- (dtucker) [defines.h] Use SIZE_T_MAX for SIZE_MAX for platforms that have a
[openssh-git.git] / monitor.c
blob29d987c70fdc243ea3038e463720aa5f51f9554e
1 /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.110 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
2 /*
3 * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4 * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5 * All rights reserved.
7 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * are met:
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
28 #include "includes.h"
30 #include <sys/types.h>
31 #include <sys/param.h>
32 #include <sys/socket.h>
33 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
34 #include <sys/wait.h>
36 #include <errno.h>
37 #include <fcntl.h>
38 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
39 #include <paths.h>
40 #endif
41 #include <pwd.h>
42 #include <signal.h>
43 #include <stdarg.h>
44 #include <stdlib.h>
45 #include <string.h>
46 #include <unistd.h>
48 #ifdef SKEY
49 #include <skey.h>
50 #endif
52 #include <openssl/dh.h>
54 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
55 #include "xmalloc.h"
56 #include "ssh.h"
57 #include "key.h"
58 #include "buffer.h"
59 #include "hostfile.h"
60 #include "auth.h"
61 #include "cipher.h"
62 #include "kex.h"
63 #include "dh.h"
64 #ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
65 #undef TARGET_OS_MAC
66 #include "zlib.h"
67 #define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
68 #else
69 #include "zlib.h"
70 #endif
71 #include "packet.h"
72 #include "auth-options.h"
73 #include "sshpty.h"
74 #include "channels.h"
75 #include "session.h"
76 #include "sshlogin.h"
77 #include "canohost.h"
78 #include "log.h"
79 #include "servconf.h"
80 #include "monitor.h"
81 #include "monitor_mm.h"
82 #ifdef GSSAPI
83 #include "ssh-gss.h"
84 #endif
85 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
86 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
87 #include "misc.h"
88 #include "compat.h"
89 #include "ssh2.h"
90 #include "jpake.h"
91 #include "roaming.h"
93 #ifdef GSSAPI
94 static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
95 #endif
97 /* Imports */
98 extern ServerOptions options;
99 extern u_int utmp_len;
100 extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
101 extern z_stream incoming_stream;
102 extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
103 extern u_char session_id[];
104 extern Buffer auth_debug;
105 extern int auth_debug_init;
106 extern Buffer loginmsg;
108 /* State exported from the child */
110 struct {
111 z_stream incoming;
112 z_stream outgoing;
113 u_char *keyin;
114 u_int keyinlen;
115 u_char *keyout;
116 u_int keyoutlen;
117 u_char *ivin;
118 u_int ivinlen;
119 u_char *ivout;
120 u_int ivoutlen;
121 u_char *ssh1key;
122 u_int ssh1keylen;
123 int ssh1cipher;
124 int ssh1protoflags;
125 u_char *input;
126 u_int ilen;
127 u_char *output;
128 u_int olen;
129 u_int64_t sent_bytes;
130 u_int64_t recv_bytes;
131 } child_state;
133 /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
135 int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
136 int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
137 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
138 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
139 int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
140 int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
141 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
142 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
143 int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
144 int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
145 int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
146 int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
147 int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
148 int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
149 int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
150 int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
151 int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
152 int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
153 int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
154 int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
155 int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
156 int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
157 int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
158 int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
159 int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
161 #ifdef USE_PAM
162 int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
163 int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *);
164 int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *);
165 int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *);
166 int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *);
167 int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *);
168 #endif
170 #ifdef GSSAPI
171 int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
172 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
173 int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
174 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
175 #endif
177 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
178 int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
179 int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
180 #endif
182 static Authctxt *authctxt;
183 static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
185 /* local state for key verify */
186 static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
187 static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
188 static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
189 static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
190 static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
191 static char *auth_method = "unknown";
192 static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
193 static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
194 static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
196 struct mon_table {
197 enum monitor_reqtype type;
198 int flags;
199 int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
202 #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
203 #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
204 #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
205 #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
207 #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
209 #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
211 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
212 {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
213 {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
214 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
215 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
216 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
217 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
218 #ifdef USE_PAM
219 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
220 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
221 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
222 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
223 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
224 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
225 #endif
226 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
227 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
228 #endif
229 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
230 {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
231 {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
232 #endif
233 #ifdef SKEY
234 {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
235 {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
236 #endif
237 {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
238 {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
239 #ifdef GSSAPI
240 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
241 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
242 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
243 {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
244 #endif
245 #ifdef JPAKE
246 {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
247 {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
248 {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
249 {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
