1 # SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE
2 # Copyright (C) YEAR Free Software Foundation, Inc.
3 # This file is distributed under the same license as the PACKAGE package.
4 # FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, YEAR.
9 "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n"
10 "POT-Creation-Date: 2015-02-12 01:15+0100\n"
11 "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
12 "Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
13 "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
16 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
17 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
21 msgid "[[!meta title=\"Frequently asked questions\"]]\n"
26 msgid "[[!toc levels=2]]\n"
31 msgid "<a id=\"project\"></a>\n"
36 msgid "Other useful resources\n"
39 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
40 msgid "[The Tor Project: FAQ](https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en)"
43 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
45 "[The Tor Project: Stack Exchange, question & answer site](https://tor."
51 msgid "Tails project\n"
56 msgid "<a id=\"relationship_with_tor\"></a>\n"
61 msgid "What is the relationship between Tor and Tails?\n"
66 "See our explanation about [[why does Tails use Tor|doc/about/"
72 msgid "<a id=\"debian\"></a>\n"
77 msgid "Why is Tails based on Debian and not on another distribution?\n"
82 "We are deeply rooted and involved in Debian. The friendships, relationships, "
83 "and technical expertise we have in Debian have many benefits for Tails, and "
84 "we are not ready to build the same relationship with Ubuntu, OpenBSD, or any "
85 "other distribution. See our statement about our [[contribute/"
86 "relationship_with_upstream]] for details."
91 "See also the article [Why there are so many Debian derivatives](http://"
92 "upsilon.cc/~zack/blog/posts/2011/09/"
93 "why_there_are_so_many_debian_derivatives/) by Stefano Zacchiroli."
98 msgid "<a id=\"ubuntu\"></a>\n"
103 msgid "Why isn't Tails based on Ubuntu?\n"
107 msgid "First, see the answer to the [[previous question|faq#debian]]."
110 #. type: Bullet: '0. '
111 msgid "The rapid development cycle of Ubuntu would be too fast for Tails."
114 #. type: Bullet: '0. '
116 "Ubuntu adds features in ways that we find dangerous for privacy. For example "
117 "Ubuntu One ([partly discontinued](http://blog.canonical.com/2014/04/02/"
118 "shutting-down-ubuntu-one-file-services/)) and the [Amazon ads and data "
119 "leaks](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/privacy-ubuntu-1210-amazon-ads-"
123 #. type: Bullet: '0. '
125 "Ubuntu is led by a company that takes most of the important decisions and "
126 "has the power to make them happen."
129 #. type: Bullet: '0. '
131 "We usually ship kernels and video drivers from [Debian backports](http://"
132 "backports.debian.org/). The result is comparable to Ubuntu in terms of "
133 "support for recent hardware."
136 #. type: Bullet: '0. '
138 "We think that the general quality of the maintenance work being done on "
139 "packages matters from a security perspective. Debian maintainers generally "
140 "are experts in the fields their packages deal with; while it is generally "
141 "not the case outside of the limited number of packages Ubuntu officially "
145 #. type: Bullet: '0. '
147 "We are actively working on improving [[AppArmor support|contribute/design/"
148 "application_isolation]] in Tails; a security framework that is already used "
149 "in a few Ubuntu applications."
152 #. type: Bullet: '0. '
154 "We are also working on adding compiler hardening options to more Debian "
155 "packages included in Tails; another security feature that Ubuntu already "
161 msgid "<a id=\"website\"></a>\n"
166 msgid "Tails website\n"
171 msgid "<a id=\"ssl_certificate\"></a>\n"
176 msgid "Why does tails.boum.org rely on a commercial SSL certificate?\n"
181 "HTTPS provides encryption and authentication on the web. The standard "
182 "authentication mechanism through SSL certificates is centralized and based "
183 "on commercial or institutional certificate authorities. This mechanism has "
184 "proven to be susceptible to various methods of compromise. See our [[warning "
185 "about man-in-the-middle attacks|doc/about/warning#man-in-the-middle]]."
190 "Still, we use HTTPS on our website and rely on a commercial certificate even "
191 "if we acknowledge those security problems."
194 #. type: Bullet: '1. '
195 msgid "Providing no HTTPS and no kind of encryption would be a worse option."
