4 * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
5 * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
6 * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
8 * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
9 * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
10 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
11 * and limitations under the License.
13 * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
14 * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
15 * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
16 * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
17 * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
23 * Copyright (c) 1988, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
26 /* Copyright (c) 1988 AT&T */
27 /* All Rights Reserved */
29 * Copyright 2016 Joyent, Inc.
32 #include <sys/types.h>
33 #include <sys/param.h>
34 #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
35 #include <sys/systm.h>
36 #include <sys/signal.h>
37 #include <sys/cred_impl.h>
38 #include <sys/policy.h>
40 #include <sys/errno.h>
43 #include <sys/vnode.h>
46 #include <sys/cpuvar.h>
48 #include <sys/cmn_err.h>
49 #include <sys/debug.h>
50 #include <sys/pathname.h>
53 #include <sys/vtrace.h>
55 #include <sys/exechdr.h>
57 #include <sys/prsystm.h>
58 #include <sys/modctl.h>
59 #include <sys/vmparam.h>
61 #include <sys/schedctl.h>
62 #include <sys/utrap.h>
63 #include <sys/systeminfo.h>
64 #include <sys/stack.h>
66 #include <sys/dtrace.h>
67 #include <sys/lwpchan_impl.h>
70 #include <sys/brand.h>
72 #include <sys/random.h>
80 #include <vm/seg_vn.h>
82 #define PRIV_RESET 0x01 /* needs to reset privs */
83 #define PRIV_SETID 0x02 /* needs to change uids */
84 #define PRIV_SETUGID 0x04 /* is setuid/setgid/forced privs */
85 #define PRIV_INCREASE 0x08 /* child runs with more privs */
86 #define MAC_FLAGS 0x10 /* need to adjust MAC flags */
87 #define PRIV_FORCED 0x20 /* has forced privileges */
89 static int execsetid(struct vnode
*, struct vattr
*, uid_t
*, uid_t
*,
90 priv_set_t
*, cred_t
*, const char *);
91 static int hold_execsw(struct execsw
*);
93 uint_t auxv_hwcap
= 0; /* auxv AT_SUN_HWCAP value; determined on the fly */
94 uint_t auxv_hwcap_2
= 0; /* AT_SUN_HWCAP2 */
95 #if defined(_SYSCALL32_IMPL)
96 uint_t auxv_hwcap32
= 0; /* 32-bit version of auxv_hwcap */
97 uint_t auxv_hwcap32_2
= 0; /* 32-bit version of auxv_hwcap2 */
100 #define PSUIDFLAGS (SNOCD|SUGID)
103 * These are consumed within the specific exec modules, but are defined here
106 * 1) The exec modules are unloadable, which would make this near useless.
108 * 2) We want them to be common across all of them, should more than ELF come
111 * All must be powers of 2.
113 size_t aslr_max_brk_skew
= 16 * 1024 * 1024; /* 16MB */
114 #pragma weak exec_stackgap = aslr_max_stack_skew /* Old, compatible name */
115 size_t aslr_max_stack_skew
= 64 * 1024; /* 64KB */
118 * exece() - system call wrapper around exec_common()
121 exece(const char *fname
, const char **argp
, const char **envp
)
125 error
= exec_common(fname
, argp
, envp
, EBA_NONE
);
126 return (error
? (set_errno(error
)) : 0);
130 exec_common(const char *fname
, const char **argp
, const char **envp
,
133 vnode_t
*vp
= NULL
, *dir
= NULL
, *tmpvp
= NULL
;
134 proc_t
*p
= ttoproc(curthread
);
135 klwp_t
*lwp
= ttolwp(curthread
);
136 struct user
*up
= PTOU(p
);
137 long execsz
; /* temporary count of exec size */
140 char exec_file
[MAXCOMLEN
+1];
142 struct pathname resolvepn
;
145 k_sigset_t savedmask
;
146 lwpdir_t
*lwpdir
= NULL
;
148 lwpdir_t
*old_lwpdir
= NULL
;
149 uint_t old_lwpdir_sz
;
150 tidhash_t
*old_tidhash
;
151 uint_t old_tidhash_sz
;
152 ret_tidhash_t
*ret_tidhash
;
154 boolean_t brandme
= B_FALSE
;
157 * exec() is not supported for the /proc agent lwp.
159 if (curthread
== p
->p_agenttp
)
162 if (brand_action
!= EBA_NONE
) {
164 * Brand actions are not supported for processes that are not
165 * running in a branded zone.
167 if (!ZONE_IS_BRANDED(p
->p_zone
))
170 if (brand_action
== EBA_NATIVE
) {
171 /* Only branded processes can be unbranded */
172 if (!PROC_IS_BRANDED(p
))
175 /* Only unbranded processes can be branded */
176 if (PROC_IS_BRANDED(p
))
182 * If this is a native zone, or if the process is already
183 * branded, then we don't need to do anything. If this is
184 * a native process in a branded zone, we need to brand the
185 * process as it exec()s the new binary.
187 if (ZONE_IS_BRANDED(p
->p_zone
) && !PROC_IS_BRANDED(p
))
192 * Inform /proc that an exec() has started.
193 * Hold signals that are ignored by default so that we will
194 * not be interrupted by a signal that will be ignored after
195 * successful completion of gexec().
197 mutex_enter(&p
->p_lock
);
199 schedctl_finish_sigblock(curthread
);
200 savedmask
= curthread
->t_hold
;
201 sigorset(&curthread
->t_hold
, &ignoredefault
);
202 mutex_exit(&p
->p_lock
);
205 * Look up path name and remember last component for later.
206 * To help coreadm expand its %d token, we attempt to save
207 * the directory containing the executable in p_execdir. The
208 * first call to lookuppn() may fail and return EINVAL because
209 * dirvpp is non-NULL. In that case, we make a second call to
210 * lookuppn() with dirvpp set to NULL; p_execdir will be NULL,
211 * but coreadm is allowed to expand %d to the empty string and
212 * there are other cases in which that failure may occur.
214 if ((error
= pn_get((char *)fname
, UIO_USERSPACE
, &pn
)) != 0)
216 pn_alloc(&resolvepn
);
217 if ((error
= lookuppn(&pn
, &resolvepn
, FOLLOW
, &dir
, &vp
)) != 0) {
224 if ((error
= pn_get((char *)fname
, UIO_USERSPACE
, &pn
)) != 0)
226 pn_alloc(&resolvepn
);
227 if ((error
= lookuppn(&pn
, &resolvepn
, FOLLOW
, NULLVPP
,
243 if ((error
= secpolicy_basic_exec(CRED(), vp
)) != 0) {
253 * We do not allow executing files in attribute directories.
254 * We test this by determining whether the resolved path
255 * contains a "/" when we're in an attribute directory;
256 * only if the pathname does not contain a "/" the resolved path
257 * points to a file in the current working (attribute) directory.
259 if ((p
->p_user
.u_cdir
->v_flag
& V_XATTRDIR
) != 0 &&
260 strchr(resolvepn
.pn_path
, '/') == NULL
) {
270 bzero(exec_file
, MAXCOMLEN
+1);
271 (void) strncpy(exec_file
, pn
.pn_path
, MAXCOMLEN
);
272 bzero(&args
, sizeof (args
));
273 args
.pathname
= resolvepn
.pn_path
;
274 /* don't free resolvepn until we are done with args */
278 * If we're running in a profile shell, then call pfexecd.
280 if ((CR_FLAGS(p
->p_cred
) & PRIV_PFEXEC
) != 0) {
281 error
= pfexec_call(p
->p_cred
, &resolvepn
, &args
.pfcred
,
284 /* Returning errno in case we're not allowed to execute. */
293 /* Don't change the credentials when using old ptrace. */
294 if (args
.pfcred
!= NULL
&&
295 (p
->p_proc_flag
& P_PR_PTRACE
) != 0) {
298 args
.scrubenv
= B_FALSE
;
303 * Specific exec handlers, or policies determined via
304 * /etc/system may override the historical default.