250 {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
251 #endif
252 {0, 0, NULL}
255 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
256 {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
257 {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
258 {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
259 {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
260 {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
261 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
262 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
263 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
264 #endif
265 {0, 0, NULL}
268 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
269 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
270 {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
271 {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
272 {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
273 {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
274 {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
275 {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
276 {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
277 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
278 {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
279 {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
280 #endif
281 #ifdef SKEY
282 {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
283 {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
284 #endif
285 #ifdef USE_PAM
286 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
287 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
288 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
289 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
290 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
291 {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
292 #endif
293 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
294 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
295 #endif
296 {0, 0, NULL}
299 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
300 {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
301 {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
302 {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
303 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
304 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
305 {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
306 #endif
307 {0, 0, NULL}
310 struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
312 /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
314 static void
315 monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
317 while (ent->f != NULL) {
318 if (ent->type == type) {
319 ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
320 ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
321 return;
323 ent++;
327 static void
328 monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
330 struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
332 while (ent->f != NULL) {
333 if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
334 ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
335 ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
337 ent++;
341 void
342 monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
344 struct mon_table *ent;
345 int authenticated = 0;
347 debug3("preauth child monitor started");
349 authctxt = _authctxt;
350 memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
352 authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
354 if (compat20) {
355 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
357 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
358 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
359 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
360 } else {
361 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
363 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
366 /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
367 while (!authenticated) {
368 auth_method = "unknown";
369 authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
370 if (authenticated) {
371 if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
372 fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
373 __func__, ent->type);
374 if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
375 !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
376 authenticated = 0;
377 #ifdef USE_PAM
378 /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
379 if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
380 Buffer m;
382 buffer_init(&m);
383 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
384 MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
385 authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
386 buffer_free(&m);
388 #endif
391 if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
392 auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
393 compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
394 if (!authenticated)
395 authctxt->failures++;
397 #ifdef JPAKE
398 /* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
399 if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
400 if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
401 jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
402 authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
405 #endif
408 if (!authctxt->valid)
409 fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
410 if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
411 fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
413 debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
414 __func__, authctxt->user);
416 mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
419 static void
420 monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
422 monitor_child_pid = pid;
425 static void
426 monitor_child_handler(int sig)
428 kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
431 void
432 monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
434 monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
435 signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
436 signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
437 signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
439 if (compat20) {
440 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
442 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
443 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
444 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
445 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
446 } else {
447 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
448 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
450 if (!no_pty_flag) {
451 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
452 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
455 for (;;)
456 monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
459 void
460 monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
462 if (options.compression) {
463 /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
464 mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
469 monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
470 struct mon_table **pent)
472 Buffer m;
473 int ret;
474 u_char type;
476 buffer_init(&m);
478 mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
479 type = buffer_get_char(&m);
481 debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
483 while (ent->f != NULL) {
484 if (ent->type == type)
485 break;
486 ent++;
489 if (ent->f != NULL) {
490 if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
491 fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
492 type);
493 ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
494 buffer_free(&m);
496 /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
497 if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
498 debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
499 type);
500 ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
503 if (pent != NULL)
504 *pent = ent;
506 return ret;
509 fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
511 /* NOTREACHED */
512 return (-1);
515 /* allowed key state */
516 static int
517 monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
519 /* make sure key is allowed */
520 if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
521 timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
522 return (0);
523 return (1);
526 static void
