4 NETWORK WORKING GROUP N. Williams
6 Expires: December 15, 2005 June 13, 2005
9 A PRF for the Kerberos V GSS-API Mechanism
10 draft-ietf-kitten-krb5-gssapi-prf-04.txt
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35 This Internet-Draft will expire on December 15, 2005.
39 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
43 This document defines the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the
44 Kerberos V mechanism for the Generic Security Service Application
45 Programming Interface (GSS-API), based on the PRF defined for the
46 Kerberos V cryptographic framework, for keying application protocols
47 given an established Kerberos V GSS-API security context.
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62 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
63 1.1 Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
64 2. Kerberos V GSS Mechanism PRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
65 3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
66 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
67 5. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
68 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
69 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 6
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118 This document specifies the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism's pseudo-
119 random function corresponding to [GSS-PRF]. The function is a "PRF+"
122 1.1 Conventions used in this document
124 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
125 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
126 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
128 2. Kerberos V GSS Mechanism PRF
130 The GSS-API PRF [GSS-PRF] function for the Kerberos V mechanism
131 [RFC1964] shall be the output of a PRF+ function based on the
132 encryption type's PRF function keyed with the negotiated session key
133 of the security context corresponding to the 'prf_key' input
134 parameter of GSS_Pseudo_random().
136 This PRF+ MUST be keyed with the key indicated by the 'prf_key' input
137 parameter as follows:
139 o GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL -- use the sub-session key asserted by the
140 acceptor, if any, or the sub-session asserted by the initiator, if
141 any, or the Ticket's session key
143 o GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL -- use the sub-session key asserted by the
144 initiator, if any, or the Ticket's session key
146 The PRF+ function is a simple counter-based extension of the Kerberos
147 V pseudo-random function [RFC3961] for the encryption type of the
148 security context's keys:
150 PRF+(K, L, S) = truncate(L, T1 || T2 || .. || Tn)
152 Tn = pseudo-random(K, n || S)
154 where '||' is the concatenation operator, 'n' is encoded as a network
155 byte order 32-bit unsigned binary number, truncate(L, S) truncates
156 the input octet string S to length L, and pseudo-random() is the
157 Kerberos V pseudo-random function [RFC3961].
159 The maximum output size of the Kerberos V mechanism's GSS-API PRF
160 then is, necessarily, 2^32 times the output size of the pseudo-
161 random() function for the encryption type of the given key.
163 When the input size is longer than 2^14 octets as per [GSS-PRF] and
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172 exceeds an implementation's resources then the mechanism MUST return
173 GSS_S_FAILURE and GSS_KRB5_S_KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG as the minor status
176 3. IANA Considerations
178 This document has no IANA considerations currently. If and when a
179 relevant IANA registry of GSS-API symbols and constants is created
180 then the GSS_KRB5_S_KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG minor status code should be
181 added to such a registry.
183 4. Security Considerations
185 Kerberos V encryption types' PRF functions use a key derived from
186 contexts' session keys and should preserve the forward security
187 properties of the mechanisms' key exchanges.
189 Legacy Kerberos V encryption types may be weak, particularly the
190 single-DES encryption types.
192 See also [GSS-PRF] for generic security considerations of
195 See also [RFC3961] for generic security considerations of the
196 Kerberos V cryptographic framework.
198 Use of Ticket session keys, rather than sub-session keys, when
199 initiators and acceptors fail to assert sub-session keys, is
200 dangerous as ticket reuse can lead to key reuse, therefore initiators
201 should assert sub-session keys always, and acceptors should assert
202 sub-session keys at least when initiators fail to do so..
204 The computational cost of computing this PRF+ may vary depending on
205 the Kerberos V encryption types being used, but generally the
206 computation of this PRF+ gets more expensive as the input and output
207 octet string lengths grow (note that the use of a counter in the PRF+
208 construction allows for parallelization). This means that if an
209 application can be tricked into providing very large input octet
210 strings and requesting very long output octet strings then that may
211 constitute a denial of service attack on the application; therefore
212 applications SHOULD place appropriate limits on the size of any input
213 octet strings received from their peers without integrity protection.
215 5. Normative References
217 [CFX] Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
218 Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism: Version 2".
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228 [GSS-PRF] Williams, N., "A PRF API extension for the GSS-API".
230 [RFC1964] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism",
233 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
234 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
236 [RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
237 Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
239 [RFC2744] Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 :
240 C-bindings", RFC 2744, January 2000.
242 [RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
243 Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.
254 Email: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
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