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10 INTERNET DRAFT K. Raeburn
11 Kerberos Working Group MIT
12 Document: draft-ietf-krb-wg-crypto-07.txt February 10, 2004
13 expires August 10, 2004
15 Encryption and Checksum Specifications
16 for Kerberos 5
18 Status of this Memo
20 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
21 all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [RFC2026]. Internet-Drafts
22 are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
23 its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also
24 distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are
25 draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated,
26 replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is
27 inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite
28 them other than as "work in progress."
30 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
31 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.html.
33 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
34 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
36 Abstract
38 This document describes a framework for defining encryption and
39 checksum mechanisms for use with the Kerberos protocol, defining an
40 abstraction layer between the Kerberos protocol and related
41 protocols, and the actual mechanisms themselves. Several mechanisms
42 are also defined in this document. Some are taken from RFC 1510,
43 modified in form to fit this new framework, and occasionally modified
44 in content when the old specification was incorrect. New mechanisms
45 are presented here as well. This document does NOT indicate which
46 mechanisms may be considered "required to implement".
48 Comments should be sent to the editor, or to the IETF Kerberos
49 working group (ietf-krb-wg@anl.gov).
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63 1mTable of Contents0m
66 Status of this Memo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
67 Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
68 Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
69 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
70 2. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
71 3. Encryption algorithm profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
72 4. Checksum algorithm profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
73 5. Simplified profile for CBC ciphers with key derivation . . . . . 10
74 5.1. A key derivation function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
75 5.2. Simplified profile parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
76 5.3. Cryptosystem profile based on simplified profile . . . . . . . 14
77 5.4. Checksum profiles based on simplified profile . . . . . . . . . 16
78 6. Profiles for Kerberos encryption and checksum algorithms . . . . 16
79 6.1. Unkeyed checksums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
80 6.2. DES-based encryption and checksum types . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
81 6.3. Triple-DES based encryption and checksum types . . . . . . . . 28
82 7. Use of Kerberos encryption outside this specification . . . . . . 30
83 8. Assigned Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
84 9. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
85 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
86 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
87 12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
88 A. Test vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
89 A.1. n-fold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
90 A.2. mit_des_string_to_key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
91 A.3. DES3 DR and DK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
92 A.4. DES3string_to_key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
93 A.5. Modified CRC-32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
94 B. Significant Changes from RFC 1510 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
95 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
96 Intellectual Property Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
97 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
98 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
99 Editor's address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
100 Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
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119 1. Introduction
121 The Kerberos protocols [Kerb] are designed to encrypt messages of
122 arbitrary sizes, using block encryption ciphers, or less commonly,
123 stream encryption ciphers. Encryption is used to prove the
124 identities of the network entities participating in message
125 exchanges. However, nothing in the Kerberos protocol requires any
126 specific encryption algorithm be used, as long as certain operations
127 are available in the algorithm that is used.
129 The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms
130 currently defined for Kerberos, as well as a framework for defining
131 future mechanisms. The encoding, chaining, padding and other
132 requirements for each are described. Test vectors for several
133 functions are given in appendix A.
135 2. Concepts
137 Both encryption and checksum mechanisms are defined in terms of
138 profiles, detailed in later sections. Each specifies a collection of
139 operations and attributes that must be defined for a mechanism. A
140 Kerberos encryption or checksum mechanism specification is not
141 complete if it does not define all of these operations and
142 attributes.
144 An encryption mechanism must provide for confidentiality and
145 integrity of the original plaintext. (Integrity checking may be
146 achieved by incorporating a checksum, if the encryption mode does not
147 provide an integrity check itself.) It must also provide non-
148 malleability [Bellare98, Dolev91]. Use of a random confounder
149 prepended to the plaintext is recommended. It should not be possible
150 to determine if two ciphertexts correspond to the same plaintext,
151 without knowledge of the key.
153 A checksum mechanism [1] must provide proof of the integrity of the
154 associated message, and must preserve the confidentiality of the
155 message in case it is not sent in the clear. It should be infeasible
156 to find two plaintexts which have the same checksum. It is NOT
157 required that an eavesdropper be unable to determine if two checksums
158 are for the same message; it is assumed that the messages themselves
159 will be visible to any such eavesdropper.
161 Due to advances in cryptography, it is considered unwise by some
162 cryptographers to use the same key for multiple purposes. Since keys
163 are used in performing a number of different functions in Kerberos,
164 it is desirable to use different keys for each of these purposes,
165 even though we start with a single long-term or session key.
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175 We do this by enumerating the different uses of keys within Kerberos,
176 and making the "usage number" an input to the encryption or checksum
177 mechanisms; this enumeration is outside the scope of this document.
178 Later sections of this document define simplified profile templates
179 for encryption and checksum mechanisms that use a key derivation
180 function applied to a CBC mode (or similar) cipher and a checksum or
181 hash algorithm.
183 We distinguish the "base key" specified by other documents from the
184 "specific key" to be used for a particular instance of encryption or
185 checksum operations. It is expected but not required that the
186 specific key will be one or more separate keys derived from the
187 original protocol key and the key usage number. The specific key
188 should not be explicitly referenced outside of this document. The
189 typical language used in other documents should be something like,
190 "encrypt this octet string using this key and this usage number";
191 generation of the specific key and cipher state (described in the
192 next section) are implicit. The creation of a new cipher-state
193 object, or the re-use of one from a previous encryption operation,
194 may also be explicit.
196 New protocols defined in terms of the Kerberos encryption and
197 checksum types should use their own key usage values. Key usages are
198 unsigned 32 bit integers; zero is not permitted.
200 All data is assumed to be in the form of strings of octets or 8-bit
201 bytes. Environments with other byte sizes will have to emulate this
202 behavior in order to get correct results.
204 Each algorithm is assigned an encryption type (or "etype") or
205 checksum type number, for algorithm identification within the
206 Kerberos protocol. The full list of current type number assignments
207 is given in section 8.
209 3. Encryption algorithm profile
211 An encryption mechanism profile must define the following attributes
212 and operations. The operations must be defined as functions in the
213 mathematical sense: no additional or implicit inputs (such as
214 Kerberos principal names or message sequence numbers) are permitted.
216 protocol key format
217 This describes what octet string values represent valid keys. For
218 encryption mechanisms that don't have perfectly dense key spaces,
219 this will describe the representation used for encoding keys. It
220 need not describe specific values that are not valid or desirable
221 for use; such values should be avoid by all key generation
222 routines.
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231 specific key structure
232 This is not a protocol format at all, but a description of the
233 keying material derived from the chosen key and used to encrypt or
234 decrypt data or compute or verify a checksum. It may, for
235 example, be a single key, a set of keys, or a combination of the
236 original key with additional data. The authors recommend using
237 one or more keys derived from the original key via one-way key
238 derivation functions.
240 required checksum mechanism
241 This indicates a checksum mechanism that must be available when
242 this encryption mechanism is used. Since Kerberos has no built in
243 mechanism for negotiating checksum mechanisms, once an encryption
244 mechanism has been decided upon, the corresponding checksum
245 mechanism can simply be used.
247 key-generation seed length, K
248 This is the length of the random bitstring needed to generate a
249 key with the encryption scheme's random-to-key function (described
250 below). This must be a fixed value so that various techniques for
251 producing a random bitstring of a given length may be used with
252 key generation functions.
254 key generation functions
255 Keys must be generated in a number of cases, from different types
256 of inputs. All function specifications must indicate how to
257 generate keys in the proper wire format, and must avoid generation
258 of keys that significantly compromise the confidentiality of
259 encrypted data, if the cryptosystem has such. Entropy from each
260 source should be preserved as much as possible. Many of the
261 inputs, while unknown, may be at least partly predictable (e.g., a
262 password string is likely to be entirely in the ASCII subset and
263 of fairly short length in many environments; a semi-random string
264 may include timestamps); the benefit of such predictability to an
265 attacker must be minimized.
267 string-to-key (UTF-8 string, UTF-8 string, opaque)->(protocol-key)
268 This function generates a key from two UTF-8 strings and an
269 opaque octet string. One of the strings is normally the
270 principal's pass phrase, but is in general merely a secret
271 string. The other string is a "salt" string intended to
272 produce different keys from the same password for different
273 users or realms. While the strings provided will use UTF-8
274 encoding, no specific version of Unicode should be assumed; all
275 valid UTF-8 strings should be allowed. Strings provided in
276 other encodings MUST first be converted to UTF-8 before
277 applying this function.
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287 The third argument, the octet string, may be used to pass
288 mechanism-specific parameters in to this function. Since doing
289 so implies knowledge of the specific encryption system, it is
290 intended that generating non-default parameter values be an
291 uncommon operation, and that normal Kerberos applications be
292 able to treat this parameter block as an opaque object supplied
293 by the Key Distribution Center or defaulted to some mechanism-
294 specific constant value.
296 The string-to-key function should be a one-way function, so
297 that compromising a user's key in one realm does not compromise
298 the user's key in another realm, even if the same password (but
299 a different salt) is used.
301 random-to-key (bitstring[K])->(protocol-key)
302 This function generates a key from a random bitstring of a
303 specific size. It may be assumed that all the bits of the
304 input string are equally random, even though the entropy
305 present in the random source may be limited.
307 key-derivation (protocol-key, integer)->(specific-key)
308 In this function, the integer input is the key usage value as
309 described above; the usage values must be assumed to be known
310 to an attacker. The specific-key output value was described in
311 section 2.
313 string-to-key parameter format
314 This describes the format of the block of data that can be passed
315 to the string-to-key function above to configure additional
316 parameters for that function. Along with the mechanism of
317 encoding parameter values, bounds on the allowed parameters should
318 also be described to avoid allowing a spoofed KDC to compromise
319 the user's password. It may be desirable to construct the
320 encoding such that values weakening the resulting key unacceptably
321 cannot be encoded, if practical.
323 Tighter bounds might be permitted by local security policy, or to
324 avoid excess resource consumption; if so, recommended defaults for
325 those bounds should be given in the specification. The
326 description should also outline possible weaknesses that may be
327 caused by not applying bounds checks or other validation to a
328 parameter string received from the network.
330 As mentioned above, this should be considered opaque to most
331 normal applications.
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343 default string-to-key parameters (octet string)
344 This default value for the "params" argument to the string-to-key
345 function is to be used when the application protocol (Kerberos or
346 otherwise) does not explicitly set the parameter value. As
347 indicated above, this parameter block should be treated as an
348 opaque object in most cases.
350 cipher state
351 This describes any information that can be carried over from one
352 encryption or decryption operation to the next, for use in
353 conjunction with a given specific key. For example, a block
354 cipher used in CBC mode may put an initial vector of one block in
355 the cipher state. Other encryption modes may track nonces or
356 other data.
358 This state must be non-empty, and must influence encryption so as
359 to require that messages be decrypted in the same order they were
360 encrypted, if the cipher state is carried over from one encryption
361 to the next. Distinguishing out-of-order or missing messages from
362 corrupted messages is not required; if desired, this can be done
363 at a higher level by including sequence numbers and not "chaining"
364 the cipher state between encryption operations.
366 The cipher state may not be reused in multiple encryption or
367 decryption operations; these operations all generate a new cipher
368 state that may be used for following operations using the same key
369 and operation.