527 monitor_reset_key_state(void)
529 /* reset state */
530 if (key_blob != NULL)
531 xfree(key_blob);
532 if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
533 xfree(hostbased_cuser);
534 if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
535 xfree(hostbased_chost);
536 key_blob = NULL;
537 key_bloblen = 0;
538 key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
539 hostbased_cuser = NULL;
540 hostbased_chost = NULL;
544 mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
546 DH *dh;
547 int min, want, max;
549 min = buffer_get_int(m);
550 want = buffer_get_int(m);
551 max = buffer_get_int(m);
553 debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
554 __func__, min, want, max);
555 /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
556 if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
557 fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
558 __func__, min, want, max);
560 buffer_clear(m);
562 dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
563 if (dh == NULL) {
564 buffer_put_char(m, 0);
565 return (0);
566 } else {
567 /* Send first bignum */
568 buffer_put_char(m, 1);
569 buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
570 buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
572 DH_free(dh);
574 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
575 return (0);
579 mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
581 Key *key;
582 u_char *p;
583 u_char *signature;
584 u_int siglen, datlen;
585 int keyid;
587 debug3("%s", __func__);
589 keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
590 p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
593 * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
594 * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
596 if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
597 fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
599 /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
600 if (session_id2_len == 0) {
601 session_id2_len = datlen;
602 session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
603 memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
606 if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
607 fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
608 if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
609 fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
611 debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
613 buffer_clear(m);
614 buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
616 xfree(p);
617 xfree(signature);
619 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
621 /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
622 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
624 return (0);
627 /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
630 mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
632 char *username;
633 struct passwd *pwent;
634 int allowed = 0;
636 debug3("%s", __func__);
638 if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
639 fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
641 username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
643 pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
645 authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
646 setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
647 xfree(username);
649 buffer_clear(m);
651 if (pwent == NULL) {
652 buffer_put_char(m, 0);
653 authctxt->pw = fakepw();
654 goto out;
657 allowed = 1;
658 authctxt->pw = pwent;
659 authctxt->valid = 1;
661 buffer_put_char(m, 1);
662 buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
663 buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
664 buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
665 buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
666 #ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
667 buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
668 #endif
669 buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
670 buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
672 out:
673 buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
674 if (options.banner != NULL)
675 buffer_put_cstring(m, options.banner);
676 debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
677 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
679 /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
680 if (!compat20)
681 monitor_permit_authentications(1);
682 else {
683 /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
684 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
685 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
688 #ifdef USE_PAM
689 if (options.use_pam)
690 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
691 #endif
693 return (0);
696 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
698 char *banner;
700 buffer_clear(m);
701 banner = auth2_read_banner();
702 buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
703 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
705 if (banner != NULL)
706 xfree(banner);
708 return (0);
712 mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
714 monitor_permit_authentications(1);
716 authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
717 authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
718 debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
719 __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
721 if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
722 xfree(authctxt->style);
723 authctxt->style = NULL;
726 return (0);
730 mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
732 static int call_count;
733 char *passwd;
734 int authenticated;
735 u_int plen;
737 passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
738 /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
739 authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
740 auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
741 memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
742 xfree(passwd);
744 buffer_clear(m);
745 buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
747 debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
748 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
750 call_count++;
751 if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
752 auth_method = "none";
753 else
754 auth_method = "password";
756 /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
757 return (authenticated);
760 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
762 mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
764 char *name, *infotxt;
765 u_int numprompts;
766 u_int *echo_on;
767 char **prompts;
768 u_int success;
770 success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
771 &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
773 buffer_clear(m);
774 buffer_put_int(m, success);
775 if (success)
776 buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
778 debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
779 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
781 if (success) {
782 xfree(name);
783 xfree(infotxt);
784 xfree(prompts);
785 xfree(echo_on);
788 return (0);
792 mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
794 char *response;
795 int authok;
797 if (authctxt->as == 0)
798 fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
800 response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
801 authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
802 auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
803 authctxt->as = NULL;
804 debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
805 xfree(response);
807 buffer_clear(m);
808 buffer_put_int(m, authok);
810 debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
811 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
813 auth_method = "bsdauth";
815 return (authok != 0);
817 #endif
819 #ifdef SKEY
821 mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
823 struct skey skey;
824 char challenge[1024];
825 u_int success;
827 success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
828 sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
830 buffer_clear(m);
831 buffer_put_int(m, success);
832 if (success)
833 buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
835 debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
836 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
838 return (0);
842 mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
844 char *response;
