Allow IPv6 address entry in tools>ping - Loosens valid character check

[tomato/davidwu.git] / release / src / router / openssl / crypto / ocsp / ocsp_vfy.c

/* ocsp_vfy.c */
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
 * project 2000.
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 */

#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <string.h>

static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                                X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags);
static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret);
static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags);
static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                                X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);

/* Verify a basic response message */

int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                                X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
        {
        X509 *signer, *x;
        STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
        X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
        int i, ret = 0;
        ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);
        if (!ret)
                {
                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
                goto end;
                }
        if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
                flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
        if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
                {
                EVP_PKEY *skey;
                skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
                ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
                EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
                if(ret <= 0)
                        {
                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
                        goto end;
                        }
                }
        if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
                {
                int init_res;
                if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
                        init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL);
                else
                        init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
                if(!init_res)
                        {
                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
                        goto end;
                        }

                X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
                ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
                chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);
                X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
                if (ret <= 0)
                        {
                        i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);     
                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
                        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
                                        X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
                        goto end;
                        }
                if(flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS)
                        {
                        ret = 1;
                        goto end;
                        }
                /* At this point we have a valid certificate chain
                 * need to verify it against the OCSP issuer criteria.
                 */
                ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags);

                /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
                if (ret != 0) goto end;

                /* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and
                 * check for explicit trust
                 */
                if(flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) goto end;

                x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
                if(X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
                        {
                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
                        goto end;
                        }
                ret = 1;
                }



        end:
        if(chain) sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
        return ret;
        }


static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                                X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
        {
        X509 *signer;
        OCSP_RESPID *rid = bs->tbsResponseData->responderId;
        if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid)))
                {
                *psigner = signer;
                return 2;
                }
        if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
            (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid)))
                {
                *psigner = signer;
                return 1;
                }
        /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */

        *psigner = NULL;
        return 0;
        }


static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
        {
        int i;
        unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
        X509 *x;

        /* Easy if lookup by name */
        if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
                return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);

        /* Lookup by key hash */

        /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
        if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL;
        keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
        /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
                {
                x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
                X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
                if(!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
                        return x;
                }
        return NULL;
        }


static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags)
        {
        STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
        X509 *signer, *sca;
        OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
        int i;
        sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;

        if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0)
                {
                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
                return -1;
                }

        /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
        i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);

        /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
        if (i <= 0) return i;

        signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
        /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
        if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1)
                {
                sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
                i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
                if (i < 0) return i;
                if (i)
                        {
                        /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
                        if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags)) return 1;
                        return 0;
                        }
                }

        /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
        return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
        }


/* Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with the same
 * algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates against the issuer.
 * If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check equality against one of them.
 */
        
static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
        {
        OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
        int i, idcount;

        idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
        if (idcount <= 0)
                {
                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
                return -1;
                }

        cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;

        *ret = NULL;

        for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++)
                {
                tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
                /* Check to see if IDs match */
                if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid))
                        {
                        /* If algoritm mismatch let caller deal with it */
                        if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm,
                                        cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm))
                                        return 2;
                        /* Else mismatch */
                        return 0;
                        }
                }

        /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
        *ret = cid;
        return 1;
        }


static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
                        STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
        {
        /* If only one ID to match then do it */
        if(cid)
                {
                const EVP_MD *dgst;
                X509_NAME *iname;
                int mdlen;
                unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
                if (!(dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm)))
                        {
                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
                        return -1;
                        }

                mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
                if (mdlen < 0)
                    return -1;
                if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) ||
                   (cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen))
                        return 0;
                iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
                if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
                        return -1;
                if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen))
                        return 0;
                X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
                if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen))
                        return 0;

                return 1;

                }
        else
                {
                /* We have to match the whole lot */
                int i, ret;
                OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
                for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++)
                        {
                        tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
                        ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
                        if (ret <= 0) return ret;
                        }
                return 1;
                }
                        
        }

static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags)
        {
        X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
        if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) &&
            (x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
                return 1;
        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
        return 0;
        }

/* Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP
 * response verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it
 * against a given trust value.
 */

int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
        {
        X509 *signer;
        X509_NAME *nm;
        GENERAL_NAME *gen;
        int ret;
        X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
        if (!req->optionalSignature) 
                {
                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
                return 0;
                }
        gen = req->tbsRequest->requestorName;
        if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
                {
                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
                return 0;
                }
        nm = gen->d.directoryName;
        ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, store, flags);
        if (ret <= 0)
                {
                OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
                return 0;
                }
        if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
                flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
        if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
                {
                EVP_PKEY *skey;
                skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
                ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
                EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
                if(ret <= 0)
                        {
                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
                        return 0;
                        }
                }
        if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
                {
                int init_res;
                if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
                        init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, NULL);
                else
                        init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer,
                                        req->optionalSignature->certs);
                if(!init_res)
                        {
                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
                        return 0;
                        }

                X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
                X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
                ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
                X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
                if (ret <= 0)
                        {
                        ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);   
                        OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
                        ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
                                        X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
                        return 0;
                        }
                }
        return 1;
        }

static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                                X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
        {
        X509 *signer;
        if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN))
                {
                signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
                *psigner = signer;
                return 1;
                }

        signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
        if (signer)
                {
                *psigner = signer;
                return 2;
                }
        return 0;
        }