8322 nl: misleading-indentation

[unleashed/tickless.git] / usr / src / lib / pkcs11 / pkcs11_softtoken / common / softKeysUtil.c

/*
 * CDDL HEADER START
 *
 * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
 * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
 * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 *
 * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
 * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
 * and limitations under the License.
 *
 * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
 * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
 * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
 * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
 * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
 *
 * CDDL HEADER END
 */
/*
 * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
 * Use is subject to license terms.
 */

#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <strings.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <security/cryptoki.h>
#include <sys/crypto/common.h>
#include <aes_impl.h>
#include <blowfish_impl.h>
#include <des_impl.h>
#include <arcfour.h>
#include <cryptoutil.h>
#include "softGlobal.h"
#include "softSession.h"
#include "softObject.h"
#include "softDSA.h"
#include "softRSA.h"
#include "softDH.h"
#include "softEC.h"
#include "softMAC.h"
#include "softOps.h"
#include "softKeys.h"
#include "softKeystore.h"
#include "softSSL.h"
#include "softASN1.h"


#define local_min(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))

static CK_RV
soft_pkcs12_pbe(soft_session_t *, CK_MECHANISM_PTR, soft_object_t *);

/*
 * Create a temporary key object struct by filling up its template attributes.
 */
CK_RV
soft_gen_keyobject(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,  CK_ULONG ulCount,
    CK_ULONG *objecthandle_p, soft_session_t *sp,
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS class, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, CK_ULONG keylen, CK_ULONG mode,
    boolean_t internal)
{

        CK_RV rv;
        soft_object_t *new_objp = NULL;

        new_objp = calloc(1, sizeof (soft_object_t));
        if (new_objp == NULL) {
                return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
        }

        new_objp->extra_attrlistp = NULL;

        /*
         * Validate attribute template and fill in the attributes
         * in the soft_object_t.
         */
        rv = soft_build_key(pTemplate, ulCount, new_objp, class, key_type,
            keylen, mode);
        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                goto fail_cleanup1;
        }

        /*
         * If generating a key is an internal request (i.e. not a C_XXX
         * API request), then skip the following checks.
         */
        if (!internal) {
                rv = soft_pin_expired_check(new_objp);
                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        goto fail_cleanup2;
                }

                rv = soft_object_write_access_check(sp, new_objp);
                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        goto fail_cleanup2;
                }
        }

        /* Initialize the rest of stuffs in soft_object_t. */
        (void) pthread_mutex_init(&new_objp->object_mutex, NULL);
        new_objp->magic_marker = SOFTTOKEN_OBJECT_MAGIC;

        /* Write the new token object to the keystore */
        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(new_objp)) {
                new_objp->version = 1;
                new_objp->session_handle = (CK_SESSION_HANDLE)NULL;
                soft_add_token_object_to_slot(new_objp);
                /*
                 * Type casting the address of an object struct to
                 * an object handle.
                 */
                *objecthandle_p = (CK_ULONG)new_objp;

                return (CKR_OK);
        }

        new_objp->session_handle = (CK_SESSION_HANDLE)sp;

        /* Add the new object to the session's object list. */
        soft_add_object_to_session(new_objp, sp);

        /* Type casting the address of an object struct to an object handle. */
        *objecthandle_p =  (CK_ULONG)new_objp;

        return (CKR_OK);

fail_cleanup2:
        /*
         * When any error occurs after soft_build_key(), we will need to
         * clean up the memory allocated by the soft_build_key().
         */
        soft_cleanup_object(new_objp);

fail_cleanup1:
        if (new_objp) {
                /*
                 * The storage allocated inside of this object should have
                 * been cleaned up by the soft_build_key() if it failed.
                 * Therefore, we can safely free the object.
                 */
                free(new_objp);
        }

        return (rv);
}

CK_RV
soft_genkey(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{

        CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
        soft_object_t *secret_key;
        CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
        CK_ULONG keylen = 0;
        CK_ULONG i;
        int des_strength = 0;
        int retry = 0;
        int keyfound = 0;
        boolean_t is_ssl_mech = B_FALSE;

        switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
        case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
                key_type = CKK_DES;
                break;

        case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
                key_type = CKK_DES2;
                break;

        case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
                key_type = CKK_DES3;
                break;

        case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
                key_type = CKK_AES;
                break;

        case CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN:
                key_type = CKK_BLOWFISH;
                break;

        case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
                key_type = CKK_RC4;
                break;

        case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
        case CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
                if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
                    pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof (CK_VERSION))
                        return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
                is_ssl_mech = B_TRUE;
                key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
                keylen = 48;
                break;

        case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
                keyfound = 0;
                for (i = 0; i < ulCount && !keyfound; i++) {
                        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE &&
                            pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) {
                                key_type = *((CK_KEY_TYPE*)pTemplate[i].pValue);
                                keyfound = 1;
                        }
                }
                if (!keyfound)
                        return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
                /*
                 * Make sure that parameters were given for this
                 * mechanism.
                 */
                if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
                    pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
                    sizeof (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS))
                        return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
                break;

        case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
                keyfound = 0;
                for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) {
                        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE &&
                            pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) {
                                key_type = *((CK_KEY_TYPE*)pTemplate[i].pValue);
                                keyfound = 1;
                        }
                        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN &&
                            pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) {
                                keylen = *((CK_ULONG*)pTemplate[i].pValue);
                        }
                }
                /* If a keytype was specified, it had better be CKK_RC4 */
                if (keyfound && key_type != CKK_RC4)
                        return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT);
                else if (!keyfound)
                        key_type = CKK_RC4;

                /* If key length was specified, it better be 16 bytes */
                if (keylen != 0 && keylen != 16)
                        return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT);

                /*
                 * Make sure that parameters were given for this
                 * mechanism.
                 */
                if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
                    pMechanism->ulParameterLen !=
                    sizeof (CK_PBE_PARAMS))
                        return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
                break;
        default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }

        /* Create a new object for secret key. */
        rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pTemplate, ulCount, phKey, session_p,
            CKO_SECRET_KEY, key_type, keylen, SOFT_GEN_KEY, B_FALSE);

        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                return (rv);
        }