306 args
.stk_prot
= PROT_ZFOD
;
307 args
.dat_prot
= PROT_ZFOD
;
309 CPU_STATS_ADD_K(sys
, sysexec
, 1);
310 DTRACE_PROC1(exec
, char *, args
.pathname
);
316 /* If necessary, brand this process before we start the exec. */
320 if ((error
= gexec(&vp
, &ua
, &args
, NULL
, 0, &execsz
,
321 exec_file
, p
->p_cred
, brand_action
)) != 0) {
323 brand_clearbrand(p
, B_FALSE
);
332 * Free floating point registers (sun4u only)
335 lwp_freeregs(lwp
, 1);
338 * Free thread and process context ops.
340 if (curthread
->t_ctx
)
341 freectx(curthread
, 1);
346 * Remember file name for accounting; clear any cached DTrace predicate.
348 up
->u_acflag
&= ~AFORK
;
349 bcopy(exec_file
, up
->u_comm
, MAXCOMLEN
+1);
350 curthread
->t_predcache
= NULL
;
353 * Clear contract template state
355 lwp_ctmpl_clear(lwp
);
358 * Save the directory in which we found the executable for expanding
359 * the %d token used in core file patterns.
361 mutex_enter(&p
->p_lock
);
362 tmpvp
= p
->p_execdir
;
364 if (p
->p_execdir
!= NULL
)
365 VN_HOLD(p
->p_execdir
);
366 mutex_exit(&p
->p_lock
);
372 * Reset stack state to the user stack, clear set of signals
373 * caught on the signal stack, and reset list of signals that
374 * restart system calls; the new program's environment should
375 * not be affected by detritus from the old program. Any
376 * pending held signals remain held, so don't clear t_hold.
378 mutex_enter(&p
->p_lock
);
379 lwp
->lwp_oldcontext
= 0;
381 lwp
->lwp_old_stk_ctl
= 0;
382 sigemptyset(&up
->u_signodefer
);
383 sigemptyset(&up
->u_sigonstack
);
384 sigemptyset(&up
->u_sigresethand
);
385 lwp
->lwp_sigaltstack
.ss_sp
= 0;
386 lwp
->lwp_sigaltstack
.ss_size
= 0;
387 lwp
->lwp_sigaltstack
.ss_flags
= SS_DISABLE
;
390 * Make saved resource limit == current resource limit.
392 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
395 (void) rctl_rlimit_get(rctlproc_legacy
[i
], p
,
396 &up
->u_saved_rlimit
[i
]);
401 * If the action was to catch the signal, then the action
402 * must be reset to SIG_DFL.
405 p
->p_flag
&= ~(SNOWAIT
|SJCTL
);
406 p
->p_flag
|= (SEXECED
|SMSACCT
|SMSFORK
);
407 up
->u_signal
[SIGCLD
- 1] = SIG_DFL
;
410 * Delete the dot4 sigqueues/signotifies.
414 mutex_exit(&p
->p_lock
);
416 mutex_enter(&p
->p_pflock
);
417 p
->p_prof
.pr_base
= NULL
;
418 p
->p_prof
.pr_size
= 0;
419 p
->p_prof
.pr_off
= 0;
420 p
->p_prof
.pr_scale
= 0;
421 p
->p_prof
.pr_samples
= 0;
422 mutex_exit(&p
->p_pflock
);
424 ASSERT(curthread
->t_schedctl
== NULL
);
427 if (p
->p_utraps
!= NULL
)
432 * Close all close-on-exec files.
434 close_exec(P_FINFO(p
));
435 TRACE_2(TR_FAC_PROC
, TR_PROC_EXEC
, "proc_exec:p %p up %p", p
, up
);
437 /* Unbrand ourself if necessary. */
438 if (PROC_IS_BRANDED(p
) && (brand_action
== EBA_NATIVE
))
439 brand_clearbrand(p
, B_FALSE
);
443 /* Mark this as an executable vnode */
444 mutex_enter(&vp
->v_lock
);
445 vp
->v_flag
|= VVMEXEC
;
446 mutex_exit(&vp
->v_lock
);
454 * Allocate a new lwp directory and lwpid hash table if necessary.
456 if (curthread
->t_tid
!= 1 || p
->p_lwpdir_sz
!= 2) {
457 lwpdir
= kmem_zalloc(2 * sizeof (lwpdir_t
), KM_SLEEP
);
458 lwpdir
->ld_next
= lwpdir
+ 1;
459 tidhash
= kmem_zalloc(2 * sizeof (tidhash_t
), KM_SLEEP
);
460 if (p
->p_lwpdir
!= NULL
)
461 lep
= p
->p_lwpdir
[curthread
->t_dslot
].ld_entry
;
463 lep
= kmem_zalloc(sizeof (*lep
), KM_SLEEP
);
466 if (PROC_IS_BRANDED(p
))
469 mutex_enter(&p
->p_lock
);
473 * Reset lwp id to the default value of 1.
474 * This is a single-threaded process now
475 * and lwp #1 is lwp_wait()able by default.
476 * The t_unpark flag should not be inherited.
478 ASSERT(p
->p_lwpcnt
== 1 && p
->p_zombcnt
== 0);
479 curthread
->t_tid
= 1;
481 ASSERT(curthread
->t_lpl
!= NULL
);
482 p
->p_t1_lgrpid
= curthread
->t_lpl
->lpl_lgrpid
;
484 if (p
->p_tr_lgrpid
!= LGRP_NONE
&& p
->p_tr_lgrpid
!= p
->p_t1_lgrpid
) {
485 lgrp_update_trthr_migrations(1);
487 curthread
->t_unpark
= 0;
488 curthread
->t_proc_flag
|= TP_TWAIT
;
489 curthread
->t_proc_flag
&= ~TP_DAEMON
; /* daemons shouldn't exec */
490 p
->p_lwpdaemon
= 0; /* but oh well ... */
494 * Install the newly-allocated lwp directory and lwpid hash table
495 * and insert the current thread into the new hash table.
497 if (lwpdir
!= NULL
) {
498 old_lwpdir
= p
->p_lwpdir
;
499 old_lwpdir_sz
= p
->p_lwpdir_sz
;
500 old_tidhash
= p
->p_tidhash
;
501 old_tidhash_sz
= p
->p_tidhash_sz
;
502 p
->p_lwpdir
= p
->p_lwpfree
= lwpdir
;
504 lep
->le_thread
= curthread
;
505 lep
->le_lwpid
= curthread
->t_tid
;
506 lep
->le_start
= curthread
->t_start
;
507 lwp_hash_in(p
, lep
, tidhash
, 2, 0);
508 p
->p_tidhash
= tidhash
;
511 ret_tidhash
= p
->p_ret_tidhash
;
512 p
->p_ret_tidhash
= NULL
;
515 * Restore the saved signal mask and
516 * inform /proc that the exec() has finished.
518 curthread
->t_hold
= savedmask
;
520 mutex_exit(&p
->p_lock
);
522 kmem_free(old_lwpdir
, old_lwpdir_sz
* sizeof (lwpdir_t
));
523 kmem_free(old_tidhash
, old_tidhash_sz
* sizeof (tidhash_t
));
525 while (ret_tidhash
!= NULL
) {
526 ret_tidhash_t
*next
= ret_tidhash
->rth_next
;
527 kmem_free(ret_tidhash
->rth_tidhash
,
528 ret_tidhash
->rth_tidhash_sz
* sizeof (tidhash_t
));
529 kmem_free(ret_tidhash
, sizeof (*ret_tidhash
));
534 DTRACE_PROC(exec__success
);
538 DTRACE_PROC1(exec__failure
, int, error
);
539 out
: /* error return */
540 mutex_enter(&p
->p_lock
);
541 curthread
->t_hold
= savedmask
;
543 mutex_exit(&p
->p_lock
);
550 * Perform generic exec duties and switchout to object-file specific
558 struct intpdata
*idatap
,
565 struct vnode
*vp
, *execvp
= NULL
;
566 proc_t
*pp
= ttoproc(curthread
);
573 char magbuf
[MAGIC_BYTES
];
575 cred_t
*oldcred
, *newcred
= NULL
;
579 secflagset_t old_secflags
;
581 secflags_copy(&old_secflags
, &pp
->p_secflags
.psf_effective
);
584 * If the SNOCD or SUGID flag is set, turn it off and remember the
585 * previous setting so we can restore it if we encounter an error.
