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shdoclc: Remove a space before an ellipsis in the Italian translation.
[wine/hramrach.git] / dlls / crypt32 / chain.c
blob36ed1f327c522ab1bff09ec6daa7522cb1dea38a
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
3 *
4 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
7 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
8 *
9 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
10 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
12 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
13 *
14 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
15 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
16 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
17 *
18 */
19 #include <stdarg.h>
20 #define NONAMELESSUNION
21 #include "windef.h"
22 #include "winbase.h"
23 #define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
24 #define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
25 #include "wincrypt.h"
26 #include "wininet.h"
27 #include "wine/debug.h"
28 #include "wine/unicode.h"
29 #include "crypt32_private.h"
30
31 WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt);
32 WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain);
33
34 #define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
35
36 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_defaultChainEngine;
37
38 /* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
39 * the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
40 * It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
41 * CTLs or complex certificate chains.
42 */
43 typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
44 {
45 LONG ref;
46 HCERTSTORE hRoot;
47 HCERTSTORE hWorld;
48 DWORD dwFlags;
49 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
50 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
51 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
52 } CertificateChainEngine, *PCertificateChainEngine;
53
54 static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection,
55 DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
56 {
57 DWORD i;
58
59 for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
60 CertAddStoreToCollection(collection, stores[i], 0, 0);
61 }
62
63 static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
64 {
65 DWORD i;
66
67 for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
68 CertCloseStore(stores[i], 0);
69 }
70
71 static const WCHAR rootW[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
72
73 /* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
74 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
75 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
76 {
77 PCCERT_CONTEXT matching = NULL;
78 BYTE hash[20];
79 DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
80
81 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID, hash, &size))
82 {
83 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
84
85 matching = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, cert->dwCertEncodingType,
86 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH, &blob, NULL);
87 }
88 return matching;
89 }
90
91 static BOOL CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store)
92 {
93 BOOL ret = TRUE;
94
95 if (store)
96 {
97 HCERTSTORE rootStore = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
98 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL, check;
99
100 do {
101 cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store, cert);
102 if (cert)
103 {
104 if (!(check = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore, cert)))
105 ret = FALSE;
106 else
107 CertFreeCertificateContext(check);
108 }
109 } while (ret && cert);
110 if (cert)
111 CertFreeCertificateContext(cert);
112 CertCloseStore(rootStore, 0);
113 }
114 return ret;
115 }
116
117 HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root,
118 PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig)
119 {
120 static const WCHAR caW[] = { 'C','A',0 };
121 static const WCHAR myW[] = { 'M','y',0 };
122 static const WCHAR trustW[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
123 PCertificateChainEngine engine =
124 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine));
125
126 if (engine)
127 {
128 HCERTSTORE worldStores[4];
129
130 engine->ref = 1;
131 engine->hRoot = root;
132 engine->hWorld = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
133 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
134 worldStores[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine->hRoot);
135 worldStores[1] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, caW);
136 worldStores[2] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, myW);
137 worldStores[3] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, trustW);
138 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld,
139 sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]), worldStores);
140 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld,
141 pConfig->cAdditionalStore, pConfig->rghAdditionalStore);
142 CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]),
143 worldStores);
144 engine->dwFlags = pConfig->dwFlags;
145 engine->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout = pConfig->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
146 engine->MaximumCachedCertificates =
147 pConfig->MaximumCachedCertificates;
148 if (pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus)
149 engine->CycleDetectionModulus = pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus;
150 else
151 engine->CycleDetectionModulus = DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS;
152 }
153 return engine;
154 }
155
156 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT
157 {
158 DWORD cbSize;
159 HCERTSTORE hRestrictedRoot;
160 HCERTSTORE hRestrictedTrust;
161 HCERTSTORE hRestrictedOther;
162 DWORD cAdditionalStore;
163 HCERTSTORE *rghAdditionalStore;
164 DWORD dwFlags;
165 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
166 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
167 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
168 } CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT;
169
170 BOOL WINAPI CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig,
171 HCERTCHAINENGINE *phChainEngine)
172 {
173 BOOL ret;
174
175 TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig, phChainEngine);
176
177 if (pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT)
178 && pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG))
179 {
180 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
181 return FALSE;
182 }
183 *phChainEngine = NULL;
184 ret = CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
185 if (ret)
186 {
187 HCERTSTORE root;
188 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine;
189
190 if (pConfig->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG) &&
191 pConfig->hExclusiveRoot)
192 root = CertDuplicateStore(pConfig->hExclusiveRoot);
193 else if (pConfig->hRestrictedRoot)
194 root = CertDuplicateStore(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
