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1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
4 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
5 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
6 * are met:
7 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
8 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
9 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
11 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
14 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
15 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
16 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
17 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
18 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
19 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
20 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
21 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
22 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
25 #include "includes.h"
26 RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.60 2005/06/17 02:44:32 djm Exp $");
28 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
29 #include <login.h>
30 #endif
31 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
32 #include <shadow.h>
33 #endif
35 #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
36 #include <libgen.h>
37 #endif
39 #include "xmalloc.h"
40 #include "match.h"
41 #include "groupaccess.h"
42 #include "log.h"
43 #include "servconf.h"
44 #include "auth.h"
45 #include "auth-options.h"
46 #include "canohost.h"
47 #include "buffer.h"
48 #include "bufaux.h"
49 #include "uidswap.h"
50 #include "misc.h"
51 #include "bufaux.h"
52 #include "packet.h"
53 #include "loginrec.h"
54 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
56 /* import */
57 extern ServerOptions options;
58 extern Buffer loginmsg;
60 /* Debugging messages */
61 Buffer auth_debug;
62 int auth_debug_init;
65 * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
66 * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
67 * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
68 * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
69 * listed there, false will be returned.
70 * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
71 * Otherwise true is returned.
73 int
74 allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
76 struct stat st;
77 const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
78 char *shell;
79 u_int i;
80 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
81 struct spwd *spw = NULL;
82 #endif
84 /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
85 if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
86 return 0;
88 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
89 if (!options.use_pam)
90 spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
91 #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
92 if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
93 return 0;
94 #endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
95 #endif /* USE_SHADOW */
97 /* grab passwd field for locked account check */
98 #ifdef USE_SHADOW
99 if (spw != NULL)
100 passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
101 #else
102 passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
103 #endif
105 /* check for locked account */
106 if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
107 int locked = 0;
109 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
110 if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
111 locked = 1;
112 #endif
113 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
114 if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
115 strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
116 locked = 1;
117 #endif
118 #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
119 if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
120 locked = 1;
121 #endif
122 if (locked) {
123 logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
124 pw->pw_name);
125 return 0;
130 * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
131 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
133 shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
135 /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
136 if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
137 logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
138 pw->pw_name, shell);
139 return 0;
141 if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
142 (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
143 logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
144 pw->pw_name, shell);
145 return 0;
148 if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
149 options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
150 hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
151 ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
154 /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
155 if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
156 for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
157 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
158 options.deny_users[i])) {
159 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
160 "because listed in DenyUsers",
161 pw->pw_name, hostname);
162 return 0;
165 /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
166 if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
167 for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
168 if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
169 options.allow_users[i]))
170 break;
171 /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
172 if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
173 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
174 "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
175 return 0;
178 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
179 /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
180 if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
181 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
182 "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
183 return 0;
186 /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
187 if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
188 if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
189 options.num_deny_groups)) {
190 ga_free();
191 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
192 "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
193 pw->pw_name, hostname);
194 return 0;
197 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
198 * isn't listed there
200 if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
201 if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
202 options.num_allow_groups)) {
203 ga_free();
204 logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
205 "because none of user's groups are listed "
206 "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
207 return 0;
209 ga_free();
212 #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
213 if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
214 return 0;
215 #endif
217 /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
218 return 1;
221 void
222 auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
224 void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
225 char *authmsg;
227 /* Raise logging level */
228 if (authenticated == 1 ||
229 !authctxt->valid ||
230 authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
231 strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
232 authlog = logit;
234 if (authctxt->postponed)
235 authmsg = "Postponed";
236 else
237 authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
239 authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
240 authmsg,
241 method,
242 authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
243 authctxt->user,
244 get_remote_ipaddr(),
245 get_remote_port(),
246 info);
248 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
249 if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
250 (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
251 strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
252 strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
253 record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
254 get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
255 #endif
256 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
257 if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) {
258 ssh_audit_event_t event;
260 debug3("audit failed auth attempt, method %s euid %d",
261 method, (int)geteuid());
263 * Because the auth loop is used in both monitor and slave,
264 * we must be careful to send each event only once and with
265 * enough privs to write the event.