        /* Obtain the secret object pointer. */
        secret_key = (soft_object_t *)*phKey;

        switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
        case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
                /*
                 * Set up key value len since it is not a required
                 * attribute for C_GenerateKey.
                 */
                keylen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES_KEYSIZE;
                des_strength = DES;
                break;

        case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
                /*
                 * Set up key value len since it is not a required
                 * attribute for C_GenerateKey.
                 */
                keylen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES2_KEYSIZE;
                des_strength = DES2;
                break;

        case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
                /*
                 * Set up key value len since it is not a required
                 * attribute for C_GenerateKey.
                 */
                keylen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES3_KEYSIZE;
                des_strength = DES3;
                break;

        case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
        case CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
                secret_key->bool_attr_mask |= DERIVE_BOOL_ON;
        /* FALLTHRU */

        case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
        case CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN:
        case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
        case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
                keylen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key);
                break;

        case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
                /*
                 * PKCS#11 does not allow one to specify key
                 * sizes for DES and 3DES, so we must set it here
                 * when using PBKD2 algorithms.
                 */
                if (key_type == CKK_DES) {
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES_KEYSIZE;
                        des_strength = DES;
                } else if (key_type == CKK_DES3) {
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES3_KEYSIZE;
                        des_strength = DES3;
                }

                keylen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key);
                break;
        }

        if ((OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key) = malloc(keylen)) == NULL) {
                if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
                        soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                else
                        soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
                            B_FALSE, B_FALSE);

                return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
        }
        switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
        case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
                /*
                 * Use the PBE algorithm described in PKCS#11 section
                 * 12.33 to derive the key.
                 */
                rv = soft_pkcs12_pbe(session_p, pMechanism, secret_key);
                break;
        case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
                /* Generate keys using PKCS#5 PBKD2 algorithm */
                rv = soft_generate_pkcs5_pbkdf2_key(session_p, pMechanism,
                    secret_key);
                if (rv == CKR_OK && des_strength > 0) {
                        /* Perform weak key checking for DES and DES3. */
                        if (des_keycheck(OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key),
                            des_strength, OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key)) ==
                            B_FALSE) {
                                /* We got a weak secret key. */
                                rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
                        }
                }
                break;
        default:
                do {
                        /* If this fails, bail out */
                        rv = CKR_OK;
                        if (pkcs11_get_urandom(
                            OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key), keylen) < 0) {
                                rv = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
                                break;
                        }

                        /* Perform weak key checking for DES and DES3. */
                        if (des_strength > 0) {
                                rv = CKR_OK;
                                if (des_keycheck(OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key),
                                    des_strength, OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key)) ==
                                    B_FALSE) {
                                        /* We got a weak key, retry! */
                                        retry++;
                                        rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
                                }
                        }
                        /*
                         * Copy over the SSL client version For SSL mechs
                         * The first two bytes of the key is the version
                         */
                        if (is_ssl_mech)
                                bcopy(pMechanism->pParameter,
                                    OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key),
                                    sizeof (CK_VERSION));

                } while (rv != CKR_OK && retry < KEYGEN_RETRY);
                if (retry == KEYGEN_RETRY)
                        rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
                break;
        }

        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
                        soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                else
                        soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
                            B_FALSE, B_FALSE);

        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key)) {
                /*
                 * All the info has been filled, so we can write to
                 * keystore now.
                 */
                rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(secret_key);
                if (rv != CKR_OK)
                        soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
        }

        return (rv);
}

CK_RV
soft_genkey_pair(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPublicAttrCount,
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPrivateAttrCount,
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey)
{

        CK_RV rv;
        soft_object_t *public_key, *private_key;
        CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;

        switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {

        case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
                key_type = CKK_RSA;
                break;

        case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
                key_type = CKK_DSA;
                break;

        case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
                key_type = CKK_DH;
                break;

        case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
                key_type = CKK_EC;
                break;

        default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }

        /* Create a new object for public key. */
        rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pPublicKeyTemplate, ulPublicAttrCount,
            phPublicKey, session_p, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, key_type, 0,
            SOFT_GEN_KEY, B_FALSE);

        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                return (rv);
        }

        /* Obtain the public object pointer. */
        public_key = (soft_object_t *)*phPublicKey;

        /* Create a new object for private key. */
        rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pPrivateKeyTemplate, ulPrivateAttrCount,
            phPrivateKey, session_p, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, key_type, 0,
            SOFT_GEN_KEY, B_FALSE);

        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                /*
                 * Both public key and private key must be successful.
                 */
                if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(public_key))
                        soft_delete_token_object(public_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                else
                        soft_delete_object(session_p, public_key,
                            B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                return (rv);
        }

        /* Obtain the private object pointer. */
        private_key = (soft_object_t *)*phPrivateKey;

        /*
         * At this point, both public key and private key objects
         * are settled with the application specified attributes.
         * We are ready to generate the rest of key attributes based
         * on the existing attributes.
         */

        switch (key_type) {
        case CKK_RSA:
                rv = soft_rsa_genkey_pair(public_key, private_key);
                break;

        case CKK_DSA:
                rv = soft_dsa_genkey_pair(public_key, private_key);
                break;

        case CKK_DH:
                rv = soft_dh_genkey_pair(public_key, private_key);
                private_key->bool_attr_mask |= DERIVE_BOOL_ON;
                break;
        case CKK_EC:
                rv = soft_ec_genkey_pair(public_key, private_key);
                private_key->bool_attr_mask |= DERIVE_BOOL_ON;
                break;
        }

        if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(public_key)) {
                        soft_delete_token_object(public_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                        soft_delete_token_object(private_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                } else {
                        soft_delete_object(session_p, public_key,
                            B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                        soft_delete_object(session_p, private_key,
                            B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                }
                return (rv);
        }

        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(public_key)) {
                /*
                 * All the info has been filled, so we can write to
                 * keystore now.
                 */
                rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(public_key);
                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        soft_delete_token_object(public_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                        soft_delete_token_object(private_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                        return (rv);
                }
        }