587 if (level
== 0 && (pp
->p_flag
& PSUIDFLAGS
)) {
588 mutex_enter(&pp
->p_lock
);
589 suidflags
= pp
->p_flag
& PSUIDFLAGS
;
590 pp
->p_flag
&= ~PSUIDFLAGS
;
591 mutex_exit(&pp
->p_lock
);
594 if ((error
= execpermissions(*vpp
, &vattr
, args
)) != 0)
597 /* need to open vnode for stateful file systems */
598 if ((error
= VOP_OPEN(vpp
, FREAD
, CRED(), NULL
)) != 0)
603 * Note: to support binary compatibility with SunOS a.out
604 * executables, we read in the first four bytes, as the
605 * magic number is in bytes 2-3.
607 if (error
= vn_rdwr(UIO_READ
, vp
, magbuf
, sizeof (magbuf
),
608 (offset_t
)0, UIO_SYSSPACE
, 0, (rlim64_t
)0, CRED(), &resid
))
613 if ((eswp
= findexec_by_hdr(magbuf
)) == NULL
)
617 (privflags
= execsetid(vp
, &vattr
, &uid
, &gid
, &fset
,
618 args
->pfcred
== NULL
? cred
: args
->pfcred
, args
->pathname
)) != 0) {
620 /* Pfcred is a credential with a ref count of 1 */
622 if (args
->pfcred
!= NULL
) {
623 privflags
|= PRIV_INCREASE
|PRIV_RESET
;
624 newcred
= cred
= args
->pfcred
;
626 newcred
= cred
= crdup(cred
);
629 /* If we can, drop the PA bit */
630 if ((privflags
& PRIV_RESET
) != 0)
631 priv_adjust_PA(cred
);
633 if (privflags
& PRIV_SETID
) {
640 if (privflags
& MAC_FLAGS
) {
641 if (!(CR_FLAGS(cred
) & NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT
))
642 CR_FLAGS(cred
) &= ~NET_MAC_AWARE
;
643 CR_FLAGS(cred
) &= ~NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT
;
647 * Implement the privilege updates:
653 * E' = P' = (I' + F) & A
655 * But if running under ptrace, we cap I and F with P.
657 if ((privflags
& (PRIV_RESET
|PRIV_FORCED
)) != 0) {
658 if ((privflags
& PRIV_INCREASE
) != 0 &&
659 (pp
->p_proc_flag
& P_PR_PTRACE
) != 0) {
660 priv_intersect(&CR_OPPRIV(cred
),
662 priv_intersect(&CR_OPPRIV(cred
), &fset
);
664 priv_intersect(&CR_LPRIV(cred
), &CR_IPRIV(cred
));
665 CR_EPRIV(cred
) = CR_PPRIV(cred
) = CR_IPRIV(cred
);
666 if (privflags
& PRIV_FORCED
) {
668 priv_union(&fset
, &CR_EPRIV(cred
));
669 priv_union(&fset
, &CR_PPRIV(cred
));
671 priv_adjust_PA(cred
);
673 } else if (level
== 0 && args
->pfcred
!= NULL
) {
674 newcred
= cred
= args
->pfcred
;
675 privflags
|= PRIV_INCREASE
;
676 /* pfcred is not forced to adhere to these settings */
677 priv_intersect(&CR_LPRIV(cred
), &CR_IPRIV(cred
));
678 CR_EPRIV(cred
) = CR_PPRIV(cred
) = CR_IPRIV(cred
);
679 priv_adjust_PA(cred
);
682 /* The new image gets the inheritable secflags as its secflags */
683 secflags_promote(pp
);
685 /* SunOS 4.x buy-back */
686 if ((vp
->v_vfsp
->vfs_flag
& VFS_NOSETUID
) &&
687 (vattr
.va_mode
& (VSUID
|VSGID
))) {
688 char path
[MAXNAMELEN
];
689 refstr_t
*mntpt
= NULL
;
692 bzero(path
, sizeof (path
));
693 zone_hold(pp
->p_zone
);
695 ret
= vnodetopath(pp
->p_zone
->zone_rootvp
, vp
, path
,
696 sizeof (path
), cred
);
698 /* fallback to mountpoint if a path can't be found */
699 if ((ret
!= 0) || (ret
== 0 && path
[0] == '\0'))
700 mntpt
= vfs_getmntpoint(vp
->v_vfsp
);
703 zcmn_err(pp
->p_zone
->zone_id
, CE_NOTE
,
704 "!uid %d: setuid execution not allowed, "
705 "file=%s", cred
->cr_uid
, path
);
707 zcmn_err(pp
->p_zone
->zone_id
, CE_NOTE
,
708 "!uid %d: setuid execution not allowed, "
709 "fs=%s, file=%s", cred
->cr_uid
,
710 ZONE_PATH_TRANSLATE(refstr_value(mntpt
),
711 pp
->p_zone
), exec_file
);
713 if (!INGLOBALZONE(pp
)) {
714 /* zone_rootpath always has trailing / */
716 cmn_err(CE_NOTE
, "!zone: %s, uid: %d "
717 "setuid execution not allowed, file=%s%s",
718 pp
->p_zone
->zone_name
, cred
->cr_uid
,
719 pp
->p_zone
->zone_rootpath
, path
+ 1);
721 cmn_err(CE_NOTE
, "!zone: %s, uid: %d "
722 "setuid execution not allowed, fs=%s, "
723 "file=%s", pp
->p_zone
->zone_name
,
724 cred
->cr_uid
, refstr_value(mntpt
),
731 zone_rele(pp
->p_zone
);
735 * execsetid() told us whether or not we had to change the
736 * credentials of the process. In privflags, it told us
737 * whether we gained any privileges or executed a set-uid executable.
739 setid
= (privflags
& (PRIV_SETUGID
|PRIV_INCREASE
|PRIV_FORCED
));
742 * Use /etc/system variable to determine if the stack
743 * should be marked as executable by default.
745 if ((noexec_user_stack
!= 0) ||
746 secflag_enabled(pp
, PROC_SEC_NOEXECSTACK
))
747 args
->stk_prot
&= ~PROT_EXEC
;
749 args
->execswp
= eswp
; /* Save execsw pointer in uarg for exec_func */
753 * Traditionally, the setid flags told the sub processes whether
754 * the file just executed was set-uid or set-gid; this caused
755 * some confusion as the 'setid' flag did not match the SUGID
756 * process flag which is only set when the uids/gids do not match.
757 * A script set-gid/set-uid to the real uid/gid would start with
758 * /dev/fd/X but an executable would happily trust LD_LIBRARY_PATH.
759 * Now we flag those cases where the calling process cannot
760 * be trusted to influence the newly exec'ed process, either
761 * because it runs with more privileges or when the uids/gids
762 * do in fact not match.
763 * This also makes the runtime linker agree with the on exec
764 * values of SNOCD and SUGID.
767 if (cred
->cr_uid
!= cred
->cr_ruid
|| (cred
->cr_rgid
!= cred
->cr_gid
&&
768 !supgroupmember(cred
->cr_gid
, cred
))) {
769 setidfl
|= EXECSETID_UGIDS
;
771 if (setid
& PRIV_SETUGID
)
772 setidfl
|= EXECSETID_SETID
;
773 if (setid
& PRIV_FORCED
)
774 setidfl
|= EXECSETID_PRIVS
;
780 error
= (*eswp
->exec_func
)(vp
, uap
, args
, idatap
, level
, execsz
,
781 setidfl
, exec_file
, cred
, brand_action
);
782 rw_exit(eswp
->exec_lock
);
787 * If this process's p_exec has been set to the vp of
788 * the executable by exec_func, we will return without
789 * calling VOP_CLOSE because proc_exit will close it
792 if (pp
->p_exec
== vp
)
801 if (execvp
!= NULL
) {
803 * Close the previous executable only if we are
806 (void) VOP_CLOSE(execvp
, FREAD
, 1, (offset_t
)0,
810 mutex_enter(&pp
->p_crlock
);
812 oruid
= pp
->p_cred
->cr_ruid
;
814 if (newcred
!= NULL
) {
816 * Free the old credentials, and set the new ones.
