Allow IPv6 address entry in tools>ping - Loosens valid character check

[tomato/davidwu.git] / release / src / router / openssl / crypto / engine / eng_rsax.c

/* crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c */
/* Copyright (c) 2010-2010 Intel Corp.
 *   Author: Vinodh.Gopal@intel.com
 *           Jim Guilford
 *           Erdinc.Ozturk@intel.com
 *           Maxim.Perminov@intel.com
 *           Ying.Huang@intel.com
 *
 * More information about algorithm used can be found at:
 *   http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/srds2009/escs2009_submission_Gopal.pdf
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 */

#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>

/* RSAX is available **ONLY* on x86_64 CPUs */
#undef COMPILE_RSAX

#if (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
     defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
#define COMPILE_RSAX
static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax (void);
#endif

void ENGINE_load_rsax (void)
        {
/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */
#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX
        ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_rsax();
        if(!toadd) return;
        ENGINE_add(toadd);
        ENGINE_free(toadd);
        ERR_clear_error();
#endif
        }

#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX
#define E_RSAX_LIB_NAME "rsax engine"

static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e);
static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e);
static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e);
static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *r);
#endif

static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN e_rsax_cmd_defns[] = {
        {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
        };

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
static RSA_METHOD e_rsax_rsa =
        {
        "Intel RSA-X method",
        NULL,
        NULL,
        NULL,
        NULL,
        e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp,
        NULL,
        NULL,
        e_rsax_rsa_finish,
        RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE,
        NULL,
        NULL,
        NULL
        };
#endif

/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
static const char *engine_e_rsax_id = "rsax";
static const char *engine_e_rsax_name = "RSAX engine support";

/* This internal function is used by ENGINE_rsax() */
static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)
        {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
        const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
#endif
        if(!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rsax_id) ||
                        !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rsax_name) ||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
                        !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &e_rsax_rsa) ||
#endif
                        !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, e_rsax_destroy) ||
                        !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, e_rsax_init) ||
                        !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, e_rsax_finish) ||
                        !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, e_rsax_ctrl) ||
                        !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, e_rsax_cmd_defns))
                return 0;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
        meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
        e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
        e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
        e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc;
        e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec;
        e_rsax_rsa.bn_mod_exp = meth1->bn_mod_exp;
#endif
        return 1;
        }

static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void)
        {
        ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
        if(!ret)
                return NULL;
        if(!bind_helper(ret))
                {
                ENGINE_free(ret);
                return NULL;
                }
        return ret;
        }

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* Used to attach our own key-data to an RSA structure */
static int rsax_ex_data_idx = -1;
#endif

static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e)
        {
        return 1;
        }

/* (de)initialisation functions. */
static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e)
        {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
        if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1)
                rsax_ex_data_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
                        NULL,
                        NULL, NULL, NULL);
#endif
        if (rsax_ex_data_idx  == -1)
                return 0;
        return 1;
        }

static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e)
        {
        return 1;
        }

static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
        {
        int to_return = 1;

        switch(cmd)
                {
        /* The command isn't understood by this engine */
        default:
                to_return = 0;
                break;
                }

        return to_return;
        }


#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

#ifdef _WIN32
typedef unsigned __int64 UINT64;
#else
typedef unsigned long long UINT64;
#endif
typedef unsigned short UINT16;

/* Table t is interleaved in the following manner:
 * The order in memory is t[0][0], t[0][1], ..., t[0][7], t[1][0], ...
 * A particular 512-bit value is stored in t[][index] rather than the more
 * normal t[index][]; i.e. the qwords of a particular entry in t are not
 * adjacent in memory
 */

/* Init BIGNUM b from the interleaved UINT64 array */
static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM* b, UINT64 *array);

/* Extract array elements from BIGNUM b
 * To set the whole array from b, call with n=8
 */
static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM* b, unsigned int n, UINT64 *array);

struct mod_ctx_512 {
    UINT64 t[8][8];
    UINT64 m[8];
    UINT64 m1[8]; /* 2^278 % m */
    UINT64 m2[8]; /* 2^640 % m */
    UINT64 k1[2]; /* (- 1/m) % 2^128 */
};

static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data);

void mod_exp_512(UINT64 *result, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
                 UINT64 *g,      /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
                 UINT64 *exp,    /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */
                 struct mod_ctx_512 *data);

typedef struct st_e_rsax_mod_ctx
{
  UINT64 type;
  union {
    struct mod_ctx_512 b512;
  } ctx;

