8322 nl: misleading-indentation
[unleashed/tickless.git] / usr / src / cmd / newtask / newtask.c
blob1e8e0c935053420c5ca670533ccf50f9d0256a56
1 /*
2 * CDDL HEADER START
4 * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
5 * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
6 * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance
7 * with the License.
9 * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
10 * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
11 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
12 * and limitations under the License.
14 * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
15 * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
16 * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
17 * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
18 * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
20 * CDDL HEADER END
23 * Copyright (c) 2013 Gary Mills
24 * Copyright 2015, Joyent, Inc.
26 * Copyright 2005 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
27 * Use is subject to license terms.
30 #include <sys/types.h>
31 #include <sys/task.h>
33 #include <alloca.h>
34 #include <libproc.h>
35 #include <libintl.h>
36 #include <libgen.h>
37 #include <limits.h>
38 #include <project.h>
39 #include <pwd.h>
40 #include <secdb.h>
41 #include <stdio.h>
42 #include <stdlib.h>
43 #include <string.h>
44 #include <sys/varargs.h>
45 #include <unistd.h>
46 #include <errno.h>
47 #include <signal.h>
48 #include <priv_utils.h>
50 #include "utils.h"
52 #define OPTIONS_STRING "Fc:lp:v"
53 #define NENV 8
54 #define ENVSIZE 255
55 #define PATH "PATH=/usr/bin"
56 #define SUPATH "PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin"
57 #define SHELL "/usr/bin/sh"
58 #define SHELL2 "/sbin/sh"
59 #define TIMEZONEFILE "/etc/default/init"
60 #define LOGINFILE "/etc/default/login"
61 #define GLOBAL_ERR_SZ 1024
62 #define GRAB_RETRY_MAX 100
64 static const char *pname;
65 extern char **environ;
66 static char *supath = SUPATH;
67 static char *path = PATH;
68 static char global_error[GLOBAL_ERR_SZ];
69 static int verbose = 0;
71 static priv_set_t *nset;
73 /* Private definitions for libproject */
74 extern projid_t setproject_proc(const char *, const char *, int, pid_t,
75 struct ps_prochandle *, struct project *);
76 extern priv_set_t *setproject_initpriv(void);
78 static void usage(void);
80 static void preserve_error(const char *format, ...);
82 static int update_running_proc(int, char *, char *);
83 static int set_ids(struct ps_prochandle *, struct project *,
84 struct passwd *);
85 static struct passwd *match_user(uid_t, char *, int);
86 static void setproject_err(char *, char *, int, struct project *);
88 static void
89 usage(void)
91 (void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("usage: \n\t%s [-v] [-p project] "
92 "[-c pid | [-Fl] [command [args ...]]]\n"), pname);
93 exit(2);
96 int
97 main(int argc, char *argv[])
99 int c;
100 struct passwd *pw;
101 char *projname = NULL;
102 uid_t uid;
103 int login_flag = 0;
104 int finalize_flag = TASK_NORMAL;
105 int newproj_flag = 0;
106 taskid_t taskid;
107 char *shell;
108 char *env[NENV];
109 char **targs;
110 char *filename, *procname = NULL;
111 int error;
113 nset = setproject_initpriv();
114 if (nset == NULL)
115 die(gettext("privilege initialization failed\n"));
117 pname = getpname(argv[0]);
119 while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, OPTIONS_STRING)) != EOF) {
120 switch (c) {
121 case 'v':
122 verbose = 1;
123 break;
124 case 'p':
125 newproj_flag = 1;
126 projname = optarg;
127 break;
128 case 'F':
129 finalize_flag = TASK_FINAL;
130 break;
131 case 'l':
132 login_flag++;
133 break;
134 case 'c':
135 procname = optarg;
136 break;
137 case '?':
138 default:
139 usage();
140 /*NOTREACHED*/
144 /* -c option is invalid with -F, -l, or a specified command */
145 if ((procname != NULL) &&
146 (finalize_flag == TASK_FINAL || login_flag || optind < argc))
147 usage();
149 if (procname != NULL) {
150 /* Change project/task of an existing process */
151 return (update_running_proc(newproj_flag, procname, projname));
155 * Get user data, so that we can confirm project membership as
156 * well as construct an appropriate login environment.