371 The contents of the cipher state must be treated as opaque outside
372 of encryption system specifications.
374 initial cipher state (specific-key, direction)->(state)
375 This describes the generation of the initial value for the cipher
376 state if it is not being carried over from a previous encryption
377 or decryption operation.
379 This describes any initial state setup needed before encrypting
380 arbitrary amounts of data with a given specific key; the specific
381 key and the direction of operations to be performed (encrypt
382 versus decrypt) must be the only input needed for this
383 initialization.
385 This state should be treated as opaque in any uses outside of an
386 encryption algorithm definition.
388 IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: [Kerb1510] was vague on whether and to what
389 degree an application protocol could exercise control over the
390 initial vector used in DES CBC operations. Some existing
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399 implementations permit the setting of the initial vector. This
400 framework does not provide for application control of the cipher
401 state (beyond "initialize" and "carry over from previous
402 encryption"), since the form and content of the initial cipher
403 state can vary between encryption systems, and may not always be a
404 single block of random data.
406 New Kerberos application protocols should not assume that they can
407 control the initial vector, or that one even exists. However, a
408 general-purpose implementation may wish to provide the capability,
409 in case applications explicitly setting it are encountered.
411 encrypt (specific-key, state, octet string)->(state, octet string)
412 This function takes the specific key, cipher state, and a non-
413 empty plaintext string as input, and generates ciphertext and a
414 new cipher state as outputs. If the basic encryption algorithm
415 itself does not provide for integrity protection (as DES in CBC
416 mode does not do), then some form of MAC or checksum must be
417 included that can be verified by the receiver. Some random factor
418 such as a confounder should be included so that an observer cannot
419 know if two messages contain the same plaintext, even if the
420 cipher state and specific keys are the same. The exact length of
421 the plaintext need not be encoded, but if it is not and if padding
422 is required, the padding must be added at the end of the string so
423 that the decrypted version may be parsed from the beginning.
425 The specification of the encryption function must not only
426 indicate the precise contents of the output octet string, but also
427 the output cipher state. The application protocol may carry
428 forward the output cipher state from one encryption with a given
429 specific key to another; the effect of this "chaining" must be
430 defined. [2]
432 Assuming correctly-produced values for the specific key and cipher
433 state, no input octet string may result in an error indication.
435 decrypt (specific-key, state, octet string)->(state, octet string)
436 This function takes the specific key, cipher state, and ciphertext
437 as inputs, and verifies the integrity of the supplied ciphertext.
438 If the ciphertext's integrity is intact, this function produces
439 the plaintext and a new cipher state as outputs; otherwise, an
440 error indication must be returned, and the data discarded.
442 The result of the decryption may be longer than the original
443 plaintext, for example if the encryption mode adds padding to
444 reach a multiple of a block size. If this is the case, any extra
445 octets must be after the decoded plaintext. An application
446 protocol which needs to know the exact length of the message must
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455 encode a length or recognizable "end of message" marker within the
456 plaintext. [3]
458 As with the encryption function, a correct specification for this
459 function must indicate not only the contents of the output octet
460 string, but also the resulting cipher state.
462 pseudo-random (protocol-key, octet-string)->(octet-string)
463 This pseudo-random function should generate an octet string of
464 some size that independent of the octet string input. The PRF
465 output string should be suitable for use in key generation, even
466 if the octet string input is public. It should not reveal the
467 input key, even if the output is made public.
469 These operations and attributes are all that is required to support
470 Kerberos and various proposed preauthentication schemes.
472 For convenience of certain application protocols that may wish to use
473 the encryption profile, we add the constraint that, for any given
474 plaintext input size, there must be a message size between that given
475 size and that size plus 65535 such that the length of such that the
476 decrypted version of the ciphertext for any message of that size will
477 never have extra octets added at the end.
479 Expressed mathematically, for every message length L1, there exists a
480 message size L2 such that:
482 L2 >= L1
483 L2 < L1 + 65536
484 for every message M with |M| = L2, decrypt(encrypt(M)) = M
486 A document defining a new encryption type should also describe known
487 weaknesses or attacks, so that its security may be fairly assessed,
488 and should include test vectors or other validation procedures for
489 the operations defined. Specific references to information readily
490 available elsewhere are sufficient.
492 4. Checksum algorithm profile
494 A checksum mechanism profile must define the following attributes and
495 operations:
497 associated encryption algorithm(s)
498 This indicates the types of encryption keys this checksum
499 mechanism can be used with.
501 A keyed checksum mechanism may have more than one associated
502 encryption algorithm if they share the same wire key format,
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511 string-to-key function, and key derivation function. (This
512 combination means that, for example, a checksum type, key usage
513 value and password are adequate to get the specific key used to
514 compute a checksum.)
516 An unkeyed checksum mechanism can be used in conjunction with any
517 encryption type, since the key is ignored, but its use must be
518 limited to cases where the checksum itself is protected, to avoid
519 trivial attacks.
521 get_mic function
522 This function generates a MIC token for a given specific key (see
523 section 3), and message (represented as an octet string), that may
524 be used to verify the integrity of the associated message. This
525 function is not required to return the same deterministic result
526 on every use; it need only generate a token that the verify_mic
527 routine can check.
529 The output of this function will also dictate the size of the
530 checksum. It must be no larger than 65535 octets.
532 verify_mic function
533 Given a specific key, message, and MIC token, this function
534 ascertains whether the message integrity has been compromised.
535 For a deterministic get_mic routine, the corresponding verify_mic
536 may simply generate another checksum and compare them.
538 The get_mic and verify_mic operations must be able to handle inputs
539 of arbitrary length; if any padding is needed, the padding scheme
540 must be specified as part of these functions.
542 These operations and attributes are all that should be required to
543 support Kerberos and various proposed preauthentication schemes.
545 As with encryption mechanism definition documents, documents defining
546 new checksum mechanisms should indicate validation processes and
547 known weaknesses.
549 5. Simplified profile for CBC ciphers with key derivation
551 The profile outlines in sections 3 and 4 describes a large number of
552 operations that must be defined for encryption and checksum
553 algorithms to be used with Kerberos. We describe here a simpler
554 profile from which both encryption and checksum mechanism definitions
555 can be generated, filling in uses of key derivation in appropriate
556 places, providing integrity protection, and defining multiple
557 operations for the cryptosystem profile based on a smaller set of
558 operations given in the simplified profile. Not all of the existing
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567 cryptosystems for Kerberos fit into this simplified profile, but we
568 recommend that future cryptosystems use it or something based on it.
569 [4]
571 Not all of the operations in the complete profiles are defined
572 through this mechanism; several must still be defined for each new
573 algorithm pair.
575 5.1. A key derivation function
577 Rather than define some scheme by which a "protocol key" is composed
578 of a large number of encryption keys, we use keys derived from a base
579 key to perform cryptographic operations. The base key must be used
580 only for generating the derived keys, and this derivation must be
581 non-invertible and entropy-preserving. Given these restrictions,
582 compromise of one derived key does not compromise the other subkeys.
583 Attack of the base key is limited, since it is only used for
584 derivation, and is not exposed to any user data.
586 Since the derived key has as much entropy as the base keys (if the
587 cryptosystem is good), password-derived keys have the full benefit of
588 all the entropy in the password.
590 To generate a derived key from a base key, we generate a pseudorandom
591 octet string, using an algorithm DR described below, and generate a
592 key from that octet string using a function dependent on the
593 encryption algorithm; the input length needed for that function,
594 which is also dependent on the encryption algorithm, dictates the
595 length of the string to be generated by the DR algorithm (the value
596 "k" below). These procedures are based on the key derivation in
597 [Blumenthal96].
599 Derived Key = DK(Base Key, Well-Known Constant)
601 DK(Key, Constant) = random-to-key(DR(Key, Constant))
603 DR(Key, Constant) = k-truncate(E(Key, Constant,
604 initial-cipher-state))
606 Here DR is the random-octet generation function described below, and
607 DK is the key-derivation function produced from it. In this
608 construction, E(Key, Plaintext, CipherState) is a cipher, Constant is
609 a well-known constant determined by the specific usage of this
610 function, and k-truncate truncates its argument by taking the first k
611 bits. Here, k is the key generation seed length needed for the
612 encryption system.
614 The output of the DR function is a string of bits; the actual key is
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623 produced by applying the cryptosystem's random-to-key operation on
624 this bitstring.
626 If the Constant is smaller than the cipher block size of E, then it
627 must be expanded with n-fold() so it can be encrypted. If the output
628 of E is shorter than k bits it is fed back into the encryption as
629 many times as necessary. The construct is as follows (where |
630 indicates concatentation):
632 K1 = E(Key, n-fold(Constant), initial-cipher-state)
633 K2 = E(Key, K1, initial-cipher-state)
634 K3 = E(Key, K2, initial-cipher-state)
635 K4 = ...
637 DR(Key, Constant) = k-truncate(K1 | K2 | K3 | K4 ...)
639 n-fold is an algorithm which takes m input bits and ``stretches''
640 them to form n output bits with equal contribution from each input
641 bit to the output, as described in [Blumenthal96]:
643 We first define a primitive called n-folding, which takes a
644 variable-length input block and produces a fixed-length output
645 sequence. The intent is to give each input bit approximately
646 equal weight in determining the value of each output bit. Note
647 that whenever we need to treat a string of octets as a number, the
648 assumed representation is Big-Endian -- Most Significant Byte
649 first.
651 To n-fold a number X, replicate the input value to a length that
652 is the least common multiple of n and the length of X. Before
653 each repetition, the input is rotated to the right by 13 bit
654 positions. The successive n-bit chunks are added together using
655 1's-complement addition (that is, with end-around carry) to yield
656 a n-bit result....
659 Test vectors for n-fold are supplied in Appendix A. [5]
661 In this section, n-fold is always used to produce c bits of output,
662 where c is the cipher block size of E.
664 The size of the Constant must not be larger than c, because reducing
665 the length of the Constant by n-folding can cause collisions.
667 If the size of the Constant is smaller than c, then the Constant must
668 be n-folded to length c. This string is used as input to E. If the
669 block size of E is less than the random-to-key input size, then the
670 output from E is taken as input to a second invocation of E. This
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679 process is repeated until the number of bits accumulated is greater
680 than or equal to the random-to-key input size. When enough bits have
681 been computed, the first k are taken as the random data used to
682 create the key with the algorithm-dependent random-to-key function.
684 Since the derived key is the result of one or more encryptions in the
685 base key, deriving the base key from the derived key is equivalent to
686 determining the key from a very small number of plaintext/ciphertext
687 pairs. Thus, this construction is as strong as the cryptosystem
688 itself.
690 5.2. Simplified profile parameters
692 These are the operations and attributes that must be defined:
694 protocol key format
695 string-to-key function
696 default string-to-key parameters
697 key-generation seed length, k
698 random-to-key function
699 As above for the normal encryption mechanism profile.
701 unkeyed hash algorithm, H
702 This should be a collision-resistant hash algorithm with fixed-
703 size output, suitable for use in an HMAC [HMAC]. It must support
704 inputs of arbitrary length. Its output must be at least the
705 message block size (below).