845 int authok;
847 response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
849 authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
850 authctxt->valid &&
851 skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
852 skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
854 xfree(response);
856 buffer_clear(m);
857 buffer_put_int(m, authok);
859 debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
860 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
862 auth_method = "skey";
864 return (authok != 0);
866 #endif
868 #ifdef USE_PAM
870 mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m)
872 if (!options.use_pam)
873 fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
875 start_pam(authctxt);
877 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
879 return (0);
883 mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m)
885 u_int ret;
887 if (!options.use_pam)
888 fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
890 ret = do_pam_account();
892 buffer_put_int(m, ret);
893 buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
895 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
897 return (ret);
900 static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
901 extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
904 mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
907 debug3("%s", __func__);
908 authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
909 sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
910 sshpam_authok = NULL;
911 buffer_clear(m);
912 if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
913 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
914 buffer_put_int(m, 1);
915 } else {
916 buffer_put_int(m, 0);
918 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
919 return (0);
923 mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
925 char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
926 u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
927 int ret;
929 debug3("%s", __func__);
930 sshpam_authok = NULL;
931 ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
932 if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
933 sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
934 if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
935 ret = -1;
936 buffer_clear(m);
937 buffer_put_int(m, ret);
938 buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
939 xfree(name);
940 buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
941 xfree(info);
942 buffer_put_int(m, num);
943 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
944 buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
945 xfree(prompts[i]);
946 buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]);
948 if (prompts != NULL)
949 xfree(prompts);
950 if (echo_on != NULL)
951 xfree(echo_on);
952 auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
953 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
954 return (0);
958 mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
960 char **resp;
961 u_int i, num;
962 int ret;
964 debug3("%s", __func__);
965 sshpam_authok = NULL;
966 num = buffer_get_int(m);
967 if (num > 0) {
968 resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
969 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
970 resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
971 ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
972 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
973 xfree(resp[i]);
974 xfree(resp);
975 } else {
976 ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
978 buffer_clear(m);
979 buffer_put_int(m, ret);
980 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
981 auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
982 if (ret == 0)
983 sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
984 return (0);
988 mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
991 debug3("%s", __func__);
992 (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
993 buffer_clear(m);
994 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
995 auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
996 return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
998 #endif
1001 mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1003 Key *key;
1004 char *cuser, *chost;
1005 u_char *blob;
1006 u_int bloblen;
1007 enum mm_keytype type = 0;
1008 int allowed = 0;
1010 debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1012 type = buffer_get_int(m);
1013 cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1014 chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1015 blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1017 key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1019 if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
1020 (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1021 fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1023 debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1025 if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1026 switch (type) {
1027 case MM_USERKEY:
1028 allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
1029 user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
1030 auth_method = "publickey";
1031 if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
1032 auth_clear_options();
1033 break;
1034 case MM_HOSTKEY:
1035 allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
1036 hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1037 cuser, chost, key);
1038 auth_method = "hostbased";
1039 break;
1040 case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
1041 key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1042 allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
1043 auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1044 cuser, chost, key);
1045 if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
1046 auth_clear_options();
1047 auth_method = "rsa";
1048 break;
1049 default:
1050 fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1051 break;
1054 if (key != NULL)
1055 key_free(key);
1057 /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
1058 monitor_reset_key_state();
1060 if (allowed) {
1061 /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1062 key_blob = blob;
1063 key_bloblen = bloblen;
1064 key_blobtype = type;
1065 hostbased_cuser = cuser;
1066 hostbased_chost = chost;
1067 } else {
1068 /* Log failed attempt */
1069 auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
1070 xfree(blob);
1071 xfree(cuser);
1072 xfree(chost);
1075 debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1076 __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1078 buffer_clear(m);
1079 buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1080 buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1082 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1084 if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1085 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1087 return (0);
1090 static int
1091 monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1093 Buffer b;
1094 char *p;
1095 u_int len;
1096 int fail = 0;
1098 buffer_init(&b);
1099 buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1101 if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1102 p = buffer_ptr(&b);
1103 len = buffer_len(&b);
1104 if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1105 (len < session_id2_len) ||
1106 (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1107 fail++;
1108 buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
1109 } else {
1110 p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1111 if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1112 (len != session_id2_len) ||
1113 (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1114 fail++;
1115 xfree(p);
1117 if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1118 fail++;
1119 p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1120 if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
1121 logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1122 authctxt->user, p);
1123 fail++;
1125 xfree(p);
1126 buffer_skip_string(&b);
1127 if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
1128 if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1129 fail++;
1130 } else {
1131 p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1132 if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
1133 fail++;
1134 xfree(p);
1135 if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1136 fail++;