201 "2. Providing a self-signed certificate or another marginally supported\n"
202 "authentication mechanism would not work for the majority of users. Modern\n"
203 "browsers display very strong warnings when facing a self-signed certificate, and\n"
204 "many people would think the website is broken while it is not.\n"
209 "We prefer to provide weak security, using a commercial certificate, that "
210 "still works for most people. At the same time, we make clear this security "
211 "is limited and encourage stronger ways of verifying the authenticity of "
212 "Tails once downloaded. See our documentation on [[verifying the ISO|"
218 msgid "<a id=\"hardware\"></a>\n"
223 msgid "Hardware compatibility\n"
228 msgid "<a id=\"64-bit\"></a>\n"
233 msgid "Does Tails work with 64-bit processors?\n"
238 "Yes. Tails automatically detects the type of processor of the computer and "
239 "loads a 32-bit or a 64-bit kernel accordingly."
244 msgid "<a id=\"arm\"></a>\n"
249 msgid "Does Tails work on ARM architecture, Raspberry Pi, or tablets?\n"
254 "For the moment, Tails is only available on the x86 and x86_64 "
255 "architectures. The Raspberry Pi and many tablets are based on the ARM "
256 "architecture. Tails does not work on the ARM architecture so far."
261 "Look for a tablet with an AMD or Intel processor. Try to verify its "
262 "compatibility with Debian beforehand, for example make sure that the Wi-Fi "
263 "interface is supported."
268 msgid "<a id=\"installation\"></a>\n"
273 msgid "Installation\n"
278 msgid "<a id=\"install_permanently\"></a>\n"
283 msgid "Can I install Tails permanently onto my hard disk?\n"
288 "This is not possible using the recommended installation methods. Tails is "
289 "designed to be a live system running from a removable media: DVD, USB stick "
295 "This is a conscious decision as this mode of operation is better for what we "
296 "want to provide to Tails users: amnesia, the fact that Tails leaves no "
297 "traces on the computer after a session is closed."
302 msgid "<a id=\"browser\"></a>\n"
307 msgid "Web browser\n"
312 msgid "<a id=\"javascript\"></a>\n"
317 msgid "Why is JavaScript enabled by default in <span class=\"application\">Tor Browser</span>?\n"
322 "Many websites today require JavaScript to work correctly. As a consequence "
323 "JavaScript is enabled by default in Tails to avoid confusing many users. But "
324 "the [[Torbutton|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser#torbutton]] extension, "
325 "included in Tails, takes care of blocking dangerous JavaScript "
331 "Tails also includes the [[NoScript|doc/anonymous_internet/"
332 "Tor_browser#noscript]] extension to optionally disable more JavaScript. This "
333 "might improve security in some cases. However, if you disable JavaScript, "
334 "then the [[fingerprint|doc/about/fingerprint]] of your browser will differ "
335 "from most Tor users. This might break your anonymity."
340 "We think that having JavaScript enabled by default is the best possible "
341 "compromise between usability and security in this case."
346 msgid "<a id=\"add-ons\"></a>\n"
351 msgid "Can I install other add-ons in <span class=\"application\">Tor Browser</span>?\n"
356 msgid "Installing add-ons in <span class=\"application\">Tor Browser</span> might break the security built in Tails.\n"
361 "Add-ons can do many things within the browser, and even if all the "
362 "networking goes through Tor, some add-ons might interact badly with the rest "
363 "of the configuration or leak private information."
369 "1. They can track and reveal information about your browsing behaviour, browsing\n"
370 "history, or system information, either on purpose or by mistake.\n"
376 "2. They can have bugs and security holes that can be remotely exploited by an\n"
383 "4. They can have bugs breaking the security offered by other add-ons, for example\n"
384 "Torbutton, and break your anonymity.\n"
390 "5. They can break your anonymity by making your browsing behaviour\n"
391 "distinguishable amongst other Tails users.\n"
396 "Unless proven otherwise, no add-on, apart from the ones already included in "
397 "Tails, have been seriously audited and should be considered safe to use in "
404 "<div class=\"next\">\n"
406 " <li>[[Warnings about persistence|doc/first_steps/persistence/warnings#index3h1]]</li>\n"
407 " <li>[[Browsing the web with <span class=\"application\">Tor Browser</span>|doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_browser]]</li>\n"
408 " <li>[[Can I hide the fact that I am using Tails?|doc/about/fingerprint/]]</li>\n"
417 "XXX: Push that information to the browser documentation?\n"
418 "XXX: Check https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/torbutton-faq.html.en#recommendedextensions\n"
424 msgid "<a id=\"flash\"></a>\n"
429 msgid "Can I view websites using Adobe Flash with Tails?\n"
433 msgid "Adobe Flash Player is not included in Tails for several reasons:"
436 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
438 "It is proprietary software which prevents us from legally including it in "
442 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
443 msgid "It is closed source and so we have no idea of what it really does."