707 HMAC output size, h
708 This indicates the size of the leading substring output by the
709 HMAC function that should be used in transmitted messages. It
710 should be at least half the output size of the hash function H,
711 and at least 80 bits; it need not match the output size.
713 message block size, m
714 This is the size of the smallest units the cipher can handle in
715 the mode in which it is being used. Messages will be padded to a
716 multiple of this size. If a block cipher is used in a mode that
717 can handle messages that are not multiples of the cipher block
718 size, such as CBC mode with cipher text stealing (CTS, see [RC5]),
719 this value would be one octet. For traditional CBC mode with
720 padding, it will be the underlying cipher's block size.
722 This value must be a multiple of 8 bits (one octet).
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735 encryption/decryption functions, E and D
736 These are basic encryption and decryption functions for messages
737 of sizes that are multiples of the message block size. No
738 integrity checking or confounder should be included here. These
739 functions take as input the IV or similar data, a protocol-format
740 key, and a octet string, returning a new IV and octet string.
742 The encryption function is not required to use CBC mode, but is
743 assumed to be using something with similar properties. In
744 particular, prepending a cipher-block-size confounder to the
745 plaintext should alter the entire ciphertext (comparable to
746 choosing and including a random initial vector for CBC mode).
748 The result of encrypting one cipher block (of size c, above) must
749 be deterministic, for the random octet generation function DR in
750 the previous section to work. For best security, it should also
751 be no larger than c.
753 cipher block size, c
754 This is the block size of the block cipher underlying the
755 encryption and decryption functions indicated above, used for key
756 derivation and for the size of the message confounder and initial
757 vector. (If a block cipher is not in use, some comparable
758 parameter should be determined.) It must be at least 5 octets.
760 This is not actually an independent parameter; rather, it is a
761 property of the functions E and D. It is listed here to clarify
762 the distinction between it and the message block size, m.
764 While there are still a number of properties to specify, they are
765 fewer and simpler than in the full profile.
767 5.3. Cryptosystem profile based on simplified profile
769 The above key derivation function is used to produce three
770 intermediate keys. One is used for computing checksums of
771 unencrypted data. The other two are used for encrypting and
772 checksumming plaintext to be sent encrypted.
774 The ciphertext output is the concatenation of the output of the basic
775 encryption function E and a (possibly truncated) HMAC using the
776 specified hash function H, both applied to the plaintext with a
777 random confounder prefix and sufficient padding to bring it to a
778 multiple of the message block size. When the HMAC is computed, the
779 key is used in the protocol key form.
781 Decryption is performed by removing the (partial) HMAC, decrypting
782 the remainder, and verifying the HMAC. The cipher state is an
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791 initial vector, initialized to zero.
793 The substring notation "[1..h]" in the following table should be read
794 as using 1-based indexing; leading substrings are used.
797 cryptosystem from simplified profile
798 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
799 protocol key format As given.
801 specific key structure Three protocol-format keys: { Kc, Ke, Ki }.
803 key-generation seed As given.
804 length
806 required checksum As defined below in section 5.4.
807 mechanism
809 cipher state initial vector (usually of length c)
811 initial cipher state all bits zero
813 encryption function conf = random string of length c
814 pad = shortest string to bring confounder
815 and plaintext to a length that's a
816 multiple of m
817 (C1, newIV) = E(Ke, conf | plaintext | pad,
818 oldstate.ivec)
819 H1 = HMAC(Ki, conf | plaintext | pad)
820 ciphertext = C1 | H1[1..h]
821 newstate.ivec = newIV
823 decryption function (C1,H1) = ciphertext
824 (P1, newIV) = D(Ke, C1, oldstate.ivec)
825 if (H1 != HMAC(Ki, P1)[1..h])
826 report error
827 newstate.ivec = newIV
829 default string-to-key As given.
830 params
832 pseudo-random function tmp1 = H(octet-string)
833 tmp2 = truncate tmp1 to multiple of m
834 PRF = E(protocol-key, tmp2, initial-cipher-state)
836 key generation functions:
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847 cryptosystem from simplified profile
848 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
849 string-to-key function As given.
851 random-to-key function As given.
853 key-derivation function The "well-known constant" used for the DK
854 function is the key usage number, expressed as
855 four octets in big-endian order, followed by one
856 octet indicated below.
858 Kc = DK(base-key, usage | 0x99);
859 Ke = DK(base-key, usage | 0xAA);
860 Ki = DK(base-key, usage | 0x55);
863 5.4. Checksum profiles based on simplified profile
865 When an encryption system is defined using the simplified profile
866 given in section 5.2, a checksum algorithm may be defined for it as
867 follows:
870 checksum mechanism from simplified profile
871 --------------------------------------------------
872 associated cryptosystem as defined above
874 get_mic HMAC(Kc, message)[1..h]
876 verify_mic get_mic and compare
878 The HMAC function and key Kc are as described in section 5.3.
880 6. Profiles for Kerberos encryption and checksum algorithms
882 These profiles describe the encryption and checksum systems defined
883 for Kerberos. The astute reader will notice that some of them do not
884 fulfull all of the requirements outlined in previous sections. These
885 systems are defined for backward compatibility; newer implementations
886 should (whenever possible) attempt to make use of encryption systems
887 which satisfy all of the profile requirements.
889 The full list of current encryption and checksum type number
890 assignments, including values currently reserved but not defined in
891 this document, is given in section 8.
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903 6.1. Unkeyed checksums
905 These checksum types use no encryption keys, and thus can be used in
906 combination with any encryption type, but may only be used with
907 caution, in limited circumstances where the lack of a key does not
908 provide a window for an attack, preferably as part of an encrypted
909 message. [6] Keyed checksum algorithms are recommended.
911 6.1.1. The RSA MD5 Checksum
913 The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5
914 algorithm [MD5-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of
915 arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet)
916 checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed to be collision-proof.
918 rsa-md5
919 ----------------------------------------------
920 associated cryptosystem any
922 get_mic rsa-md5(msg)
924 verify_mic get_mic and compare
926 The rsa-md5 checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number of
927 seven (7).
929 6.1.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum
931 The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4
932 algorithm [MD4-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of
933 arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet)
934 checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed to be collision-proof.
937 rsa-md4
938 ----------------------------------------------
939 associated cryptosystem any
941 get_mic md4(msg)
943 verify_mic get_mic and compare
946 The rsa-md4 checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number of
947 two (2).
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959 6.1.3. CRC-32 Checksum
961 This CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic
962 redundancy check as described in ISO 3309 [CRC], modified as
963 described below. The resulting checksum is four (4) octets in
964 length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed nor collision-proof; thus, the
965 use of this checksum is not recommended. An attacker using a
966 probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack as described in [SG92] might be
967 able to generate an alternative message that satisfies the checksum.
969 The CRC-32 checksum used in the des-cbc-crc encryption mode is
970 identical to the 32-bit FCS described in ISO 3309 with two
971 exceptions: the sum with the all-ones polynomial times x**k is
972 omitted, and the final remainder is not ones-complemented. ISO 3309
973 describes the FCS in terms of bits, while this document describes the
974 Kerberos protocol in terms of octets. To disambiguate the ISO 3309
975 definition for the purpose of computing the CRC-32 in the des-cbc-crc
976 encryption mode, the ordering of bits in each octet shall be assumed
977 to be LSB-first. Given this assumed ordering of bits within an
978 octet, the mapping of bits to polynomial coefficients shall be
979 identical to that specified in ISO 3309.
981 Test values for this modified CRC function are included in appendix
982 A.5.
985 crc32
986 ----------------------------------------------
987 associated cryptosystem any
989 get_mic crc32(msg)
991 verify_mic get_mic and compare
994 The crc32 checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number of
995 one (1).
997 6.2. DES-based encryption and checksum types
999 These encryption systems encrypt information under the Data
1000 Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode
1001 [DESM80]. A checksum is computed as described below and placed in
1002 the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to
1003 be encrypted (the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message)
1004 must be padded to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The values
1005 of the padding bytes are unspecified.
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1015 Plaintext and DES ciphertext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which
1016 are concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms.
1017 The first octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the
1018 octet's MSB used as the DES input block's MSB, etc.), the second
1019 octet the next 8 bits, ..., and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least
1020 significant bits.
1022 Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an
1023 additional input in the form of an initialization vector; this vector
1024 is specified for each encryption system, below.
1026 The DES specifications [DESI81] identify four 'weak' and twelve
1027 'semi-weak' keys; those keys SHALL NOT be used for encrypting
1028 messages for use in Kerberos. The "variant keys" generated for the
1029 RSA-MD5-DES, RSA-MD4-DES and DES-MAC checksum types by an exclusive-
1030 or of a DES key with a constant are not checked for this property.
1032 A DES key is 8 octets of data. This consists of 56 bits of actual
1033 key data, and 8 parity bits, one per octet. The key is encoded as a
1034 series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits within the
1035 key are also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption
1036 key is (B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8)
1037 where B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8
1038 are the parity bits, the first octet of the key would be
1039 B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the most significant bit). See the
1040 [DESM80] introduction for reference.
1042 Encryption data format
1044 The format for the data to be encrypted includes a one-block
1045 confounder, a checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary
1046 padding, as described in the following diagram. The msg-seq field
1047 contains the part of the protocol message which is to be encrypted.
1049 +-----------+----------+---------+-----+
1050 |confounder | checksum | msg-seq | pad |
1051 +-----------+----------+---------+-----+
1053 One generates a random confounder of one block, placing it in
1054 'confounder'; zeroes out the 'checksum' field (of length appropriate
1055 to exactly hold the checksum to be computed); calculates the
1056 appropriate checksum over the whole sequence, placing the result in
1057 'checksum'; adds the necessary padding; then encrypts using the
1058 specified encryption type and the appropriate key.
1060 String or random-data to key transformation
1062 To generate a DES key from two UTF-8 text strings (password and
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1071 salt), the two strings are concatenated, password first, and the
1072 result is then padded with zero-valued octets to a multiple of 8
1073 octets.
1075 The top bit of each octet (always zero if the password is plain
1076 ASCII, as was assumed when the original specification was written) is
1077 discarded, and a bitstring is formed of the remaining seven bits of
1078 each octet. This bitstring is then fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed
1079 with itself to produce a 56-bit string. An eight-octet key is formed
1080 from this string, each octet using seven bits from the bitstring,
1081 leaving the least significant bit unassigned. The key is then
1082 "corrected" by correcting the parity on the key, and if the key
1083 matches a 'weak' or 'semi-weak' key as described in the DES
1084 specification, it is eXclusive-ORed with the constant
1085 0x00000000000000F0. This key is then used to generate a DES CBC
1086 checksum on the initial string with the salt appended. The result of
1087 the CBC checksum is then "corrected" as described above to form the
1088 result which is returned as the key.
1090 For purposes of the string-to-key function, the DES CBC checksum is
1091 calculated by CBC encrypting a string using the key as IV and using
1092 the final 8 byte block as the checksum.