1137 buffer_skip_string(&b);
1139 buffer_skip_string(&b);
1140 if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1141 fail++;
1142 buffer_free(&b);
1143 return (fail == 0);
1146 static int
1147 monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1148 char *chost)
1150 Buffer b;
1151 char *p;
1152 u_int len;
1153 int fail = 0;
1155 buffer_init(&b);
1156 buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1158 p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1159 if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1160 (len != session_id2_len) ||
1161 (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1162 fail++;
1163 xfree(p);
1165 if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1166 fail++;
1167 p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1168 if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
1169 logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1170 authctxt->user, p);
1171 fail++;
1173 xfree(p);
1174 buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1175 p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1176 if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1177 fail++;
1178 xfree(p);
1179 buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1180 buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1182 /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1183 p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1184 if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1185 p[len - 1] = '\0';
1186 if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1187 fail++;
1188 xfree(p);
1190 /* verify client user */
1191 p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1192 if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1193 fail++;
1194 xfree(p);
1196 if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1197 fail++;
1198 buffer_free(&b);
1199 return (fail == 0);
1203 mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1205 Key *key;
1206 u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1207 u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1208 int verified = 0;
1209 int valid_data = 0;
1211 blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1212 signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1213 data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1215 if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1216 !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1217 fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1219 key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1220 if (key == NULL)
1221 fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1223 switch (key_blobtype) {
1224 case MM_USERKEY:
1225 valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1226 break;
1227 case MM_HOSTKEY:
1228 valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1229 hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1230 break;
1231 default:
1232 valid_data = 0;
1233 break;
1235 if (!valid_data)
1236 fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1238 verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1239 debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1240 __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1242 key_free(key);
1243 xfree(blob);
1244 xfree(signature);
1245 xfree(data);
1247 auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1249 monitor_reset_key_state();
1251 buffer_clear(m);
1252 buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1253 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1255 return (verified == 1);
1258 static void
1259 mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1261 socklen_t fromlen;
1262 struct sockaddr_storage from;
1265 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1266 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1268 memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1269 fromlen = sizeof(from);
1270 if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1271 if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1272 (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1273 debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1274 cleanup_exit(255);
1277 /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1278 record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1279 get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1280 (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1283 static void
1284 mm_session_close(Session *s)
1286 debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1287 if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1288 debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1289 session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1291 session_unused(s->self);
1295 mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1297 extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1298 Session *s;
1299 int res, fd0;
1301 debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1303 buffer_clear(m);
1304 s = session_new();
1305 if (s == NULL)
1306 goto error;
1307 s->authctxt = authctxt;
1308 s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1309 s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1310 res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1311 if (res == 0)
1312 goto error;
1313 pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1315 buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1316 buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1318 /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1319 if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1320 fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1322 mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1324 /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1325 close(0);
1327 /* send messages generated by record_login */
1328 buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1329 buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1331 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1333 if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1334 mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1335 fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1337 /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1338 if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1339 fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1340 if (fd0 != 0)
1341 error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1343 /* slave is not needed */
1344 close(s->ttyfd);
1345 s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1346 /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1347 s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1349 debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1351 return (0);
1353 error:
1354 if (s != NULL)
1355 mm_session_close(s);
1356 buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1357 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1358 return (0);
1362 mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1364 Session *s;
1365 char *tty;
1367 debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1369 tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1370 if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1371 mm_session_close(s);
1372 buffer_clear(m);
1373 xfree(tty);
1374 return (0);
1378 mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1380 BIGNUM *p;
1381 int rsafail;
1383 /* Turn off permissions */
1384 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1386 if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1387 fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1389 buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1391 rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1393 buffer_clear(m);
1394 buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1395 buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1397 BN_clear_free(p);
1399 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1401 /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1402 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1404 return (0);
1408 mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1410 int i;
1412 debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1414 if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1415 fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1416 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1417 session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1419 /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1420 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1422 return (0);