158 uid = getuid();
159 if ((pw = match_user(uid, projname, 1)) == NULL) {
160 die("%s\n", global_error);
164 * If no projname was specified, we're just creating a new task
165 * under the current project, so we can just set the new taskid.
166 * If our project is changing, we need to update any attendant
167 * pool/rctl bindings, so let setproject() do the dirty work.
169 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_ON);
170 if (projname == NULL) {
171 if (settaskid(getprojid(), finalize_flag) == -1)
172 if (errno == EAGAIN)
173 die(gettext("resource control limit has been "
174 "reached"));
175 else
176 die(gettext("settaskid failed"));
177 } else {
178 if ((error = setproject(projname,
179 pw->pw_name, finalize_flag)) != 0) {
180 setproject_err(pw->pw_name, projname, error, NULL);
181 if (error < 0)
182 die("%s\n", global_error);
183 else
184 warn("%s\n", global_error);
187 __priv_relinquish();
189 taskid = gettaskid();
191 if (verbose)
192 (void) fprintf(stderr, "%d\n", (int)taskid);
195 * Validate user's shell from passwd database.
197 if (strcmp(pw->pw_shell, "") == 0) {
198 if (access(SHELL, X_OK) == 0)
199 pw->pw_shell = SHELL;
200 else
201 pw->pw_shell = SHELL2;
204 if (login_flag) {
206 * Since we've been invoked as a "simulated login", set up the
207 * environment.
209 char *cur_tz = getenv("TZ");
210 char *cur_term = getenv("TERM");
212 char **envnext;
214 size_t len_home = strlen(pw->pw_dir) + strlen("HOME=") + 1;
215 size_t len_logname = strlen(pw->pw_name) + strlen("LOGNAME=") +
217 size_t len_shell = strlen(pw->pw_shell) + strlen("SHELL=") + 1;
218 size_t len_mail = strlen(pw->pw_name) +
219 strlen("MAIL=/var/mail/") + 1;
220 size_t len_tz;
221 size_t len_term;
223 char *env_home = safe_malloc(len_home);
224 char *env_logname = safe_malloc(len_logname);
225 char *env_shell = safe_malloc(len_shell);
226 char *env_mail = safe_malloc(len_mail);
227 char *env_tz;
228 char *env_term;
230 (void) snprintf(env_home, len_home, "HOME=%s", pw->pw_dir);
231 (void) snprintf(env_logname, len_logname, "LOGNAME=%s",
232 pw->pw_name);
233 (void) snprintf(env_shell, len_shell, "SHELL=%s", pw->pw_shell);
234 (void) snprintf(env_mail, len_mail, "MAIL=/var/mail/%s",
235 pw->pw_name);
237 env[0] = env_home;
238 env[1] = env_logname;
239 env[2] = (pw->pw_uid == 0 ? supath : path);
240 env[3] = env_shell;
241 env[4] = env_mail;
242 env[5] = NULL;
243 env[6] = NULL;
244 env[7] = NULL;
246 envnext = (char **)&env[5];
249 * It's possible that TERM wasn't defined in the outer
250 * environment.
252 if (cur_term != NULL) {
253 len_term = strlen(cur_term) + strlen("TERM=") + 1;
254 env_term = safe_malloc(len_term);
256 (void) snprintf(env_term, len_term, "TERM=%s",
257 cur_term);
258 *envnext = env_term;
259 envnext++;
263 * It is also possible that TZ wasn't defined in the outer
264 * environment. In that case, we must attempt to open the file
265 * defining the default timezone and select the appropriate
266 * entry. If there is no default timezone there, try
267 * TIMEZONE in /etc/default/login, duplicating the algorithm
268 * that login uses.