446 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
447 msgid "It has a very long history of serious security vulnerabilities."
450 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
452 "It is known to favor privacy invasive technologies such as [[!wikipedia "
453 "Local_shared_object]]."
456 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
457 msgid "Adobe only maintains their GNU/Linux Flash plugin for Google Chrome."
462 "We have considered including open-source alternative software to Adobe "
463 "Flash, such as [Gnash](http://www.gnu.org/software/gnash/), but it is not "
464 "the case yet, see [[!tails_ticket 5363]]."
469 msgid "But you can already watch HTML5 videos with <span class=\"application\">Tor Browser</span>.\n"
474 msgid "<a id=\"anonymity_test\"></a>\n"
479 msgid "How to analyse the results of online anonymity tests?\n"
484 "Fingerprinting websites such as <https://panopticlick.eff.org/> or <https://"
485 "ip-check.info/> try to retrieve as much information as possible from your "
486 "browser to see if it can be used to identify you."
492 "As explained in our documentation about\n"
493 "[[fingerprinting|doc/about/fingerprint]], Tails provides anonymity on the web by\n"
494 "making it difficult to distinguish a particular user amongst all the users of\n"
495 "<span class=\"application\">Tor Browser</span> (either in Tails or on other operating systems).\n"
501 "So, the information retrieved by such fingerprinting websites is not harmful for\n"
502 "anonymity in itself, as long as it is the same for all users of <span class=\"application\">Tor Browser</span>.\n"
508 "For example, the user-agent property of the browser was set to `Mozilla/5.0\n"
509 "(Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.3) Gecko/20100401 Firefox/3.6.3`,\n"
510 "as of Tails 0.21 and <span class=\"application\">Tor Browser</span> 2.3.25-13. This value preserves your anonymity even if\n"
511 "the operating system installed on the computer is Windows NT and you usually run\n"
512 "Firefox. On the other hand, changing this value makes you distinguishable from\n"
513 "others users of <span class=\"application\">Tor Browser</span> and breaks your anonymity.\n"
518 "Furthermore, we verify the result of those websites before each release, see "
519 "our [[test suite|contribute/release_process/test]]."
524 msgid "<a id=\"java\"></a>\n"
529 msgid "Is Java installed in the <span class=\"application\">Tor Browser</span>?\n"
534 "Tails does not include a Java plugin in its browser because it could break "
540 msgid "<a id=\"persistence\"></a>\n"
545 msgid "Persistence\n"
550 msgid "<a id=\"persistent_features\"></a>\n"
555 msgid "Can I save my custom settings?\n"
561 "<em>… like language, keyboard layout, background image, toolbar position,\n"
562 "browser settings, touchpad preferences, etc.</em>\n"
567 "By default Tails does not save anything from one working session to "
568 "another. Only the persistent volume allows you to reuse data across "
569 "different working sessions. See the list of existing [[persistent features|"
570 "doc/first_steps/persistence/configure#features]]."
575 "We are frequently requested to add new persistent features but we are "
576 "usually busy working on other priorities. See our [open tickets](https://"
577 "labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails/issues?query_id=122) about persistence. "
578 "Any bit of help [[is welcome|contribute/how/code]]."
583 msgid "<a id=\"luks\"></a>\n"
588 msgid "How strong is the encryption of the persistent volume and LUKS?\n"
593 "Tails uses LUKS to encrypt the persistent volume. This is the same technique "
594 "as the one we recommend for [[creating and using encrypted volumes|doc/"
595 "encryption_and_privacy/encrypted_volumes]] in general."
600 "LUKS is a very popular standard for disk encryption in Linux. LUKS is the "
601 "default technique for full-disk encryption proposed by many distribution, "
602 "including Debian and Ubuntu, when installing a regular system."
607 "Currently the default cipher is `aes-cbc-essiv:sha256` with a key size of "
613 "To understand better how persistence work, see our [[design document|"
614 "contribute/design/persistence]]."
619 msgid "<a id=\"recover_passphrase\"></a>\n"
624 msgid "Is it possible to recover the passphrase of the persistent volume?\n"
629 "No. The encryption of the persistent volume is very strong and it is not "
630 "possible to recover the passphrase of the persistent volume. If the "
631 "passphrase is weak enough, an attacker, using a brute force attack, could "
632 "try many possible passphrases and end up guessing your passphrase."
