preprocessor cleanup: __lint

[unleashed/tickless.git] / lib / libssl / s3_cbc.c

/* $OpenBSD: s3_cbc.c,v 1.16 2017/01/23 08:08:06 beck Exp $ */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 */

#include "ssl_locl.h"

#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>

/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length
 * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */
#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16

/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
 * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
 * supported by TLS.) */
#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128

/* Some utility functions are needed:
 *
 * These macros return the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
 * bits. They use the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
 * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to replace
 * them with something else on odd CPUs. */
#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x) ((unsigned)((int)(x) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1)))
#define DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(x) ((unsigned char)(DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(x)))

/* constant_time_lt returns 0xff if a<b and 0x00 otherwise. */
static unsigned
constant_time_lt(unsigned a, unsigned b)
{
        a -= b;
        return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(a);
}

/* constant_time_ge returns 0xff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */
static unsigned
constant_time_ge(unsigned a, unsigned b)
{
        a -= b;
        return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(~a);
}

/* constant_time_eq_8 returns 0xff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */
static unsigned char
constant_time_eq_8(unsigned a, unsigned b)
{
        unsigned c = a ^ b;
        c--;
        return DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL_8(c);
}

/* tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
 * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and
 * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record
 * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the
 * padding was removed.
 *
 * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record.
 * returns:
 *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
 *   1: if the padding was valid
 *  -1: otherwise. */
int
tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size,
    unsigned mac_size)
{
        unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
        const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;

        /* Check if version requires explicit IV */
        if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
                /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
                 * non-constant time.
                 */
                if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
                        return 0;
                /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
                rec->data += block_size;
                rec->input += block_size;
                rec->length -= block_size;
        } else if (overhead > rec->length)
                return 0;

        padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];

        if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
                /* padding is already verified */
                rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
                return 1;
        }

        good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
        /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
         * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
         * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1
         * bytes of padding.
         *
         * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks
         * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
         * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
         * public information so we can use it.) */
        to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
        if (to_check > rec->length - 1)
                to_check = rec->length - 1;

        for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
                unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge(padding_length, i);
                unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i];
                /* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
                 * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
                good &= ~(mask&(padding_length ^ b));
        }

        /* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
         * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We
         * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the
         * bits. */
        good &= good >> 4;
        good &= good >> 2;
        good &= good >> 1;
        good <<= sizeof(good)*8 - 1;
        good = DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good);

        padding_length = good & (padding_length + 1);
        rec->length -= padding_length;
        rec->type |= padding_length<<8; /* kludge: pass padding length */

        return (int)((good & 1) | (~good & -1));
}

/* ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in
 * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may
 * vary within a 256-byte window).
 *
 * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to
 * this function.
 *
 * On entry:
 *   rec->orig_len >= md_size
 *   md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
 *
 * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with
 * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into
 * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't
 * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are
 * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
 */
#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE

void
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char* out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec,
    unsigned md_size, unsigned orig_len)
{
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
        unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
        unsigned char *rotated_mac;
#else
        unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
#endif

        /* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */
        unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
        unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
        /* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
         * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
        unsigned scan_start = 0;
        unsigned i, j;
        unsigned div_spoiler;
        unsigned rotate_offset;

        OPENSSL_assert(orig_len >= md_size);
        OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);

#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
        rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf)&63);
#endif

        /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
        if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
                scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
        /* div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
         * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
         * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
         *
         * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't
         * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it
         * to prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. */
        div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;
        div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler) - 1) * 8;
        rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;

        memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
        for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++) {
                unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge(i, mac_start);
                unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge(i, mac_end);
                unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
                rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
                j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size);
        }

        /* Now rotate the MAC */
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
        j = 0;
        for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
                /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
                ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset^32];
                out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
                rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
        }
#else
        memset(out, 0, md_size);
        rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
        rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
        for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
                for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
                        out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
                rotate_offset++;
                rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
        }
#endif
}

/* u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
 * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */
#define u32toLE(n, p) \
        (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
         *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))

/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard
 * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function
 * typically does. */
static void
tls1_md5_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
{
        MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx;
        u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
        u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
        u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
        u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
}

static void
tls1_sha1_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
{
        SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
        l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
        l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
        l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
        l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
        l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
}

static void
tls1_sha256_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
{
        SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
        unsigned i;

        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
                l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
        }
}

static void
tls1_sha512_final_raw(void* ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
{
        SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
        unsigned i;

        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
                l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
        }
}

/* Largest hash context ever used by the functions above. */
#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX

/* Type giving the alignment needed by the above */
#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX_ALIGNMENT SHA_LONG64

/* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
 * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */
char
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
        switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
        case NID_md5:
        case NID_sha1:
        case NID_sha224:
        case NID_sha256:
        case NID_sha384:
        case NID_sha512:
                return 1;
        default:
                return 0;
        }
}