} E_RSAX_MOD_CTX;

static E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *e_rsax_get_ctx(RSA *rsa, int idx, BIGNUM* m)
{
        E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr;

        if (idx < 0 || idx > 2)
           return NULL;

        hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx);
        if (!hptr) {
            hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(3*sizeof(E_RSAX_MOD_CTX));
            if (!hptr) return NULL;
            hptr[2].type = hptr[1].type= hptr[0].type = 0;
            RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, hptr);
        }

        if (hptr[idx].type == (UINT64)BN_num_bits(m))
            return hptr+idx;

        if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) {
            UINT64 _m[8];
            bn_extract_to_array_512(m, 8, _m);
            memset( &hptr[idx].ctx.b512, 0, sizeof(struct mod_ctx_512));
            mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(_m, &hptr[idx].ctx.b512);
        }

        hptr[idx].type = BN_num_bits(m);
        return hptr+idx;
}

static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
        {
        E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx);
        if(hptr)
                {
                OPENSSL_free(hptr);
                RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, NULL);
                }
        if (rsa->_method_mod_n)
                BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
        if (rsa->_method_mod_p)
                BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
        if (rsa->_method_mod_q)
                BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
        return 1;
        }


static int e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *e,
                    const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont, E_RSAX_MOD_CTX* rsax_mod_ctx )
{
        if (rsax_mod_ctx && BN_get_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
           if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) {
                UINT64 _r[8];
                UINT64 _g[8];
                UINT64 _e[8];

                /* Init the arrays from the BIGNUMs */
                bn_extract_to_array_512(g, 8, _g);
                bn_extract_to_array_512(e, 8, _e);

                mod_exp_512(_r, _g, _e, &rsax_mod_ctx->ctx.b512);
                /* Return the result in the BIGNUM */
                interleaved_array_to_bn_512(r, _r);
                return 1;
           }
        }

        return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, g, e, m, ctx, in_mont);
}

/* Declares for the Intel CIAP 512-bit / CRT / 1024 bit RSA modular
 * exponentiation routine precalculations and a structure to hold the
 * necessary values.  These files are meant to live in crypto/rsa/ in
 * the target openssl.
 */

/*
 * Local method: extracts a piece from a BIGNUM, to fit it into
 * an array. Call with n=8 to extract an entire 512-bit BIGNUM
 */
static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM* b, unsigned int n, UINT64 *array)
{
        int i;
        UINT64 tmp;
        unsigned char bn_buff[64];
        memset(bn_buff, 0, 64);
        if (BN_num_bytes(b) > 64) {
                printf ("Can't support this byte size\n");
                return 0; }
        if (BN_num_bytes(b)!=0) {
                if (!BN_bn2bin(b, bn_buff+(64-BN_num_bytes(b)))) {
                        printf ("Error's in bn2bin\n");
                        /* We have to error, here */
                        return 0; } }
        while (n-- > 0) {
                array[n] = 0;
                for (i=7; i>=0; i--) {
                        tmp = bn_buff[63-(n*8+i)];
                        array[n] |= tmp << (8*i); } }
        return 1;
}

/* Init a 512-bit BIGNUM from the UINT64*_ (8 * 64) interleaved array */
static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM* b, UINT64 *array)
{
        unsigned char tmp[64];
        int n=8;
        int i;
        while (n-- > 0) {
                for (i = 7; i>=0; i--) {
                        tmp[63-(n*8+i)] = (unsigned char)(array[n]>>(8*i)); } }
        BN_bin2bn(tmp, 64, b);
        return 0;
}


/* The main 512bit precompute call */
static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data)
 {
    BIGNUM two_768, two_640, two_128, two_512, tmp, _m, tmp2;

    /* We need a BN_CTX for the modulo functions */
    BN_CTX* ctx;
    /* Some tmps */
    UINT64 _t[8];
    int i, j, ret = 0;

    /* Init _m with m */
    BN_init(&_m);
    interleaved_array_to_bn_512(&_m, m);
    memset(_t, 0, 64);

    /* Inits */
    BN_init(&two_768);
    BN_init(&two_640);
    BN_init(&two_128);
    BN_init(&two_512);
    BN_init(&tmp);
    BN_init(&tmp2);