1094 Pseudocode follows:
1096 removeMSBits(8byteblock) {
1097 /* Treats a 64 bit block as 8 octets and remove the MSB in
1098 each octect (in big endian mode) and concatenates the
1099 result. E.g., input octet string:
1100 01110000 01100001 11110011 01110011 11110111 01101111
1101 11110010 01100100
1102 results in output bitstring:
1103 1110000 1100001 1110011 1110011 1110111 1101111
1104 1110010 1100100 */
1105 }
1107 reverse(56bitblock) {
1108 /* Treats a 56-bit block as a binary string and reverse it.
1109 E.g., input string:
1110 1000001 1010100 1001000 1000101 1001110 1000001
1111 0101110 1001101
1112 results in output string:
1113 1011001 0111010 1000001 0111001 1010001 0001001
1114 0010101 1000001 */
1115 }
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1127 add_parity_bits(56bitblock) {
1128 /* Copies a 56-bit block into a 64-bit block, left shift
1129 content in each octet and add DES parity bit.
1130 E.g., input string:
1131 1100000 0001111 0011100 0110100 1000101 1100100
1132 0110110 0010111
1133 results in output string:
1134 11000001 00011111 00111000 01101000 10001010 11001000
1135 01101101 00101111 */
1136 }
1138 key_correction(key) {
1139 fixparity(key);
1140 if (is_weak_key(key))
1141 key = key XOR 0xF0;
1142 return(key);
1143 }
1145 mit_des_string_to_key(string,salt) {
1146 odd = 1;
1147 s = string | salt;
1148 tempstring = 0; /* 56-bit string */
1149 pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */
1150 for (8byteblock in s) {
1151 56bitstring = removeMSBits(8byteblock);
1152 if (odd == 0) reverse(56bitstring);
1153 odd = ! odd;
1154 tempstring = tempstring XOR 56bitstring;
1155 }
1156 tempkey = key_correction(add_parity_bits(tempstring));
1157 key = key_correction(DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey));
1158 return(key);
1159 }
1161 des_string_to_key(string,salt,params) {
1162 if (length(params) == 0)
1163 type = 0;
1164 else if (length(params) == 1)
1165 type = params[0];
1166 else
1167 error("invalid params");
1168 if (type == 0)
1169 mit_des_string_to_key(string,salt);
1170 else
1171 error("invalid params");
1172 }
1174 One common extension is to support the "AFS string-to-key" algorithm,
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1183 which is not defined here, if the type value above is one (1).
1185 For generation of a key from a random bitstring, we start with a
1186 56-bit string, and as with the string-to-key operation above, insert
1187 parity bits, and if the result is a weak or semi-weak key, modify it
1188 by exclusive-OR with the constart 0x00000000000000F0:
1190 des_random_to_key(bitstring) {
1191 return key_correction(add_parity_bits(bitstring));
1192 }
1194 6.2.1. DES with MD5
1196 The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under DES in CBC
1197 mode with an all-zero initial vector, with an MD5 checksum (described
1198 in [MD5-92]) computed and placed in the checksum field.
1200 The encryption system parameters for des-cbc-md5 are:
1202 des-cbc-md5
1203 --------------------------------------------------------------------
1204 protocol key format 8 bytes, parity in low bit of each
1206 specific key structure copy of original key
1208 required checksum rsa-md5-des
1209 mechanism
1211 key-generation seed 8 bytes
1212 length
1214 cipher state 8 bytes (CBC initial vector)
1216 initial cipher state all-zero
1218 encryption function des-cbc(confounder | checksum | msg | pad,
1219 ivec=oldstate)
1220 where
1221 checksum = md5(confounder | 0000...
1222 | msg | pad)
1224 newstate = last block of des-cbc output
1226 decryption function decrypt encrypted text and verify checksum
1228 newstate = last block of ciphertext
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1239 des-cbc-md5
1240 --------------------------------------------------------------------
1241 default string-to-key empty string
1242 params
1244 pseudo-random function des-cbc(md5(input-string), ivec=0)
1246 key generation functions:
1248 string-to-key des_string_to_key
1250 random-to-key des_random_to_key
1252 key-derivation identity
1254 The des-cbc-md5 encryption type is assigned the etype value three
1255 (3).
1257 6.2.2. DES with MD4
1259 The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode also encrypts information under DES
1260 in CBC mode, with an all-zero initial vector. An MD4 checksum
1261 (described in [MD4-92]) is computed and placed in the checksum field.
1263 des-cbc-md4
1264 --------------------------------------------------------------------
1265 protocol key format 8 bytes, parity in low bit of each
1267 specific key structure copy of original key
1269 required checksum rsa-md4-des
1270 mechanism
1272 key-generation seed 8 bytes
1273 length
1275 cipher state 8 bytes (CBC initial vector)
1277 initial cipher state all-zero
1279 encryption function des-cbc(confounder | checksum | msg | pad,
1280 ivec=oldstate)
1281 where
1282 checksum = md4(confounder | 0000...
1283 | msg | pad)
1285 newstate = last block of des-cbc output
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1295 des-cbc-md4
1296 --------------------------------------------------------------------
1298 decryption function decrypt encrypted text and verify checksum
1300 newstate = last block of ciphertext
1302 default string-to-key empty string
1303 params
1305 pseudo-random function des-cbc(md5(input-string), ivec=0)
1307 key generation functions:
1309 string-to-key des_string_to_key
1311 random-to-key copy input, then fix parity bits
1313 key-derivation identity
1315 Note that des-cbc-md4 uses md5, not md4, in the PRF definition.
1317 The des-cbc-md4 encryption algorithm is assigned the etype value two
1318 (2).
1320 6.2.3. DES with CRC
1322 The des-cbc-crc encryption type uses DES in CBC mode with the key
1323 used as the initialization vector, with a 4-octet CRC-based checksum
1324 computed as described in section 6.1.3. Note that this is not a
1325 standard CRC-32 checksum, but a slightly modified one.
1328 des-cbc-crc
1329 --------------------------------------------------------------------
1330 protocol key format 8 bytes, parity in low bit of each
1332 specific key structure copy of original key
1334 required checksum rsa-md5-des
1335 mechanism
1337 key-generation seed 8 bytes
1338 length
1340 cipher state 8 bytes (CBC initial vector)
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1351 des-cbc-crc
1352 --------------------------------------------------------------------
1353 initial cipher state copy of original key
1355 encryption function des-cbc(confounder | checksum | msg | pad,
1356 ivec=oldstate)
1357 where
1358 checksum = crc(confounder | 00000000
1359 | msg | pad)
1361 newstate = last block of des-cbc output
1363 decryption function decrypt encrypted text and verify checksum
1365 newstate = last block of ciphertext
1367 default string-to-key empty string
1368 params
1370 pseudo-random function des-cbc(md5(input-string), ivec=0)
1372 key generation functions:
1374 string-to-key des_string_to_key
1376 random-to-key copy input, then fix parity bits
1378 key-derivation identity
1380 The des-cbc-crc encryption algorithm is assigned the etype value one
1381 (1).
1383 6.2.4. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES
1385 The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum
1386 by prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA
1387 MD5 checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the
1388 checksum using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a
1389 variant of the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing
1390 the key with the hexadecimal constant 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The
1391 initialization vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24
1392 octets long. This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be
1393 collision-proof.
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1407 rsa-md5-des
1408 ----------------------------------------------------------------
1409 associated cryptosystem des-cbc-md5, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-crc
1411 get_mic des-cbc(key XOR 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0,
1412 conf | rsa-md5(conf | msg))
1414 verify_mic decrypt and verify rsa-md5 checksum
1417 The rsa-md5-des checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number
1418 of eight (8).
1420 6.2.5. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES
1422 The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum
1423 by prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA
1424 MD4 checksum algorithm [MD4-92], and encrypting the confounder and
1425 the checksum using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a
1426 variant of the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing
1427 the key with the constant 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. [7] The initialization
1428 vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets long.
1429 This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof.
1431 rsa-md4-des
1432 ----------------------------------------------------------------
1433 associated cryptosystem des-cbc-md5, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-crc
1435 get_mic des-cbc(key XOR 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0,
1436 conf | rsa-md4(conf | msg),
1437 ivec=0)
1439 verify_mic decrypt and verify rsa-md4 checksum
1441 The rsa-md4-des checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number
1442 of three (3).
1444 6.2.6. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative
1446 The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof
1447 checksum by applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting
1448 the results using DES in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode using a DES
1449 key as both key and initialization vector. The resulting checksum is
1450 16 octets long. This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be
1451 collision-proof. Note that this checksum type is the old method for
1452 encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it is no longer recommended.
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1463 rsa-md4-des-k
1464 ----------------------------------------------------------------
1465 associated cryptosystem des-cbc-md5, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-crc
1467 get_mic des-cbc(key, md4(msg), ivec=key)
1469 verify_mic decrypt, compute checksum and compare
1472 The rsa-md4-des-k checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type
1473 number of six (6).
1475 6.2.7. DES CBC checksum
1477 The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder
1478 to the plaintext, padding with zero-valued octets if necessary to
1479 bring the length to a multiple of 8 octets, performing a DES CBC-mode
1480 encryption on the result using the key and an initialization vector
1481 of zero, taking the last block of the ciphertext, prepending the same
1482 confounder and encrypting the pair using DES in cipher-block-chaining
1483 (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where the variant is computed
1484 by eXclusive-ORing the key with the constant 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The
1485 initialization vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 128
1486 bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are redundant. This checksum
1487 is tamper-proof and collision-proof.
1490 des-mac
1491 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
1492 associated des-cbc-md5, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-crc
1493 cryptosystem
1495 get_mic des-cbc(key XOR 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0,
1496 conf | des-mac(key, conf | msg | pad, ivec=0),
1497 ivec=0)
1499 verify_mic decrypt, compute DES MAC using confounder, compare
1502 The des-mac checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number of
1503 four (4).
1505 6.2.8. DES CBC checksum alternative
1507 The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode
1508 encryption of the plaintext, with zero-valued padding bytes if
1509 necessary to bring the length to a multiple of 8 octets, and using
1510 the last block of the ciphertext as the checksum value. It is keyed
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1519 with an encryption key which is also used as the initialization
1520 vector. The resulting checksum is 64 bits (8 octets) long. This
1521 checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note that this
1522 checksum type is the old method for encoding the DESMAC checksum and
1523 it is no longer recommended.
1526 des-mac-k
1527 ----------------------------------------------------------------
1528 associated cryptosystem des-cbc-md5, des-cbc-md4, des-cbc-crc
1530 get_mic des-mac(key, msg | pad, ivec=key)
1532 verify_mic compute MAC and compare
1535 The des-mac-k checksum algorithm is assigned a checksum type number
1536 of five (5).
1538 6.3. Triple-DES based encryption and checksum types
1540 This encryption and checksum type pair is based on the Triple DES
1541 cryptosystem in Outer-CBC mode, and the HMAC-SHA1 message
1542 authentication algorithm.
1544 A Triple DES key is the concatenation of three DES keys as described
1545 above for des-cbc-md5. A Triple DES key is generated from random
1546 data by creating three DES keys from separate sequences of random
1547 data.
1549 Encrypted data using this type must be generated as described in
1550 section 5.3. If the length of the input data is not a multiple of
1551 the block size, zero-valued octets must be used to pad the plaintext
1552 to the next eight-octet boundary. The confounder must be eight
1553 random octets (one block).
