2 * Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel
4 * Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen
5 * Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
8 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
9 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
10 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
13 #include <linux/tcp.h>
14 #include <linux/slab.h>
15 #include <linux/random.h>
16 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
17 #include <linux/kernel.h>
18 #include <linux/export.h>
20 #include <net/route.h>
22 /* Timestamps: lowest bits store TCP options */
24 #define TSMASK (((__u32)1 << TSBITS) - 1)
26 extern int sysctl_tcp_syncookies
;
28 __u32 syncookie_secret
[2][16-4+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS
];
29 EXPORT_SYMBOL(syncookie_secret
);
31 static __init
int init_syncookies(void)
33 get_random_bytes(syncookie_secret
, sizeof(syncookie_secret
));
36 __initcall(init_syncookies
);
38 #define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
39 #define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
41 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32
[16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS
],
44 static u32
cookie_hash(__be32 saddr
, __be32 daddr
, __be16 sport
, __be16 dport
,
47 __u32
*tmp
= __get_cpu_var(ipv4_cookie_scratch
);
49 memcpy(tmp
+ 4, syncookie_secret
[c
], sizeof(syncookie_secret
[c
]));
50 tmp
[0] = (__force u32
)saddr
;
51 tmp
[1] = (__force u32
)daddr
;
52 tmp
[2] = ((__force u32
)sport
<< 16) + (__force u32
)dport
;
54 sha_transform(tmp
+ 16, (__u8
*)tmp
, tmp
+ 16 + 5);
61 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we encode
62 * tcp options in the lower bits of the timestamp value that will be
63 * sent in the syn-ack.
64 * Since subsequent timestamps use the normal tcp_time_stamp value, we
65 * must make sure that the resulting initial timestamp is <= tcp_time_stamp.
67 __u32
cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock
*req
)
69 struct inet_request_sock
*ireq
;
70 u32 ts
, ts_now
= tcp_time_stamp
;
75 options
= ireq
->wscale_ok
? ireq
->snd_wscale
: 0xf;
76 options
|= ireq
->sack_ok
<< 4;
77 options
|= ireq
->ecn_ok
<< 5;
79 ts
= ts_now
& ~TSMASK
;
91 static __u32
secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr
, __be32 daddr
, __be16 sport
,
92 __be16 dport
, __u32 sseq
, __u32 count
,
96 * Compute the secure sequence number.
97 * The output should be:
98 * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
99 * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
100 * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
102 * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
103 * MSS into the second hash value.
106 return (cookie_hash(saddr
, daddr
, sport
, dport
, 0, 0) +
107 sseq
+ (count
<< COOKIEBITS
) +
108 ((cookie_hash(saddr
, daddr
, sport
, dport
, count
, 1) + data
)
113 * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
114 * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
115 * range. This must be checked by the caller.
117 * The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
118 * "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value
119 * is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
121 static __u32
check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie
, __be32 saddr
, __be32 daddr
,
122 __be16 sport
, __be16 dport
, __u32 sseq
,
123 __u32 count
, __u32 maxdiff
)
127 /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
128 cookie
-= cookie_hash(saddr
, daddr
, sport
, dport
, 0, 0) + sseq
;
130 /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
131 diff
= (count
- (cookie
>> COOKIEBITS
)) & ((__u32
) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS
);
136 cookie_hash(saddr
, daddr
, sport
, dport
, count
- diff
, 1))
137 & COOKIEMASK
; /* Leaving the data behind */
141 * MSS Values are taken from the 2009 paper
142 * 'Measuring TCP Maximum Segment Size' by S. Alcock and R. Nelson:
143 * - values 1440 to 1460 accounted for 80% of observed mss values
144 * - values outside the 536-1460 range are rare (<0.2%).
146 * Table must be sorted.
148 static __u16
const msstab
[] = {
160 * Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned
161 * rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie.
163 __u32
cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, __u16
*mssp
)
165 const struct iphdr
*iph
= ip_hdr(skb
);
166 const struct tcphdr
*th
= tcp_hdr(skb
);
168 const __u16 mss
= *mssp
;
170 tcp_synq_overflow(sk
);
172 for (mssind
= ARRAY_SIZE(msstab
) - 1; mssind
; mssind
--)
173 if (mss
>= msstab
[mssind
])
175 *mssp
= msstab
[mssind
];
177 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk
), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESSENT
);
179 return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph
->saddr
, iph
->daddr
,
180 th
->source
, th
->dest
, ntohl(th
->seq
),
181 jiffies
/ (HZ
* 60), mssind
);
185 * This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
186 * Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
187 * sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
188 * backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
190 #define COUNTER_TRIES 4
192 * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
193 * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
195 static inline int cookie_check(struct sk_buff
*skb
, __u32 cookie
)
197 const struct iphdr
*iph
= ip_hdr(skb
);
198 const struct tcphdr
*th
= tcp_hdr(skb
);
199 __u32 seq
= ntohl(th
->seq
) - 1;
200 __u32 mssind
= check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie
, iph
->saddr
, iph
->daddr
,
201 th
->source
, th
->dest
, seq
,
205 return mssind
< ARRAY_SIZE(msstab
) ? msstab
[mssind
] : 0;
208 static inline struct sock
*get_cookie_sock(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
209 struct request_sock
*req
,
210 struct dst_entry
*dst
)
212 struct inet_connection_sock
*icsk
= inet_csk(sk
);
215 child
= icsk
->icsk_af_ops
->syn_recv_sock(sk
, skb
, req
, dst
);
217 inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk
, req
, child
);
226 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored
227 * additional tcp options in the timestamp.
