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libc: add strtonum(3)
[unleashed/tickless.git] / lib / libssl / ssl_srvr.c
blobc43d63d9919f8d4ddb78b375784d70c2282da75b
1 /* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.22 2017/08/12 21:47:59 jsing Exp $ */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #include <stdio.h>
152
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154
155 #include <openssl/bn.h>
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/curve25519.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/dh.h>
160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
161 #include <openssl/gost.h>
162 #endif
163 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
164 #include <openssl/md5.h>
165 #include <openssl/objects.h>
166 #include <openssl/x509.h>
167
168 #include "bytestring.h"
169
170 int
171 ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
172 {
173 unsigned long alg_k;
174 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
175 int ret = -1;
176 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
177
178 ERR_clear_error();
179 errno = 0;
180
181 if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL)
182 cb = s->internal->info_callback;
183 else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL)
184 cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback;
185
186 /* init things to blank */
187 s->internal->in_handshake++;
188 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
189 SSL_clear(s);
190
191 if (s->cert == NULL) {
192 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
193 ret = -1;
194 goto end;
195 }
196
197 for (;;) {
198 state = S3I(s)->hs.state;
199
200 switch (S3I(s)->hs.state) {
201 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
202 s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
203 /* S3I(s)->hs.state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204
205 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
206 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
207 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
209
210 s->server = 1;
211 if (cb != NULL)
212 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
213
214 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
215 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
216 ret = -1;
217 goto end;
218 }
219 s->internal->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
220
221 if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) {
222 ret = -1;
223 goto end;
224 }
225 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
226 ret = -1;
227 goto end;
228 }
229
230 s->internal->init_num = 0;
231
232 if (S3I(s)->hs.state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
233 /*
234 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO
235 * so that the output is sent in a way that
236 * TCP likes :-)
237 */
238 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
239 ret = -1;
240 goto end;
241 }
242
243 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) {
244 ret = -1;
245 goto end;
246 }
247
248 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++;
250 } else if (!S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) {
251 /*
252 * Server attempting to renegotiate with
253 * client that doesn't support secure
254 * renegotiation.
255 */
256 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
257 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
258 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
259 ret = -1;
260 goto end;
261 } else {
262 /*
263 * S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
264 * we will just send a HelloRequest
265 */
266 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
267 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
268 }
269 break;
270
271 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
273
274 s->internal->shutdown = 0;
275 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
276 if (ret <= 0)
277 goto end;
278 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
279 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
280 s->internal->init_num = 0;
281
282 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) {
283 ret = -1;
284 goto end;
285 }
286 break;
287
288 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
289 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK;
290 break;
291
292 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
293 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
294 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
295
296 s->internal->shutdown = 0;
297 if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
298 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
299 if (ret <= 0)
300 goto end;
301 }
302
303 s->internal->renegotiate = 2;
304 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
305 s->internal->init_num = 0;
306 break;
307
308 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
309 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
310 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
311 if (ret <= 0)
312 goto end;
313 if (s->internal->hit) {
314 if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
315 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
316 else
317 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
318 }
319 else
320 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
321 s->internal->init_num = 0;
322 break;
323
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
326 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */
327 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
328 SSL_aNULL)) {
329 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
330 if (ret <= 0)
331 goto end;
332 if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected)
333 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
334 else
335 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
336 } else {
337 skip = 1;
338 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
339 }
340 s->internal->init_num = 0;
341 break;
342
343 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
344 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
345 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
346
347 /*
348 * Only send if using a DH key exchange.
349 *
350 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange
351 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other
352 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's
353 * public key for key exchange.
354 */
355 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
356 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
357 if (ret <= 0)
358 goto end;
359 } else
360 skip = 1;
361
362 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
363 s->internal->init_num = 0;
364 break;
365
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
368 /*
369 * Determine whether or not we need to request a
370 * certificate.
371 *
372 * Do not request a certificate if:
373 *
374 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset).
375 *
376 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are
377 * renegotiating.
378 *
379 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites
380 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
381 * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application
382 * insists on verification (against the specs, but
383 * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3).
384 */
385 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
386 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
387 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
388 ((S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
389 SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode &
390 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) {
391 /* No cert request */
392 skip = 1;
393 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 0;
394 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
395 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
396 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
397 ret = -1;
398 goto end;
399 }
400 }
401 } else {
402 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 1;
403 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
404 if (ret <= 0)
405 goto end;
406 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
407 s->internal->init_num = 0;
408 }
409 break;
410
411 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
412 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
413 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
414 if (ret <= 0)
415 goto end;
416 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
417 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
418 s->internal->init_num = 0;
419 break;
420
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
422
423 /*
424 * This code originally checked to see if
425 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
426 * and then flushed. This caused problems
427 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
428 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
429 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
430 * still exist. So instead we just flush
431 * unconditionally.
432 */
433
434 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
435 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
436 ret = -1;
437 goto end;
438 }
439 s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
440
441 S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state;
442 break;
443
444 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
445 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
446 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) {
447 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
448 if (ret <= 0)
449 goto end;
450 }
451 s->internal->init_num = 0;
452 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
453 break;
454
455 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
456 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
457 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
458 if (ret <= 0)
459 goto end;
460 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
461 if (ret == 2) {
462 /*
463 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when
464 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
465 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
466 * message is not sent.
467 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
468 * the client uses its key from the certificate
469 * for key exchange.
470 */
471 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
472 s->internal->init_num = 0;
473 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) {
474 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
475 s->internal->init_num = 0;
476 if (!s->session->peer)
477 break;
478 /*
479 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
480 * at this point and digest cached records.