1555 The simplified profile for Triple DES, with key derivation as defined
1556 in section 5, is as follows:
1558 des3-cbc-hmac-sha1-kd, hmac-sha1-des3-kd
1559 ------------------------------------------------
1560 protocol key format 24 bytes, parity in low
1561 bit of each
1563 key-generation seed 21 bytes
1564 length
1570 Raeburn [Page 28]
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1572 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
1575 des3-cbc-hmac-sha1-kd, hmac-sha1-des3-kd
1576 ------------------------------------------------
1577 hash function SHA-1
1579 HMAC output size 160 bits
1581 message block size 8 bytes
1583 default string-to-key empty string
1584 params
1586 encryption and triple-DES encrypt and
1587 decryption functions decrypt, in outer-CBC
1588 mode (cipher block size
1589 8 octets)
1591 key generation functions:
1593 random-to-key DES3random-to-key (see
1594 below)
1596 string-to-key DES3string-to-key (see
1597 below)
1599 The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1-kd encryption type is assigned the value
1600 sixteen (16). The hmac-sha1-des3-kd checksum algorithm is assigned a
1601 checksum type number of twelve (12).
1603 6.3.1. Triple DES Key Production (random-to-key, string-to-key)
1605 The 168 bits of random key data are converted to a protocol key value
1606 as follows. First, the 168 bits are divided into three groups of 56
1607 bits, which are expanded individually into 64 bits as follows:
1609 DES3random-to-key:
1610 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 p
1611 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 p
1612 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 p
1613 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 p
1614 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 p
1615 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 p
1616 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 p
1617 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 p
1619 The "p" bits are parity bits computed over the data bits. The output
1620 of the three expansions, each corrected to avoid "weak" and "semi-
1621 weak" keys as in section 6.2, are concatenated to form the protocol
1622 key value.
1626 Raeburn [Page 29]
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1628 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
1631 The string-to-key function is used to transform UTF-8 passwords into
1632 DES3 keys. The DES3 string-to-key function relies on the "N-fold"
1633 algorithm and DK function, described in section 5.
1635 The n-fold algorithm is applied to the password string concatenated
1636 with a salt value. For 3-key triple DES, the operation will involve
1637 a 168-fold of the input password string, to generate an intermediate
1638 key, from which the user's long-term key will be derived with the DK
1639 function. The DES3 string-to-key function is shown here in
1640 pseudocode:
1642 DES3string-to-key(passwordString, salt, params)
1643 if (params != emptyString)
1644 error("invalid params");
1645 s = passwordString + salt
1646 tmpKey = random-to-key(168-fold(s))
1647 key = DK (tmpKey, KerberosConstant)
1649 Weak key checking is performed in the random-to-key and DK
1650 operations. The KerberosConstant value is the byte string {0x6b 0x65
1651 0x72 0x62 0x65 0x72 0x6f 0x73}. These values correspond to the ASCII
1652 encoding for the string "kerberos".
1654 7. Use of Kerberos encryption outside this specification
1656 Several Kerberos-based application protocols and preauthentication
1657 systems have been designed and deployed that perform encryption and
1658 message integrity checks in various ways. While in some cases there
1659 may be good reason for specifying these protocols in terms of
1660 specific encryption or checksum algorithms, we anticipate that in
1661 many cases this will not be true, and more generic approaches
1662 independent of particular algorithms will be desirable. Rather than
1663 having each protocol designer reinvent schemes for protecting data,
1664 using multiple keys, etc, we have attempted to present in this
1665 section a general framework that should be sufficient not only for
1666 the Kerberos protocol itself but also for many preauthentication
1667 systems and application protocols, while trying to avoid some of the
1668 assumptions that can work their way into such protocol designs.
1670 Some problematic assumptions we've seen (and sometimes made) include:
1671 that a random bitstring is always valid as a key (not true for DES
1672 keys with parity); that the basic block encryption chaining mode
1673 provides no integrity checking, or can easily be separated from such
1674 checking (not true for many modes in development that do both
1675 simultaneously); that a checksum for a message always results in the
1676 same value (not true if a confounder is incorporated); that an
1677 initial vector is used (may not be true if a block cipher in CBC mode
1678 is not in use).
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1684 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
1687 Such assumptions, while they may hold for any given set of encryption
1688 and checksum algorithms, may not be true of the next algorithms to be
1689 defined, leaving the application protocol unable to make use of those
1690 algorithms without updates to its specification.
1692 The Kerberos protocol uses only the attributes and operations
1693 described in sections 3 and 4. Preauthentication systems and
1694 application protocols making use of Kerberos are encouraged to use
1695 them as well. The specific key and string-to-key parameters should
1696 generally be treated as opaque. While the string-to-key parameters
1697 are manipulated as an octet string, the representation for the
1698 specific key structure is implementation-defined; it may not even be
1699 a single object.
1701 While we don't recommend it, some application protocols will
1702 undoubtedly continue to use the key data directly, even if only in
1703 some of the currently existing protocol specifications. An
1704 implementation intended to support general Kerberos applications may
1705 therefore need to make the key data available, as well as the
1706 attributes and operations described in sections 3 and 4. [8]
1708 8. Assigned Numbers
1710 The following encryption type numbers are already assigned or
1711 reserved for use in Kerberos and related protocols.
1714 encryption type etype section or comment
1715 -----------------------------------------------------------------
1716 des-cbc-crc 1 6.2.3
1717 des-cbc-md4 2 6.2.2
1718 des-cbc-md5 3 6.2.1
1719 [reserved] 4
1720 des3-cbc-md5 5
1721 [reserved] 6
1722 des3-cbc-sha1 7
1723 dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9 (pkinit)
1724 md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10 (pkinit)
1725 sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11 (pkinit)
1726 rc2CBC-EnvOID 12 (pkinit)
1727 rsaEncryption-EnvOID 13 (pkinit from PKCS#1 v1.5)
1728 rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID 14 (pkinit from PKCS#1 v2.0)
1729 des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID 15 (pkinit)
1730 des3-cbc-sha1-kd 16 6.3
1731 aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 17 [KRB5-AES]
1732 aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 18 [KRB5-AES]
1733 rc4-hmac 23 (Microsoft)
1738 Raeburn [Page 31]
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1740 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
1743 rc4-hmac-exp 24 (Microsoft)
1744 subkey-keymaterial 65 (opaque; PacketCable)
1747 (The "des3-cbc-sha1" assignment is a deprecated version using no key
1748 derivation. It should not be confused with des3-cbc-sha1-kd.)
1750 Several numbers have been reserved for use in encryption systems not
1751 defined here. Encryption type numbers have unfortunately been
1752 overloaded on occasion in Kerberos-related protocols, so some of the
1753 reserved numbers do not and will not correspond to encryption systems
1754 fitting the profile presented here.
1756 The following checksum type numbers are assigned or reserved. As
1757 with encryption type numbers, some overloading of checksum numbers
1758 has occurred.
1761 Checksum type sumtype checksum section or
1762 value size reference
1763 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
1764 CRC32 1 4 6.1.3
1765 rsa-md4 2 16 6.1.2
1766 rsa-md4-des 3 24 6.2.5
1767 des-mac 4 16 6.2.7
1768 des-mac-k 5 8 6.2.8
1769 rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 6.2.6
1770 rsa-md5 7 16 6.1.1
1771 rsa-md5-des 8 24 6.2.4
1772 rsa-md5-des3 9 24 ??
1773 sha1 (unkeyed) 10 20 ??
1774 hmac-sha1-des3-kd 12 20 6.3
1775 hmac-sha1-des3 13 20 ??
1776 sha1 (unkeyed) 14 20 ??
1777 hmac-sha1-96-aes128 15 20 [KRB5-AES]
1778 hmac-sha1-96-aes256 16 20 [KRB5-AES]
1779 [reserved] 0x8003 ? [GSS-KRB5]
1782 Encryption and checksum type numbers are signed 32-bit values. Zero
1783 is invalid, and negative numbers are reserved for local use. All
1784 standardized values must be positive.
1794 Raeburn [Page 32]
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1796 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
1799 9. Implementation Notes
1801 The "interface" described here is the minimal information that must
1802 be defined to make a cryptosystem useful within Kerberos in an
1803 interoperable fashion. Despite the functional notation used in some
1804 places, it is not an attempt to define an API for cryptographic
1805 functionality within Kerberos. Actual implementations providing
1806 clean APIs will probably find it useful to make additional
1807 information available, which should be possible to derive from a
1808 specification written to the framework given here. For example, an
1809 application designer may wish to determine the largest number of
1810 bytes that can be encrypted without overflowing a certain size output
1811 buffer, or conversely, the maximum number of bytes that might be
1812 obtained by decrypting a ciphertext message of a given size. (In
1813 fact, an implementation of the GSS-API Kerberos mechanism [GSS-KRB5]
1814 will require some of these.)
1816 The presence of a mechanism in this document should not be taken as
1817 an indication that it must be implemented for compliance with any
1818 specification; required mechanisms will be specified elsewhere.
1819 Indeed, some of the mechanisms described here for backwards
1820 compatibility are now considered rather weak for protecting critical
1821 data.
1823 10. Security Considerations
1825 Recent years have brought advancements in the ability to perform
1826 large-scale attacks against DES, to such a degree that it is not
1827 considered a strong encryption mechanism any longer; triple-DES is
1828 generally preferred in its place, despite the poorer performance.
1829 See [ESP-DES] for a summary of some of the potential attacks, and
1830 [EFF-DES] for a detailed discussion of the implementation of
1831 particular attack. However, most Kerberos implementations still have
1832 DES as their primary interoperable encryption type.
1834 DES has four 'weak' keys and twelve 'semi-weak' keys, and the use of
1835 single-DES here avoids them. However, DES also has 48 'possibly-
1836 weak' keys [Schneier96] (note that the tables in many editions of the
1837 reference contains errors) which are not avoided.
1839 DES weak keys are keys with the property that E1(E1(P)) = P (where E1
1840 denotes encryption of a single block with key 1). DES semi-weak keys
1841 or "dual" keys are pairs of keys with the property that E1(P) =
1842 D2(P), and thus E2(E1(P)) = P. Because of the use of CBC mode and
1843 leading random confounder, however, these properties are unlikely to
1844 present a security problem.
1846 Many of the choices concerning when weak-key corrections are
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1852 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
1855 performed relate more to compatibility with existing implementations
1856 than to any risk analysis.
1858 While checks are also done for the component DES keys in a triple-DES
1859 key, the nature of the weak keys is such that it is extremely
1860 unlikely that they will weaken the triple-DES encryption -- only
1861 slightly more likely than having the middle of the three sub-keys
1862 match one of the other two, which effectively converts the encryption
1863 to single-DES, which is a case we make no effort to avoid.
1865 The true CRC-32 checksum is not collision-proof; an attacker could
1866 use a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack to generate a valid
1867 message even if a confounder is used [SG92]. The use of collision-
1868 proof checksums is of course recommended for environments where such
1869 attacks represent a significant threat. The "simplifications" (read:
1870 bugs) introduced when CRC-32 was implemented for Kerberos cause
1871 leading zeros to effectively be ignored, so messages differing only
1872 in leading zero bits will have the same checksum.