270 if (cur_tz != NULL) {
271 len_tz = strlen(cur_tz) + strlen("TZ=") + 1;
272 env_tz = safe_malloc(len_tz);
274 (void) snprintf(env_tz, len_tz, "TZ=%s", cur_tz);
275 *envnext = env_tz;
276 } else {
277 if ((env_tz = getdefault(TIMEZONEFILE, "TZ=",
278 "TZ=")) != NULL)
279 *envnext = env_tz;
280 else {
281 env_tz = getdefault(LOGINFILE, "TIMEZONE=",
282 "TZ=");
283 *envnext = env_tz;
287 environ = (char **)&env[0];
290 * Prefix the shell string with a hyphen, indicating a login
291 * shell.
293 shell = safe_malloc(PATH_MAX);
294 (void) snprintf(shell, PATH_MAX, "-%s", basename(pw->pw_shell));
295 } else {
296 shell = basename(pw->pw_shell);
300 * If there are no arguments, we launch the user's shell; otherwise, the
301 * remaining commands are assumed to form a valid command invocation
302 * that we can exec.
304 if (optind >= argc) {
305 targs = alloca(2 * sizeof (char *));
306 filename = pw->pw_shell;
307 targs[0] = shell;
308 targs[1] = NULL;
309 } else {
310 targs = &argv[optind];
311 filename = targs[0];
314 if (execvp(filename, targs) == -1)
315 die(gettext("exec of %s failed"), targs[0]);
318 * We should never get here.
320 return (1);
323 static int
324 update_running_proc(int newproj_flag, char *procname, char *projname)
326 struct ps_prochandle *p;
327 prcred_t original_prcred, current_prcred;
328 projid_t prprojid;
329 taskid_t taskid;
330 int error = 0, gret;
331 struct project project;
332 char prbuf[PROJECT_BUFSZ];
333 struct passwd *passwd_entry;
334 int grab_retry_count = 0;
337 * Catch signals from terminal. There isn't much sense in
338 * doing anything but ignoring them since we don't do anything
339 * after the point we'd be capable of handling them again.
341 (void) sigignore(SIGHUP);
342 (void) sigignore(SIGINT);
343 (void) sigignore(SIGQUIT);
344 (void) sigignore(SIGTERM);
346 /* flush stdout before grabbing the proc to avoid deadlock */
347 (void) fflush(stdout);
350 * We need to grab the process, which will force it to stop execution
351 * until the grab is released, in order to aquire some information about
352 * it, such as its current project (which is achieved via an injected
353 * system call and therefore needs an agent) and its credentials. We
354 * will then need to release it again because it may be a process that
355 * we rely on for later calls, for example nscd.
357 if ((p = proc_arg_grab(procname, PR_ARG_PIDS, 0, &gret)) == NULL) {
358 warn(gettext("failed to grab for process %s: %s\n"),
359 procname, Pgrab_error(gret));
360 return (1);
362 if (Pcreate_agent(p) != 0) {
363 Prelease(p, 0);
364 warn(gettext("cannot control process %s\n"), procname);
365 return (1);
369 * The victim process is now held. Do not call any functions
370 * which generate stdout/stderr until the process has been
371 * released.
375 * The target process will soon be restarted (in case it is in newtask's
376 * execution path) and then stopped again. We need to ensure that our cached
377 * data doesn't change while the process runs so return here if the target
378 * process changes its user id in between our stop operations, so that we can
379 * try again.
381 pgrab_retry:
383 /* Cache required information about the process. */
384 if (Pcred(p, &original_prcred, 0) != 0) {
385 preserve_error(gettext("cannot get process credentials %s\n"),
386 procname);
387 error = 1;
389 if ((prprojid = pr_getprojid(p)) == -1) {
390 preserve_error(gettext("cannot get process project id %s\n"),
391 procname);
392 error = 1;
396 * We now have all the required information, so release the target
397 * process and perform our sanity checks. The process needs to be
398 * running at this point because it may be in the execution path of the
399 * calls made below.