481 */
482 if (!S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
483 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
484 ret = -1;
485 goto end;
486 }
487 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
488 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
489 ret = -1;
490 goto end;
491 }
492 } else {
493 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
494 s->internal->init_num = 0;
495
496 /*
497 * We need to get hashes here so if there is
498 * a client cert, it can be verified.
499 */
500 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
501 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
502 ret = -1;
503 goto end;
504 }
505 }
506 if (!tls1_handshake_hash_value(s,
507 S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md,
508 sizeof(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md),
509 NULL)) {
510 ret = -1;
511 goto end;
512 }
513 }
514 break;
515
516 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
517 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
518 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
519
520 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
521 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
522 if (ret <= 0)
523 goto end;
524
525 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
526 s->internal->init_num = 0;
527 break;
528
529 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
530 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
531 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
532 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
533 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
534 if (ret <= 0)
535 goto end;
536 if (s->internal->hit)
537 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK;
538 else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
539 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
540 else
541 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
542 s->internal->init_num = 0;
543 break;
544
545 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
547 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
548 if (ret <= 0)
549 goto end;
550 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
551 s->internal->init_num = 0;
552 break;
553
554 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
556 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
557 if (ret <= 0)
558 goto end;
559 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
560 s->internal->init_num = 0;
561 break;
562
563
564 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
565 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
566
567 s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher;
568 if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) {
569 ret = -1;
570 goto end;
571 }
572
573 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
574 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
575
576 if (ret <= 0)
577 goto end;
578 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
579 s->internal->init_num = 0;
580
581 if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(
582 s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
583 ret = -1;
584 goto end;
585 }
586
587 break;
588
589 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
590 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
591 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
592 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
593 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
594 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE);
595 if (ret <= 0)
596 goto end;
597 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
598 if (s->internal->hit)
599 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
600 else
601 S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
602 s->internal->init_num = 0;
603 break;
604
605 case SSL_ST_OK:
606 /* clean a few things up */
607 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
608
609 BUF_MEM_free(s->internal->init_buf);
610 s->internal->init_buf = NULL;
611
612 /* remove buffering on output */
613 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
614
615 s->internal->init_num = 0;
616
617 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
618 if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) {
619 s->internal->renegotiate = 0;
620 s->internal->new_session = 0;
621
622 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
623
624 s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++;
625 /* s->server=1; */
626 s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
627
628 if (cb != NULL)
629 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
630 }
631
632 ret = 1;
633 goto end;
634 /* break; */
635
636 default:
637 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
638 ret = -1;
639 goto end;
640 /* break; */
641 }
642
643 if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
644 if (s->internal->debug) {
645 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
646 goto end;
647 }
648
649
650 if ((cb != NULL) && (S3I(s)->hs.state != state)) {
651 new_state = S3I(s)->hs.state;
652 S3I(s)->hs.state = state;
653 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
654 S3I(s)->hs.state = new_state;
655 }
656 }
657 skip = 0;
658 }
659 end:
660 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
661
662 s->internal->in_handshake--;
663 if (cb != NULL)
664 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
665 return (ret);
666 }
667
668 int
669 ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
670 {
671 CBB cbb, hello;
672
673 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
674
675 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
676 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &hello,
677 SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST))
678 goto err;
679 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb))
680 goto err;
681
682 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
683 }
684
685 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
686 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
687
688 err:
689 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
690
691 return (-1);
692 }
693
694 int
695 ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
696 {
697 CBS cbs, client_random, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites;
698 CBS compression_methods;
699 uint16_t client_version;
700 uint8_t comp_method;
701 int comp_null;
702 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
703 long n;
704 unsigned long id;
705 unsigned char *p, *d;
706 SSL_CIPHER *c;
707 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
708 unsigned long alg_k;
709 const SSL_METHOD *method;
710 uint16_t shared_version;
711 unsigned char *end;
712
713 /*
714 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
715 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
716 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
717 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
718 * TLSv1.
719 */
720 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
721 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
722 }
723
724 s->internal->first_packet = 1;
725 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
726 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
727 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
728 if (!ok)
729 return ((int)n);
730 s->internal->first_packet = 0;
731
732 if (n < 0)
733 goto err;
734
735 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg;
736 end = d + n;
737
738 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
739
740 /*
741 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header.
742 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
743 */
744 if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &client_version))
745 goto truncated;
746
747 if (ssl_max_shared_version(s, client_version, &shared_version) != 1) {
748 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
749 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
750 !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) {
751 /*
752 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote
753 * version number.
754 */
755 s->version = s->client_version;
756 }
757 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
758 goto f_err;
759 }
760 s->client_version = client_version;
761 s->version = shared_version;
762
763 if ((method = tls1_get_server_method(shared_version)) == NULL)
764 method = dtls1_get_server_method(shared_version);
765 if (method == NULL) {
766 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
767 goto err;
768 }
769 s->method = method;
770
771 if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
772 goto truncated;
773 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id))
774 goto truncated;
775
776 /*
777 * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello doesn't
778 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
779 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
780 */
781 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
782 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cookie))
783 goto truncated;
784 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
785 if (CBS_len(&cookie) == 0)
786 return (1);
787 }
788 }
789
790 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&client_random, s->s3->client_random,
791 sizeof(s->s3->client_random), NULL))
792 goto err;
793
794 s->internal->hit = 0;
795
796 /*
797 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
798 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
799 * ignore resumption requests with flag
800 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag
801 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications
802 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older
803 * library versions).
804 *
805 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated()
806 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session
807 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
808 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
809 * ignored.