817 * Do this for both the process and the (single) thread.
820 pp
->p_cred
= cred
; /* cred already held for proc */
821 crhold(cred
); /* hold new cred for thread */
823 * DTrace accesses t_cred in probe context. t_cred
824 * must always be either NULL, or point to a valid,
825 * allocated cred structure.
827 oldcred
= curthread
->t_cred
;
828 curthread
->t_cred
= cred
;
831 if (priv_basic_test
>= 0 &&
832 !PRIV_ISASSERT(&CR_IPRIV(newcred
),
834 pid_t pid
= pp
->p_pid
;
835 char *fn
= PTOU(pp
)->u_comm
;
837 cmn_err(CE_WARN
, "%s[%d]: exec: basic_test "
838 "privilege removed from E/I", fn
, pid
);
842 * On emerging from a successful exec(), the saved
843 * uid and gid equal the effective uid and gid.
845 cred
->cr_suid
= cred
->cr_uid
;
846 cred
->cr_sgid
= cred
->cr_gid
;
849 * If the real and effective ids do not match, this
850 * is a setuid process that should not dump core.
851 * The group comparison is tricky; we prevent the code
852 * from flagging SNOCD when executing with an effective gid
853 * which is a supplementary group.
855 if (cred
->cr_ruid
!= cred
->cr_uid
||
856 (cred
->cr_rgid
!= cred
->cr_gid
&&
857 !supgroupmember(cred
->cr_gid
, cred
)) ||
858 (privflags
& PRIV_INCREASE
) != 0)
859 suidflags
= PSUIDFLAGS
;
863 mutex_exit(&pp
->p_crlock
);
864 if (newcred
!= NULL
&& oruid
!= newcred
->cr_ruid
) {
865 /* Note that the process remains in the same zone. */
866 mutex_enter(&pidlock
);
867 upcount_dec(oruid
, crgetzoneid(newcred
));
868 upcount_inc(newcred
->cr_ruid
, crgetzoneid(newcred
));
869 mutex_exit(&pidlock
);
872 mutex_enter(&pp
->p_lock
);
873 pp
->p_flag
|= suidflags
;
874 mutex_exit(&pp
->p_lock
);
876 if (setid
&& (pp
->p_proc_flag
& P_PR_PTRACE
) == 0) {
878 * If process is traced via /proc, arrange to
879 * invalidate the associated /proc vnode.
881 if (pp
->p_plist
|| (pp
->p_proc_flag
& P_PR_TRACE
))
882 args
->traceinval
= 1;
884 if (pp
->p_proc_flag
& P_PR_PTRACE
)
885 psignal(pp
, SIGTRAP
);
886 if (args
->traceinval
)
887 prinvalidate(&pp
->p_user
);
894 (void) VOP_CLOSE(vp
, FREAD
, 1, (offset_t
)0, cred
, NULL
);
902 mutex_enter(&pp
->p_lock
);
904 pp
->p_flag
|= suidflags
;
907 * Restore the effective secflags, to maintain the invariant they
908 * never change for a given process
910 secflags_copy(&pp
->p_secflags
.psf_effective
, &old_secflags
);
911 mutex_exit(&pp
->p_lock
);
916 extern char *execswnames
[];
919 allocate_execsw(char *name
, char *magic
, size_t magic_size
)
925 mutex_enter(&execsw_lock
);
926 for (i
= 0; i
< nexectype
; i
++) {
927 if (execswnames
[i
] == NULL
) {
928 ename
= kmem_alloc(strlen(name
) + 1, KM_SLEEP
);
929 (void) strcpy(ename
, name
);
930 execswnames
[i
] = ename
;
932 * Set the magic number last so that we
933 * don't need to hold the execsw_lock in
936 magicp
= kmem_alloc(magic_size
, KM_SLEEP
);
937 for (j
= 0; j
< magic_size
; j
++)
938 magicp
[j
] = magic
[j
];
939 execsw
[i
].exec_magic
= magicp
;
940 mutex_exit(&execsw_lock
);
944 mutex_exit(&execsw_lock
);
949 * Find the exec switch table entry with the corresponding magic string.
952 findexecsw(char *magic
)
956 for (eswp
= execsw
; eswp
< &execsw
[nexectype
]; eswp
++) {
957 ASSERT(eswp
->exec_maglen
<= MAGIC_BYTES
);
958 if (magic
&& eswp
->exec_maglen
!= 0 &&
959 bcmp(magic
, eswp
->exec_magic
, eswp
->exec_maglen
) == 0)
966 * Find the execsw[] index for the given exec header string by looking for the
967 * magic string at a specified offset and length for each kind of executable
968 * file format until one matches. If no execsw[] entry is found, try to
969 * autoload a module for this magic string.
972 findexec_by_hdr(char *header
)
976 for (eswp
= execsw
; eswp
< &execsw
[nexectype
]; eswp
++) {
977 ASSERT(eswp
->exec_maglen
<= MAGIC_BYTES
);
978 if (header
&& eswp
->exec_maglen
!= 0 &&
979 bcmp(&header
[eswp
->exec_magoff
], eswp
->exec_magic
,
980 eswp
->exec_maglen
) == 0) {
981 if (hold_execsw(eswp
) != 0)
986 return (NULL
); /* couldn't find the type */
990 * Find the execsw[] index for the given magic string. If no execsw[] entry
991 * is found, try to autoload a module for this magic string.
994 findexec_by_magic(char *magic
)
998 for (eswp
= execsw
; eswp
< &execsw
[nexectype
]; eswp
++) {
999 ASSERT(eswp
->exec_maglen
<= MAGIC_BYTES
);
1000 if (magic
&& eswp
->exec_maglen
!= 0 &&
1001 bcmp(magic
, eswp
->exec_magic
, eswp
->exec_maglen
) == 0) {
1002 if (hold_execsw(eswp
) != 0)
1007 return (NULL
); /* couldn't find the type */
1011 hold_execsw(struct execsw
*eswp
)
1015 rw_enter(eswp
->exec_lock
, RW_READER
);
1016 while (!LOADED_EXEC(eswp
)) {
1017 rw_exit(eswp
->exec_lock
);
1018 name
= execswnames
[eswp
-execsw
];
1020 if (modload("exec", name
) == -1)
1022 rw_enter(eswp
->exec_lock
, RW_READER
);
1028 execsetid(struct vnode
*vp
, struct vattr
*vattrp
, uid_t
*uidp
, uid_t
*gidp
,
1029 priv_set_t
*fset
, cred_t
*cr
, const char *pathname
)
1031 proc_t
*pp
= ttoproc(curthread
);
1036 * Remember credentials.
1041 /* Will try to reset the PRIV_AWARE bit later. */
1042 if ((CR_FLAGS(cr
) & (PRIV_AWARE
|PRIV_AWARE_INHERIT
)) == PRIV_AWARE
)
1043 privflags
|= PRIV_RESET
;
1045 if ((vp
->v_vfsp
->vfs_flag
& VFS_NOSETUID
) == 0) {
1047 * If it's a set-uid root program we perform the
1048 * forced privilege look-aside. This has three possible
1050 * no look aside information -> treat as before
1051 * look aside in Limit set -> apply forced privs
1052 * look aside not in Limit set -> ignore set-uid root
1054 * Ordinary set-uid root execution only allowed if the limit
1055 * set holds all unsafe privileges.