        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(private_key)) {
                rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(private_key);
                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        /*
                         * We also need to delete the public token object
                         * from keystore.
                         */
                        soft_delete_token_object(public_key, B_TRUE, B_FALSE);
                        soft_delete_token_object(private_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                }
        }

        return (rv);
}


CK_RV
soft_key_derive_check_length(soft_object_t *secret_key, CK_ULONG max_keylen)
{

        switch (secret_key->key_type) {
        case CKK_GENERIC_SECRET:
                if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) == 0) {
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = max_keylen;
                        return (CKR_OK);
                } else if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) > max_keylen) {
                        return (CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID);
                }
                break;
        case CKK_RC4:
        case CKK_AES:
        case CKK_BLOWFISH:
                if ((OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) == 0) ||
                    (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) > max_keylen)) {
                        /* RC4 and AES has variable key length */
                        return (CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID);
                }
                break;
        case CKK_DES:
                if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) == 0) {
                        /* DES has a well-defined length */
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES_KEYSIZE;
                        return (CKR_OK);
                } else if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) != DES_KEYSIZE) {
                        return (CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID);
                }
                break;
        case CKK_DES2:
                if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) == 0) {
                        /* DES2 has a well-defined length */
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) = DES2_KEYSIZE;
                        return (CKR_OK);
                } else if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key) != DES2_KEYSIZE) {
                        return (CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID);
                }
                break;

        default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }

        return (CKR_OK);
}

/*
 * PKCS#11 (12.33) says that v = 512 bits (64 bytes) for SHA1
 * PBE methods.
 */
#define PKCS12_BUFFER_SIZE 64
/*
 * PKCS#12 defines 3 different ID bytes to be used for
 * deriving keys for different operations.
 */
#define PBE_ID_ENCRYPT  1
#define PBE_ID_IV       2
#define PBE_ID_MAC      3
#define PBE_CEIL(a, b)  (((a)/(b)) + (((a)%(b)) > 0))

static CK_RV
soft_pkcs12_pbe(soft_session_t *session_p,
                CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
                soft_object_t *derived_key)
{
        CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
        CK_PBE_PARAMS *params = pMechanism->pParameter;
        CK_ULONG c, i, j, k;
        CK_ULONG hashSize;
        CK_ULONG buffSize;
        /*
         * Terse variable names are used to make following
         * the PKCS#12 spec easier.
         */
        CK_BYTE *A = NULL;
        CK_BYTE *Ai = NULL;
        CK_BYTE *B = NULL;
        CK_BYTE *D = NULL;
        CK_BYTE *I = NULL, *S, *P;
        CK_BYTE *keybuf = NULL;
        CK_ULONG Alen, Ilen, Slen, Plen, AiLen, Blen, Dlen;
        CK_ULONG keysize = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(derived_key);
        CK_MECHANISM digest_mech;

        /* U = hash function output bits */
        if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128) {
                hashSize = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
                buffSize = PKCS12_BUFFER_SIZE;
                digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA_1;
                digest_mech.pParameter = NULL;
                digest_mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
        } else {
                /* we only support 1 PBE mech for now */
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }
        keybuf = OBJ_SEC_VALUE(derived_key);

        Blen = Dlen = buffSize;
        D = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(Dlen);
        if (D == NULL) {
                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                goto cleanup;
        }

        B = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(Blen);
        if (B == NULL) {
                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                goto cleanup;
        }

        /*
         * Initialize some values and create some buffers
         * that we need later.
         *
         * Slen = buffSize * CEIL(SaltLength/buffSize)
         */
        Slen = buffSize * PBE_CEIL(params->ulSaltLen, buffSize);

        /*
         * Plen = buffSize * CEIL(PasswordLength/buffSize)
         */
        Plen = buffSize * PBE_CEIL(params->ulPasswordLen, buffSize);

        /*
         * From step 4: I = S + P, so: Ilen = Slen + Plen
         */
        Ilen = Slen + Plen;
        I = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(Ilen);
        if (I == NULL) {
                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                goto cleanup;
        }

        S = I;
        P = I + Slen;

        /*
         * Step 1.
         * We are only interested in deriving keys for encrypt/decrypt
         * for now, so construct the "D"iversifier accordingly.
         */
        (void) memset(D, PBE_ID_ENCRYPT, Dlen);

        /*
         * Step 2.
         * Concatenate copies of the salt together to make S.
         */
        for (i = 0; i < Slen; i += params->ulSaltLen) {
                (void) memcpy(S+i, params->pSalt,
                    ((Slen - i) > params->ulSaltLen ?
                    params->ulSaltLen : (Slen - i)));
        }

        /*
         * Step 3.
         * Concatenate copies of the password together to make
         * a string P.
         */
        for (i = 0; i < Plen; i += params->ulPasswordLen) {
                (void) memcpy(P+i, params->pPassword,
                    ((Plen - i) > params->ulPasswordLen ?
                    params->ulPasswordLen : (Plen - i)));
        }

        /*
         * Step 4.
         * I = S+P - this is now done because S and P are
         * pointers into I.
         *
         * Step 5.
         * c= CEIL[n/u]
         * where n = pseudorandom bits of output desired.
         */
        c = PBE_CEIL(keysize, hashSize);

        /*
         * Step 6.
         */
        Alen = c * hashSize;
        A = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(Alen);
        if (A == NULL) {
                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                goto cleanup;
        }
        AiLen = hashSize;
        Ai = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(AiLen);
        if (Ai == NULL) {
                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                goto cleanup;
        }

        /*
         * Step 6a.
         * Ai = Hr(D+I)
         */
        for (i = 0; i < c; i++) {
                (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);

                if (session_p->sign.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE) {
                        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                        rv = CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
                        goto cleanup;
                }
                session_p->sign.flags |= CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
                (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);

                for (j = 0; j < params->ulIteration; j++) {
                        rv = soft_digest_init(session_p, &digest_mech);
                        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                                goto digest_done;

                        if (j == 0) {
                                rv = soft_digest_update(session_p, D, Dlen);
                                if (rv != CKR_OK)
                                        goto digest_done;

                                rv = soft_digest_update(session_p, I, Ilen);
                        } else {
                                rv = soft_digest_update(session_p, Ai, AiLen);
                        }
                        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                                goto digest_done;