637 msgid "<a id=\"networking\"></a>\n"
647 msgid "<a id=\"vpn\"></a>\n"
652 msgid "Can I use Tails with a VPN?\n"
656 msgid "Three possible scenarios need to be distinguished:"
661 msgid "Using a VPN instead of Tor"
666 msgid "Using a VPN to connect to Tor (VPN before Tor)"
671 msgid "Connecting to a VPN using Tor (VPN after Tor)"
676 "For more information, see our [[blueprint on VPN support|blueprint/"
682 "It is a very [[fundamental assumption of Tails|about#tor]] to force all "
683 "outgoing traffic to anonymity networks such as Tor or I2P. VPN are not "
684 "anonymity networks, because the administrators of the VPN can know both "
685 "where you are connecting from and where you are connecting to. Tor provides "
686 "anonymity by making it impossible for a single point in the network to know "
687 "both the origin and the destination of a connection."
692 "In some situations, you might be forced to use a VPN to connect to the "
693 "Internet, for example by your ISP. This is currenlty not possible using "
694 "Tails. See [[!tails_ticket 5858]]."
699 "[[Tor bridges|doc/first_steps/startup_options/bridge_mode]] can also be "
700 "useful to bypass the limitations imposed by your ISP."
704 msgid "In some situtations, it can be useful to connect to a VPN through Tor:"
707 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
708 msgid "To access services that block connections coming from Tor."
711 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
713 "To access ressources only available inside a VPN, for example at your "
714 "company or University."
718 msgid "This is currenlty not possible easily using Tails."
723 msgid "<a id=\"mac_address\"></a>\n"
728 msgid "Does Tails change the MAC address of my network interfaces?\n"
733 "Starting from Tails 0.23, [[MAC spoofing|doc/first_steps/startup_options/"
734 "mac_spoofing]] is enabled by default on all interfaces."
739 msgid "<a id=\"dns\"></a>\n"
744 msgid "How does the DNS resolution work in Tails?\n"
749 "See our [[design document|contribute/design/Tor_enforcement/DNS]] on this "
755 msgid "<a id=\"htp\"></a>\n"
760 msgid "Why does Tails automatically connect to several websites when starting?\n"
765 "Tor and I2P require the system clock to be well synchronized in order to "
766 "work properly. When starting Tails, a notification is displayed while the "
767 "clock is being synchronized."
772 "This synchronization is made by sending HTTPS queries through Tor to "
773 "severals websites and deducing a correct time from their answers. The list "
774 "of websites that could be queried in this process can be found in `/etc/"
780 "See also our [[design document|contribute/design/Time_syncing]] on this "
786 msgid "<a id=\"relay\"></a>\n"
791 msgid "Can I help the Tor network by running a relay or a bridge in Tails?\n"
796 "It is currently impossible to run a Tor relay or bridge in Tails. See [[!"
797 "tails_ticket 5418]]."
802 msgid "<a id=\"software\"></a>\n"
807 msgid "Software not included in Tails\n"
812 msgid "<a id=\"new_software\"></a>\n"
817 msgid "Can my favourite software be included in Tails?\n"
822 "First of all, make sure that this software is already available in Debian, "
823 "as this is a requirement to be included in Tails. Adding to Tails software "
824 "which is not in Debian imply an additional workload that could compromise "
825 "the sustainability of the project. On top of that, being in Debian brings "
829 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
831 "It is included in the Debian process for security updates and new versions."
834 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
835 msgid "It is authenticated using OpenPGP signatures."
838 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
840 "It is under the scrutiny of the Debian community and its many users and "
841 "derivatives, including Ubuntu."
846 "To check whether a software is in Debian, search for it on <https://packages."
847 "debian.org/>. If it is not yet available in Debian, you should ask its "
848 "developers why it is not the case yet."
853 "Second, this software might not be useful to accomplish our design goals. "
854 "Refer to our [[design documents|contribute/design]] to understand which are "
855 "the intended use cases, and the assumptions on which Tails is based."
860 "We also try to limit the amount of software included in Tails, and we only "
861 "add new software with a very good reason to do so:"
864 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
865 msgid "We try to limit the growth of the ISO image and automatic upgrades."
868 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
869 msgid "More software implies more security issues."
872 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
873 msgid "We avoid proposing several options to accomplish the same task."
876 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
878 "If a package needs to be removed after its inclusion, for example because of "
879 "security problems, then this might be problematic as users might rely on it."