1057 if (vattrp
->va_mode
& VSUID
) {
1058 if (vattrp
->va_uid
== 0) {
1059 int res
= get_forced_privs(cr
, pathname
, fset
);
1063 if (priv_issubset(&priv_unsafe
,
1065 uid
= vattrp
->va_uid
;
1066 privflags
|= PRIV_SETUGID
;
1070 privflags
|= PRIV_FORCED
|PRIV_INCREASE
;
1076 uid
= vattrp
->va_uid
;
1077 privflags
|= PRIV_SETUGID
;
1080 if (vattrp
->va_mode
& VSGID
) {
1081 gid
= vattrp
->va_gid
;
1082 privflags
|= PRIV_SETUGID
;
1087 * Do we need to change our credential anyway?
1088 * This is the case when E != I or P != I, as
1089 * we need to do the assignments (with F empty and A full)
1090 * Or when I is not a subset of L; in that case we need to
1095 * E' = P' = (I' + F) & A
1099 if (!priv_isequalset(&CR_EPRIV(cr
), &CR_IPRIV(cr
)) ||
1100 !priv_issubset(&CR_IPRIV(cr
), &CR_LPRIV(cr
)) ||
1101 !priv_isequalset(&CR_PPRIV(cr
), &CR_IPRIV(cr
)))
1102 privflags
|= PRIV_RESET
;
1104 /* Child has more privileges than parent */
1105 if (!priv_issubset(&CR_IPRIV(cr
), &CR_PPRIV(cr
)))
1106 privflags
|= PRIV_INCREASE
;
1108 /* If MAC-aware flag(s) are on, need to update cred to remove. */
1109 if ((CR_FLAGS(cr
) & NET_MAC_AWARE
) ||
1110 (CR_FLAGS(cr
) & NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT
))
1111 privflags
|= MAC_FLAGS
;
1113 * Set setuid/setgid protections if no ptrace() compatibility.
1114 * For privileged processes, honor setuid/setgid even in
1115 * the presence of ptrace() compatibility.
1117 if (((pp
->p_proc_flag
& P_PR_PTRACE
) == 0 ||
1118 PRIV_POLICY_ONLY(cr
, PRIV_PROC_OWNER
, (uid
== 0))) &&
1119 (cr
->cr_uid
!= uid
||
1120 cr
->cr_gid
!= gid
||
1121 cr
->cr_suid
!= uid
||
1122 cr
->cr_sgid
!= gid
)) {
1125 privflags
|= PRIV_SETID
;
1131 execpermissions(struct vnode
*vp
, struct vattr
*vattrp
, struct uarg
*args
)
1134 proc_t
*p
= ttoproc(curthread
);
1136 vattrp
->va_mask
= AT_MODE
| AT_UID
| AT_GID
| AT_SIZE
;
1137 if (error
= VOP_GETATTR(vp
, vattrp
, ATTR_EXEC
, p
->p_cred
, NULL
))
1140 * Check the access mode.
1141 * If VPROC, ask /proc if the file is an object file.
1143 if ((error
= VOP_ACCESS(vp
, VEXEC
, 0, p
->p_cred
, NULL
)) != 0 ||
1144 !(vp
->v_type
== VREG
|| (vp
->v_type
== VPROC
&& pr_isobject(vp
))) ||
1145 (vp
->v_vfsp
->vfs_flag
& VFS_NOEXEC
) != 0 ||
1146 (vattrp
->va_mode
& (VEXEC
|(VEXEC
>>3)|(VEXEC
>>6))) == 0) {
1152 if ((p
->p_plist
|| (p
->p_proc_flag
& (P_PR_PTRACE
|P_PR_TRACE
))) &&
1153 (error
= VOP_ACCESS(vp
, VREAD
, 0, p
->p_cred
, NULL
))) {
1155 * If process is under ptrace(2) compatibility,
1158 if (p
->p_proc_flag
& P_PR_PTRACE
)
1161 * Process is traced via /proc.
1162 * Arrange to invalidate the /proc vnode.
1164 args
->traceinval
= 1;
1174 * Map a section of an executable file into the user's
1178 execmap(struct vnode
*vp
, caddr_t addr
, size_t len
, size_t zfodlen
,
1179 off_t offset
, int prot
, int page
, uint_t szc
)
1183 caddr_t zfodbase
, oldaddr
;
1187 proc_t
*p
= ttoproc(curthread
);
1190 addr
= (caddr_t
)((uintptr_t)addr
& (uintptr_t)PAGEMASK
);
1193 len
+= ((size_t)oldaddr
- (size_t)addr
);
1195 offset
= (off_t
)((uintptr_t)offset
& PAGEMASK
);
1197 spgcnt_t prefltmem
, availm
, npages
;
1199 uint_t mflag
= MAP_PRIVATE
| MAP_FIXED
;
1201 if ((prot
& (PROT_WRITE
| PROT_EXEC
)) == PROT_EXEC
) {
1204 mflag
|= MAP_INITDATA
;
1207 if (valid_usr_range(addr
, len
, prot
, p
->p_as
,
1208 p
->p_as
->a_userlimit
) != RANGE_OKAY
) {
1212 if (error
= VOP_MAP(vp
, (offset_t
)offset
,
1213 p
->p_as
, &addr
, len
, prot
, PROT_ALL
,
1214 mflag
, CRED(), NULL
))
1218 * If the segment can fit, then we prefault
1219 * the entire segment in. This is based on the
1220 * model that says the best working set of a
1221 * small program is all of its pages.
1223 npages
= (spgcnt_t
)btopr(len
);
1224 prefltmem
= freemem
- desfree
;
1226 (npages
< prefltmem
&& len
< PGTHRESH
) ? 1 : 0;
1229 * If we aren't prefaulting the segment,
1230 * increment "deficit", if necessary to ensure
1231 * that pages will become available when this
1232 * process starts executing.
1234 availm
= freemem
- lotsfree
;
1235 if (preread
== 0 && npages
> availm
&&
1236 deficit
< lotsfree
) {
1237 deficit
+= MIN((pgcnt_t
)(npages
- availm
),
1238 lotsfree
- deficit
);
1242 TRACE_2(TR_FAC_PROC
, TR_EXECMAP_PREREAD
,
1243 "execmap preread:freemem %d size %lu",
1245 (void) as_fault(p
->p_as
->a_hat
, p
->p_as
,
1246 (caddr_t
)addr
, len
, F_INVAL
, S_READ
);
1249 if (valid_usr_range(addr
, len
, prot
, p
->p_as
,
1250 p
->p_as
->a_userlimit
) != RANGE_OKAY
) {
1255 if (error
= as_map(p
->p_as
, addr
, len
,
1256 segvn_create
, zfod_argsp
))
1259 * Read in the segment in one big chunk.
1261 if (error
= vn_rdwr(UIO_READ
, vp
, (caddr_t
)oldaddr
,
1262 oldlen
, (offset_t
)oldoffset
, UIO_USERSPACE
, 0,
1263 (rlim64_t
)0, CRED(), (ssize_t
*)0))
1266 * Now set protections.
1268 if (prot
!= PROT_ZFOD
) {
1269 (void) as_setprot(p
->p_as
, (caddr_t
)addr
,
1276 struct as
*as
= curproc
->p_as
;
1280 end
= (size_t)addr
+ len
;
1281 zfodbase
= (caddr_t
)roundup(end
, PAGESIZE
);
1282 zfoddiff
= (uintptr_t)zfodbase
- end
;
1285 * Before we go to zero the remaining space on the last
1286 * page, make sure we have write permission.
1288 * Normal illumos binaries don't even hit the case
1289 * where we have to change permission on the last page
1290 * since their protection is typically either
1291 * PROT_USER | PROT_WRITE | PROT_READ
1293 * PROT_ZFOD (same as PROT_ALL).
1295 * We need to be careful how we zero-fill the last page
1296 * if the segment protection does not include
1297 * PROT_WRITE. Using as_setprot() can cause the VM
1298 * segment code to call segvn_vpage(), which must
1299 * allocate a page struct for each page in the segment.
1300 * If we have a very large segment, this may fail, so
1301 * we have to check for that, even though we ignore
1302 * other return values from as_setprot.