                        rv = soft_digest_final(session_p, Ai, &AiLen);
                        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                                goto digest_done;
                }
digest_done:
                (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                session_p->sign.flags &= ~CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
                (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);

                if (rv != CKR_OK)
                        goto cleanup;
                /*
                 * Step 6b.
                 * Concatenate Ai to make B
                 */
                for (j = 0; j < Blen; j += hashSize) {
                        (void) memcpy(B+j, Ai, ((Blen - j > hashSize) ?
                            hashSize : Blen - j));
                }

                /*
                 * Step 6c.
                 */
                k = Ilen / Blen;
                for (j = 0; j < k; j++) {
                        uchar_t idx;
                        CK_ULONG m, q = 1, cbit = 0;

                        for (m = Blen - 1; m >= (CK_ULONG)0; m--, q = 0) {
                                idx = m + j*Blen;

                                q += (CK_ULONG)I[idx] + (CK_ULONG)B[m];
                                q += cbit;
                                I[idx] = (CK_BYTE)(q & 0xff);
                                cbit = (q > 0xff);
                        }
                }

                /*
                 * Step 7.
                 *  A += Ai
                 */
                (void) memcpy(A + i*hashSize, Ai, AiLen);
        }

        /*
         * Step 8.
         * The final output of this process is the A buffer
         */
        (void) memcpy(keybuf, A, keysize);

cleanup:
        if (A) {
                bzero(A, Alen);
                free(A);
        }
        if (Ai) {
                bzero(Ai, AiLen);
                free(Ai);
        }
        if (B) {
                bzero(B, Blen);
                free(B);
        }
        if (D) {
                bzero(D, Dlen);
                free(D);
        }
        if (I) {
                bzero(I, Ilen);
                free(I);
        }
        return (rv);
}

CK_RV
soft_derivekey(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    soft_object_t *basekey_p, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
    CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{

        CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
        soft_object_t *secret_key;
        CK_MECHANISM digest_mech;
        CK_BYTE hash[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* space enough for all mechs */
        CK_ULONG hash_len = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
        CK_ULONG secret_key_len;
        CK_ULONG hash_size;

        switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
        case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
                /*
                 * Create a new object for secret key. The key type should
                 * be provided in the template.
                 */
                rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pTemplate, ulAttributeCount,
                    phKey, session_p, CKO_SECRET_KEY, (CK_KEY_TYPE)~0UL, 0,
                    SOFT_DERIVE_KEY_DH, B_FALSE);

                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        return (rv);
                }

                /* Obtain the secret object pointer. */
                secret_key = (soft_object_t *)*phKey;

                rv = soft_dh_key_derive(basekey_p, secret_key,
                    (CK_BYTE *)pMechanism->pParameter,
                    pMechanism->ulParameterLen);

                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
                                soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
                                    B_FALSE);
                        else
                                soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
                                    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                        return (rv);
                }

                break;

        case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
                /*
                 * Create a new object for secret key. The key type should
                 * be provided in the template.
                 */
                rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pTemplate, ulAttributeCount,
                    phKey, session_p, CKO_SECRET_KEY, (CK_KEY_TYPE)~0UL, 0,
                    SOFT_DERIVE_KEY_DH, B_FALSE);

                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        return (rv);
                }

                /* Obtain the secret object pointer. */
                secret_key = (soft_object_t *)*phKey;

                rv = soft_ec_key_derive(basekey_p, secret_key,
                    (CK_BYTE *)pMechanism->pParameter,
                    pMechanism->ulParameterLen);

                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
                                soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
                                    B_FALSE);
                        else
                                soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
                                    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                        return (rv);
                }

                break;

        case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION:
                hash_size = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
                digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA_1;
                goto common;

        case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION:
                hash_size = MD5_HASH_SIZE;
                digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_MD5;
                goto common;

        case CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION:
                hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
                digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA256;
                goto common;

        case CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION:
                hash_size = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
                digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA384;
                goto common;

        case CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION:
                hash_size = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
                digest_mech.mechanism = CKM_SHA512;
                goto common;

common:
                /*
                 * Create a new object for secret key. The key type is optional
                 * to be provided in the template. If it is not specified in
                 * the template, the default is CKK_GENERIC_SECRET.
                 */
                rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pTemplate, ulAttributeCount,
                    phKey, session_p, CKO_SECRET_KEY,
                    (CK_KEY_TYPE)CKK_GENERIC_SECRET, 0,
                    SOFT_DERIVE_KEY_OTHER, B_FALSE);

                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        return (rv);
                }

                /* Obtain the secret object pointer. */
                secret_key = (soft_object_t *)*phKey;

                /* Validate the key type and key length */
                rv = soft_key_derive_check_length(secret_key, hash_size);
                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
                                soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
                                    B_FALSE);
                        else
                                soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
                                    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                        return (rv);
                }

                /*
                 * Derive the secret key by digesting the value of another
                 * secret key (base key) with SHA-1 or MD5.
                 */
                rv = soft_digest_init_internal(session_p, &digest_mech);
                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
                                soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
                                    B_FALSE);
                        else
                                soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
                                    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                        return (rv);
                }

                rv = soft_digest(session_p, OBJ_SEC_VALUE(basekey_p),
                    OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(basekey_p), hash, &hash_len);

                (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                /* soft_digest_common() has freed the digest context */
                session_p->digest.flags = 0;
                (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);

                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
                                soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
                                    B_FALSE);
                        else
                                soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
                                    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                        return (rv);
                }

                secret_key_len = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key);

                if ((OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key) = malloc(secret_key_len)) ==
                    NULL) {
                        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key))
                                soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE,
                                    B_FALSE);
                        else
                                soft_delete_object(session_p, secret_key,
                                    B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
                        return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
                }

                /*
                 * The key produced by this mechanism will be of the
                 * specified type and length.
                 * The truncation removes extra bytes from the leading
                 * of the digested key value.
                 */
                (void) memcpy(OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key),
                    (hash + hash_len - secret_key_len),
                    secret_key_len);

                break;