810 */
811 if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options &
812 SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
813 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
814 goto err;
815 } else {
816 /* XXX - pass CBS through instead... */
817 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s,
818 (unsigned char *)CBS_data(&session_id),
819 CBS_len(&session_id), end);
820 if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
821 s->internal->hit = 1;
822 } else if (i == -1)
823 goto err;
824 else {
825 /* i == 0 */
826 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
827 goto err;
828 }
829 }
830
831 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
832 /*
833 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the HelloVerify
834 * message has not been sent - make sure that it does not cause
835 * an overflow.
836 */
837 if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie)) {
838 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
839 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
840 goto f_err;
841 }
842
843 /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
844 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
845 CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) {
846 size_t cookie_len;
847
848 /* XXX - rcvd_cookie seems to only be used here... */
849 if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie,
850 sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie), &cookie_len))
851 goto err;
852
853 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
854 if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s,
855 D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) {
856 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
857 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
858 goto f_err;
859 }
860 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
861 /* XXX - can d1->cookie_len > sizeof(rcvd_cookie) ? */
862 } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie,
863 D1I(s)->cookie, D1I(s)->cookie_len) != 0) {
864 /* default verification */
865 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
866 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
867 goto f_err;
868 }
869 cookie_valid = 1;
870 }
871 }
872
873 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cipher_suites))
874 goto truncated;
875
876 /* XXX - This logic seems wrong... */
877 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) {
878 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
879 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
880 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
881 goto f_err;
882 }
883
884 if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
885 if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,
886 CBS_data(&cipher_suites), CBS_len(&cipher_suites))) == NULL)
887 goto err;
888 }
889
890 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
891 if (s->internal->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
892 j = 0;
893 id = s->session->cipher->id;
894
895 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
896 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
897 if (c->id == id) {
898 j = 1;
899 break;
900 }
901 }
902 if (j == 0) {
903 /*
904 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher
905 * list if we are asked to reuse it
906 */
907 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
908 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
909 goto f_err;
910 }
911 }
912
913 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &compression_methods))
914 goto truncated;
915
916 comp_null = 0;
917 while (CBS_len(&compression_methods) > 0) {
918 if (!CBS_get_u8(&compression_methods, &comp_method))
919 goto truncated;
920 if (comp_method == 0)
921 comp_null = 1;
922 }
923 if (comp_null == 0) {
924 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
925 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
926 goto f_err;
927 }
928
929 p = (unsigned char *)CBS_data(&cbs);
930
931 /* TLS extensions*/
932 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
933 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
934 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
935 goto f_err;
936 }
937 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
938 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
939 goto err;
940 }
941
942 /*
943 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
944 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
945 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
946 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation.
947 */
948 arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
949
950 if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) {
951 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
952
953 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
954 if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
955 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher,
956 s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
957 s->internal->hit = 1;
958 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
959 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
960
961 ciphers = NULL;
962
963 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
964 pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher :
965 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
966 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
967 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
968 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
969 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
970 goto f_err;
971 }
972
973 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
974
975 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
976 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->internal->cipher_list_by_id);
977
978 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
979 s->internal->cipher_list_by_id =
980 sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
981 }
982 }
983
984 /*
985 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
986 * pick a cipher
987 */
988
989 if (!s->internal->hit) {
990 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
991 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
992 if (ciphers == NULL) {
993 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
994 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
995 goto f_err;
996 }
997 ciphers = NULL;
998 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
999 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1000
1001 if (c == NULL) {
1002 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1003 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1004 goto f_err;
1005 }
1006 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = c;
1007 } else {
1008 S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1009 }
1010
1011 if (!tls1_handshake_hash_init(s))
1012 goto err;
1013
1014 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1015 if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) ||
1016 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1017 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1018 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1019 goto f_err;
1020 }
1021 }
1022
1023 /*
1024 * We now have the following setup.
1025 * client_random
1026 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1027 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1028 * compression - basically ignored right now
1029 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1030 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1031 * s->internal->hit - session reuse flag
1032 * s->hs.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1033 */
1034
1035 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1036 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1037 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1038 goto err;
1039 }
1040
1041 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
1042
1043 if (0) {
1044 truncated:
1045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1047 f_err:
1048 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1049 }
1050 err:
1051 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1052
1053 return (ret);
1054 }
1055
1056 int
1057 ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1058 {
1059 unsigned char *bufend;
1060 unsigned char *p, *d;
1061 CBB cbb, session_id;
1062 size_t outlen;
1063 int sl;
1064
1065 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1066
1067 bufend = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1068
1069 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1070 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO);
1071
1072 if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, p, bufend - p))
1073 goto err;
1074
1075 if (!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, s->version))
1076 goto err;
1077 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s->s3->server_random,
1078 sizeof(s->s3->server_random)))
1079 goto err;
1080
1081 /*
1082 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1083 * back in the server hello:
1084 *
1085 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1086 * we send back the old session ID.
1087 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1088 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1089 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1090 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1091 * session ID.
1092 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1093 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1094 *
1095 * s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1096 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1097 * to send back.