1305 AS_LOCK_ENTER(as
, RW_READER
);
1306 seg
= as_segat(curproc
->p_as
, (caddr_t
)end
);
1308 SEGOP_GETPROT(seg
, (caddr_t
)end
, zfoddiff
- 1,
1312 if (seg
!= NULL
&& (zprot
& PROT_WRITE
) == 0) {
1313 if (as_setprot(as
, (caddr_t
)end
, zfoddiff
- 1,
1314 zprot
| PROT_WRITE
) == ENOMEM
) {
1320 if (on_fault(&ljb
)) {
1322 if (seg
!= NULL
&& (zprot
& PROT_WRITE
) == 0)
1323 (void) as_setprot(as
, (caddr_t
)end
,
1324 zfoddiff
- 1, zprot
);
1328 uzero((void *)end
, zfoddiff
);
1330 if (seg
!= NULL
&& (zprot
& PROT_WRITE
) == 0)
1331 (void) as_setprot(as
, (caddr_t
)end
,
1332 zfoddiff
- 1, zprot
);
1334 if (zfodlen
> zfoddiff
) {
1335 struct segvn_crargs crargs
=
1336 SEGVN_ZFOD_ARGS(PROT_ZFOD
, PROT_ALL
);
1338 zfodlen
-= zfoddiff
;
1339 if (valid_usr_range(zfodbase
, zfodlen
, prot
, p
->p_as
,
1340 p
->p_as
->a_userlimit
) != RANGE_OKAY
) {
1346 * ASSERT alignment because the mapelfexec()
1347 * caller for the szc > 0 case extended zfod
1348 * so it's end is pgsz aligned.
1350 size_t pgsz
= page_get_pagesize(szc
);
1351 ASSERT(IS_P2ALIGNED(zfodbase
+ zfodlen
, pgsz
));
1353 if (IS_P2ALIGNED(zfodbase
, pgsz
)) {
1356 crargs
.szc
= AS_MAP_HEAP
;
1359 crargs
.szc
= AS_MAP_NO_LPOOB
;
1361 if (error
= as_map(p
->p_as
, (caddr_t
)zfodbase
,
1362 zfodlen
, segvn_create
, &crargs
))
1364 if (prot
!= PROT_ZFOD
) {
1365 (void) as_setprot(p
->p_as
, (caddr_t
)zfodbase
,
1376 setexecenv(struct execenv
*ep
)
1378 proc_t
*p
= ttoproc(curthread
);
1379 klwp_t
*lwp
= ttolwp(curthread
);
1382 p
->p_bssbase
= ep
->ex_bssbase
;
1383 p
->p_brkbase
= ep
->ex_brkbase
;
1384 p
->p_brksize
= ep
->ex_brksize
;
1386 VN_RELE(p
->p_exec
); /* out with the old */
1387 vp
= p
->p_exec
= ep
->ex_vp
;
1389 VN_HOLD(vp
); /* in with the new */
1391 lwp
->lwp_sigaltstack
.ss_sp
= 0;
1392 lwp
->lwp_sigaltstack
.ss_size
= 0;
1393 lwp
->lwp_sigaltstack
.ss_flags
= SS_DISABLE
;
1397 execopen(struct vnode
**vpp
, int *fdp
)
1399 struct vnode
*vp
= *vpp
;
1402 int filemode
= FREAD
;
1404 VN_HOLD(vp
); /* open reference */
1405 if (error
= falloc(NULL
, filemode
, &fp
, fdp
)) {
1407 *fdp
= -1; /* just in case falloc changed value */
1410 if (error
= VOP_OPEN(&vp
, filemode
, CRED(), NULL
)) {
1417 *vpp
= vp
; /* vnode should not have changed */
1419 mutex_exit(&fp
->f_tlock
);
1427 return (closeandsetf(fd
, NULL
));
1432 * noexec stub function.
1440 struct intpdata
*idatap
,
1447 cmn_err(CE_WARN
, "missing exec capability for %s", uap
->fname
);
1452 * Support routines for building a user stack.
1454 * execve(path, argv, envp) must construct a new stack with the specified
1455 * arguments and environment variables (see exec_args() for a description
1456 * of the user stack layout). To do this, we copy the arguments and
1457 * environment variables from the old user address space into the kernel,
1458 * free the old as, create the new as, and copy our buffered information
1459 * to the new stack. Our kernel buffer has the following structure:
1461 * +-----------------------+ <--- stk_base + stk_size
1462 * | string offsets |
1463 * +-----------------------+ <--- stk_offp
1465 * | STK_AVAIL() space |
1467 * +-----------------------+ <--- stk_strp
1469 * +-----------------------+ <--- stk_base
1471 * When we add a string, we store the string's contents (including the null
1472 * terminator) at stk_strp, and we store the offset of the string relative to
1473 * stk_base at --stk_offp. At strings are added, stk_strp increases and
1474 * stk_offp decreases. The amount of space remaining, STK_AVAIL(), is just
1475 * the difference between these pointers. If we run out of space, we return
1476 * an error and exec_args() starts all over again with a buffer twice as large.
1477 * When we're all done, the kernel buffer looks like this:
1479 * +-----------------------+ <--- stk_base + stk_size
1480 * | argv[0] offset |
1481 * +-----------------------+
1483 * +-----------------------+
1484 * | argv[argc-1] offset |
1485 * +-----------------------+
1486 * | envp[0] offset |
1487 * +-----------------------+
1489 * +-----------------------+
1490 * | envp[envc-1] offset |
1491 * +-----------------------+
1492 * | AT_SUN_PLATFORM offset|
1493 * +-----------------------+
1494 * | AT_SUN_EXECNAME offset|
1495 * +-----------------------+ <--- stk_offp
1497 * | STK_AVAIL() space |
1499 * +-----------------------+ <--- stk_strp
1500 * | AT_SUN_EXECNAME offset|
1501 * +-----------------------+
1502 * | AT_SUN_PLATFORM offset|
1503 * +-----------------------+
1504 * | envp[envc-1] string |
1505 * +-----------------------+
1507 * +-----------------------+
1508 * | envp[0] string |
1509 * +-----------------------+
1510 * | argv[argc-1] string |
1511 * +-----------------------+
1513 * +-----------------------+
1514 * | argv[0] string |
1515 * +-----------------------+ <--- stk_base
1518 #define STK_AVAIL(args) ((char *)(args)->stk_offp - (args)->stk_strp)
1521 * Add a string to the stack.
1524 stk_add(uarg_t
*args
, const char *sp
, enum uio_seg segflg
)
1529 if (STK_AVAIL(args
) < sizeof (int))
1531 *--args
->stk_offp
= args
->stk_strp
- args
->stk_base
;
1533 if (segflg
== UIO_USERSPACE
) {
1534 error
= copyinstr(sp
, args
->stk_strp
, STK_AVAIL(args
), &len
);
1538 len
= strlen(sp
) + 1;
1539 if (len
> STK_AVAIL(args
))
1541 bcopy(sp
, args
->stk_strp
, len
);
1544 args
->stk_strp
+= len
;
1550 stk_getptr(uarg_t
*args
, char *src
, char **dst
)
1554 if (args
->from_model
== DATAMODEL_NATIVE
) {
1556 error
= fulword(src
, &ptr
);
1557 *dst
= (caddr_t
)ptr
;
1560 error
= fuword32(src
, &ptr
);
1561 *dst
= (caddr_t
)(uintptr_t)ptr
;
1567 stk_putptr(uarg_t
*args
, char *addr
, char *value
)
1569 if (args
->to_model
== DATAMODEL_NATIVE
)
1570 return (sulword(addr
, (ulong_t
)value
));
1572 return (suword32(addr
, (uint32_t)(uintptr_t)value
));
1576 stk_copyin(execa_t
*uap
, uarg_t
*args
, intpdata_t
*intp
, void **auxvpp
)
1581 size_t ptrsize
= args
->from_ptrsize
;
1583 char *argv
= (char *)uap
->argp
;
1584 char *envp
= (char *)uap
->envp
;
1587 * Copy interpreter's name and argument to argv[0] and argv[1].