401 Pdestroy_agent(p);
402 Prelease(p, 0);
404 /* if our data acquisition failed, then we can't continue. */
405 if (error) {
406 warn("%s\n", global_error);
407 return (1);
410 if (newproj_flag == 0) {
412 * Just changing the task, so set projname to the current
413 * project of the running process.
415 if (getprojbyid(prprojid, &project, &prbuf,
416 PROJECT_BUFSZ) == NULL) {
417 warn(gettext("unable to get project name "
418 "for projid %d"), prprojid);
419 return (1);
421 projname = project.pj_name;
422 } else {
424 * cache info for the project which user passed in via the
425 * command line
427 if (getprojbyname(projname, &project, &prbuf,
428 PROJECT_BUFSZ) == NULL) {
429 warn(gettext("unknown project \"%s\"\n"), projname);
430 return (1);
435 * Use our cached information to verify that the owner of the running
436 * process is a member of proj
438 if ((passwd_entry = match_user(original_prcred.pr_ruid,
439 projname, 0)) == NULL) {
440 warn("%s\n", global_error);
441 return (1);
445 * We can now safely stop the process again in order to change the
446 * project and taskid as required.
448 if ((p = proc_arg_grab(procname, PR_ARG_PIDS, 0, &gret)) == NULL) {
449 warn(gettext("failed to grab for process %s: %s\n"),
450 procname, Pgrab_error(gret));
451 return (1);
453 if (Pcreate_agent(p) != 0) {
454 Prelease(p, 0);
455 warn(gettext("cannot control process %s\n"), procname);
456 return (1);
460 * Now that the target process is stopped, check the validity of our
461 * cached info. If we aren't superuser then match_user() will have
462 * checked to make sure that the owner of the process is in the relevant
463 * project. If our ruid has changed, then match_user()'s conclusion may
464 * be invalid.
466 if (getuid() != 0) {
467 if (Pcred(p, &current_prcred, 0) != 0) {
468 Pdestroy_agent(p);
469 Prelease(p, 0);
470 warn(gettext("can't get process credentials %s\n"),
471 procname);
472 return (1);
475 if (original_prcred.pr_ruid != current_prcred.pr_ruid) {
476 if (grab_retry_count++ < GRAB_RETRY_MAX)
477 goto pgrab_retry;
479 warn(gettext("process consistently changed its "
480 "user id %s\n"), procname);
481 return (1);
485 error = set_ids(p, &project, passwd_entry);
487 if (verbose)
488 taskid = pr_gettaskid(p);
490 Pdestroy_agent(p);
491 Prelease(p, 0);
493 if (error) {
495 * error is serious enough to stop, only if negative.
496 * Otherwise, it simply indicates one of the resource
497 * control assignments failed, which is worth warning
498 * about.
500 warn("%s\n", global_error);
501 if (error < 0)
502 return (1);
505 if (verbose)
506 (void) fprintf(stderr, "%d\n", (int)taskid);
508 return (0);
511 static int
512 set_ids(struct ps_prochandle *p, struct project *project,
513 struct passwd *passwd_entry)
515 int be_su = 0;
516 prcred_t old_prcred;
517 int error;
518 prpriv_t *old_prpriv, *new_prpriv;
519 size_t prsz = sizeof (prpriv_t);
520 priv_set_t *eset, *pset;
521 int ind;
523 if (Pcred(p, &old_prcred, 0) != 0) {
524 preserve_error(gettext("can't get process credentials"));
525 return (1);
528 old_prpriv = proc_get_priv(Pstatus(p)->pr_pid);
529 if (old_prpriv == NULL) {
530 preserve_error(gettext("can't get process privileges"));
531 return (1);
534 prsz = PRIV_PRPRIV_SIZE(old_prpriv);
536 new_prpriv = malloc(prsz);
537 if (new_prpriv == NULL) {
538 preserve_error(gettext("can't allocate memory"));
539 proc_free_priv(old_prpriv);
540 return (1);
543 (void) memcpy(new_prpriv, old_prpriv, prsz);
546 * If the process already has the proc_taskid privilege,
547 * we don't need to elevate its privileges; if it doesn't,
548 * we try to do it here.