1098 */
1099 if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1100 && !s->internal->hit)
1101 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1102
1103 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1104 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1105 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1106 goto err;
1107 }
1108
1109 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &session_id))
1110 goto err;
1111 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl))
1112 goto err;
1113
1114 /* Cipher suite. */
1115 if (!CBB_add_u16(&cbb,
1116 ssl3_cipher_get_value(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher)))
1117 goto err;
1118
1119 /* Compression method. */
1120 if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0))
1121 goto err;
1122
1123 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &outlen))
1124 goto err;
1125
1126 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p + outlen,
1127 bufend)) == NULL) {
1128 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1129 goto err;
1130 }
1131
1132 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d);
1133 }
1134
1135 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1136 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1137
1138 err:
1139 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
1140
1141 return (-1);
1142 }
1143
1144 int
1145 ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1146 {
1147 CBB cbb, done;
1148
1149 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1150
1151 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1152 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &done,
1153 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))
1154 goto err;
1155 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb))
1156 goto err;
1157
1158 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1159 }
1160
1161 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1162 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1163
1164 err:
1165 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
1166
1167 return (-1);
1168 }
1169
1170 int
1171 ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
1172 {
1173 CBB dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys;
1174 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1175 unsigned char *data;
1176 int al;
1177
1178 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1179 if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) {
1180 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1181 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 goto f_err;
1183 }
1184 } else
1185 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp;
1186
1187 if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)
1188 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
1189 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher));
1190
1191 if (dhp == NULL) {
1192 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1193 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1194 goto f_err;
1195 }
1196
1197 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1198 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 goto err;
1200 }
1201
1202 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1203 dh = dhp;
1204 } else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1205 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1206 goto err;
1207 }
1208 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = dh;
1209 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1210 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1211 goto err;
1212 }
1213
1214 /*
1215 * Serialize the DH parameters and public key.
1216 */
1217 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_p))
1218 goto err;
1219 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_p, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->p)))
1220 goto err;
1221 BN_bn2bin(dh->p, data);
1222
1223 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_g))
1224 goto err;
1225 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_g, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->g)))
1226 goto err;
1227 BN_bn2bin(dh->g, data);
1228
1229 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Ys))
1230 goto err;
1231 if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Ys, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key)))
1232 goto err;
1233 BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, data);
1234
1235 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1236 goto err;
1237
1238 return (1);
1239
1240 f_err:
1241 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1242 err:
1243 return (-1);
1244 }
1245
1246 static int
1247 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb)
1248 {
1249 const EC_GROUP *group;
1250 const EC_POINT *pubkey;
1251 unsigned char *data;
1252 int encoded_len = 0;
1253 int curve_id = 0;
1254 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1255 EC_KEY *ecdh;
1256 CBB ecpoint;
1257 int al;
1258
1259 /*
1260 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1261 * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1262 */
1263 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) {
1264 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1265 goto err;
1266 }
1267
1268 if (S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1269 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1270 goto err;
1271 }
1272
1273 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) {
1274 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1275 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1276 goto f_err;
1277 }
1278 ecdh = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh;
1279
1280 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1281 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1282 goto err;
1283 }
1284 if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL ||
1285 (pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)) == NULL ||
1286 EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) {
1287 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1288 goto err;
1289 }
1290
1291 /*
1292 * Encode the public key.
1293 */
1294 encoded_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pubkey,
1295 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
1296 if (encoded_len == 0) {
1297 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1298 goto err;
1299 }
1300 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
1301 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1302 goto err;
1303 }
1304
1305 /*
1306 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1307 * In this case the ServerKeyExchange message has:
1308 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1309 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1310 * the actual encoded point itself.
1311 */
1312 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
1313 goto err;
1314 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id))
1315 goto err;
1316 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
1317 goto err;
1318 if (!CBB_add_space(&ecpoint, &data, encoded_len))
1319 goto err;
1320 if (EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pubkey, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1321 data, encoded_len, bn_ctx) == 0) {
1322 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1323 goto err;
1324 }
1325 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1326 goto err;
1327
1328 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1329
1330 return (1);
1331
1332 f_err:
1333 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1334 err:
1335 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1336
1337 return (-1);
1338 }
1339
1340 static int
1341 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb)
1342 {
1343 uint8_t *public_key = NULL;
1344 int curve_id;
1345 CBB ecpoint;
1346 int ret = -1;
1347
1348 /* Generate an X25519 key pair. */
1349 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) {
1350 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1351 goto err;
1352 }
1353 if ((S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1354 goto err;
1355 if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1356 goto err;
1357 X25519_keypair(public_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519);
1358
1359 /* Serialize public key. */
1360 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) {
1361 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1362 goto err;
1363 }
1364
1365 if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
1366 goto err;
1367 if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id))
1368 goto err;
1369 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
1370 goto err;
1371 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH))
1372 goto err;
1373 if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
1374 goto err;
1375
1376 ret = 1;
1377
1378 err:
1379 free(public_key);
1380
1381 return (ret);
1382 }
1383
1384 static int
1385 ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
1386 {
1387 int nid;
1388
1389 nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
1390
1391 if (nid == NID_X25519)
1392 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, nid, cbb);
1393
1394 return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, nid, cbb);
1395 }
1396
1397 int
1398 ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1399 {
1400 CBB cbb;
1401 unsigned char *params = NULL;
1402 size_t params_len;
1403 unsigned char *q;
1404 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1405 unsigned int u;
1406 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1407 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1408 unsigned char *p, *d;
1409 int al, i, j, n, kn;
1410 unsigned long type;
1411 BUF_MEM *buf;
1412 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1413
1414 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1415
1416 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1417 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1418 type = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1419
1420 buf = s->internal->init_buf;
1421
1422 if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0))
1423 goto err;
1424
1425 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1426 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb) != 1)
1427 goto err;
1428 } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1429 if (ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb) != 1)
1430 goto err;
1431 } else {
1432 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1433 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1434 goto f_err;
1435 }
1436
1437 if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &params, &params_len))
1438 goto err;
1439
1440 if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) {
1441 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(
1442 s, S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) {
1443 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1444 goto f_err;
1445 }
1446 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1447 } else {
1448 pkey = NULL;
1449 kn = 0;
1450 }
1451
1452 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) +
1453 params_len + kn)) {
1454 SSLerror(s, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1455 goto err;
1456 }
1457
1458 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
1459 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE);
1460
1461 memcpy(p, params, params_len);
1462
1463 free(params);
1464 params = NULL;
1465
1466 n = params_len;
1467 p += params_len;
1468
1469 /* not anonymous */
1470 if (pkey != NULL) {
1471 /*
1472 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1473 * and p points to the space at the end.