195 else
196 root = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
197 engine = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(root, pConfig);
198 if (engine)
199 {
200 *phChainEngine = engine;
201 ret = TRUE;
202 }
203 else
204 ret = FALSE;
205 }
206 return ret;
207 }
208
209 VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine)
210 {
211 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
212
213 TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine);
214
215 if (engine && InterlockedDecrement(&engine->ref) == 0)
216 {
217 CertCloseStore(engine->hWorld, 0);
218 CertCloseStore(engine->hRoot, 0);
219 CryptMemFree(engine);
220 }
221 }
222
223 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(void)
224 {
225 if (!CRYPT_defaultChainEngine)
226 {
227 CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config = { 0 };
228 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine;
229
230 config.cbSize = sizeof(config);
231 CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&config, &engine);
232 InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&CRYPT_defaultChainEngine, engine,
233 NULL);
234 if (CRYPT_defaultChainEngine != engine)
235 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine);
236 }
237 return CRYPT_defaultChainEngine;
238 }
239
240 void default_chain_engine_free(void)
241 {
242 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(CRYPT_defaultChainEngine);
243 }
244
245 typedef struct _CertificateChain
246 {
247 CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context;
248 HCERTSTORE world;
249 LONG ref;
250 } CertificateChain, *PCertificateChain;
251
252 static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
253 {
254 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
255 DWORD size;
256 BOOL ret;
257
258 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
259 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
260 {
261 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
262
263 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
264 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
265 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
266 &info, &size);
267 if (ret)
268 {
269 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
270 info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
271 {
272 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
273 DWORD i;
274
275 for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
276 i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
277 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
278 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
279 directoryName =
280 &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
281 if (directoryName)
282 {
283 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
284 &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer)
285 && CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
286 &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber);
287 }
288 else
289 {
290 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
291 ret = FALSE;
292 }
293 }
294 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
295 {
296 ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
297 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
298 if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
299 {
300 LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
301
302 if (buf)
303 {
304 CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
305 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
306 ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size);
307 CryptMemFree(buf);
308 }
309 }
310 else
311 ret = FALSE;
312 }
313 LocalFree(info);
314 }
315 }
316 else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
317 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
318 {
319 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
320
321 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
322 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
323 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
324 &info, &size);
325 if (ret)
326 {
327 if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
328 {
329 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
330 &info->CertIssuer, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer) &&
331 CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->CertSerialNumber,
332 &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber);
333 }
334 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
335 {
336 ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
337 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
338 if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
339 {
340 LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
341
342 if (buf)
343 {
344 CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
345 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
346 ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size);
347 CryptMemFree(buf);
348 }
349 else
350 ret = FALSE;
351 }
352 else
353 ret = FALSE;
354 }
355 else
356 ret = FALSE;
357 LocalFree(info);
358 }
359 }
360 else
361 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
362 &cert->pCertInfo->Subject, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer);
363 return ret;
364 }
365
366 static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element)
367 {
368 CertFreeCertificateContext(element->pCertContext);
369 CryptMemFree(element);
370 }
371
372 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
373 {
374 DWORD i, j, cyclicCertIndex = 0;
375
376 /* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
377 for (i = 0; !cyclicCertIndex && i < chain->cElement; i++)
378 for (j = i + 1; !cyclicCertIndex && j < chain->cElement; j++)
379 if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
380 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
381 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo))
382 cyclicCertIndex = j;
383 if (cyclicCertIndex)
384 {
385 chain->rgpElement[cyclicCertIndex]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
386 |= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
387 /* Release remaining certs */
388 for (i = cyclicCertIndex + 1; i < chain->cElement; i++)
389 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
390 /* Truncate chain */
391 chain->cElement = cyclicCertIndex + 1;
392 }
393 }
394
395 /* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
396 static inline BOOL CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain)
397 {
398 if (chain->cElement)
399 return chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
400 & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC;
401 else
402 return FALSE;
403 }
404
405 static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS *chainStatus,
406 const CERT_TRUST_STATUS *elementStatus)
407 {
408 /* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
409 chainStatus->dwErrorStatus |= elementStatus->dwErrorStatus;
410 /* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
411 * chain.