1874 [HMAC] and [IPSEC-HMAC] discuss weaknesses of the HMAC algorithm.
1875 Unlike [IPSEC-HMAC], the triple-DES specification here does not use
1876 the suggested truncation of the HMAC output. As pointed out in
1877 [IPSEC-HMAC], SHA-1 was not developed to be used as a keyed hash
1878 function, which is a criterion of HMAC. [HMAC-TEST] contains test
1879 vectors for HMAC-SHA-1.
1881 The mit_des_string_to_key function was originally constructed with
1882 the assumption that all input would be ASCII; it ignores the top bit
1883 of each input byte. Folding with XOR is also not an especially good
1884 mixing mechanism in terms of preserving randomness.
1886 The n-fold function used in the string-to-key operation for des3-cbc-
1887 hmac-sha1-kd was designed to cause each bit of input to contribute
1888 equally to the output; it was not designed to maximize or equally
1889 distribute randomness in the input, and there are conceivable cases
1890 of partially structured input where randomness may be lost. This
1891 should only be an issue for highly structured passwords, however.
1893 [RFC1851] discusses the relative strength of triple-DES encryption.
1894 The relative slow speed of triple-DES encryption may also be an issue
1895 for some applications.
1897 In [Bellovin91], there is a suggestion that analyses of encryption
1898 schemes should include a model of an attacker capable of submitting
1899 known plaintexts to be encrypted with an unknown key, as well as
1900 being able to perform many types of operations on known protocol
1901 messages. Recent experiences with the chosen-plaintext attacks on
1902 Kerberos version 4 bear out the value of this suggestion.
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1911 The use of unkeyed encrypted checksums, such as those used in the
1912 single-DES cryptosystems specified in [Kerb1510], allows for cut-and-
1913 paste attacks, especially if a confounder is not used. In addition,
1914 unkeyed encrypted checksums are vulnerable to chosen-plaintext
1915 attacks: an attacker with access to an encryption oracle can easily
1916 encrypt the required unkeyed checksum along with the chosen
1917 plaintext. [Bellovin99] These weaknesses, combined with a common
1918 implementation design choice described below, allow for a cross-
1919 protocol attack from version 4 to version 5.
1921 The use of a random confounder is an important means of preventing an
1922 attacker from making effective use of protocol exchanges as an
1923 encryption oracle. In Kerberos version 4, the encryption of constant
1924 plaintext to constant ciphertext makes an effective encryption oracle
1925 for an attacker. The use of random confounders in [Kerb1510]
1926 frustrates this sort of chosen-plaintext attack.
1928 Using the same key for multiple purposes can enable or increase the
1929 scope of chosen-plaintext attacks. Some software which implements
1930 both versions 4 and 5 of the Kerberos protocol uses the same keys for
1931 both versions of the protocol. This enables the encryption oracle of
1932 version 4 to be used to attack version 5. Vulnerabilities such as
1933 this cross-protocol attack reinforce the wisdom of not using a key
1934 for multiple purposes.
1936 This document, like the Kerberos protocol, completely ignores the
1937 notion of limiting the amount of data a key may be used with to a
1938 quantity based on the robustness of the algorithm or size of the key.
1939 It is assumed that any defined algorithms and key sizes will be
1940 strong enough to support very large amounts of data, or they will be
1941 deprecated once significant attacks are known.
1943 This document also places no bounds on the amount of data that can be
1944 handled in various operations. In order to avoid denial of service
1945 attacks, implementations will probably want to restrict message sizes
1946 at some higher level.
1948 11. IANA Considerations
1950 Two registries for numeric values should be created: Kerberos
1951 Encryption Type Numbers and Kerberos Checksum Type Numbers. These
1952 are signed values ranging from -2147483648 to 2147483647. Positive
1953 values should be assigned only for algorithms specified in accordance
1954 with this specification for use with Kerberos or related protocols.
1955 Negative values are for private use; local and experimental
1956 algorithms should use these values. Zero is reserved and may not be
1957 assigned.
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1967 Positive encryption and checksum type numbers may be assigned
1968 following either of two policies described in [BCP26].
1970 Standards-track specifications may be assigned values under the
1971 Standards Action policy.
1973 Specifications in non-standards track RFCs may be assigned values
1974 after Expert Review. A non-IETF specification may be assigned values
1975 by publishing an Informational or standards-track RFC referencing the
1976 external specification; that specification must be public and
1977 published in some permanent record much like the IETF RFCs. It is
1978 highly desirable, though not required, that the full specification be
1979 published as an IETF RFC.
1981 Smaller encryption type values should be used for IETF standards-
1982 track mechanisms, and much higher values (16777216 and above) for
1983 other mechanisms. (Rationale: In the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding,
1984 smaller numbers encode to smaller octet sequences, so this favors
1985 standards-track mechanisms with slightly smaller messages.) Aside
1986 from that guideline, IANA may choose numbers as it sees fit.
1988 Internet-Draft specifications should not include values for
1989 encryption and checksum type numbers. Instead, they should indicate
1990 that values would be assigned by IANA when the document is approved
1991 as an RFC. For development and interoperability testing, values in
1992 the private-use range (negative values) may be used, but should not
1993 be included in the draft specification.
1995 Each registered value should have an associated unique name to refer
1996 to it by. The lists given in section 8 should be used as an initial
1997 registry; they include reservations for specifications in progress in
1998 parallel with this document, and for certain other values believed to
1999 be in use already.
2001 12. Acknowledgments
2003 This document is an extension of the encryption specification
2004 included in [Kerb1510] by B. Clifford Neuman and John Kohl, and much
2005 of the text of the background, concepts, and DES specifications are
2006 drawn directly from that document.
2008 The abstract framework presented in this document was put together by
2009 Jeff Altman, Sam Hartman, Jeff Hutzelman, Cliff Neuman, Ken Raeburn,
2010 and Tom Yu, and the details were refined several times based on
2011 comments from John Brezak and others.
2013 Marc Horowitz wrote the original specification of triple-DES and key
2014 derivation in a pair of Internet Drafts (under the names draft-
2018 Raeburn [Page 36]
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2020 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2023 horowitz-key-derivation and draft-horowitz-kerb-key-derivation) which
2024 were later folded into a draft revision of [Kerb1510], from which
2025 this document was later split off.
2027 Tom Yu provided the text describing the modifications to the standard
2028 CRC algorithm as Kerberos implementations actually use it, and some
2029 of the Security Considerations section.
2031 Miroslav Jurisic provided information for one of the UTF-8 test cases
2032 for the string-to-key functions.
2034 Marcus Watts noticed some errors in earlier drafts, and pointed out
2035 that the simplified profile could easily be modified to support
2036 cipher text stealing modes.
2038 Simon Josefsson contributed some clarifications to the DES "CBC
2039 checksum", string-to-key and weak key descriptions, and some test
2040 vectors.
2042 Simon Josefsson, Louis LeVay and others also caught some errors in
2043 earlier drafts.
2045 A. Test vectors
2047 This section provides test vectors for various functions defined or
2048 described in this document. For convenience, most inputs are ASCII
2049 strings, though some UTF-8 samples are be provided for string-to-key
2050 functions. Keys and other binary data are specified as hexadecimal
2051 strings.
2053 A.1. n-fold
2055 The n-fold function is defined in section 5.1. As noted there, the
2056 sample vector in the original paper defining the algorithm appears to
2057 be incorrect. Here are some test cases provided by Marc Horowitz and
2058 Simon Josefsson:
2074 Raeburn [Page 37]
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2076 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2079 64-fold("012345") =
2080 64-fold(303132333435) = be072631276b1955
2082 56-fold("password") =
2083 56-fold(70617373776f7264) = 78a07b6caf85fa
2085 64-fold("Rough Consensus, and Running Code") =
2086 64-fold(526f75676820436f6e73656e7375732c20616e642052756e
2087 6e696e6720436f6465) = bb6ed30870b7f0e0
2089 168-fold("password") =
2090 168-fold(70617373776f7264) =
2091 59e4a8ca7c0385c3c37b3f6d2000247cb6e6bd5b3e
2093 192-fold("MASSACHVSETTS INSTITVTE OF TECHNOLOGY"
2094 192-fold(4d41535341434856534554545320494e5354495456544520
2095 4f4620544543484e4f4c4f4759) =
2096 db3b0d8f0b061e603282b308a50841229ad798fab9540c1b
2098 168-fold("Q") =
2099 168-fold(51) =
2100 518a54a2 15a8452a 518a54a2 15a8452a
2101 518a54a2 15
2103 168-fold("ba") =
2104 168-fold(6261) =
2105 fb25d531 ae897449 9f52fd92 ea9857c4
2106 ba24cf29 7e
2108 Here are some additional values corresponding to folded values of the
2109 string "kerberos"; the 64-bit form is used in the des3 string-to-key
2110 (section 6.3.1).
2112 64-fold("kerberos") =
2113 6b657262 65726f73
2114 128-fold("kerberos") =
2115 6b657262 65726f73 7b9b5b2b 93132b93
2116 168-fold("kerberos") =
2117 8372c236 344e5f15 50cd0747 e15d62ca
2118 7a5a3bce a4
2119 256-fold("kerberos") =
2120 6b657262 65726f73 7b9b5b2b 93132b93
2121 5c9bdcda d95c9899 c4cae4de e6d6cae4
2123 Note that the initial octets exactly match the input string when the
2124 output length is a multiple of the input length.
2130 Raeburn [Page 38]
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2132 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2135 A.2. mit_des_string_to_key
2137 The function mit_des_string_to_key is defined in section 6.2. We
2138 present here several test values, with some of the intermediate
2139 results. The fourth test demonstrates the use of UTF-8 with three
2140 characters. The last two tests are specifically constructed so as to
2141 trigger the weak-key fixups for the intermediate key produced by fan-
2142 folding; we have no test cases that cause such fixups for the final
2143 key.