1474 */
1475 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1476 q = md_buf;
1477 j = 0;
1478 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5_sha1(),
1479 NULL))
1480 goto err;
1481 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random,
1482 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1483 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random,
1484 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1485 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1486 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
1487 (unsigned int *)&i);
1488 q += i;
1489 j += i;
1490 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1491 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1492 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
1493 goto err;
1494 }
1495 s2n(u, p);
1496 n += u + 2;
1497 } else if (md) {
1498 /* Send signature algorithm. */
1499 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1500 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1501 /* Should never happen */
1502 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1503 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1504 goto f_err;
1505 }
1506 p += 2;
1507 }
1508 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1509 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,
1510 s->s3->client_random,
1511 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1512 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,
1513 s->s3->server_random,
1514 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1515 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1516 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2],
1517 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1518 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1519 goto err;
1520 }
1521 s2n(i, p);
1522 n += i + 2;
1523 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1524 n += 2;
1525 } else {
1526 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1527 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1528 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1529 goto f_err;
1530 }
1531 }
1532
1533 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n);
1534 }
1535
1536 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1537
1538 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1539
1540 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1541
1542 f_err:
1543 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1544 err:
1545 free(params);
1546 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1547 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
1548
1549 return (-1);
1550 }
1551
1552 int
1553 ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1554 {
1555 CBB cbb, cert_request, cert_types, sigalgs, cert_auth, dn;
1556 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1557 X509_NAME *name;
1558 int i;
1559
1560 /*
1561 * Certificate Request - RFC 5246 section 7.4.4.
1562 */
1563
1564 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
1565
1566 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
1567 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &cert_request,
1568 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST))
1569 goto err;
1570
1571 if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types))
1572 goto err;
1573 if (!ssl3_get_req_cert_types(s, &cert_types))
1574 goto err;
1575
1576 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1577 unsigned char *sigalgs_data;
1578 size_t sigalgs_len;
1579
1580 tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, &sigalgs_data, &sigalgs_len);
1581
1582 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs))
1583 goto err;
1584 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&sigalgs, sigalgs_data, sigalgs_len))
1585 goto err;
1586 }
1587
1588 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_auth))
1589 goto err;
1590
1591 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1592 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1593 unsigned char *name_data;
1594 size_t name_len;
1595
1596 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1597 name_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
1598
1599 if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_auth, &dn))
1600 goto err;
1601 if (!CBB_add_space(&dn, &name_data, name_len))
1602 goto err;
1603 if (i2d_X509_NAME(name, &name_data) != name_len)
1604 goto err;
1605 }
1606
1607 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb))
1608 goto err;
1609
1610 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1611 }
1612
1613 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1614 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1615
1616 err:
1617 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
1618
1619 return (-1);
1620 }
1621
1622 static int
1623 ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
1624 {
1625 unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
1626 unsigned char *d;
1627 RSA *rsa = NULL;
1628 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1629 int i, al;
1630
1631 d = p;
1632
1633 arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey));
1634 fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1635 fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1636
1637 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1638 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1639 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
1640 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1641 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1642 goto f_err;
1643 }
1644 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
1645
1646 if (2 > n)
1647 goto truncated;
1648 n2s(p, i);
1649 if (n != i + 2) {
1650 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1651 goto err;
1652 } else
1653 n = i;
1654
1655 i = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1656
1657 ERR_clear_error();
1658
1659 al = -1;
1660
1661 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
1662 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1663 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1664 }
1665
1666 if (p - d + 2 > n) /* needed in the SSL3 case */
1667 goto truncated;
1668 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) &&
1669 (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
1670 /*
1671 * The premaster secret must contain the same version
1672 * number as the ClientHello to detect version rollback
1673 * attacks (strangely, the protocol does not offer such
1674 * protection for DH ciphersuites).
1675 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated
1676 * protocol version instead if the server does not
1677 * support the requested protocol version.
1678 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
1679 * clients.
1680 */
1681 if (!((s->internal->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1682 (p[0] == (s->version >> 8)) &&
1683 (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) {
1684 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1685 /* SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1686
1687 /*
1688 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
1689 * Bleichenbacher's attack
1690 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits
1691 * the version number check as a "bad version
1692 * oracle" -- an alert would reveal that the
1693 * plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1694 * made up by the adversary is properly
1695 * formatted except that the version number is
1696 * wrong.
1697 * To avoid such attacks, we should treat this
1698 * just like any other decryption error.
1699 */
1700 }
1701 }
1702
1703 if (al != -1) {
1704 /*
1705 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead
1706 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack
1707 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
1708 * section 7.4.7.1).