1426 mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1428 BIGNUM *client_n;
1429 Key *key = NULL;
1430 u_char *blob = NULL;
1431 u_int blen = 0;
1432 int allowed = 0;
1434 debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1436 auth_method = "rsa";
1437 if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1438 if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1439 fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1440 buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1441 allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1442 BN_clear_free(client_n);
1444 buffer_clear(m);
1445 buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1446 buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1448 /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1449 monitor_reset_key_state();
1451 if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1452 key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1453 if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1454 fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1455 buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1457 /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1458 key_blob = blob;
1459 key_bloblen = blen;
1460 key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1462 if (key != NULL)
1463 key_free(key);
1465 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1467 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1468 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1469 return (0);
1473 mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1475 Key *key = NULL;
1476 u_char *blob;
1477 u_int blen;
1479 debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1481 if (!authctxt->valid)
1482 fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1483 blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1484 if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1485 fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1486 if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1487 fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1488 if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1489 fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1490 if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1491 fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1492 key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1493 if (ssh1_challenge)
1494 BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1495 ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1497 buffer_clear(m);
1498 buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1500 debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1501 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1503 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1505 xfree(blob);
1506 key_free(key);
1507 return (0);
1511 mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1513 Key *key = NULL;
1514 u_char *blob, *response;
1515 u_int blen, len;
1516 int success;
1518 debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1520 if (!authctxt->valid)
1521 fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1522 if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1523 fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1525 blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1526 if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1527 fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1528 if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1529 fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1530 if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1531 fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1532 response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1533 if (len != 16)
1534 fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1535 success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1537 xfree(blob);
1538 key_free(key);
1539 xfree(response);
1541 auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1543 /* reset state */
1544 BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1545 ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1546 monitor_reset_key_state();
1548 buffer_clear(m);
1549 buffer_put_int(m, success);
1550 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1552 return (success);
1556 mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1558 extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1559 int res, status;
1561 debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1563 /* The child is terminating */
1564 session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1566 #ifdef USE_PAM
1567 if (options.use_pam)
1568 sshpam_cleanup();
1569 #endif
1571 while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1572 if (errno != EINTR)
1573 exit(1);
1575 res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1577 /* Terminate process */
1578 exit(res);
1581 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1582 /* Report that an audit event occurred */
1584 mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
1586 ssh_audit_event_t event;
1588 debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1590 event = buffer_get_int(m);
1591 switch(event) {
1592 case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
1593 case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
1594 case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
1595 case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
1596 case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
1597 case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
1598 case SSH_INVALID_USER:
1599 audit_event(event);
1600 break;
1601 default:
1602 fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
1605 return (0);
1609 mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
1611 u_int len;
1612 char *cmd;
1614 debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1615 cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1616 /* sanity check command, if so how? */
1617 audit_run_command(cmd);
1618 xfree(cmd);
1619 return (0);
1621 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
1623 void
1624 monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1626 if (compat20) {
1627 set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
1628 set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
1629 } else {
1630 packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
1631 packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
1632 child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
1633 xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
1636 /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
1637 packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
1638 xfree(child_state.keyout);
1639 packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
1640 xfree(child_state.keyin);
1642 if (!compat20) {
1643 packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
1644 xfree(child_state.ivout);
1645 packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
1646 xfree(child_state.ivin);
1649 memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
1650 sizeof(incoming_stream));
1651 memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
1652 sizeof(outgoing_stream));
1654 /* Update with new address */
1655 if (options.compression)
1656 mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
1658 /* Network I/O buffers */
1659 /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
1660 buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
1661 buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
1662 memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
1663 xfree(child_state.input);
1665 buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
1666 buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
1667 child_state.olen);
1668 memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
1669 xfree(child_state.output);
1671 /* Roaming */
1672 if (compat20)
1673 roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
1676 static Kex *
1677 mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
1679 Kex *kex;
1680 void *blob;
1681 u_int bloblen;
1683 kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
1684 kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
1685 if (session_id2 == NULL ||