        /*
         * The key sensitivity and extractability rules for the generated
         * keys will be enforced inside soft_ssl_master_key_derive() and
         * soft_ssl_key_and_mac_derive()
         */
        case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
        case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
        case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
        case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
                if (phKey == NULL_PTR)
                        return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
                return (soft_ssl_master_key_derive(session_p, pMechanism,
                    basekey_p, pTemplate, ulAttributeCount, phKey));

        case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
        case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
                return (soft_ssl_key_and_mac_derive(session_p, pMechanism,
                    basekey_p, pTemplate, ulAttributeCount));

        case CKM_TLS_PRF:
                if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
                    pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof (CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS) ||
                    phKey != NULL)
                        return (CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD);

                if (pTemplate != NULL)
                        return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT);

                return (derive_tls_prf(
                    (CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR)pMechanism->pParameter, basekey_p));

        default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }

        soft_derive_enforce_flags(basekey_p, secret_key);

        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(secret_key)) {
                /*
                 * All the info has been filled, so we can write to
                 * keystore now.
                 */
                rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(secret_key);
                if (rv != CKR_OK)
                        soft_delete_token_object(secret_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
        }

        return (rv);
}


/*
 * Perform key derivation rules on key's sensitivity and extractability.
 */
void
soft_derive_enforce_flags(soft_object_t *basekey, soft_object_t *newkey)
{

        boolean_t new_sensitive = B_FALSE;
        boolean_t new_extractable = B_FALSE;

        /*
         * The sensitive and extractable bits have been set when
         * the newkey was built.
         */
        if (newkey->bool_attr_mask & SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON) {
                new_sensitive = B_TRUE;
        }

        if (newkey->bool_attr_mask & EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON) {
                new_extractable = B_TRUE;
        }

        /* Derive the CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE flag */
        if (!basekey->bool_attr_mask & ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON) {
                /*
                 * If the base key has its CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE set to
                 * FALSE, then the derived key will as well.
                 */
                newkey->bool_attr_mask &= ~ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON;
        } else {
                /*
                 * If the base key has its CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE set to TRUE,
                 * then the derived key has the CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE set to
                 * the same value as its CKA_SENSITIVE;
                 */
                if (new_sensitive) {
                        newkey->bool_attr_mask |= ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON;
                } else {
                        newkey->bool_attr_mask &= ~ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON;
                }
        }

        /* Derive the CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE flag */
        if (!basekey->bool_attr_mask & NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON) {
                /*
                 * If the base key has its CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE set to
                 * FALSE, then the derived key will as well.
                 */
                newkey->bool_attr_mask &= ~NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON;
        } else {
                /*
                 * If the base key has its CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE set to TRUE,
                 * then the derived key has the CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE set to
                 * the opposite value from its CKA_EXTRACTABLE;
                 */
                if (new_extractable) {
                        newkey->bool_attr_mask &= ~NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON;
                } else {
                        newkey->bool_attr_mask |= NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON;
                }
        }

        /* Set the CKA_LOCAL flag to false */
        newkey->bool_attr_mask &= ~LOCAL_BOOL_ON;
}


/*
 * do_prf
 *
 * This routine implements Step 3. of the PBKDF2 function
 * defined in PKCS#5 for generating derived keys from a
 * password.
 *
 * Currently, PRF is always SHA_1_HMAC.
 */
static CK_RV
do_prf(soft_session_t *session_p,
        CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR params,
        soft_object_t *hmac_key,
        CK_BYTE *newsalt, CK_ULONG saltlen,
        CK_BYTE *blockdata, CK_ULONG blocklen)
{
        CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
        CK_MECHANISM digest_mech = {CKM_SHA_1_HMAC, NULL, 0};
        CK_BYTE buffer[2][SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
        CK_ULONG hmac_outlen = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
        CK_ULONG inlen;
        CK_BYTE *input, *output;
        CK_ULONG i, j;

        input = newsalt;
        inlen = saltlen;

        output = buffer[1];
        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);

        if (session_p->sign.flags & CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE) {
                (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);
                return (CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE);
        }
        session_p->sign.flags |= CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);

        for (i = 0; i < params->iterations; i++) {
                /*
                 * The key doesn't change, its always the
                 * password iniitally given.
                 */
                rv = soft_sign_init(session_p, &digest_mech, hmac_key);

                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        goto cleanup;
                }

                /* Call PRF function (SHA1_HMAC for now). */
                rv = soft_sign(session_p, input, inlen, output, &hmac_outlen);

                if (rv != CKR_OK) {
                        goto cleanup;
                }
                /*
                 * The first time, initialize the output buffer
                 * with the HMAC signature.
                 */
                if (i == 0) {
                        (void) memcpy(blockdata, output,
                            local_min(blocklen, hmac_outlen));
                } else {
                        /*
                         * XOR the existing data with output from PRF.
                         *
                         * Only XOR up to the length of the blockdata,
                         * it may be less than a full hmac buffer when
                         * the final block is being computed.
                         */
                        for (j = 0; j < hmac_outlen && j < blocklen; j++)
                                blockdata[j] ^= output[j];
                }
                /* Output from previous PRF is input for next round */
                input = output;
                inlen = hmac_outlen;

                /*
                 * Switch buffers to avoid overuse of memcpy.
                 * Initially we used buffer[1], so after the end of
                 * the first iteration (i==0), we switch to buffer[0]
                 * and continue swapping with each iteration.
                 */
                output = buffer[i%2];
        }
cleanup:
        (void) pthread_mutex_lock(&session_p->session_mutex);
        session_p->sign.flags &= ~CRYPTO_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
        (void) pthread_mutex_unlock(&session_p->session_mutex);

        return (rv);
}

static CK_RV
soft_create_hmac_key(soft_session_t *session_p,  CK_BYTE *passwd,
                CK_ULONG passwd_len, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{
        CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
        CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
        CK_KEY_TYPE keytype = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
        CK_BBOOL True = TRUE;
        CK_ATTRIBUTE keytemplate[4];
        /*
         * We must initialize each template member individually
         * because at the time of initial coding for ON10, the
         * compiler was using the "-xc99=%none" option
         * which prevents us from being able to declare the whole
         * template in place as usual.
         */
        keytemplate[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
        keytemplate[0].pValue = &keyclass;
        keytemplate[0].ulValueLen =  sizeof (keyclass);