1709 */
1710 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1711 p = fakekey;
1712 }
1713
1714 s->session->master_key_length =
1715 tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
1716 s->session->master_key, p, i);
1717
1718 explicit_bzero(p, i);
1719
1720 return (1);
1721 truncated:
1722 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1723 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1724 f_err:
1725 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1726 err:
1727 return (-1);
1728 }
1729
1730 static int
1731 ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
1732 {
1733 BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
1734 int key_size, al;
1735 CBS cbs, dh_Yc;
1736 DH *dh;
1737
1738 if (n < 0)
1739 goto err;
1740
1741 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n);
1742
1743 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &dh_Yc))
1744 goto truncated;
1745
1746 if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
1747 goto truncated;
1748
1749 if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh == NULL) {
1750 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1751 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1752 goto f_err;
1753 }
1754 dh = S3I(s)->tmp.dh;
1755
1756 if ((bn = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL)) == NULL) {
1757 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1758 goto err;
1759 }
1760
1761 key_size = DH_compute_key(p, bn, dh);
1762 if (key_size <= 0) {
1763 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1764 BN_clear_free(bn);
1765 goto err;
1766 }
1767
1768 s->session->master_key_length =
1769 tls1_generate_master_secret(
1770 s, s->session->master_key, p, key_size);
1771
1772 explicit_bzero(p, key_size);
1773
1774 DH_free(S3I(s)->tmp.dh);
1775 S3I(s)->tmp.dh = NULL;
1776
1777 BN_clear_free(bn);
1778
1779 return (1);
1780
1781 truncated:
1782 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1783 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1784 f_err:
1785 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1786 err:
1787 return (-1);
1788 }
1789
1790 static int
1791 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
1792 {
1793 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1794 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1795 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1796 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1797 int i, al;
1798
1799 int ret = 1;
1800 int key_size;
1801 const EC_KEY *tkey;
1802 const EC_GROUP *group;
1803 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
1804
1805 /* Initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair. */
1806 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1807 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1808 goto err;
1809 }
1810
1811 /*
1812 * Use the ephemeral values we saved when
1813 * generating the ServerKeyExchange message.
1814 */
1815 tkey = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh;
1816
1817 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
1818 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
1819
1820 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
1821 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
1822 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1823 goto err;
1824 }
1825
1826 /* Let's get client's public key */
1827 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
1828 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1829 goto err;
1830 }
1831
1832 if (n == 0L) {
1833 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
1834 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
1835 s->session->peer)) == NULL) ||
1836 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
1837 /*
1838 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
1839 * authentication using ECDH certificates
1840 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
1841 * never executed. When that support is
1842 * added, we ought to ensure the key
1843 * received in the certificate is
1844 * authorized for key agreement.
1845 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
1846 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
1847 * group.
1848 */
1849 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1850 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
1851 goto f_err;
1852 }
1853
1854 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
1855 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec))
1856 == 0) {
1857 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1858 goto err;
1859 }
1860 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
1861 } else {
1862 /*
1863 * Get client's public key from encoded point
1864 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
1865 */
1866 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
1867 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1868 goto err;
1869 }
1870
1871 /* Get encoded point length */
1872 i = *p;
1873
1874 p += 1;
1875 if (n != 1 + i) {
1876 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1877 goto err;
1878 }
1879 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
1880 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
1881 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1882 goto err;
1883 }
1884 /*
1885 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
1886 * currently, so set it to the start.
1887 */
1888 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data;
1889 }
1890
1891 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
1892 key_size = ECDH_size(srvr_ecdh);
1893 if (key_size <= 0) {
1894 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1895 goto err;
1896 }
1897 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, key_size, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
1898 NULL);
1899 if (i <= 0) {
1900 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1901 goto err;
1902 }
1903
1904 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
1905 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
1906 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
1907 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1908 EC_KEY_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh);
1909 S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
1910
1911 /* Compute the master secret */
1912 s->session->master_key_length =
1913 tls1_generate_master_secret(
1914 s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
1915
1916 explicit_bzero(p, i);
1917 return (ret);
1918
1919 f_err:
1920 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1921 err:
1922 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
1923 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
1924 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
1925 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1926 return (-1);
1927 }
1928
1929 static int
1930 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
1931 {
1932 uint8_t *shared_key = NULL;
1933 CBS cbs, ecpoint;
1934 int ret = -1;
1935
1936 if (n < 0)
1937 goto err;
1938
1939 CBS_init(&cbs, p, n);
1940 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &ecpoint))
1941 goto err;
1942 if (CBS_len(&ecpoint) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH)
1943 goto err;
1944
1945 if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1946 goto err;
1947 if (!X25519(shared_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, CBS_data(&ecpoint)))
1948 goto err;
1949
1950 freezero(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
1951 S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = NULL;
1952
1953 s->session->master_key_length =
1954 tls1_generate_master_secret(
1955 s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
1956
1957 ret = 1;
1958
1959 err:
1960 freezero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
1961
1962 return (ret);
1963 }
1964
1965 static int
1966 ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
1967 {
1968 if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL)
1969 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, p, n);
1970
1971 return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, p, n);
1972 }
1973
1974 static int
1975 ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
1976 {
1977
1978 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
1979 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
1980 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
1981 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
1982 unsigned long alg_a;
1983 int Ttag, Tclass;
1984 long Tlen;
1985 int al;
1986 int ret = 0;
1987
1988 /* Get our certificate private key*/
1989 alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1990 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
1991 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
1992
1993 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
1994 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
1995 /*
1996 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type,
1997 * maybe use it for key exchange.
1998 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because
1999 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for
2000 * authorization only.
