
)
1752 if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
, sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
) > 0) {
1753 /* Server key has bigger modulus. */
1754 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
) <
1755 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED
) {
1756 fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1757 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1758 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
),
1759 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
),
1760 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED
);
1762 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int
, session_key_int
,
1763 sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
) <= 0)
1765 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int
, session_key_int
,
1766 sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
) <= 0)
1769 /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
1770 if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
) <
1771 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED
) {
1772 fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1773 get_remote_ipaddr(),
1774 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
),
1775 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
),
1776 SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED
);
1778 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int
, session_key_int
,
1779 sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
) < 0)
1781 if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int
, session_key_int
,
1782 sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
) < 0)
1795 BIGNUM
*session_key_int
;
1796 u_char session_key
[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH
];
1798 u_int cipher_type
, auth_mask
, protocol_flags
;
1802 * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
1803 * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
1804 * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
1805 * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
1806 * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
1807 * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
1808 * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
1810 for (i
= 0; i
< 8; i
++) {
1813 cookie
[i
] = rnd
& 0xff;
1818 * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
1819 * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
1822 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1823 for (i
= 0; i
< 8; i
++)
1824 packet_put_char(cookie
[i
]);
1826 /* Store our public server RSA key. */
1827 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
));
1828 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->e
);
1829 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
);
1831 /* Store our public host RSA key. */
1832 packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
));
1833 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->e
);
1834 packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
);
1836 /* Put protocol flags. */
1837 packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN
);
1839 /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
1840 packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
1842 /* Declare supported authentication types. */
1844 if (options
.rhosts_rsa_authentication
)
1845 auth_mask
|= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA
;
1846 if (options
.rsa_authentication
)
1847 auth_mask
|= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA
;
1848 if (options
.challenge_response_authentication
== 1)
1849 auth_mask
|= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS
;
1850 if (options
.password_authentication
)
1851 auth_mask
|= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD
;
1852 packet_put_int(auth_mask
);
1854 /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
1856 packet_write_wait();
1858 debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
1859 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
),
1860 BN_num_bits(sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
));
1862 /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
1863 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY
);
1865 /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
1866 cipher_type
= packet_get_char();
1868 if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type
)))
1869 packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
1871 /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
1872 sent earlier with the public key packet. */
1873 for (i
= 0; i
< 8; i
++)
1874 if (cookie
[i
] != packet_get_char())
1875 packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
1877 debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type
));
1879 /* Get the encrypted integer. */
1880 if ((session_key_int
= BN_new()) == NULL
)
1881 fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
1882 packet_get_bignum(session_key_int
);
1884 protocol_flags
= packet_get_int();
1885 packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags
);
1888 /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */
1889 rsafail
= PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int
));
1892 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
1893 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
1894 * key is in the highest bits.
1897 BN_mask_bits(session_key_int
, sizeof(session_key
) * 8);
1898 len
= BN_num_bytes(session_key_int
);
1899 if (len
< 0 || len
> sizeof(session_key
)) {
1900 error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
1901 "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
1902 get_remote_ipaddr(), len
, (u_long
)sizeof(session_key
));
1905 memset(session_key
, 0, sizeof(session_key
));
1906 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int
,
1907 session_key
+ sizeof(session_key
) - len
);
1909 derive_ssh1_session_id(
1910 sensitive_data
.ssh1_host_key
->rsa
->n
,
1911 sensitive_data
.server_key
->rsa
->n
,
1912 cookie
, session_id
);
1914 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
1917 for (i
= 0; i
< 16; i
++)
1918 session_key
[i
] ^= session_id
[i
];
1922 int bytes
= BN_num_bytes(session_key_int
);
1923 u_char
*buf
= xmalloc(bytes
);
1926 logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
1927 BN_bn2bin(session_key_int
, buf
);
1929 MD5_Update(&md
, buf
, bytes
);
1930 MD5_Update(&md
, sensitive_data
.ssh1_cookie
, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH
);
1931 MD5_Final(session_key
, &md
);
1933 MD5_Update(&md
, session_key
, 16);
1934 MD5_Update(&md
, buf
, bytes
);
1935 MD5_Update(&md
, sensitive_data
.ssh1_cookie
, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH
);
1936 MD5_Final(session_key
+ 16, &md
);
1937 memset(buf
, 0, bytes
);
1939 for (i
= 0; i
< 16; i
++)
1940 session_id
[i
] = session_key
[i
] ^ session_key
[i
+ 16];
1942 /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
1943 destroy_sensitive_data();
1946 mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id
);
1948 /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
1949 BN_clear_free(session_key_int
);
1951 /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
1952 packet_set_encryption_key(session_key
, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH
, cipher_type
);
1954 /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
1955 memset(session_key
, 0, sizeof(session_key
));
1957 debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
1959 /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
1960 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS
);
1962 packet_write_wait();
1966 * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
1973 if (options
.ciphers
!= NULL
) {
1974 myproposal
[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS
] =
1975 myproposal
[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC
] = options
.ciphers
;
1977 myproposal
[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS
] =
1978 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal
[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS
]);
1979 myproposal
[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC
] =
1980 compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal
[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC
]);
1982 if (options
.macs
!= NULL
) {
1983 myproposal
[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS
] =
1984 myproposal
[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC
] = options
.macs
;
1986 if (!options
.compression
) {
1987 myproposal
[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS
] =
1988 myproposal
[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC
] = "none";
1990 myproposal
[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS
] = list_hostkey_types();
1992 /* start key exchange */
1993 kex
= kex_setup(myproposal
);
1994 kex
->kex
[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1
] = kexdh_server
;
1995 kex
->kex
[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1
] = kexdh_server
;
1996 kex
->kex
[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1
] = kexgex_server
;
1998 kex
->client_version_string
=client_version_string
;
1999 kex
->server_version_string
=server_version_string
;
2000 kex
->load_host_key
=&get_hostkey_by_type
;
2001 kex
->host_key_index
=&get_hostkey_index
;
2005 dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK
, &kex
->done
, kex
);
2007 session_id2
= kex
->session_id
;
2008 session_id2_len
= kex
->session_id_len
;
2011 /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
2012 packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE
);
2013 packet_put_cstring("markus");
2015 packet_write_wait();
2020 /* server specific fatal cleanup */
2025 do_cleanup(the_authctxt
);
2026 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
2027 /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
2028 if (!use_privsep
|| mm_is_monitor())
2029 audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON
);