/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded TLS
 * record.
 *
 *   ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
 *     ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
 *   md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
 *   md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
 *   header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
 *   data: the record data itself, less any preceeding explicit IV.
 *   data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
 *     once the padding has been removed.
 *   data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
 *     record, including padding.
 *
 * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
 * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
 * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
 * padding too. )
 */
int
ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char* md_out,
    size_t* md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13],
    const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,
    size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret,
    unsigned mac_secret_length)
{
        union {
                /*
                 * Alignment here is to allow this to be cast as SHA512_CTX
                 * without losing alignment required by the 64-bit SHA_LONG64
                 * integer it contains.
                 */
                LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX_ALIGNMENT align;
                unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];
        } md_state;
        void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
        void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
        unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
        unsigned header_length, variance_blocks,
        len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
        num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
        unsigned int bits;      /* at most 18 bits */
        unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
        /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
        unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
        unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
        unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
        unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
        EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
        /* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
        * the hash. */
        unsigned md_length_size = 8;
        char length_is_big_endian = 1;

        /* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
         * many possible overflows later in this function. */
        OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024*1024);

        switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
        case NID_md5:
                MD5_Init((MD5_CTX*)md_state.c);
                md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
                md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform;
                md_size = 16;
                length_is_big_endian = 0;
                break;
        case NID_sha1:
                SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX*)md_state.c);
                md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
                md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA1_Transform;
                md_size = 20;
                break;
        case NID_sha224:
                SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
                md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
                md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
                md_size = 224/8;
                break;
        case NID_sha256:
                SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX*)md_state.c);
                md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
                md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA256_Transform;
                md_size = 32;
                break;
        case NID_sha384:
                SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
                md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
                md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
                md_size = 384/8;
                md_block_size = 128;
                md_length_size = 16;
                break;
        case NID_sha512:
                SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX*)md_state.c);
                md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
                md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) SHA512_Transform;
                md_size = 64;
                md_block_size = 128;
                md_length_size = 16;
                break;
        default:
                /* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been
                 * called first to check that the hash function is
                 * supported. */
                OPENSSL_assert(0);
                if (md_out_size)
                        *md_out_size = 0;
                return 0;
        }

        OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
        OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
        OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);

        header_length = 13;

        /* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
         * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
         * padding value.
         *
         * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
         * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
         * can vary based on the padding.
         *
         * Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously
         * cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */
        variance_blocks = 6;
        /* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
         * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) */
        len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
        /* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
        * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */
        max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
        /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
        num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
        /* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
         * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
         * end to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we
         * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
         * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
         * they are plaintext. */
        num_starting_blocks = 0;
        /* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
         * we start processing. */
        k = 0;
        /* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be
         * MACed. */
        mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
        /* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that
         * contains application data. */
        c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
        /* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
         * value. */
        index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
        /* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash
         * length, in bits. */
        index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
        /* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
         * block for the masked HMAC key. */

        if (num_blocks > variance_blocks) {
                num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
                k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks;
        }

        bits = 8*mac_end_offset;
        /* Compute the initial HMAC block. */
        bits += 8*md_block_size;
        memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
        OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
        memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
        for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
                hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;

        md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);

        if (length_is_big_endian) {
                memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
                length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
                length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
                length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
                length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (unsigned char)bits;
        } else {
                memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size);
                length_bytes[md_length_size - 5] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
                length_bytes[md_length_size - 6] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
                length_bytes[md_length_size - 7] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
                length_bytes[md_length_size - 8] = (unsigned char)bits;
        }

        if (k > 0) {
                /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
                memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
                memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
                md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
                for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++)
                        md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
        }

        memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));

        /* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
         * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
         * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
         * constant time, to |mac_out|. */
        for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks; i++) {
                unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
                unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
                unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
                for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
                        unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
                        if (k < header_length)
                                b = header[k];
                        else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
                                b = data[k - header_length];
                        k++;

                        is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c);
                        is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge(j, c + 1);
                        /* If this is the block containing the end of the
                         * application data, and we are at the offset for the
                         * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
                        b = (b&~is_past_c) | (0x80&is_past_c);
                        /* If this is the block containing the end of the
                         * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
                         * just write zero. */
                        b = b&~is_past_cp1;
                        /* If this is index_b (the final block), but not
                         * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
                         * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
                         * add an extra block of zeros. */
                        b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;

                        /* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
                         * length. */
                        if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
                                /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
                                b = (b&~is_block_b) | (is_block_b&length_bytes[j - (md_block_size - md_length_size)]);
                        }
                        block[j] = b;
                }

                md_transform(md_state.c, block);
                md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
                /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
                for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
                        mac_out[j] |= block[j]&is_block_b;
        }

        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, ctx->digest, NULL /* engine */)) {
                EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
                return 0;
        }

        /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
        for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
                hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;

        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);

        EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
        if (md_out_size)
                *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);

        return 1;
}