549 * As we do not wish to leave a window in which the process runs
550 * with elevated privileges, we make sure that the process dies
551 * when we go away unexpectedly.
554 ind = priv_getsetbyname(PRIV_EFFECTIVE);
555 eset = (priv_set_t *)&new_prpriv->pr_sets[new_prpriv->pr_setsize * ind];
556 ind = priv_getsetbyname(PRIV_PERMITTED);
557 pset = (priv_set_t *)&new_prpriv->pr_sets[new_prpriv->pr_setsize * ind];
559 if (!priv_issubset(nset, eset)) {
560 be_su = 1;
561 priv_union(nset, eset);
562 priv_union(nset, pset);
563 if (Psetflags(p, PR_KLC) != 0) {
564 preserve_error(gettext("cannot set process "
565 "privileges"));
566 (void) Punsetflags(p, PR_KLC);
567 free(new_prpriv);
568 proc_free_priv(old_prpriv);
569 return (1);
571 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_ON);
572 if (Psetpriv(p, new_prpriv) != 0) {
573 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_OFF);
574 preserve_error(gettext("cannot set process "
575 "privileges"));
576 (void) Punsetflags(p, PR_KLC);
577 free(new_prpriv);
578 proc_free_priv(old_prpriv);
579 return (1);
581 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_OFF);
584 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_ON);
585 if ((error = setproject_proc(project->pj_name,
586 passwd_entry->pw_name, 0, Pstatus(p)->pr_pid, p, project)) != 0) {
587 /* global_error is set by setproject_err */
588 setproject_err(passwd_entry->pw_name, project->pj_name,
589 error, project);
591 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_OFF);
593 /* relinquish added privileges */
594 if (be_su) {
595 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_ON);
596 if (Psetpriv(p, old_prpriv) != 0) {
598 * We shouldn't ever be in a state where we can't
599 * set the process back to its old creds, but we
600 * don't want to take the chance of leaving a
601 * non-privileged process with enhanced creds. So,
602 * release the process from libproc control, knowing
603 * that it will be killed.
605 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_OFF);
606 Pdestroy_agent(p);
607 die(gettext("cannot relinquish superuser credentials "
608 "for pid %d. The process was killed."),
609 Pstatus(p)->pr_pid);
611 (void) __priv_bracket(PRIV_OFF);
612 if (Punsetflags(p, PR_KLC) != 0)
613 preserve_error(gettext("error relinquishing "
614 "credentials. Process %d will be killed."),
615 Pstatus(p)->pr_pid);
617 free(new_prpriv);
618 proc_free_priv(old_prpriv);
620 return (error);
624 * preserve_error() should be called rather than warn() by any
625 * function that is called while the victim process is being
626 * held by Pgrab.
628 * It saves a single error message to be printed until after
629 * the process has been released. Since multiple errors are not
630 * stored, any error should be considered critical.
632 void
633 preserve_error(const char *format, ...)
635 va_list alist;
637 va_start(alist, format);
640 * GLOBAL_ERR_SZ is pretty big. If the error is longer
641 * than that, just truncate it, rather than chance missing
642 * the error altogether.
644 (void) vsnprintf(global_error, GLOBAL_ERR_SZ-1, format, alist);
646 va_end(alist);
651 * Given the input arguments, return the passwd structure that matches best.
652 * Also, since we use getpwnam() and friends, subsequent calls to this
653 * function will re-use the memory previously returned.
655 static struct passwd *
656 match_user(uid_t uid, char *projname, int is_my_uid)
658 char prbuf[PROJECT_BUFSZ], username[LOGNAME_MAX+1];
659 struct project prj;
660 char *tmp_name;
661 struct passwd *pw = NULL;
664 * In order to allow users with the same UID but distinguishable
665 * user names to be in different projects we play a guessing
666 * game of which username is most appropriate. If we're checking
667 * for the uid of the calling process, the login name is a
668 * good starting point.