2001 */
2002 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2003 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2004 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,
2005 client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2006 ERR_clear_error();
2007 }
2008 if (2 > n)
2009 goto truncated;
2010 /* Decrypt session key */
2011 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2012 &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2013 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2014 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2015 goto gerr;
2016 }
2017 start = p;
2018 inlen = Tlen;
2019 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen,
2020 start, inlen) <=0) {
2021 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2022 goto gerr;
2023 }
2024 /* Generate master secret */
2025 s->session->master_key_length =
2026 tls1_generate_master_secret(
2027 s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32);
2028 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2029 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1,
2030 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2031 ret = 2;
2032 else
2033 ret = 1;
2034 gerr:
2035 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2036 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2037 if (ret)
2038 return (ret);
2039 else
2040 goto err;
2041
2042 truncated:
2043 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2045 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2046 err:
2047 return (-1);
2048 }
2049
2050 int
2051 ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2052 {
2053 unsigned long alg_k;
2054 unsigned char *p;
2055 int al, ok;
2056 long n;
2057
2058 /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */
2059 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2060 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2061 if (!ok)
2062 return ((int)n);
2063
2064 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg;
2065
2066 alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2067
2068 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2069 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, p, n) != 1)
2070 goto err;
2071 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2072 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, p, n) != 1)
2073 goto err;
2074 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2075 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, p, n) != 1)
2076 goto err;
2077 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2078 if (ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, p, n) != 1)
2079 goto err;
2080 } else {
2081 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2082 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2083 goto f_err;
2084 }
2085
2086 return (1);
2087
2088 f_err:
2089 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2090 err:
2091 return (-1);
2092 }
2093
2094 int
2095 ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2096 {
2097 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2098 unsigned char *p;
2099 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2100 long n;
2101 int type = 0, i, j;
2102 X509 *peer;
2103 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2104 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2105 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2106
2107 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2108 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2109 if (!ok)
2110 return ((int)n);
2111
2112 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2113 peer = s->session->peer;
2114 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2115 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2116 } else {
2117 peer = NULL;
2118 pkey = NULL;
2119 }
2120
2121 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2122 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2123 if (peer != NULL) {
2124 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2125 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2126 goto f_err;
2127 }
2128 ret = 1;
2129 goto end;
2130 }
2131
2132 if (peer == NULL) {
2133 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2134 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2135 goto f_err;
2136 }
2137
2138 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2139 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2140 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2141 goto f_err;
2142 }
2143
2144 if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) {
2145 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2146 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2147 goto f_err;
2148 }
2149
2150 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2151 p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg;
2152 /*
2153 * Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites.
2154 *
2155 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is a bare
2156 * signature without length field.
2157 */
2158 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2159 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) {
2160 i = 64;
2161 } else {
2162 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2163 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2164 /* Should never happen */
2165 if (sigalg == -1) {
2166 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2167 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2168 goto f_err;
2169 }
2170 if (2 > n)
2171 goto truncated;
2172 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2173 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
2174 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2175 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 goto f_err;
2177 }
2178 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
2179 if (md == NULL) {
2180 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2181 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2182 goto f_err;
2183 }
2184 p += 2;
2185 n -= 2;
2186 }
2187 if (2 > n)
2188 goto truncated;
2189 n2s(p, i);
2190 n -= 2;
2191 if (i > n)
2192 goto truncated;
2193 }
2194 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2195 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2196 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2197 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2198 goto f_err;
2199 }
2200
2201 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2202 long hdatalen = 0;
2203 void *hdata;
2204 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2205 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2206 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2207 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2208 goto f_err;
2209 }
2210 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
2211 !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2212 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2213 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2214 goto f_err;
2215 }
2216
2217 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
2218 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2219 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2220 goto f_err;
2221 }
2222 } else
2223 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2224 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2225 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2226 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2227 if (i < 0) {
2228 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2229 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2230 goto f_err;
2231 }
2232 if (i == 0) {
2233 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2234 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2235 goto f_err;
2236 }
2237 } else
2238 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2239 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2240 &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2241 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
2242 if (j <= 0) {
2243 /* bad signature */
2244 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2245 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2246 goto f_err;
2247 }
2248 } else
2249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2250 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2251 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2252 long hdatalen = 0;
2253 void *hdata;
2254 unsigned char signature[128];
2255 unsigned int siglen = sizeof(signature);
2256 int nid;
2257 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
2258
2259 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2260 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2261 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2262 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2263 goto f_err;
2264 }
2265 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) ||
2266 !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) {
2267 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2268 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2269 goto f_err;
2270 }
2271 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2272 if (!pctx) {
2273 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2274 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2275 goto f_err;
2276 }
2277 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
2278 !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
2279 !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, signature, &siglen) ||
2280 (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) ||
2281 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) ||
2282 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY,
2283 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT,
2284 GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE,
2285 NULL) <= 0)) {
2286 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2287 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2288 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2289 goto f_err;
2290 }
2291
2292 if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, p, i, signature, siglen) <= 0) {
2293 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2294 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2295 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2296 goto f_err;
2297 }
2298
2299 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2300 } else
2301 #endif
2302 {
2303 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2304 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2305 goto f_err;
2306 }
2307
2308
2309 ret = 1;
2310 if (0) {
2311 truncated:
2312 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2314 f_err:
2315 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2316 }
2317 end:
2318 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
2319 BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer);
2320 S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2321 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
2322 }
2323 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
2324 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2325 return (ret);
2326 }
2327
2328 int
2329 ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2330 {
2331 CBS cbs, client_certs;
2332 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
2333 X509 *x = NULL;
2334 long n;
2335 const unsigned char *q;
2336 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2337
2338 n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2339 -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok);
2340
2341 if (!ok)
2342 return ((int)n);
2343
2344 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
2345 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2346 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2347 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2348 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2349 goto f_err;
2350 }
2351 /*
2352 * If tls asked for a client cert,
2353 * the client must return a 0 list.