412 */
413 chainStatus->dwInfoStatus |= (elementStatus->dwInfoStatus & 0xfffffff0);
414 }
415
416 static BOOL CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
417 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, DWORD subjectInfoStatus)
418 {
419 BOOL ret = FALSE;
420 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
421
422 if (element)
423 {
424 if (!chain->cElement)
425 chain->rgpElement = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
426 else
427 chain->rgpElement = CryptMemRealloc(chain->rgpElement,
428 (chain->cElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
429 if (chain->rgpElement)
430 {
431 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement++] = element;
432 memset(element, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
433 element->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT);
434 element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert);
435 if (chain->cElement > 1)
436 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 2]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus
437 = subjectInfoStatus;
438 /* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
439 if (!(chain->cElement % engine->CycleDetectionModulus))
440 {
441 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain);
442 /* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
443 * cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
444 */
445 element = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
446 }
447 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
448 &element->TrustStatus);
449 ret = TRUE;
450 }
451 else
452 CryptMemFree(element);
453 }
454 return ret;
455 }
456
457 static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
458 {
459 DWORD i;
460
461 for (i = 0; i < chain->cElement; i++)
462 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
463 CryptMemFree(chain->rgpElement);
464 CryptMemFree(chain);
465 }
466
467 static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot,
468 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
469 {
470 PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot,
471 rootElement->pCertContext);
472
473 if (!trustedRoot)
474 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
475 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT;
476 else
477 CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot);
478 }
479
480 static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hRoot,
481 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
482 {
483 PCCERT_CONTEXT root = rootElement->pCertContext;
484
485 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root->dwCertEncodingType,
486 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, (void *)root,
487 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT, (void *)root, 0, NULL))
488 {
489 TRACE_(chain)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
490 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
491 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
492 }
493 CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot, rootElement);
494 }
495
496 /* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
497 * or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
498 * CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
499 * constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
500 * Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
501 */
502 static BOOL CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert,
503 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *constraints, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified)
504 {
505 BOOL ret = TRUE;
506 PCERT_EXTENSION ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
507 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
508
509 constraints->fPathLenConstraint = FALSE;
510 if (ext)
511 {
512 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
513 DWORD size = 0;
514
515 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
516 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
517 NULL, &info, &size);
518 if (ret)
519 {
520 if (info->SubjectType.cbData == 1)
521 constraints->fCA =
522 info->SubjectType.pbData[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG;
523 LocalFree(info);
524 }
525 }
526 else
527 {
528 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2,
529 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
530 if (ext)
531 {
532 DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
533
534 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
535 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
536 0, NULL, constraints, &size);
537 }
538 else
539 constraints->fCA = defaultIfNotSpecified;
540 }
541 return ret;
542 }
543
544 /* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
545 * remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
546 * basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
547 * allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
548 * allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
549 * This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
550 * CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
551 * used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
552 * section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
553 * application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
554 * through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
555 * certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
556 * accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
557 * Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
558 * constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
559 * root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
560 * the next certificate in the chain.
561 * Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
562 * 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
563 * 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
564 * Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
565 * occurs.
566 * Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
567 * chain is valid.
568 */
569 static BOOL CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
570 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *chainConstraints,
571 DWORD remainingCAs, BOOL isRoot, BOOL *pathLengthConstraintViolated)
572 {
573 BOOL validBasicConstraints, implicitCA = FALSE;
574 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
575
576 if (isRoot)
577 implicitCA = TRUE;
578 else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
579 cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
580 {
581 BYTE hash[20];
582 DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
583
584 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID,
585 hash, &size))
586 {
587 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
588 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CertFindCertificateInStore(
589 engine->hWorld, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH,
590 &blob, NULL);
591
592 if (localCert)
593 {
594 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
595 implicitCA = TRUE;
596 }
597 }
598 }
599 if ((validBasicConstraints = CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert,
600 &constraints, implicitCA)))
601 {
602 chainConstraints->fCA = constraints.fCA;
603 if (!constraints.fCA)
604 {
605 TRACE_(chain)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs + 1);
606 validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
607 }
608 else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint)
609 {
610 /* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
611 * entire remaining chain.