670 if (is_my_uid) {
671 if ((tmp_name = getlogin()) == NULL ||
672 (pw = getpwnam(tmp_name)) == NULL || (pw->pw_uid != uid) ||
673 (pw->pw_name == NULL))
674 pw = NULL;
678 * If the login name doesn't work, we try the first match for
679 * the current uid in the password file.
681 if (pw == NULL) {
682 if (((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) || pw->pw_name == NULL) {
683 preserve_error(gettext("cannot find username "
684 "for uid %d"), uid);
685 return (NULL);
690 * If projname wasn't supplied, we've done our best, so just return
691 * what we've got now. Alternatively, if newtask's invoker has
692 * superuser privileges, return the pw structure we've got now, with
693 * no further checking from inproj(). Superuser should be able to
694 * join any project, and the subsequent call to setproject() will
695 * allow this.
697 if (projname == NULL || getuid() == (uid_t)0)
698 return (pw);
700 (void) strlcpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof (username));
702 if (inproj(username, projname, prbuf, PROJECT_BUFSZ) == 0) {
703 char **u;
704 tmp_name = NULL;
707 * If the previous guesses didn't work, walk through all
708 * project members and test for UID-equivalence.
711 if (getprojbyname(projname, &prj, prbuf,
712 PROJECT_BUFSZ) == NULL) {
713 preserve_error(gettext("unknown project \"%s\""),
714 projname);
715 return (NULL);
718 for (u = prj.pj_users; *u; u++) {
719 if ((pw = getpwnam(*u)) == NULL)
720 continue;
722 if (pw->pw_uid == uid) {
723 tmp_name = pw->pw_name;
724 break;
728 if (tmp_name == NULL) {
729 preserve_error(gettext("user \"%s\" is not a member of "
730 "project \"%s\""), username, projname);
731 return (NULL);
735 return (pw);
738 void
739 setproject_err(char *username, char *projname, int error, struct project *proj)
741 kva_t *kv_array = NULL;
742 char prbuf[PROJECT_BUFSZ];
743 struct project local_proj;
745 switch (error) {
746 case SETPROJ_ERR_TASK:
747 if (errno == EAGAIN)
748 preserve_error(gettext("resource control limit has "
749 "been reached"));
750 else if (errno == ESRCH)
751 preserve_error(gettext("user \"%s\" is not a member of "
752 "project \"%s\""), username, projname);
753 else if (errno == EACCES)
754 preserve_error(gettext("the invoking task is final"));
755 else
756 preserve_error(
757 gettext("could not join project \"%s\""),
758 projname);
759 break;
760 case SETPROJ_ERR_POOL:
761 if (errno == EACCES)
762 preserve_error(gettext("no resource pool accepting "
763 "default bindings exists for project \"%s\""),
764 projname);
765 else if (errno == ESRCH)
766 preserve_error(gettext("specified resource pool does "
767 "not exist for project \"%s\""), projname);
768 else
769 preserve_error(gettext("could not bind to default "
770 "resource pool for project \"%s\""), projname);
771 break;
772 default:
773 if (error <= 0) {
774 preserve_error(gettext("setproject failed for "
775 "project \"%s\""), projname);
776 return;
779 * If we have a stopped target process it may be in
780 * getprojbyname()'s execution path which would make it unsafe
781 * to access the project table, so only do that if the caller
782 * hasn't provided a cached version of the project structure.
784 if (proj == NULL)
785 proj = getprojbyname(projname, &local_proj, prbuf,
786 PROJECT_BUFSZ);
788 if (proj == NULL || (kv_array = _str2kva(proj->pj_attr,
789 KV_ASSIGN, KV_DELIMITER)) == NULL ||
790 kv_array->length < error) {
791 preserve_error(gettext("warning, resource control "
792 "assignment failed for project \"%s\" "
793 "attribute %d"),
794 projname, error);
795 if (kv_array)
796 _kva_free(kv_array);
797 return;
799 preserve_error(gettext("warning, %s resource control "
800 "assignment failed for project \"%s\""),
801 kv_array->data[error - 1].key, projname);
802 _kva_free(kv_array);