        keytemplate[1].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
        keytemplate[1].pValue = &keytype;
        keytemplate[1].ulValueLen =  sizeof (keytype);

        keytemplate[2].type = CKA_SIGN;
        keytemplate[2].pValue = &True;
        keytemplate[2].ulValueLen =  sizeof (True);

        keytemplate[3].type = CKA_VALUE;
        keytemplate[3].pValue = passwd;
        keytemplate[3].ulValueLen = passwd_len;
        /*
         * Create a generic key object to be used for HMAC operations.
         * The "value" for this key is the password from the
         * mechanism parameter structure.
         */
        rv = soft_gen_keyobject(keytemplate,
            sizeof (keytemplate)/sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE), phKey, session_p,
            CKO_SECRET_KEY, (CK_KEY_TYPE)CKK_GENERIC_SECRET, 0,
            SOFT_CREATE_OBJ, B_TRUE);

        return (rv);
}

CK_RV
soft_generate_pkcs5_pbkdf2_key(soft_session_t *session_p,
                CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
                soft_object_t *secret_key)
{
        CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
        CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS   *params =
            (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
        CK_ULONG hLen = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
        CK_ULONG dkLen, i;
        CK_ULONG blocks, remainder;
        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE phKey = 0;
        soft_object_t *hmac_key = NULL;
        CK_BYTE *salt = NULL;
        CK_BYTE *keydata = NULL;

        params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR) pMechanism->pParameter;

        if (params->prf != CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1)
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);

        if (params->pPrfData != NULL || params->ulPrfDataLen != 0)
                return (CKR_DATA_INVALID);

        if (params->saltSource != CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED ||
            params->iterations == 0)
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID);

        /*
         * Create a key object to use for HMAC operations.
         */
        rv = soft_create_hmac_key(session_p, params->pPassword,
            *params->ulPasswordLen, &phKey);

        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                return (rv);

        hmac_key = (soft_object_t *)phKey;

        /* Step 1. */
        dkLen = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(secret_key);  /* length of desired key */

        if (dkLen > ((((u_longlong_t)1)<<32)-1)*hLen) {
                (void) soft_delete_object(session_p, hmac_key, B_FALSE,
                    B_FALSE);
                return (CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE);
        }

        /* Step 2. */
        blocks = dkLen / hLen;

        /* crude "Ceiling" function to adjust the number of blocks to use */
        if (blocks * hLen != dkLen)
                blocks++;

        remainder = dkLen - ((blocks - 1) * hLen);

        /* Step 3 */
        salt = (CK_BYTE *)malloc(params->ulSaltSourceDataLen + 4);
        if (salt == NULL) {
                (void) soft_delete_object(session_p, hmac_key, B_FALSE,
                    B_FALSE);
                return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
        }
        /*
         * Nothing in PKCS#5 says you cannot pass an empty
         * salt, so we will allow for this and not return error
         * if the salt is not specified.
         */
        if (params->pSaltSourceData != NULL && params->ulSaltSourceDataLen > 0)
                (void) memcpy(salt, params->pSaltSourceData,
                    params->ulSaltSourceDataLen);

        /*
         * Get pointer to the data section of the key,
         * this will be used below as output from the
         * PRF iteration/concatenations so that when the
         * blocks are all iterated, the secret_key will
         * have the resulting derived key value.
         */
        keydata = (CK_BYTE *)OBJ_SEC_VALUE(secret_key);

        /* Step 4. */
        for (i = 0; i < blocks && (rv == CKR_OK); i++) {
                CK_BYTE *s;

                s = salt + params->ulSaltSourceDataLen;

                /*
                 * Append the block index to the salt as input
                 * to the PRF.  Block index should start at 1
                 * not 0.
                 */
                *s++ = ((i+1) >> 24) & 0xff;
                *s++ = ((i+1) >> 16) & 0xff;
                *s++ = ((i+1) >> 8) & 0xff;
                *s   = ((i+1)) & 0xff;

                /*
                 * Adjust the key pointer so we always append the
                 * PRF output to the current key.
                 */
                rv = do_prf(session_p, params, hmac_key,
                    salt, params->ulSaltSourceDataLen + 4, keydata,
                    ((i + 1) == blocks ? remainder : hLen));

                keydata += hLen;
        }
        (void) soft_delete_object(session_p, hmac_key, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);
        free(salt);

        return (rv);
}

CK_RV
soft_wrapkey(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
                soft_object_t *wrappingKey_p, soft_object_t *hkey_p,
                CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen)
{
        CK_RV           rv = CKR_OK;
        CK_ULONG        plain_len = 0;
        CK_BYTE_PTR     plain_data = NULL;
        CK_ULONG        padded_len = 0;
        CK_BYTE_PTR     padded_data = NULL;
        CK_ULONG        wkey_blksz = 1;         /* so modulo will work right */

        /* Check if the mechanism is supported. */
        switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
        case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
        case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
        case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
                /*
                 * Secret key mechs with padding can be used to wrap secret
                 * keys and private keys only.  See PKCS#11, * sec 11.14,
                 * C_WrapKey and secs 12.* for each mechanism's wrapping/
                 * unwrapping constraints.
                 */
                if (hkey_p->class != CKO_SECRET_KEY && hkey_p->class !=
                    CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)
                        return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
                break;
        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
        case CKM_DES_ECB:
        case CKM_DES3_ECB:
        case CKM_AES_ECB:
        case CKM_DES_CBC:
        case CKM_DES3_CBC:
        case CKM_AES_CBC:
        case CKM_AES_CTR:
        case CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC:
                /*
                 * Unpadded secret key mechs and private key mechs are only
                 * defined for wrapping secret keys.  See PKCS#11 refs above.
                 */
                if (hkey_p->class != CKO_SECRET_KEY)
                        return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
                break;
        default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }

        if (hkey_p->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
                plain_data = OBJ_SEC_VALUE(hkey_p);
                plain_len = OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(hkey_p);
        } else {
                /*
                 * BER-encode the object to be wrapped:  call first with
                 * plain_data = NULL to get the size needed, allocate that
                 * much space, call again to fill space with actual data.
                 */
                rv = soft_object_to_asn1(hkey_p, NULL, &plain_len);
                if (rv != CKR_OK)
                        return (rv);
                if ((plain_data = malloc(plain_len)) == NULL)
                        return (CKR_HOST_MEMORY);
                (void) memset(plain_data, 0x0, plain_len);
                rv = soft_object_to_asn1(hkey_p, plain_data, &plain_len);
                if (rv != CKR_OK)
                        goto cleanup_wrap;
        }