267 event = audit_classify_auth(method);
268 switch(event) {
269 case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
270 case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
271 case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
272 if (geteuid() == 0)
273 audit_event(event);
274 break;
275 case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
276 case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
277 case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
279 * This is required to handle the case where privsep
280 * is enabled but it's root logging in, since
281 * use_privsep won't be cleared until after a
282 * successful login.
284 if (geteuid() == 0)
285 audit_event(event);
286 else
287 PRIVSEP(audit_event(event));
288 break;
289 default:
290 error("unknown authentication audit event %d", event);
293 #endif
297 * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
300 auth_root_allowed(char *method)
302 switch (options.permit_root_login) {
303 case PERMIT_YES:
304 return 1;
305 break;
306 case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
307 if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
308 return 1;
309 break;
310 case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
311 if (forced_command) {
312 logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
313 return 1;
315 break;
317 logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
318 return 0;
323 * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
324 * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
325 * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
327 * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
329 static char *
330 expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
332 char *file, *ret;
334 file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
335 "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
338 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
339 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
341 if (*file == '/')
342 return (file);
344 ret = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
345 if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
346 strlcat(ret, "/", MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
347 strlcat(ret, file, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN)
348 fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
350 xfree(file);
351 return (ret);
354 char *
355 authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
357 return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
360 char *
361 authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
363 return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
366 /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
367 HostStatus
368 check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
369 const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
371 Key *found;
372 char *user_hostfile;
373 struct stat st;
374 HostStatus host_status;
376 /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
377 found = key_new(key->type);
378 host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
380 if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
381 user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
382 if (options.strict_modes &&
383 (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
384 ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
385 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
386 logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
387 "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
388 pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
389 } else {
390 temporarily_use_uid(pw);
391 host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
392 host, key, found, NULL);
393 restore_uid();
395 xfree(user_hostfile);
397 key_free(found);
399 debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
400 "ok" : "not found", host);
401 return host_status;
406 * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
407 * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
408 * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
410 * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
412 * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
413 * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
415 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
418 secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
419 char *err, size_t errlen)
421 uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
422 char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
423 char *cp;
424 int comparehome = 0;
425 struct stat st;
427 if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
428 snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
429 strerror(errno));
430 return -1;
432 if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
433 comparehome = 1;
435 /* check the open file to avoid races */
436 if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
437 (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
438 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
439 snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
440 buf);
441 return -1;
444 /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
445 for (;;) {
446 if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
447 snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
448 return -1;
450 strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
452 debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
453 if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
454 (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
455 (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
456 snprintf(err, errlen,
457 "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
458 return -1;
461 /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
462 if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
463 debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
464 buf);
465 break;
468 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
469 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
471 if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
472 break;
474 return 0;
477 struct passwd *
478 getpwnamallow(const char *user)
480 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
481 extern login_cap_t *lc;
482 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
483 auth_session_t *as;
484 #endif
485 #endif
486 struct passwd *pw;
488 pw = getpwnam(user);
489 if (pw == NULL) {
490 logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
491 user, get_remote_ipaddr());
492 #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
493 record_failed_login(user,
494 get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
495 #endif
496 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
497 audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
498 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
499 return (NULL);
501 if (!allowed_user(pw))
502 return (NULL);
503 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
504 if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
505 debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
506 return (NULL);
508 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
509 if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
510 auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
511 debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
512 pw = NULL;
514 if (as != NULL)
515 auth_close(as);
516 #endif
517 #endif
518 if (pw != NULL)
519 return (pwcopy(pw));
520 return (NULL);
523 void
524 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
526 char buf[1024];
527 va_list args;
529 if (!auth_debug_init)
530 return;
532 va_start(args, fmt);
533 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
534 va_end(args);
535 buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
538 void
539 auth_debug_send(void)
541 char *msg;
543 if (!auth_debug_init)
544 return;
545 while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
546 msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
547 packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
548 xfree(msg);
552 void
553 auth_debug_reset(void)
555 if (auth_debug_init)
556 buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
557 else {
558 buffer_init(&auth_debug);
559 auth_debug_init = 1;
563 struct passwd *
564 fakepw(void)
566 static struct passwd fake;
568 memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
569 fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
570 fake.pw_passwd =
571 "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
572 fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
573 fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1;
574 fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1;
575 #ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
576 fake.pw_class = "";
577 #endif
578 fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
579 fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
581 return (&fake);