228 * This extracts these options from the timestamp echo.
230 * The lowest 4 bits store snd_wscale.
231 * next 2 bits indicate SACK and ECN support.
233 * return false if we decode an option that should not be.
235 bool cookie_check_timestamp(struct tcp_options_received
*tcp_opt
, bool *ecn_ok
)
237 /* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */
238 u32 options
= tcp_opt
->rcv_tsecr
& TSMASK
;
240 if (!tcp_opt
->saw_tstamp
) {
241 tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt
);
245 if (!sysctl_tcp_timestamps
)
248 tcp_opt
->sack_ok
= (options
& (1 << 4)) ? TCP_SACK_SEEN
: 0;
249 *ecn_ok
= (options
>> 5) & 1;
250 if (*ecn_ok
&& !sysctl_tcp_ecn
)
253 if (tcp_opt
->sack_ok
&& !sysctl_tcp_sack
)
256 if ((options
& 0xf) == 0xf)
257 return true; /* no window scaling */
259 tcp_opt
->wscale_ok
= 1;
260 tcp_opt
->snd_wscale
= options
& 0xf;
261 return sysctl_tcp_window_scaling
!= 0;
263 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_check_timestamp
);
265 struct sock
*cookie_v4_check(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
266 struct ip_options
*opt
)
268 struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt
;
269 const u8
*hash_location
;
270 struct inet_request_sock
*ireq
;
271 struct tcp_request_sock
*treq
;
272 struct tcp_sock
*tp
= tcp_sk(sk
);
273 const struct tcphdr
*th
= tcp_hdr(skb
);
274 __u32 cookie
= ntohl(th
->ack_seq
) - 1;
275 struct sock
*ret
= sk
;
276 struct request_sock
*req
;
282 if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies
|| !th
->ack
|| th
->rst
)
285 if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk
) ||
286 (mss
= cookie_check(skb
, cookie
)) == 0) {
287 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk
), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED
);
291 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk
), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV
);
293 /* check for timestamp cookie support */
294 memset(&tcp_opt
, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt
));
295 tcp_parse_options(skb
, &tcp_opt
, &hash_location
, 0);
297 if (!cookie_check_timestamp(&tcp_opt
, &ecn_ok
))
301 req
= inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops
); /* for safety */
305 ireq
= inet_rsk(req
);
307 treq
->rcv_isn
= ntohl(th
->seq
) - 1;
308 treq
->snt_isn
= cookie
;
310 ireq
->loc_port
= th
->dest
;
311 ireq
->rmt_port
= th
->source
;
312 ireq
->loc_addr
= ip_hdr(skb
)->daddr
;
313 ireq
->rmt_addr
= ip_hdr(skb
)->saddr
;
314 ireq
->ecn_ok
= ecn_ok
;
315 ireq
->snd_wscale
= tcp_opt
.snd_wscale
;
316 ireq
->sack_ok
= tcp_opt
.sack_ok
;
317 ireq
->wscale_ok
= tcp_opt
.wscale_ok
;
318 ireq
->tstamp_ok
= tcp_opt
.saw_tstamp
;
319 req
->ts_recent
= tcp_opt
.saw_tstamp
? tcp_opt
.rcv_tsval
: 0;
320 treq
->snt_synack
= tcp_opt
.saw_tstamp
? tcp_opt
.rcv_tsecr
: 0;
322 /* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
323 * the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
325 if (opt
&& opt
->optlen
) {
326 int opt_size
= sizeof(struct ip_options_rcu
) + opt
->optlen
;
328 ireq
->opt
= kmalloc(opt_size
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
329 if (ireq
->opt
!= NULL
&& ip_options_echo(&ireq
->opt
->opt
, skb
)) {
335 if (security_inet_conn_request(sk
, skb
, req
)) {
344 * We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
345 * window size. We should better make sure that the window size
346 * hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
347 * no easy way to do this.
352 flowi4_init_output(&fl4
, 0, sk
->sk_mark
, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk
),
353 RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE
, IPPROTO_TCP
,
354 inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk
),
355 (opt
&& opt
->srr
) ? opt
->faddr
: ireq
->rmt_addr
,
356 ireq
->loc_addr
, th
->source
, th
->dest
);
357 security_req_classify_flow(req
, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4
));
358 rt
= ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk
), &fl4
);
365 /* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
366 req
->window_clamp
= tp
->window_clamp
? :dst_metric(&rt
->dst
, RTAX_WINDOW
);
368 tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk
), req
->mss
,
369 &req
->rcv_wnd
, &req
->window_clamp
,
370 ireq
->wscale_ok
, &rcv_wscale
,
371 dst_metric(&rt
->dst
, RTAX_INITRWND
));
373 ireq
->rcv_wscale
= rcv_wscale
;
375 ret
= get_cookie_sock(sk
, skb
, req
, &rt
->dst
);