1588 * In the rare case that we have nested interpreters then those names
1589 * and arguments are also copied to the subsequent slots in argv.
1591 if (intp
!= NULL
&& intp
->intp_name
[0] != NULL
) {
1594 for (i
= 0; i
< INTP_MAXDEPTH
; i
++) {
1595 if (intp
->intp_name
[i
] == NULL
)
1597 error
= stk_add(args
, intp
->intp_name
[i
], UIO_SYSSPACE
);
1600 if (intp
->intp_arg
[i
] != NULL
) {
1601 error
= stk_add(args
, intp
->intp_arg
[i
],
1608 if (args
->fname
!= NULL
)
1609 error
= stk_add(args
, args
->fname
, UIO_SYSSPACE
);
1611 error
= stk_add(args
, uap
->fname
, UIO_USERSPACE
);
1616 * Check for an empty argv[].
1618 if (stk_getptr(args
, argv
, &sp
))
1623 argv
+= ptrsize
; /* ignore original argv[0] */
1626 if (argv_empty
== 0) {
1628 * Add argv[] strings to the stack.
1631 if (stk_getptr(args
, argv
, &sp
))
1635 if ((error
= stk_add(args
, sp
, UIO_USERSPACE
)) != 0)
1640 argc
= (int *)(args
->stk_base
+ args
->stk_size
) - args
->stk_offp
;
1641 args
->arglen
= args
->stk_strp
- args
->stk_base
;
1644 * Add environ[] strings to the stack.
1648 char *tmp
= args
->stk_strp
;
1649 if (stk_getptr(args
, envp
, &sp
))
1653 if ((error
= stk_add(args
, sp
, UIO_USERSPACE
)) != 0)
1655 if (args
->scrubenv
&& strncmp(tmp
, "LD_", 3) == 0) {
1656 /* Undo the copied string */
1657 args
->stk_strp
= tmp
;
1658 *(args
->stk_offp
++) = NULL
;
1663 args
->na
= (int *)(args
->stk_base
+ args
->stk_size
) - args
->stk_offp
;
1664 args
->ne
= args
->na
- argc
;
1667 * Add AT_SUN_PLATFORM, AT_SUN_EXECNAME, AT_SUN_BRANDNAME, and
1668 * AT_SUN_EMULATOR strings to the stack.
1670 if (auxvpp
!= NULL
&& *auxvpp
!= NULL
) {
1671 if ((error
= stk_add(args
, platform
, UIO_SYSSPACE
)) != 0)
1673 if ((error
= stk_add(args
, args
->pathname
, UIO_SYSSPACE
)) != 0)
1675 if (args
->brandname
!= NULL
&&
1676 (error
= stk_add(args
, args
->brandname
, UIO_SYSSPACE
)) != 0)
1678 if (args
->emulator
!= NULL
&&
1679 (error
= stk_add(args
, args
->emulator
, UIO_SYSSPACE
)) != 0)
1684 * Compute the size of the stack. This includes all the pointers,
1685 * the space reserved for the aux vector, and all the strings.
1686 * The total number of pointers is args->na (which is argc + envc)
1687 * plus 4 more: (1) a pointer's worth of space for argc; (2) the NULL
1688 * after the last argument (i.e. argv[argc]); (3) the NULL after the
1689 * last environment variable (i.e. envp[envc]); and (4) the NULL after
1690 * all the strings, at the very top of the stack.
1692 size
= (args
->na
+ 4) * args
->to_ptrsize
+ args
->auxsize
+
1693 (args
->stk_strp
- args
->stk_base
);
1696 * Pad the string section with zeroes to align the stack size.
1698 pad
= P2NPHASE(size
, args
->stk_align
);
1700 if (STK_AVAIL(args
) < pad
)
1703 args
->usrstack_size
= size
+ pad
;
1706 *args
->stk_strp
++ = 0;
1708 args
->nc
= args
->stk_strp
- args
->stk_base
;
1714 stk_copyout(uarg_t
*args
, char *usrstack
, void **auxvpp
, user_t
*up
)
1716 size_t ptrsize
= args
->to_ptrsize
;
1718 char *kstrp
= args
->stk_base
;
1719 char *ustrp
= usrstack
- args
->nc
- ptrsize
;
1720 char *usp
= usrstack
- args
->usrstack_size
;
1721 int *offp
= (int *)(args
->stk_base
+ args
->stk_size
);
1722 int envc
= args
->ne
;
1723 int argc
= args
->na
- envc
;
1727 * Record argc for /proc.
1732 * Put argc on the stack. Note that even though it's an int,
1733 * it always consumes ptrsize bytes (for alignment).
1735 if (stk_putptr(args
, usp
, (char *)(uintptr_t)argc
))
1739 * Add argc space (ptrsize) to usp and record argv for /proc.
1741 up
->u_argv
= (uintptr_t)(usp
+= ptrsize
);
1744 * Put the argv[] pointers on the stack.
1746 for (i
= 0; i
< argc
; i
++, usp
+= ptrsize
)
1747 if (stk_putptr(args
, usp
, &ustrp
[*--offp
]))
1751 * Copy arguments to u_psargs.
1753 pslen
= MIN(args
->arglen
, PSARGSZ
) - 1;
1754 for (i
= 0; i
< pslen
; i
++)
1755 up
->u_psargs
[i
] = (kstrp
[i
] == '\0' ? ' ' : kstrp
[i
]);
1757 up
->u_psargs
[i
++] = '\0';
1760 * Add space for argv[]'s NULL terminator (ptrsize) to usp and
1761 * record envp for /proc.
1763 up
->u_envp
= (uintptr_t)(usp
+= ptrsize
);
1766 * Put the envp[] pointers on the stack.
1768 for (i
= 0; i
< envc
; i
++, usp
+= ptrsize
)
1769 if (stk_putptr(args
, usp
, &ustrp
[*--offp
]))
1773 * Add space for envp[]'s NULL terminator (ptrsize) to usp and
1774 * remember where the stack ends, which is also where auxv begins.
1776 args
->stackend
= usp
+= ptrsize
;
1779 * Put all the argv[], envp[], and auxv strings on the stack.
1781 if (copyout(args
->stk_base
, ustrp
, args
->nc
))
1785 * Fill in the aux vector now that we know the user stack addresses
1786 * for the AT_SUN_PLATFORM, AT_SUN_EXECNAME, AT_SUN_BRANDNAME and
1787 * AT_SUN_EMULATOR strings.
1789 if (auxvpp
!= NULL
&& *auxvpp
!= NULL
) {
1790 if (args
->to_model
== DATAMODEL_NATIVE
) {
1791 auxv_t
**a
= (auxv_t
**)auxvpp
;
1792 ADDAUX(*a
, AT_SUN_PLATFORM
, (long)&ustrp
[*--offp
])
1793 ADDAUX(*a
, AT_SUN_EXECNAME
, (long)&ustrp
[*--offp
])
1794 if (args
->brandname
!= NULL
)
1796 AT_SUN_BRANDNAME
, (long)&ustrp
[*--offp
])
1797 if (args
->emulator
!= NULL
)
1799 AT_SUN_EMULATOR
, (long)&ustrp
[*--offp
])
1801 auxv32_t
**a
= (auxv32_t
**)auxvpp
;
1803 AT_SUN_PLATFORM
, (int)(uintptr_t)&ustrp
[*--offp
])
1805 AT_SUN_EXECNAME
, (int)(uintptr_t)&ustrp
[*--offp
])
1806 if (args
->brandname
!= NULL
)
1807 ADDAUX(*a
, AT_SUN_BRANDNAME
,
1808 (int)(uintptr_t)&ustrp
[*--offp
])
1809 if (args
->emulator
!= NULL
)
1810 ADDAUX(*a
, AT_SUN_EMULATOR
,
1811 (int)(uintptr_t)&ustrp
[*--offp
])
1819 * Though the actual stack base is constant, slew the %sp by a random aligned
1820 * amount in [0,aslr_max_stack_skew). Mostly, this makes life slightly more
1821 * complicated for buffer overflows hoping to overwrite the return address.