2354 */
2355 if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) {
2356 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
2357 );
2358 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2359 goto f_err;
2360 }
2361 S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2362 return (1);
2363 }
2364
2365 if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
2366 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2367 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2368 goto f_err;
2369 }
2370
2371 if (n < 0)
2372 goto truncated;
2373
2374 CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
2375
2376 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2377 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2378 goto err;
2379 }
2380
2381 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) ||
2382 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
2383 goto truncated;
2384
2385 while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) {
2386 CBS cert;
2387
2388 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) {
2389 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2390 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2391 goto f_err;
2392 }
2393
2394 q = CBS_data(&cert);
2395 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert));
2396 if (x == NULL) {
2397 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2398 goto err;
2399 }
2400 if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
2401 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2402 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2403 goto f_err;
2404 }
2405 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2406 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2407 goto err;
2408 }
2409 x = NULL;
2410 }
2411
2412 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2413 /*
2414 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned.
2415 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate.
2416 */
2417 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2418 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2419 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2420 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2421 goto f_err;
2422 }
2423 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2424 if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer && !tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
2425 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2426 goto f_err;
2427 }
2428 } else {
2429 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2430 if (i <= 0) {
2431 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2432 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2433 goto f_err;
2434 }
2435 }
2436
2437 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2438 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2439 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2440
2441 /*
2442 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2443 * when we arrive here
2444 */
2445 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) {
2446 SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2447 if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) {
2448 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2449 goto err;
2450 }
2451 }
2452 sk_X509_pop_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2453 SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
2454
2455 /*
2456 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2457 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2458 */
2459
2460 sk = NULL;
2461
2462 ret = 1;
2463 if (0) {
2464 truncated:
2465 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2466 SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2467 f_err:
2468 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2469 }
2470 err:
2471 X509_free(x);
2472 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2473
2474 return (ret);
2475 }
2476
2477 int
2478 ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2479 {
2480 CBB cbb, server_cert;
2481 X509 *x;
2482
2483 /*
2484 * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2.
2485 */
2486
2487 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
2488
2489 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
2490 if ((x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s)) == NULL) {
2491 SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2492 return (0);
2493 }
2494
2495 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &server_cert,
2496 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE))
2497 goto err;
2498 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, x))
2499 goto err;
2500 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb))
2501 goto err;
2502
2503 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2504 }
2505
2506 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2507 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2508
2509 err:
2510 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
2511
2512 return (0);
2513 }
2514
2515 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
2516 int
2517 ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2518 {
2519 unsigned char *d, *p, *macstart;
2520 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2521 const unsigned char *const_p;
2522 int len, slen_full, slen;
2523 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2524 unsigned int hlen;
2525 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2526 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2527 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2528 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2529 unsigned char key_name[16];
2530
2531 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
2532 /* get session encoding length */
2533 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2534 /*
2535 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2536 * too long
2537 */
2538 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
2539 goto err;
2540 senc = malloc(slen_full);
2541 if (!senc)
2542 goto err;
2543 p = senc;
2544 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2545
2546 /*
2547 * Create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to
2548 * clean up
2549 */
2550 const_p = senc;
2551 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
2552 if (sess == NULL)
2553 goto err;
2554
2555 /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2556 sess->session_id_length = 0;
2557
2558 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
2559 if (slen > slen_full) {
2560 /* shouldn't ever happen */
2561 goto err;
2562 }
2563 p = senc;
2564 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
2565 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2566
2567 /*
2568 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2569 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2570 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2571 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2572 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2573 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2574 */
2575 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->internal->init_buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) +
2576 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2577 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2578 goto err;
2579
2580 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET);
2581
2582 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2583 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2584
2585 /*
2586 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2587 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2588 * from parent ctx.
2589 */
2590 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2591 if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s,
2592 key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) {
2593 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2594 goto err;
2595 }
2596 } else {
2597 arc4random_buf(iv, 16);
2598 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2599 tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2600 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2601 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2602 memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2603 }
2604
2605 /*
2606 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
2607 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session
2608 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
2609 * sessions will live as long as their sessions.
2610 */
2611 l2n(s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
2612
2613 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2614 p += 2;
2615 /* Output key name */
2616 macstart = p;
2617 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2618 p += 16;
2619 /* output IV */
2620 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2621 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2622 /* Encrypt session data */
2623 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2624 p += len;
2625 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len);
2626 p += len;
2627 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2628
2629 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2630 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2631 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2632 p += hlen;
2633
2634 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2635 /* Total length */
2636 len = p - d;
2637
2638 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint. */
2639 p = d + 4;
2640 s2n(len - 6, p); /* Message length */
2641
2642 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, len);
2643
2644 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2645
2646 freezero(senc, slen_full);
2647 }
2648
2649 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2650 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2651
2652 err:
2653 freezero(senc, slen_full);
2654
2655 return (-1);
2656 }
2657
2658 int
2659 ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2660 {
2661 CBB cbb, certstatus, ocspresp;
2662
2663 memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
2664
2665 if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
2666 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &certstatus,
2667 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS))
2668 goto err;
2669 if (!CBB_add_u8(&certstatus, s->tlsext_status_type))
2670 goto err;
2671 if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certstatus, &ocspresp))
2672 goto err;
2673 if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ocspresp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
2674 s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2675 goto err;
2676 if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb))
2677 goto err;
2678
2679 S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2680 }
2681
2682 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2683 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2684
2685 err:
2686 CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
2687
2688 return (-1);
2689 }
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