612 */
613 if (!chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint ||
614 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint <
615 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
616 {
617 TRACE_(chain)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
618 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
619 chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint = TRUE;
620 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint =
621 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint;
622 }
623 }
624 }
625 if (chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint &&
626 remainingCAs > chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
627 {
628 TRACE_(chain)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
629 remainingCAs, chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
630 validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
631 *pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
632 }
633 return validBasicConstraints;
634 }
635
636 static BOOL domain_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name)
637 {
638 BOOL match;
639
640 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
641 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name...
642 * When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one
643 * or more labels. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by
644 * both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint
645 * ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint
646 * does not begin with a period, it specifies a host."
647 * and for email addresses,
648 * "To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the
649 * constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint
650 * "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host
651 * "example.com". To specify any address within a domain, the constraint
652 * is specified with a leading period (as with URIs)."
653 */
654 if (constraint[0] == '.')
655 {
656 /* Must be strictly greater than, a name can't begin with '.' */
657 if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
658 match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
659 constraint);
660 else
661 {
662 /* name is too short, no match */
663 match = FALSE;
664 }
665 }
666 else
667 match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
668 return match;
669 }
670
671 static BOOL url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
672 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
673 {
674 BOOL match = FALSE;
675
676 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
677
678 if (!constraint)
679 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
680 else if (!name)
681 ; /* no match */
682 else
683 {
684 LPCWSTR colon, authority_end, at, hostname = NULL;
685 /* The maximum length for a hostname is 254 in the DNS, see RFC 1034 */
686 WCHAR hostname_buf[255];
687
688 /* RFC 5280: only the hostname portion of the URL is compared. From
689 * section 4.2.1.10:
690 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.
691 * The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name
692 * and MAY specify a host or a domain."
693 * The format for URIs is in RFC 2396.
694 *
695 * First, remove any scheme that's present. */
696 colon = strchrW(name, ':');
697 if (colon && *(colon + 1) == '/' && *(colon + 2) == '/')
698 name = colon + 3;
699 /* Next, find the end of the authority component. (The authority is
700 * generally just the hostname, but it may contain a username or a port.
701 * Those are removed next.)
702 */
703 authority_end = strchrW(name, '/');
704 if (!authority_end)
705 authority_end = strchrW(name, '?');
706 if (!authority_end)
707 authority_end = name + strlenW(name);
708 /* Remove any port number from the authority. The userinfo portion
709 * of an authority may contain a colon, so stop if a userinfo portion
710 * is found (indicated by '@').
711 */
712 for (colon = authority_end; colon >= name && *colon != ':' &&
713 *colon != '@'; colon--)
714 ;
715 if (*colon == ':')
716 authority_end = colon;
717 /* Remove any username from the authority */
718 if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
719 name = at;
720 /* Ignore any path or query portion of the URL. */
721 if (*authority_end)
722 {
723 if (authority_end - name < sizeof(hostname_buf) /
724 sizeof(hostname_buf[0]))
725 {
726 memcpy(hostname_buf, name,
727 (authority_end - name) * sizeof(WCHAR));
728 hostname_buf[authority_end - name] = 0;
729 hostname = hostname_buf;
730 }
731 /* else: Hostname is too long, not a match */
732 }
733 else
734 hostname = name;
735 if (hostname)
736 match = domain_name_matches(constraint, hostname);
737 }
738 return match;
739 }
740
741 static BOOL rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
742 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
743 {
744 BOOL match = FALSE;
745 LPCWSTR at;
746
747 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
748
749 if (!constraint)
750 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
751 else if (!name)
752 ; /* no match */
753 else if (strchrW(constraint, '@'))
754 match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
755 else
756 {
757 if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
758 match = domain_name_matches(constraint, at + 1);
759 else
760 match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
761 }
762 return match;
763 }
764
765 static BOOL dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
766 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
767 {
768 BOOL match = FALSE;
769
770 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
771
772 if (!constraint)
773 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
774 else if (!name)
775 ; /* no match */
776 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
777 * "DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS name
778 * that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the
779 * left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example,
780 * www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but host1.example.com
781 * would not."