    /* Create our context */
    if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { goto err; }
        BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    /*
     * For production, if you care, these only need to be set once,
     * and may be made constants.
     */
    BN_lshift(&two_768, BN_value_one(), 768);
    BN_lshift(&two_640, BN_value_one(), 640);
    BN_lshift(&two_128, BN_value_one(), 128);
    BN_lshift(&two_512, BN_value_one(), 512);

    if (0 == (m[7] & 0x8000000000000000)) {
        exit(1);
    }
    if (0 == (m[0] & 0x1)) { /* Odd modulus required for Mont */
        exit(1);
    }

    /* Precompute m1 */
    BN_mod(&tmp, &two_768, &_m, ctx);
    if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m1[0])) {
            goto err; }

    /* Precompute m2 */
    BN_mod(&tmp, &two_640, &_m, ctx);
    if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m2[0])) {
            goto err;
    }

    /*
     * Precompute k1, a 128b number = ((-1)* m-1 ) mod 2128; k1 should
     * be non-negative.
     */
    BN_mod_inverse(&tmp, &_m, &two_128, ctx);
    if (!BN_is_zero(&tmp)) { BN_sub(&tmp, &two_128, &tmp); }
    if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 2, &data->k1[0])) {
            goto err; }

    /* Precompute t */
    for (i=0; i<8; i++) {
        BN_zero(&tmp);
        if (i & 1) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); }
        if (i & 2) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); }
        if (i & 4) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_640, &tmp); }

        BN_nnmod(&tmp2, &tmp, &_m, ctx);
        if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp2, 8, _t)) {
                goto err; }
        for (j=0; j<8; j++) data->t[j][i] = _t[j]; }

    /* Precompute m */
    for (i=0; i<8; i++) {
        data->m[i] = m[i]; }

    ret = 1;

err:
    /* Cleanup */
        if (ctx != NULL) {
                BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); }
    BN_free(&two_768);
    BN_free(&two_640);
    BN_free(&two_128);
    BN_free(&two_512);
    BN_free(&tmp);
    BN_free(&tmp2);
    BN_free(&_m);

    return ret;
}


static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
        {
        BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
        BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
        BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
        int ret=0;

        BN_CTX_start(ctx);
        r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
        m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
        vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

        {
                BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
                BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
                int error = 0;

                /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery
                 * intialization uses the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag
                 * (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
                 */
                if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                        {
                        BN_init(&local_p);
                        p = &local_p;
                        BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

                        BN_init(&local_q);
                        q = &local_q;
                        BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                        }
                else
                        {
                        p = rsa->p;
                        q = rsa->q;
                        }

                if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
                        {
                        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
                                error = 1;
                        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
                                error = 1;
                        }

                /* clean up */
                if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                        {
                        BN_free(&local_p);
                        BN_free(&local_q);
                        }
                if ( error )
                        goto err;
        }

        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
                if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
                        goto err;

        /* compute I mod q */
        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                {
                c = &local_c;
                BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
                }
        else
                {
                if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
                }

        /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                {
                dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
                BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                }
        else
                dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;

        if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
                rsa->_method_mod_q, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 0, rsa->q) )) goto err;

        /* compute I mod p */
        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                {
                c = &local_c;
                BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
                }
        else
                {
                if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
                }

        /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                {
                dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
                BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                }
        else
                dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;

        if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
                rsa->_method_mod_p, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 1, rsa->p) )) goto err;

        if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
        /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
         * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
        if (BN_is_negative(r0))
                if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;

        if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;

        /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                {
                pr1 = &local_r1;
                BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                }
        else
                pr1 = r1;
        if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;

        /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
         * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
         * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
         * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
         * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
         * they ensure p > q [steve]
         */
        if (BN_is_negative(r0))
                if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
        if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
        if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;

        if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
                {
                if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n) ))
                    goto err;

                /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
                 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
                 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
                 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
                if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
                if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
                if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
                        if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
                if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
                        {
                        /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
                         * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
                         * mod_exp and return that instead. */

                        BIGNUM local_d;
                        BIGNUM *d = NULL;

                        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                                {
                                d = &local_d;
                                BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                                }
                        else
                                d = rsa->d;
                        if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
                                                   rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n) )) goto err;
                        }
                }
        ret=1;

err:
        BN_CTX_end(ctx);

        return ret;
        }
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
#endif /* !COMPILE_RSAX */