        /*
         * For unpadded ECB and CBC mechanisms, the object needs to be
         * padded to the wrapping key's blocksize prior to the encryption.
         */
        padded_len = plain_len;
        padded_data = plain_data;

        switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
        case CKM_DES_ECB:
        case CKM_DES3_ECB:
        case CKM_AES_ECB:
        case CKM_DES_CBC:
        case CKM_DES3_CBC:
        case CKM_AES_CBC:
        case CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC:
                /* Find the block size of the wrapping key. */
                if (wrappingKey_p->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
                        switch (wrappingKey_p->key_type) {
                        case CKK_DES:
                        case CKK_DES2:
                        case CKK_DES3:
                                wkey_blksz = DES_BLOCK_LEN;
                                break;
                        case CKK_AES:
                                wkey_blksz = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
                                break;
                        case CKK_BLOWFISH:
                                wkey_blksz = BLOWFISH_BLOCK_LEN;
                                break;
                        default:
                                break;
                        }
                } else {
                        rv = CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
                        goto cleanup_wrap;
                }

                /* Extend the plain text data to block size boundary.  */
                if ((padded_len % wkey_blksz) != 0) {
                        padded_len += (wkey_blksz - (plain_len % wkey_blksz));
                        if ((padded_data = malloc(padded_len)) == NULL) {
                                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                                goto cleanup_wrap;
                        }
                        (void) memset(padded_data, 0x0, padded_len);
                        (void) memcpy(padded_data, plain_data, plain_len);
                }
                break;
        default:
                break;
        }

        rv = soft_encrypt_init(session_p, pMechanism, wrappingKey_p);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                goto cleanup_wrap;

        rv = soft_encrypt(session_p, padded_data, padded_len,
            pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);

cleanup_wrap:
        if (padded_data != NULL && padded_len != plain_len) {
                /* Clear buffer before returning to memory pool. */
                (void) memset(padded_data, 0x0, padded_len);
                free(padded_data);
        }

        if ((hkey_p->class != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (plain_data != NULL)) {
                /* Clear buffer before returning to memory pool. */
                (void) memset(plain_data, 0x0, plain_len);
                free(plain_data);
        }

        return (rv);
}

/*
 * Quick check for whether unwrapped key length is appropriate for key type
 * and whether it needs to be truncated (in case the wrapping function had
 * to pad the key prior to wrapping).
 */
static CK_RV
soft_unwrap_secret_len_check(CK_KEY_TYPE keytype, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechtype,
        CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount)
{
        CK_ULONG        i;
        boolean_t       isValueLen = B_FALSE;

        /*
         * Based on the key type and the mech used to unwrap, need to
         * determine if CKA_VALUE_LEN should or should not be specified.
         * PKCS#11 v2.11 restricts CKA_VALUE_LEN from being specified
         * for C_UnwrapKey for all mechs and key types, but v2.20 loosens
         * that restriction, perhaps because it makes it impossible to
         * determine the original length of unwrapped variable-length secret
         * keys, such as RC4, AES, and GENERIC_SECRET.  These variable-length
         * secret keys would have been padded with trailing null-bytes so
         * that they could be successfully wrapped with *_ECB and *_CBC
         * mechanisms.  Hence for unwrapping with these mechs, CKA_VALUE_LEN
         * must be specified.  For unwrapping with other mechs, such as
         * *_CBC_PAD, the CKA_VALUE_LEN is not needed.
         */

        /* Find out if template has CKA_VALUE_LEN. */
        for (i = 0; i < ulAttributeCount; i++) {
                if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN &&
                    pTemplate[i].pValue != NULL) {
                        isValueLen = B_TRUE;
                        break;
                }
        }

        /* Does its presence  conflict with the mech type and key type? */
        switch (mechtype) {
        case CKM_DES_ECB:
        case CKM_DES3_ECB:
        case CKM_AES_ECB:
        case CKM_DES_CBC:
        case CKM_DES3_CBC:
        case CKM_AES_CBC:
        case CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC:
                /*
                 * CKA_VALUE_LEN must be specified
                 * if keytype is CKK_RC4, CKK_AES and CKK_GENERIC_SECRET
                 * and must not be specified otherwise
                 */
                switch (keytype) {
                case CKK_DES:
                case CKK_DES2:
                case CKK_DES3:
                        if (isValueLen)
                                return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT);
                        break;
                case CKK_GENERIC_SECRET:
                case CKK_RC4:
                case CKK_AES:
                case CKK_BLOWFISH:
                        if (!isValueLen)
                                return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
                        break;
                default:
                        return (CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
                }
                break;
        default:
                /* CKA_VALUE_LEN must not be specified */
                if (isValueLen)
                        return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT);
                break;
        }

        return (CKR_OK);
}

CK_RV
soft_unwrapkey(soft_session_t *session_p, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
                soft_object_t *unwrappingkey_p,
                CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen,
                CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
                CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{
        CK_RV                   rv = CKR_OK;
        CK_OBJECT_CLASS         new_obj_class = ~0UL;
        int                     i = 0;
        soft_object_t           *new_objp = NULL;
        boolean_t               persistent = B_FALSE;
        CK_BYTE_PTR             plain_data = NULL;
        CK_ULONG                plain_len = 0;
        secret_key_obj_t        *sck = NULL;

        /* Scan the attribute template for the object class. */
        if (pTemplate != NULL && ulAttributeCount != 0) {
                for (i = 0; i < ulAttributeCount; i++) {
                        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
                                new_obj_class =
                                    *((CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue);
                                break;
                        }
                }
                if (new_obj_class == ~0UL)
                        return (CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE);
        }