782 */
783 else if (lstrlenW(name) == lstrlenW(constraint))
784 match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
785 else if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
786 {
787 match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
788 constraint);
789 if (match)
790 {
791 BOOL dot = FALSE;
792 LPCWSTR ptr;
793
794 /* This only matches if name is a subdomain of constraint, i.e.
795 * there's a '.' between the beginning of the name and the
796 * matching portion of the name.
797 */
798 for (ptr = name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint);
799 !dot && ptr >= name; ptr--)
800 if (*ptr == '.')
801 dot = TRUE;
802 match = dot;
803 }
804 }
805 /* else: name is too short, no match */
806
807 return match;
808 }
809
810 static BOOL ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *constraint,
811 const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
812 {
813 BOOL match = FALSE;
814
815 TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint->cbData, constraint->pbData,
816 name->cbData, name->pbData);
817
818 /* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
819 * IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
820 */
821 if (constraint->cbData != sizeof(DWORD) * 2 && constraint->cbData != 32)
822 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
823 else if (name->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) &&
824 constraint->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) * 2)
825 {
826 DWORD subnet, mask, addr;
827
828 memcpy(&subnet, constraint->pbData, sizeof(subnet));
829 memcpy(&mask, constraint->pbData + sizeof(subnet), sizeof(mask));
830 memcpy(&addr, name->pbData, sizeof(addr));
831 /* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
832 * don't need to swap to host order
833 */
834 match = (subnet & mask) == (addr & mask);
835 }
836 else if (name->cbData == 16 && constraint->cbData == 32)
837 {
838 const BYTE *subnet, *mask, *addr;
839 DWORD i;
840
841 subnet = constraint->pbData;
842 mask = constraint->pbData + 16;
843 addr = name->pbData;
844 match = TRUE;
845 for (i = 0; match && i < 16; i++)
846 if ((subnet[i] & mask[i]) != (addr[i] & mask[i]))
847 match = FALSE;
848 }
849 /* else: name is wrong size, no match */
850
851 return match;
852 }
853
854 static BOOL directory_name_matches(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *constraint,
855 const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
856 {
857 CERT_NAME_INFO *constraintName;
858 DWORD size;
859 BOOL match = FALSE;
860
861 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME, constraint->pbData,
862 constraint->cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &constraintName, &size))
863 {
864 DWORD i;
865
866 match = TRUE;
867 for (i = 0; match && i < constraintName->cRDN; i++)
868 match = CertIsRDNAttrsInCertificateName(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
869 CERT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_IS_RDN_ATTRS_FLAG,
870 (CERT_NAME_BLOB *)name, &constraintName->rgRDN[i]);
871 LocalFree(constraintName);
872 }
873 return match;
874 }
875
876 static BOOL alt_name_matches(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
877 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint, DWORD *trustErrorStatus, BOOL *present)
878 {
879 BOOL match = FALSE;
880
881 if (name->dwAltNameChoice == constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
882 {
883 if (present)
884 *present = TRUE;
885 switch (constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
886 {
887 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
888 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
889 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
890 break;
891 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
892 match = dns_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
893 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
894 break;
895 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
896 match = url_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
897 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
898 break;
899 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
900 match = ip_address_matches(&constraint->u.IPAddress,
901 &name->u.IPAddress, trustErrorStatus);
902 break;
903 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
904 match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
905 &name->u.DirectoryName);
906 break;
907 default:
908 ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
909 constraint->dwAltNameChoice);
910 *trustErrorStatus |=
911 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
912 }
913 }
914 else if (present)
915 *present = FALSE;
916 return match;
917 }
918
919 static BOOL alt_name_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
920 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
921 {
922 DWORD i;
923 BOOL match = FALSE;
924
925 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
926 match = alt_name_matches(name,
927 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus, NULL);
928 return match;
929 }
930
931 static BOOL alt_name_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
932 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
933 BOOL *present)
934 {
935 DWORD i;
936 BOOL match = FALSE;
937
938 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
939 match = alt_name_matches(name,
940 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus,
941 present);
942 return match;
943 }
944
945 static inline PCERT_EXTENSION get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO *cert)
946 {
947 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
948
949 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2,
950 cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
951 if (!ext)
952 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
953 cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
954 return ext;
955 }
956
957 static void compare_alt_name_with_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *altNameExt,
958 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
959 {
960 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectAltName;
961 DWORD size;
962
963 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
964 altNameExt->Value.pbData, altNameExt->Value.cbData,
965 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
966 &subjectAltName, &size))
967 {
968 DWORD i;
969
970 for (i = 0; i < subjectAltName->cAltEntry; i++)
971 {
972 BOOL nameFormPresent;
973
974 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is present.