2145 UTF-8 encodings used in test vector:
2146 eszett U+00DF C3 9F s-caron U+0161 C5 A1
2147 c-acute U+0107 C4 87 g-clef U+1011E F0 9D 84 9E
2149 Test vector:
2151 salt: "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn"
2152 415448454e412e4d49542e4544557261656275726e
2153 password: "password" 70617373776f7264
2154 fan-fold result: c01e38688ac86c2e
2155 intermediate key: c11f38688ac86d2f
2156 DES key: cbc22fae235298e3
2159 salt: "WHITEHOUSE.GOVdanny"
2160 5748495445484f5553452e474f5664616e6e79
2161 password: "potatoe" 706f7461746f65
2162 fan-fold result: a028944ee63c0416
2163 intermediate key: a129944fe63d0416
2164 DES key: df3d32a74fd92a01
2167 salt: "EXAMPLE.COMpianist" 4558414D504C452E434F4D7069616E697374
2168 password: g-clef (U+1011E) f09d849e
2169 fan-fold result: 3c4a262c18fab090
2170 intermediate key: 3d4a262c19fbb091
2171 DES key: 4ffb26bab0cd9413
2174 salt: "ATHENA.MIT.EDUJuri" + s-caron(U+0161) + "i" + c-acute(U+0107)
2175 415448454e412e4d49542e4544554a757269c5a169c487
2176 password: eszett(U+00DF)
2177 c39f
2178 fan-fold result:b8f6c40e305afc9e
2179 intermediate key: b9f7c40e315bfd9e
2180 DES key: 62c81a5232b5e69d
2186 Raeburn [Page 39]
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2188 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2191 salt: "AAAAAAAA" 4141414141414141
2192 password: "11119999" 3131313139393939
2193 fan-fold result: e0e0e0e0f0f0f0f0
2194 intermediate key: e0e0e0e0f1f1f101
2195 DES key: 984054d0f1a73e31
2198 salt: "FFFFAAAA" 4646464641414141
2199 password: "NNNN6666" 4e4e4e4e36363636
2200 fan-fold result: 1e1e1e1e0e0e0e0e
2201 intermediate key: 1f1f1f1f0e0e0efe
2202 DES key: c4bf6b25adf7a4f8
2205 This trace provided by Simon Josefsson shows the intermediate
2206 processing stages of one of the test inputs:
2208 string_to_key (des-cbc-md5, string, salt)
2209 ;; string:
2210 ;; `password' (length 8 bytes)
2211 ;; 70 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64
2212 ;; salt:
2213 ;; `ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn' (length 21 bytes)
2214 ;; 41 54 48 45 4e 41 2e 4d 49 54 2e 45 44 55 72 61
2215 ;; 65 62 75 72 6e
2216 des_string_to_key (string, salt)
2217 ;; String:
2218 ;; `password' (length 8 bytes)
2219 ;; 70 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64
2220 ;; Salt:
2221 ;; `ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn' (length 21 bytes)
2222 ;; 41 54 48 45 4e 41 2e 4d 49 54 2e 45 44 55 72 61
2223 ;; 65 62 75 72 6e
2224 odd = 1;
2225 s = string | salt;
2226 tempstring = 0; /* 56-bit string */
2227 pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */
2228 ;; s = pad(string|salt):
2229 ;; `passwordATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn\x00\x00\x00'
2230 ;; (length 32 bytes)
2231 ;; 70 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64 41 54 48 45 4e 41 2e 4d
2232 ;; 49 54 2e 45 44 55 72 61 65 62 75 72 6e 00 00 00
2233 for (8byteblock in s) {
2234 ;; loop iteration 0
2235 ;; 8byteblock:
2236 ;; `password' (length 8 bytes)
2237 ;; 70 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64
2238 ;; 01110000 01100001 01110011 01110011 01110111 01101111
2242 Raeburn [Page 40]
2243 \f
2244 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2247 ;; 01110010 01100100
2248 56bitstring = removeMSBits(8byteblock);
2249 ;; 56bitstring:
2250 ;; 1110000 1100001 1110011 1110011 1110111 1101111
2251 ;; 1110010 1100100
2252 if (odd == 0) reverse(56bitstring); ;; odd=1
2253 odd = ! odd
2254 tempstring = tempstring XOR 56bitstring;
2255 ;; tempstring
2256 ;; 1110000 1100001 1110011 1110011 1110111 1101111
2257 ;; 1110010 1100100
2259 for (8byteblock in s) {
2260 ;; loop iteration 1
2261 ;; 8byteblock:
2262 ;; `ATHENA.M' (length 8 bytes)
2263 ;; 41 54 48 45 4e 41 2e 4d
2264 ;; 01000001 01010100 01001000 01000101 01001110 01000001
2265 ;; 00101110 01001101
2266 56bitstring = removeMSBits(8byteblock);
2267 ;; 56bitstring:
2268 ;; 1000001 1010100 1001000 1000101 1001110 1000001
2269 ;; 0101110 1001101
2270 if (odd == 0) reverse(56bitstring); ;; odd=0
2271 reverse(56bitstring)
2272 ;; 56bitstring after reverse
2273 ;; 1011001 0111010 1000001 0111001 1010001 0001001
2274 ;; 0010101 1000001
2275 odd = ! odd
2276 tempstring = tempstring XOR 56bitstring;
2277 ;; tempstring
2278 ;; 0101001 1011011 0110010 1001010 0100110 1100110
2279 ;; 1100111 0100101
2281 for (8byteblock in s) {
2282 ;; loop iteration 2
2283 ;; 8byteblock:
2284 ;; `IT.EDUra' (length 8 bytes)
2285 ;; 49 54 2e 45 44 55 72 61
2286 ;; 01001001 01010100 00101110 01000101 01000100 01010101
2287 ;; 01110010 01100001
2288 56bitstring = removeMSBits(8byteblock);
2289 ;; 56bitstring:
2290 ;; 1001001 1010100 0101110 1000101 1000100 1010101
2291 ;; 1110010 1100001
2292 if (odd == 0) reverse(56bitstring); ;; odd=1
2298 Raeburn [Page 41]
2299 \f
2300 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2303 odd = ! odd
2304 tempstring = tempstring XOR 56bitstring;
2305 ;; tempstring
2306 ;; 1100000 0001111 0011100 0001111 1100010 0110011
2307 ;; 0010101 1000100
2309 for (8byteblock in s) {
2310 ;; loop iteration 3
2311 ;; 8byteblock:
2312 ;; `eburn\x00\x00\x00' (length 8 bytes)
2313 ;; 65 62 75 72 6e 00 00 00
2314 ;; 01100101 01100010 01110101 01110010 01101110 00000000
2315 ;; 00000000 00000000
2316 56bitstring = removeMSBits(8byteblock);
2317 ;; 56bitstring:
2318 ;; 1100101 1100010 1110101 1110010 1101110 0000000
2319 ;; 0000000 0000000
2320 if (odd == 0) reverse(56bitstring); ;; odd=0
2321 reverse(56bitstring)
2322 ;; 56bitstring after reverse
2323 ;; 0000000 0000000 0000000 0111011 0100111 1010111
2324 ;; 0100011 1010011
2325 odd = ! odd
2326 tempstring = tempstring XOR 56bitstring;
2327 ;; tempstring
2328 ;; 1100000 0001111 0011100 0110100 1000101 1100100
2329 ;; 0110110 0010111
2331 for (8byteblock in s) {
2332 }
2333 ;; for loop terminated
2335 tempkey = key_correction(add_parity_bits(tempstring));
2336 ;; tempkey
2337 ;; `\xc1\x1f8h\x8a\xc8m\x2f' (length 8 bytes)
2338 ;; c1 1f 38 68 8a c8 6d 2f
2339 ;; 11000001 00011111 00111000 01101000 10001010 11001000
2340 ;; 01101101 00101111
2354 Raeburn [Page 42]
2355 \f
2356 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2359 key = key_correction(DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey));
2360 ;; key
2361 ;; `\xcb\xc2\x2f\xae\x23R\x98\xe3' (length 8 bytes)
2362 ;; cb c2 2f ae 23 52 98 e3
2363 ;; 11001011 11000010 00101111 10101110 00100011 01010010
2364 ;; 10011000 11100011
2366 ;; string_to_key key:
2367 ;; `\xcb\xc2\x2f\xae\x23R\x98\xe3' (length 8 bytes)
2368 ;; cb c2 2f ae 23 52 98 e3
2371 A.3. DES3 DR and DK
2373 These tests show the derived-random and derived-key values for the
2374 des3-hmac-sha1-kd encryption scheme, using the DR and DK functions
2375 defined in section 6.3.1. The input keys were randomly generated;
2376 the usage values are from this specification.
2379 key: dce06b1f64c857a11c3db57c51899b2cc1791008ce973b92
2380 usage: 0000000155
2381 DR: 935079d14490a75c3093c4a6e8c3b049c71e6ee705
2382 DK: 925179d04591a79b5d3192c4a7e9c289b049c71f6ee604cd
2384 key: 5e13d31c70ef765746578531cb51c15bf11ca82c97cee9f2
2385 usage: 00000001aa
2386 DR: 9f58e5a047d894101c469845d67ae3c5249ed812f2
2387 DK: 9e58e5a146d9942a101c469845d67a20e3c4259ed913f207
2389 key: 98e6fd8a04a4b6859b75a176540b9752bad3ecd610a252bc
2390 usage: 0000000155
2391 DR: 12fff90c773f956d13fc2ca0d0840349dbd39908eb
2392 DK: 13fef80d763e94ec6d13fd2ca1d085070249dad39808eabf
2394 key: 622aec25a2fe2cad7094680b7c64940280084c1a7cec92b5
2395 usage: 00000001aa
2396 DR: f8debf05b097e7dc0603686aca35d91fd9a5516a70
2397 DK: f8dfbf04b097e6d9dc0702686bcb3489d91fd9a4516b703e
2399 key: d3f8298ccb166438dcb9b93ee5a7629286a491f838f802fb
2400 usage: 6b65726265726f73 ("kerberos")
2401 DR: 2270db565d2a3d64cfbfdc5305d4f778a6de42d9da
2402 DK: 2370da575d2a3da864cebfdc5204d56df779a7df43d9da43
2404 key: c1081649ada74362e6a1459d01dfd30d67c2234c940704da
2405 usage: 0000000155
2410 Raeburn [Page 43]
2411 \f
2412 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2415 DR: 348056ec98fcc517171d2b4d7a9493af482d999175
2416 DK: 348057ec98fdc48016161c2a4c7a943e92ae492c989175f7
2418 key: 5d154af238f46713155719d55e2f1f790dd661f279a7917c
2419 usage: 00000001aa
2420 DR: a8818bc367dadacbe9a6c84627fb60c294b01215e5
2421 DK: a8808ac267dada3dcbe9a7c84626fbc761c294b01315e5c1
2423 key: 798562e049852f57dc8c343ba17f2ca1d97394efc8adc443
2424 usage: 0000000155
2425 DR: c813f88b3be2b2f75424ce9175fbc8483b88c8713a
2426 DK: c813f88a3be3b334f75425ce9175fbe3c8493b89c8703b49
2428 key: 26dce334b545292f2feab9a8701a89a4b99eb9942cecd016
2429 usage: 00000001aa
2430 DR: f58efc6f83f93e55e695fd252cf8fe59f7d5ba37ec
2431 DK: f48ffd6e83f83e7354e694fd252cf83bfe58f7d5ba37ec5d
2434 A.4. DES3string_to_key
2436 These are the keys generated for some of the above input strings for
2437 triple-DES with key derivation as defined in section 6.3.1.
2439 salt: "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn"
2440 passwd: "password"
2441 key: 850bb51358548cd05e86768c313e3bfef7511937dcf72c3e
2443 salt: "WHITEHOUSE.GOVdanny"
2444 passwd: "potatoe"
2445 key: dfcd233dd0a43204ea6dc437fb15e061b02979c1f74f377a
2447 salt: "EXAMPLE.COMbuckaroo"
2448 passwd: "penny"
2449 key: 6d2fcdf2d6fbbc3ddcadb5da5710a23489b0d3b69d5d9d4a
2451 salt: "ATHENA.MIT.EDUJuri" + s-caron(U+0161) + "i"
2452 + c-acute(U+0107)
2453 passwd: eszett(U+00DF)
2454 key: 16d5a40e1ce3bacb61b9dce00470324c831973a7b952feb0
2456 salt: "EXAMPLE.COMpianist"
2457 passwd: g-clef(U+1011E)
2458 key: 85763726585dbc1cce6ec43e1f751f07f1c4cbb098f40b19
2466 Raeburn [Page 44]
2467 \f
2468 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2471 A.5. Modified CRC-32
2473 Below are modified-CRC32 values for various ASCII and octet strings.
2474 Only the printable ASCII characters are checksummed, no C-style
2475 trailing zero-valued octet. The 32-bit modified CRC and the sequence
2476 of output bytes as used in Kerberos are shown. (The octet values are
2477 separated here to emphasize that they are octet values and not 32-bit
2478 numbers, which will be the most convenient form for manipulation in
2479 some implementations. The bit and byte order used internally for
2480 such a number is irrelevant; the octet sequence generated is what is
2481 important.)