1686 kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
1687 timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
1688 fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
1689 kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
1690 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1691 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1692 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1693 kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1694 kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1695 kex->server = 1;
1696 kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1697 kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1698 blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1699 buffer_init(&kex->my);
1700 buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
1701 xfree(blob);
1702 blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1703 buffer_init(&kex->peer);
1704 buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
1705 xfree(blob);
1706 kex->done = 1;
1707 kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
1708 kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1709 kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1710 kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1711 kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1712 kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1714 return (kex);
1717 /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1719 void
1720 mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1722 Buffer m;
1723 u_char *blob, *p;
1724 u_int bloblen, plen;
1725 u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
1726 u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
1728 debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1730 buffer_init(&m);
1731 mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
1732 if (!compat20) {
1733 child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
1734 child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
1735 child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
1736 &child_state.ssh1keylen);
1737 child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
1738 &child_state.ivoutlen);
1739 child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
1740 goto skip;
1741 } else {
1742 /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
1743 *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
1746 blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1747 current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1748 xfree(blob);
1750 debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
1751 blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1752 current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1753 xfree(blob);
1755 /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
1756 seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1757 blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1758 packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1759 bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1760 packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1761 seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1762 blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1763 packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1764 bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1765 packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1767 skip:
1768 /* Get the key context */
1769 child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
1770 child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
1772 debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
1773 /* Get compression state */
1774 p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1775 if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
1776 fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1777 memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
1778 xfree(p);
1780 p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1781 if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
1782 fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1783 memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
1784 xfree(p);
1786 /* Network I/O buffers */
1787 debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
1788 child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
1789 child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
1791 /* Roaming */
1792 if (compat20) {
1793 child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1794 child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1797 buffer_free(&m);
1801 /* Allocation functions for zlib */
1802 void *
1803 mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
1805 size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
1806 void *address;
1808 if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
1809 fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
1811 address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
1813 return (address);
1816 void
1817 mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
1819 mm_free(mm, address);
1822 void
1823 mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
1825 outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1826 outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1827 outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
1829 incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1830 incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1831 incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
1834 /* XXX */
1836 #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1837 if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) \
1838 fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1839 } while (0)
1841 static void
1842 monitor_socketpair(int *pair)
1844 #ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
1845 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1846 fatal("%s: socketpair", __func__);
1847 #else
1848 fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes not supported",
1849 __func__);
1850 #endif
1851 FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1852 FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1855 #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1857 struct monitor *
1858 monitor_init(void)
1860 struct monitor *mon;
1861 int pair[2];
1863 mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1865 monitor_socketpair(pair);
1867 mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1868 mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1870 /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1871 if (options.compression) {
1872 mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1873 mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1875 /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1876 mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
1879 return mon;
1882 void
1883 monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1885 int pair[2];
1887 monitor_socketpair(pair);
1889 mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1890 mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1893 #ifdef GSSAPI
1895 mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1897 gss_OID_desc goid;
1898 OM_uint32 major;
1899 u_int len;
1901 goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1902 goid.length = len;
1904 major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1906 xfree(goid.elements);
1908 buffer_clear(m);
1909 buffer_put_int(m, major);
1911 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1913 /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1914 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1916 return (0);
1920 mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1922 gss_buffer_desc in;
1923 gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1924 OM_uint32 major, minor;
1925 OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1926 u_int len;
1928 in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1929 in.length = len;
1930 major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1931 xfree(in.value);
1933 buffer_clear(m);
1934 buffer_put_int(m, major);
1935 buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1936 buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1937 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1939 gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1941 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1942 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1943 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1944 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1946 return (0);