884 "After considering all this, if you still think that this software is a good "
885 "candidate to be included in Tails, please [[explain us|/contribute/talk]] "
891 msgid "<div class=\"tip\">\n"
896 "If a software is not included in Tails, but is included in Debian, you can "
897 "use the [[additional software|doc/first_steps/persistence/"
898 "configure#additional_software]] feature of the persistent volume to install "
899 "it automatically at the beginning of each working session."
908 msgid "Here is some of the software we are often asked to include in Tails:"
911 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
912 msgid "**bitmessage**: not in Debian"
915 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
916 msgid "**torchat**: see [[!tails_ticket 5554]]"
919 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
920 msgid "**retroshare**: not in Debian"
925 msgid "<a id=\"bittorrent\"></a>\n"
930 msgid "Can I download using BitTorrent with Tails?\n"
935 "Tails does not ship any BitTorrent software and is unlikely to do so in the "
940 msgid "The problem with using BitTorrent over Tor is double:"
943 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
945 "It is technically hard to do it properly, see: <https://blog.torproject.org/"
946 "blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea>."
949 #. type: Bullet: ' - '
951 "It harms the network, see: <https://blog.torproject.org/blog/why-tor-is-"
958 "We have relatively vague [[!tails_ticket 5991 desc=\"plans to improve\n"
959 "on this situation\"]].\n"
964 msgid "<a id=\"desktop\"></a>\n"
969 msgid "Desktop environment\n"
974 msgid "<a id=\"timezone\"></a>\n"
979 msgid "Why is the time set wrong?\n"
984 "When Tails starts, the system timezone is set to UTC (Greenwich time). So, "
985 "this time might be a few hours in the future if you are West from the United "
986 "Kingdom, or in the past if you are East from the UK. The minutes should be "
992 "We do this for anonymity reasons: if some application reveals your actual "
993 "timezone, it might help identifying who you are."
998 "Having all Tails users set to the same timezone, makes it more difficult to "
999 "distinguish you amongst all the other Tails users."
1004 msgid "<div class=\"note\">\n"
1009 "We are working on a custom clock applet with configurable timezone. See [[!"
1010 "tails_ticket 6284]]."
1015 msgid "<a id=\"misc\"></a>\n"
1020 msgid "Other security issues\n"
1025 msgid "<a id=\"compromised_system\"></a>\n"
1030 msgid "Is it safe to use Tails on a compromised system?\n"
1035 "Tails runs independently from the operating system installed on the "
1036 "computer. So, if the computer has only been compromised by software, "
1037 "running from inside your regular operating system (virus, trojan, etc.), "
1038 "then it is safe to use Tails. This is true as long as Tails itself has been "
1039 "installed using a trusted system."
1044 "If the computer has been compromised by someone having physical access to it "
1045 "and who installed untrusted pieces of hardware, then it might not be safe to "
1051 msgid "<a id=\"integrity\"></a>\n"
1056 msgid "Can I verify the integrity of a Tails device?\n"
1061 "It is not possible to verify the integrity of a Tails device when running "
1062 "Tails from this same device. This would be like asking to someone whether "
1063 "she is a liar; the answer of a true liar would always be \"no\"."
1066 #. type: Bullet: '- '
1068 "To verify the integrity of a DVD from a separate trusted system, you can "
1069 "verify the signature of the ISO image as documented in [[verify the ISO "
1070 "image using the command line|doc/get/"
1071 "verify_the_iso_image_using_the_command_line]] against the DVD itself."
1074 #. type: Bullet: '- '
1076 "There is no documented method of verifying the integrity of a USB stick or "
1077 "SD card installed using <span class=\"application\">Tails Installer</span>. "
1078 "However, if you have another trusted Tails device, you can [[clone it onto "
1079 "the untrusted device|doc/first_steps/upgrade]] to reset it to a trusted "
1085 msgid "<a id=\"reuse_memory_wipe\"></a>\n"
1090 msgid "Can I use the memory wipe feature of Tails on another operating system?\n"
1095 "The memory wipe mechanism that Tails uses on shutdown to [[protect against "
1096 "cold boot attacks|doc/advanced_topics/cold_boot_attacks]] is not yet "
1097 "available in other Linux distributions. In the future, we would like to "
1098 "package it for Debian."
1103 "If you want to implement this feature outside of Tails, have a look at the "
1104 "corresponding [[design documentation|contribute/design/memory_erasure]]."
