1 [[!meta title="Can I hide the fact that I am using Tails?"]]
3 In this context, the term fingerprint refers to what is specific to
4 Tails in the way it behaves on Internet. This can be used to determine
5 whether a particular user is using Tails or not.
7 [[As explained on our warning page|warning#fingerprint]], when using
8 Tails it is possible to know that you are using Tor. But Tails tries to
9 **make it as difficult as possible to distinguish Tails users from other
10 Tor users**, especially Tor Browser Bundle (TBB) users. If it is
11 possible to determine whether your are a Tails users or a TBB user, this
12 provides more information about you and in consequence reduces your
15 This section explains some issues regarding the fingerprint of Tails and
16 how this could be used to identify you as a Tails user.
18 For the websites that you are visiting
19 ======================================
21 The websites that you are visiting can retrieve a lot of information
22 about your browser. That information can include its name and version,
23 window size, list of available extensions, timezone, available fonts,
26 To make it difficult to distinguish Tails users from TBB users, **the
27 Tor browser tries to provide the same information as the TBB** in
28 order to have similar fingerprints.
30 See the [[fingerprint section of known issues
31 page|support/known_issues#fingerprint]] for a list of known differences
32 between the fingerprints of the Tor browser and the TBB.
34 Apart from that, **some of the extensions included in Tor browser are
35 different** than the ones included in the TBB. More sophisticated
36 attacks can use those differences to distinguish Tails user from TBB
39 For example, Tails includes <span class="application">Adblock
40 Plus</span> which removes advertisements. If an attacker can determine
41 that you are not downloading the advertisements that are included in a
42 webpage, that could help identify you as a Tails user.
44 For the moment, you should consider that **no special care is taken
45 regarding the fingerprint of the [[<span class="application">Unsafe
46 Browser</span>|doc/anonymous_internet/unsafe_browser]]**.
48 For your ISP or local network administrator
49 ===========================================
51 - Tor bridges are most of the time a good way of hiding the fact that you are
52 connecting to Tor to a local observer. If this is important for you, read
53 our documentation about [[doc/first_steps/startup_options/bridge_mode]].
55 - A Tails system is **almost exclusively generating Tor activity** on
56 the network. Usually TBB users also have network activity outside of
57 Tor, either from another web browser or other applications. So the
58 proportion of Tor activity could be used to determine whether a user
59 is using Tails or the TBB. If you are sharing your Internet
60 connection with other users that are not using Tails it is probably
61 harder for your ISP to determine whether a single user is generating
62 only Tor traffic and so maybe using Tails.
64 - Tails **does not use the entry guards mechanism of Tor**. With the
66 mechanism](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards), a Tor
67 user always uses the same few relays as first hops. As Tails does not
68 store any Tor information between separate working sessions, it does
69 not store the entry guards information either. This behaviour could
70 be used to distinguish Tails users from TBB users across several
73 - When starting, Tails synchronizes the system clock to make sure it
74 is accurate. While doing this, if the time is set too much in the
75 past or in the future, Tor is shut down and started again. This
76 behavior could be used to distinguish Tails from TBB users,
77 especially this happens every time Tails starts.