1823 * On some platforms this helps avoid cache thrashing when identical processes
1824 * simultaneously share caches that don't provide enough associativity
1825 * (e.g. sun4v systems). In this case stack slewing makes the same hot stack
1826 * variables in different processes live in different cache sets increasing
1827 * effective associativity.
1830 exec_get_spslew(void)
1833 static uint_t sp_color_stride
= 16;
1834 static uint_t sp_color_mask
= 0x1f;
1835 static uint_t sp_current_color
= (uint_t
)-1;
1839 ASSERT(ISP2(aslr_max_stack_skew
));
1841 if ((aslr_max_stack_skew
== 0) ||
1842 !secflag_enabled(curproc
, PROC_SEC_ASLR
)) {
1844 uint_t spcolor
= atomic_inc_32_nv(&sp_current_color
);
1845 return ((size_t)((spcolor
& sp_color_mask
) *
1846 SA(sp_color_stride
)));
1852 (void) random_get_pseudo_bytes((uint8_t *)&off
, sizeof (off
));
1853 return (SA(P2PHASE(off
, aslr_max_stack_skew
)));
1857 * Initialize a new user stack with the specified arguments and environment.
1858 * The initial user stack layout is as follows:
1861 * +---------------+ <--- curproc->p_usrstack
1879 * +---------------+ <--- ustrp
1883 * +---------------+ <--- auxv
1891 * +---------------+ <--- envp[]
1899 * +---------------+ <--- argv[]
1901 * +---------------+ <--- stack base
1904 exec_args(execa_t
*uap
, uarg_t
*args
, intpdata_t
*intp
, void **auxvpp
)
1908 proc_t
*p
= ttoproc(curthread
);
1909 user_t
*up
= PTOU(p
);
1913 extern int use_stk_lpg
;
1916 args
->from_model
= p
->p_model
;
1917 if (p
->p_model
== DATAMODEL_NATIVE
) {
1918 args
->from_ptrsize
= sizeof (long);
1920 args
->from_ptrsize
= sizeof (int32_t);
1923 if (args
->to_model
== DATAMODEL_NATIVE
) {
1924 args
->to_ptrsize
= sizeof (long);
1925 args
->ncargs
= NCARGS
;
1926 args
->stk_align
= STACK_ALIGN
;
1928 usrstack
= (char *)USRSTACK64_32
;
1930 usrstack
= (char *)USRSTACK
;
1932 args
->to_ptrsize
= sizeof (int32_t);
1933 args
->ncargs
= NCARGS32
;
1934 args
->stk_align
= STACK_ALIGN32
;
1935 usrstack
= (char *)USRSTACK32
;
1938 ASSERT(P2PHASE((uintptr_t)usrstack
, args
->stk_align
) == 0);
1940 #if defined(__sparc)
1942 * Make sure user register windows are empty before
1943 * attempting to make a new stack.
1945 (void) flush_user_windows_to_stack(NULL
);
1948 for (size
= PAGESIZE
; ; size
*= 2) {
1949 args
->stk_size
= size
;
1950 args
->stk_base
= kmem_alloc(size
, KM_SLEEP
);
1951 args
->stk_strp
= args
->stk_base
;
1952 args
->stk_offp
= (int *)(args
->stk_base
+ size
);
1953 error
= stk_copyin(uap
, args
, intp
, auxvpp
);
1956 kmem_free(args
->stk_base
, size
);
1957 if (error
!= E2BIG
&& error
!= ENAMETOOLONG
)
1959 if (size
>= args
->ncargs
)
1963 size
= args
->usrstack_size
;
1966 ASSERT(P2PHASE(size
, args
->stk_align
) == 0);
1967 ASSERT((ssize_t
)STK_AVAIL(args
) >= 0);
1969 if (size
> args
->ncargs
) {
1970 kmem_free(args
->stk_base
, args
->stk_size
);
1975 * Leave only the current lwp and force the other lwps to exit.
1976 * If another lwp beat us to the punch by calling exit(), bail out.
1978 if ((error
= exitlwps(0)) != 0) {
1979 kmem_free(args
->stk_base
, args
->stk_size
);
1984 * Revoke any doors created by the process.
1990 * Release schedctl data structures.
1993 schedctl_proc_cleanup();
1996 * Clean up any DTrace helpers for the process.
1998 if (p
->p_dtrace_helpers
!= NULL
) {
1999 ASSERT(dtrace_helpers_cleanup
!= NULL
);
2000 (*dtrace_helpers_cleanup
)(p
);
2003 mutex_enter(&p
->p_lock
);
2005 * Cleanup the DTrace provider associated with this process.
2007 if (p
->p_dtrace_probes
) {
2008 ASSERT(dtrace_fasttrap_exec_ptr
!= NULL
);
2009 dtrace_fasttrap_exec_ptr(p
);
2011 mutex_exit(&p
->p_lock
);
2014 * discard the lwpchan cache.
2016 if (p
->p_lcp
!= NULL
)
2017 lwpchan_destroy_cache(1);
2020 * Delete the POSIX timers.
2022 if (p
->p_itimer
!= NULL
)
2026 * Delete the ITIMER_REALPROF interval timer.
2027 * The other ITIMER_* interval timers are specified
2028 * to be inherited across exec().
2030 delete_itimer_realprof();
2033 audit_exec(args
->stk_base
, args
->stk_base
+ args
->arglen
,
2034 args
->na
- args
->ne
, args
->ne
, args
->pfcred
);
2037 * Ensure that we don't change resource associations while we
2038 * change address spaces.
2040 mutex_enter(&p
->p_lock
);
2041 pool_barrier_enter();
2042 mutex_exit(&p
->p_lock
);
2045 * Destroy the old address space and create a new one.
2046 * From here on, any errors are fatal to the exec()ing process.
2047 * On error we return -1, which means the caller must SIGKILL
2052 mutex_enter(&p
->p_lock
);
2053 pool_barrier_exit();
2054 mutex_exit(&p
->p_lock
);
2056 up
->u_execsw
= args
->execswp
;
2058 p
->p_brkbase
= NULL
;
2060 p
->p_brkpageszc
= 0;
2062 p
->p_stkpageszc
= 0;
2063 p
->p_model
= args
->to_model
;
2064 p
->p_usrstack
= usrstack
;
2065 p
->p_stkprot
= args
->stk_prot
;
2066 p
->p_datprot
= args
->dat_prot
;
2069 * Reset resource controls such that all controls are again active as
2070 * well as appropriate to the potentially new address model for the
2074 e
.rcep_t
= RCENTITY_PROCESS
;
2075 rctl_set_reset(p
->p_rctls
, p
, &e
);
2077 /* Too early to call map_pgsz for the heap */
2079 p
->p_stkpageszc
= page_szc(map_pgsz(MAPPGSZ_STK
, p
, 0, 0, 0));
2082 mutex_enter(&p
->p_lock
);
2083 p
->p_flag
|= SAUTOLPG
; /* kernel controls page sizes */
2084 mutex_exit(&p
->p_lock
);
2086 sp_slew
= exec_get_spslew();
2087 ASSERT(P2PHASE(sp_slew
, args
->stk_align
) == 0);
2088 /* Be certain we don't underflow */
2089 VERIFY((curproc
->p_usrstack
- (size
+ sp_slew
)) < curproc
->p_usrstack
);
2090 exec_set_sp(size
+ sp_slew
);
2095 if (p
->p_model
== DATAMODEL_ILP32
|| args
->addr32
)
2096 as
->a_userlimit
= (caddr_t
)USERLIMIT32
;
2097 (void) hat_setup(as
->a_hat
, HAT_ALLOC
);
2098 hat_join_srd(as
->a_hat
, args
->ex_vp
);
2101 * Finally, write out the contents of the new stack.
2103 error
= stk_copyout(args
, usrstack
- sp_slew
, auxvpp
, up
);
2104 kmem_free(args
->stk_base
, args
->stk_size
);