        /*
         * Check if the mechanism is supported, and now that the new
         * object's class is known, the mechanism selected should be
         * capable of doing the unwrap.
         */
        switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
        case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
        case CKM_RSA_X_509:
        case CKM_DES_ECB:
        case CKM_DES3_ECB:
        case CKM_AES_ECB:
        case CKM_DES_CBC:
        case CKM_DES3_CBC:
        case CKM_AES_CBC:
        case CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC:
                if (new_obj_class != CKO_SECRET_KEY)
                        return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
                break;
        case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
        case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
        case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
                if (new_obj_class != CKO_SECRET_KEY && new_obj_class !=
                    CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)
                        return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
                break;
        default:
                return (CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID);
        }

        /* Create a new object based on the attribute template. */
        rv = soft_gen_keyobject(pTemplate, ulAttributeCount,
            (CK_ULONG *)&new_objp, session_p, (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)~0UL,
            (CK_KEY_TYPE)~0UL, 0, SOFT_UNWRAP_KEY, B_FALSE);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                return (rv);

        /*
         * New key will have CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE and CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE
         * both set to FALSE.  CKA_EXTRACTABLE will be set _by_default_ to
         * true -- leaving the possibility that it may be set FALSE by the
         * supplied attribute template.  If the precise template cannot be
         * supported, unwrap fails.  PKCS#11 spec, Sec. 11.14, C_UnwrapKey.
         *
         * Therefore, check the new object's NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON and
         * ALWAYS_SENSITVE_BOOL_ON; if they are TRUE, the template must
         * have supplied them and therefore we cannot honor the unwrap.
         */
        if ((new_objp->bool_attr_mask & NEVER_EXTRACTABLE_BOOL_ON) ||
            (new_objp->bool_attr_mask & ALWAYS_SENSITIVE_BOOL_ON)) {
                rv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
                goto cleanup_unwrap;
        }

        rv = soft_decrypt_init(session_p, pMechanism, unwrappingkey_p);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                goto cleanup_unwrap;

        /* First get the length of the plain data */
        rv = soft_decrypt(session_p, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, NULL,
            &plain_len);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                goto cleanup_unwrap;

        /* Allocate space for the unwrapped data */
        if ((plain_data = malloc(plain_len)) == NULL) {
                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                goto cleanup_unwrap;
        }
        (void) memset(plain_data, 0x0, plain_len);

        /* Perform actual decryption into the allocated space. */
        rv = soft_decrypt(session_p, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, plain_data,
            &plain_len);
        if (rv != CKR_OK)
                goto cleanup_unwrap;

        if (new_objp->class == CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
                /*
                 * Since no ASN.1 encoding is done for secret keys, check for
                 * appropriateness and copy decrypted buffer to the key object.
                 */

                /* Check keytype and mechtype don't conflict with valuelen */
                rv = soft_unwrap_secret_len_check(new_objp->key_type,
                    pMechanism->mechanism, pTemplate, ulAttributeCount);
                if (rv != CKR_OK)
                        goto cleanup_unwrap;

                /*
                 * Allocate the secret key structure if not already there;
                 * it will exist for variable length keys since CKA_VALUE_LEN
                 * is specified and saved, but not for fixed length keys.
                 */
                if (OBJ_SEC(new_objp) == NULL) {
                        if ((sck = calloc(1, sizeof (secret_key_obj_t))) ==
                            NULL) {
                                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                                goto cleanup_unwrap;
                        }
                        OBJ_SEC(new_objp) = sck;
                }

                switch (new_objp->key_type) {
                /* Fixed length secret keys don't have CKA_VALUE_LEN */
                case CKK_DES:
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) = DES_KEYSIZE;
                        break;
                case CKK_DES2:
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) = DES2_KEYSIZE;
                        break;
                case CKK_DES3:
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) = DES3_KEYSIZE;
                        break;

                /*
                 * Variable length secret keys.  CKA_VALUE_LEN must be
                 * provided by the template when mech is *_ECB or *_CBC, and
                 * should already have been set during soft_gen_keyobject().
                 * Otherwise we don't need CKA_VALUE_LEN.
                 */
                case CKK_GENERIC_SECRET:
                case CKK_RC4:
                case CKK_AES:
                case CKK_BLOWFISH:
                        break;
                default:
                        rv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID;
                        goto cleanup_unwrap;
                };

                if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) == 0) {
                        /* No CKA_VALUE_LEN set so set it now and save data */
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) = plain_len;
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE(new_objp) = plain_data;
                } else if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) == plain_len) {
                        /* No need to truncate, just save the data */
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE(new_objp) = plain_data;
                } else if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp) > plain_len) {
                        /* Length can't be bigger than what was decrypted */
                        rv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE;
                        goto cleanup_unwrap;
                } else {        /* betw 0 and plain_len, hence padded */
                        /* Truncate the data before saving. */
                        OBJ_SEC_VALUE(new_objp) = realloc(plain_data,
                            OBJ_SEC_VALUE_LEN(new_objp));
                        if (OBJ_SEC_VALUE(new_objp) == NULL) {
                                rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
                                goto cleanup_unwrap;
                        }
                }
        } else {
                /* BER-decode the object to be unwrapped. */
                rv = soft_asn1_to_object(new_objp, plain_data, plain_len);
                if (rv != CKR_OK)
                        goto cleanup_unwrap;
        }

        /* If it needs to be persistent, write it to the keystore */
        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(new_objp)) {
                persistent = B_TRUE;
                rv = soft_put_object_to_keystore(new_objp);
                if (rv != CKR_OK)
                        goto cleanup_unwrap;
        }

        if (new_objp->class != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
                /* Clear buffer before returning to memory pool. */
                (void) memset(plain_data, 0x0, plain_len);
                free(plain_data);
        }

        *phKey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)new_objp;

        return (CKR_OK);

cleanup_unwrap:
        /* The decrypted private key buffer must be freed explicitly. */
        if ((new_objp->class != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (plain_data != NULL)) {
                /* Clear buffer before returning to memory pool. */
                (void) memset(plain_data, 0x0, plain_len);
                free(plain_data);
        }

        /* sck and new_objp are indirectly free()d inside these functions */
        if (IS_TOKEN_OBJECT(new_objp))
                soft_delete_token_object(new_objp, persistent, B_FALSE);
        else
                soft_delete_object(session_p, new_objp, B_FALSE, B_FALSE);

        return (rv);
}