2484 mod-crc-32("foo") = 33 bc 32 73
2485 mod-crc-32("test0123456789") = d6 88 3e b8
2486 mod-crc-32("MASSACHVSETTS INSTITVTE OF TECHNOLOGY") = f7 80 41 e3
2487 mod-crc-32(8000) = 4b 98 83 3b
2488 mod-crc-32(0008) = 32 88 db 0e
2489 mod-crc-32(0080) = 20 83 b8 ed
2490 mod-crc-32(80) = 20 83 b8 ed
2491 mod-crc-32(80000000) = 3b b6 59 ed
2492 mod-crc-32(00000001) = 96 30 07 77
2495 B. Significant Changes from RFC 1510
2497 The encryption and checksum mechanism profiles are new. The old
2498 specification defined a few operations for various mechanisms, but
2499 didn't outline what should be required of new mechanisms in terms of
2500 abstract properties, nor how to ensure that a mechanism specification
2501 is complete enough for interoperability between implementations. The
2502 new profiles do differ from the old specification in a few ways:
2504 Some message definitions in [Kerb1510] could be read as permitting
2505 the initial vector to be specified by the application; the text
2506 was too vague. It is specifically not permitted in this
2507 specification. Some encryption algorithms may not use
2508 initialization vectors, so relying on chosen, secret
2509 initialization vectors for security is unwise. Also, the
2510 prepended confounder in the existing algorithms is roughly
2511 equivalent to a per-message initialization vector that is revealed
2512 in encrypted form. However, carrying state across from one
2513 encryption to another is explicitly permitted through the opaque
2514 "cipher state" object.
2516 The use of key derivation is new.
2518 Several new methods are introduced, including generation of a key
2522 Raeburn [Page 45]
2523 \f
2524 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2527 in wire-protocol format from random input data.
2529 The means for influencing the string-to-key algorithm are laid out
2530 more clearly.
2532 Triple-DES support is new.
2534 The pseudo-random function is new.
2536 The des-cbc-crc, DES string-to-key and CRC descriptions have been
2537 updated to align them with existing implementations.
2539 [Kerb1510] had no indication what character set or encoding might be
2540 used for pass phrases and salts.
2542 In [Kerb1510], key types, encryption algorithms and checksum
2543 algorithms were only loosely associated, and the association was not
2544 well described. In this specification, key types and encryption
2545 algorithms have a one-to-one correspondence, and associations between
2546 encryption and checksum algorithms are described so that checksums
2547 can be computed given negotiated keys, without requiring further
2548 negotiation for checksum types.
2550 Notes
2552 [1] While Message Authentication Code (MAC) or Message Integrity
2553 Check (MIC) would be more appropriate terms for many of the
2554 uses in this document, we continue to use the term "checksum"
2555 for historical reasons.
2557 [2] Extending CBC mode across messages would be one obvious
2558 example of this chaining. Another might be the use of
2559 counter mode, with a counter randomly initialized and
2560 attached to the ciphertext; a second message could continue
2561 incrementing the counter when chaining the cipher state, thus
2562 avoiding having to transmit another counter value. However,
2563 this chaining is only useful for uninterrupted, ordered
2564 sequences of messages.
2566 [3] In the case of Kerberos, the encrypted objects will generally
2567 be ASN.1 DER encodings, which contain indications of their
2568 length in the first few octets.
2570 [4] As of the time of this writing, some new modes of operation
2571 have been proposed, some of which may permit encryption and
2572 integrity protection simultaneously. After some of these
2573 proposals have been subjected to adequate analysis, we may
2574 wish to formulate a new simplified profile based on one of
2578 Raeburn [Page 46]
2579 \f
2580 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2583 them.
2585 [5] It should be noted that the sample vector in Appendix B.2 of
2586 the original paper appears to be incorrect. Two independent
2587 implementations from the specification (one in C by Marc
2588 Horowitz, and another in Scheme by Bill Sommerfeld) agree on
2589 a value different from that in [Blumenthal96].
2591 [6] For example, in MIT's implementation of [Kerb1510], the rsa-
2592 md5 unkeyed checksum of application data may be included in
2593 an authenticator encrypted in a service's key; since rsa-md5
2594 is believed to be collision-proof, even if the application
2595 data is exposed to an attacker, it cannot be modified without
2596 causing the checksum verification to fail.
2598 [7] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a key to a
2599 particular function, separating the functions of generating a
2600 checksum from other encryption performed using the session
2601 key. The constant 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 was chosen because it
2602 maintains key parity. The properties of DES precluded the
2603 use of the complement. The same constant is used for similar
2604 purpose in the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy
2605 Enhanced Mail standard.
2607 [8] Perhaps one of the more common reasons for directly
2608 performing encryption is direct control over the negotiation
2609 and to select a "sufficiently strong" encryption algorithm
2610 (whatever that means in the context of a given application).
2611 While Kerberos directly provides no facility for negotiating
2612 encryption types between the application client and server,
2613 there are other means for accomplishing similar goals. For
2614 example, requesting only "strong" session key types from the
2615 KDC, and assuming that the type actually returned by the KDC
2616 will be understood and supported by the application server.
2618 Intellectual Property Statement
2620 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
2621 intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
2622 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
2623 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
2624 might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
2625 has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
2626 IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
2627 standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
2628 claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
2629 licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
2630 obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
2634 Raeburn [Page 47]
2635 \f
2636 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2639 proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
2640 be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
2642 The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
2643 copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
2644 rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
2645 this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
2646 Director.
2648 Normative References
2650 [Bellare98]
2651 Bellare, M., Desai, A., Pointcheval, D., and P. Rogaway,
2652 "Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption
2653 Schemes". Extended abstract published in Advances in Cryptology-
2654 Crypto 98 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol.
2655 1462, H. Krawcyzk ed., Springer-Verlag, 1998.
2656 [Blumenthal96]
2657 Blumenthal, U., and S. Bellovin, "A Better Key Schedule for DES-
2658 Like Ciphers", Proceedings of PRAGOCRYPT '96, 1996.
2659 [CRC]
2660 International Organization for Standardization, "ISO Information
2661 Processing Systems - Data Communication - High-Level Data Link
2662 Control Procedure - Frame Structure," IS 3309, 3rd Edition,
2663 October 1984.
2664 [DES77]
2665 National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Data
2666 Encryption Standard," Federal Information Processing Standards
2667 Publication 46, Washington, DC, 1977.
2668 [DESI81]
2669 National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce,
2670 "Guidelines for implementing and using NBS Data Encryption
2671 Standard," Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
2672 74, Washington, DC, 1981.
2673 [DESM80]
2674 National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, "DES
2675 Modes of Operation," Federal Information Processing Standards
2676 Publication 81, Springfield, VA, December 1980.
2677 [Dolev91]
2678 Dolev, D., Dwork, C., Naor, M., "Non-malleable cryptography",
2679 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing,
2680 ACM, 1991.
2681 [HMAC]
2682 Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
2683 for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
2690 Raeburn [Page 48]
2691 \f
2692 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2695 [KRB5-AES]
2696 Raeburn, K., "AES Encyrption for Kerberos 5", RFC XXXX, Xxxxxxxx
2697 2003.
2698 [MD4-92]
2699 Rivest, R., "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC 1320, MIT
2700 Laboratory for Computer Science, April 1992.
2701 [MD5-92]
2702 Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC 1321, MIT
2703 Laboratory for Computer Science, April 1992.
2704 [RFC2026]
2705 Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revisions 3," RFC
2706 2026, October 1996.
2707 [SG92]
2708 Stubblebine, S., and V. D. Gligor, "On Message Integrity in
2709 Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on
2710 Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, May 1992.
2712 Informative References
2714 [Bellovin91]
2715 Bellovin, S. M., and M. Merrit, "Limitations of the Kerberos
2716 Authentication System", in Proceedings of the Winter 1991 Usenix
2717 Security Conference, January, 1991.
2718 [Bellovin99]
2719 Bellovin, S. M., and D. Atkins, private communications, 1999.
2720 [EFF-DES]
2721 Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Cracking DES: Secrets of
2722 Encryption Research, Wiretap Politics, and Chip Design", O'Reilly
2723 & Associates, Inc., May 1998.
2724 [ESP-DES]
2725 Madson, C., and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm
2726 With Explicit IV", RFC 2405, November 1998.
2727 [GSS-KRB5]
2728 Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism," RFC 1964,
2729 June 1996.
2730 [HMAC-TEST]
2731 Cheng, P., and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1",
2732 RFC 2202, September 1997.
2733 [IPSEC-HMAC]
2734 Madson, C., and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and
2735 AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.
2736 [Kerb]
2737 Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K.
2738 Raeburn, "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)",
2739 draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-00.txt, February 22,
2740 2002. Work in progress.
2746 Raeburn [Page 49]
2747 \f
2748 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2751 [Kerb1510]
2752 Kohl, J., and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication
2753 Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993.
2754 [RC5]
2755 Baldwin, R, and R. Rivest, "The RC5, RC5-CBC, RC5-CBC-Pad, and
2756 RC5-CTS Algorithms", RFC 2040, October 1996.
2757 [Schneier96]
2758 Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition", John Wiley &
2759 Sons, New York, NY, 1996. ISBN 0-471-12845-7.
2761 Editor's address
2763 Kenneth Raeburn
2764 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2765 77 Massachusetts Avenue
2766 Cambridge, MA 02139
2767 raeburn@mit.edu
2770 Full Copyright Statement
2772 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
2774 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
2775 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
2776 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
2777 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
2778 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
2779 included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
2780 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
2781 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
2782 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
2783 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
2784 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
2785 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
2786 English.
2788 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
2789 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
2791 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
2792 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
2793 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
2794 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
2795 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
2796 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
2802 Raeburn [Page 50]
2803 \f
2804 INTERNET DRAFT February 2004
2807 Notes to RFC Editor
2809 Before publication of this document as an RFC, the following changes
2810 are needed:
2812 Change the reference "[KRB5-AES]" in Normative References to indicate
2813 the AES draft (draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-XX) that should be
2814 advancing to RFC at the same time. The RFC number and publication
2815 date are needed.
2817 If draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications advances to RFC at the
2818 same time as this document, change the information for [Kerb] in the
2819 Informative References section as well.
2821 Change the first-page headers to indicate the RFC number, network
2822 working group, etc, as appropriate for an RFC instead of an I-D.
2824 Remove the contact-info paragraph from the Abstract.
2826 Delete this section.
2858 Raeburn [Page 51]