1950 mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1952 gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1953 OM_uint32 ret;
1954 u_int len;
1956 gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1957 gssbuf.length = len;
1958 mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1959 mic.length = len;
1961 ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1963 xfree(gssbuf.value);
1964 xfree(mic.value);
1966 buffer_clear(m);
1967 buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1969 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1971 if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1972 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1974 return (0);
1978 mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1980 int authenticated;
1982 authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1984 buffer_clear(m);
1985 buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1987 debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1988 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1990 auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1992 /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1993 return (authenticated);
1995 #endif /* GSSAPI */
1997 #ifdef JPAKE
1999 mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
2001 struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
2002 u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
2003 u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
2005 if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
2006 fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
2008 if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
2009 fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
2010 __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
2011 authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
2013 jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
2014 &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
2015 &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
2016 &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
2017 &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
2019 JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
2021 buffer_clear(m);
2023 buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
2024 buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
2025 buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
2026 buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
2027 buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
2029 debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
2030 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
2032 bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
2033 bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
2034 xfree(x3_proof);
2035 xfree(x4_proof);
2037 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
2038 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
2040 return 0;
2044 mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
2046 struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
2047 char *hash_scheme, *salt;
2049 if (pctx == NULL)
2050 fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
2052 auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
2054 buffer_clear(m);
2055 /* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
2056 buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
2057 buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
2059 debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
2060 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
2062 bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
2063 bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
2064 xfree(hash_scheme);
2065 xfree(salt);
2067 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
2069 return 0;
2073 mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
2075 struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
2076 u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
2077 u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
2079 if (pctx == NULL)
2080 fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
2082 if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
2083 (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
2084 fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
2085 buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
2086 buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
2087 pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
2088 x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
2089 x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
2091 jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
2092 pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
2093 pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
2094 pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
2095 x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
2096 x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
2097 &pctx->b,
2098 &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
2100 JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
2102 bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
2103 bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
2104 xfree(x1_proof);
2105 xfree(x2_proof);
2107 buffer_clear(m);
2109 buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
2110 buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
2112 debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
2113 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
2115 bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
2116 xfree(x4_s_proof);
2118 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
2120 return 0;
2124 mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
2126 struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
2127 u_char *x2_s_proof;
2128 u_int x2_s_proof_len;
2130 if (pctx == NULL)
2131 fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
2133 if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
2134 fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
2135 buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
2136 x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
2138 jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
2139 pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
2140 pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
2141 pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
2142 session_id2, session_id2_len,
2143 x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
2144 &pctx->k,
2145 &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
2147 JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
2149 bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
2150 buffer_clear(m);
2152 /* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
2153 buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
2155 debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
2156 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
2158 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
2160 return 0;
2164 mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
2166 int authenticated = 0;
2167 u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
2168 u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
2169 struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
2171 if (pctx == NULL)
2172 fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
2174 peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
2176 authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
2177 pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
2178 session_id2, session_id2_len,
2179 peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
2181 JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
2183 bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
2184 xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
2186 buffer_clear(m);
2187 buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2189 debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
2190 mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
2192 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
2194 auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
2195 return authenticated;
2198 #endif /* JPAKE */