1109 msgid "<a id=\"new_identity\"></a>\n"
1114 msgid "Is it safe to use the new identity feature of Vidalia?\n"
1120 "In our [[warning page|doc/about/warning#identities]] we advice to restart Tails\n"
1121 "every time that you want to use a different contextual identity. The <span\n"
1122 "class=\"guilabel\">New Identity</span> feature of <span\n"
1123 "class=\"application\">Vidalia</span> forces Tor to use new circuits but only for\n"
1124 "new connections. The two main drawbacks of this technique are:\n"
1129 "- The circuits used by connections that remain open might not be changed: "
1130 "for example, a circuit used to connect to an open webpage or to an instant "
1137 "- Each application might contain information that can identify you,\n"
1138 "independently of the Tor circuit that are used. For example, the browser might\n"
1139 "contain cookies from previous websites, <span\n"
1140 "class=\"application\">[[Pidgin|doc/anonymous_internet/pidgin]]</span> will reuse the\n"
1141 "same nickname by default, etc.\n"
1146 "Tails is a full operating system, so a *new identity* should be thought on a "
1147 "broader level than only switching Tor circuits."
1152 msgid "<a id=\"truecrypt\"></a>\n"
1157 msgid "Can I use TrueCrypt with Tails?\n"
1163 "No, <span class=\"application\">TrueCrypt</span> was removed in Tails 1.2.1.\n"
1164 "But you can still [[open <span class=\"application\">TrueCrypt</span>\n"
1165 "volumes using <span class=\"code\">cryptsetup</span>|doc/encryption_and_privacy/truecrypt]].\n"
1170 "Furthermore, [TrueCrypt is now discontinued](http://truecrypt.sourceforge."
1171 "net/) and its development team recommends against using it. We recommend "
1172 "using other [[encryption tools|doc/encryption_and_privacy/"
1173 "encrypted_volumes]] such as [[LUKS|faq#luks]]."
1178 msgid "<a id=\"boot_statistics\"></a>\n"
1183 msgid "Does Tails collect information about its users?\n"
1188 "When Tails starts, two HTTPS requests are made automatically to our website "
1192 #. type: Bullet: '- '
1194 "A security check is performed to know if security issues have been announced "
1195 "for this version of Tails. The language of the working session is passed "
1196 "along with this request to display the notification in the preferred "
1197 "language of the user."
1200 #. type: Bullet: '- '
1202 "[[<span class=\"application\">Tails Upgrader</span>|doc/first_steps/"
1203 "upgrade]] checks for newer versions. The version of the running Tails is "
1204 "passed along with this request."
1209 "We believe it is important to notify the user of known security issues and "
1210 "newer versions. We calculate statistics based on the security check to know "
1211 "how many times Tails has been started and connected to Tor. Those statistics "
1212 "are published in our [[monthly reports|news]]."
1229 "How_do_you_chain_a_proxy_after_TOR___63__ "
1230 "Next_Tails_version_should_have_proxychains_for_socks_after_exit_node "
1231 "alternative_way_to_connect_to_web featurerequest:_proxychains"
1236 "easy way to chain a SOCKS5 proxy after the hop off the exit node of TOR."
1241 "I need to hide the fact that I'm coming from TOR, because many websites "
1247 "I have found some websites that explain how to create an SSH tunnel, but "
1248 "using the terminal is above my level of skills :)"
1253 "It should be possible to use a program like Proxify to chain a proxy, but I "
1254 "don't know if this creates conflicts, and I don't know how to install a "
1255 "program that can run of the persistent volume."
1260 "Surely there is someone who can simply give us a paragraph of text to enter "
1261 "into the polipo config file ( where i add the ip address and port for the "
1262 "SOCKS5 i bought ) or give some other instructions."
1268 " * Use something like `ssh -D 1081`. See `DynamicFoward` in `ssh_config(5)`. * Use `iptables` to allow connections to 1081 on localhost.\n"
1269 " * For websites, modify FoxyProxy settings to add a new proxy, before rules\n"
1270 " for Tor, that contains the addresses that needs to be reached, and\n"
1271 " which directs connections to 1081.\n"
1272 " * For other programs, draft a dedicated `tsocks.conf`. Use\n"
1273 " `TSOCKS_CONF_FILE=tsocks-specific.conf tsocks ssh one.example.org`.\n"
1278 "`proxychains` is in Debian, the package is called by the same name. This "
1279 "means it is straightforword to install it in Tails. There is no way in can "
1280 "be preconfigured for every Tails users, so it's hard to see why it should be "
1281 "included in the default package set."
1286 msgid "</rawmaterial>\n"
1291 msgid "Other topics\n"
1297 "- XXX_NICK_XXX in Pidgin might be caused by a lack of RAM\n"