975 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
976 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
977 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
978 * the certificate is acceptable."
979 */
980 if (alt_name_matches_excluded_name(
981 &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
982 trustErrorStatus))
983 {
984 TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d excluded\n",
985 subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
986 *trustErrorStatus |=
987 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
988 }
989 nameFormPresent = FALSE;
990 if (!alt_name_matches_permitted_name(
991 &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
992 trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
993 {
994 TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d not permitted\n",
995 subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
996 *trustErrorStatus |=
997 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
998 }
999 }
1000 LocalFree(subjectAltName);
1001 }
1002 else
1003 *trustErrorStatus |=
1004 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1005 }
1006
1007 static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
1008 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1009 {
1010 DWORD i;
1011 BOOL match = FALSE;
1012
1013 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1014 {
1015 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1016 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
1017
1018 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1019 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
1020 (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
1021 }
1022 return match;
1023 }
1024
1025 static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
1026 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
1027 BOOL *present)
1028 {
1029 DWORD i;
1030 BOOL match = FALSE;
1031
1032 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1033 {
1034 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1035 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
1036
1037 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1038 {
1039 *present = TRUE;
1040 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
1041 (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
1042 }
1043 }
1044 return match;
1045 }
1046
1047 static void compare_subject_with_email_constraints(
1048 const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
1049 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1050 {
1051 CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
1052 DWORD size;
1053
1054 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
1055 subjectName->pbData, subjectName->cbData,
1056 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
1057 {
1058 DWORD i, j;
1059
1060 for (i = 0; i < name->cRDN; i++)
1061 for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
1062 if (!strcmp(name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId,
1063 szOID_RSA_emailAddr))
1064 {
1065 BOOL nameFormPresent;
1066
1067 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is
1068 * present. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1069 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
1070 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
1071 * the certificate is acceptable."
1072 */
1073 if (rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(
1074 &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
1075 trustErrorStatus))
1076 {
1077 TRACE_(chain)(
1078 "email address in subject name is excluded\n");
1079 *trustErrorStatus |=
1080 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1081 }
1082 nameFormPresent = FALSE;
1083 if (!rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(
1084 &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
1085 trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
1086 {
1087 TRACE_(chain)(
1088 "email address in subject name is not permitted\n");
1089 *trustErrorStatus |=
1090 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1091 }
1092 }
1093 LocalFree(name);
1094 }
1095 else
1096 *trustErrorStatus |=
1097 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1098 }
1099
1100 static BOOL CRYPT_IsEmptyName(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
1101 {
1102 BOOL empty;
1103
1104 if (!name->cbData)
1105 empty = TRUE;
1106 else if (name->cbData == 2 && name->pbData[1] == 0)
1107 {
1108 /* An empty sequence is also empty */
1109 empty = TRUE;
1110 }
1111 else
1112 empty = FALSE;
1113 return empty;
1114 }
1115
1116 static void compare_subject_with_constraints(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
1117 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1118 {
1119 BOOL hasEmailConstraint = FALSE;
1120 DWORD i;
1121
1122 /* In general, a subject distinguished name only matches a directory name
1123 * constraint. However, an exception exists for email addresses.
1124 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.6:
1125 * "Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is
1126 * embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress
1127 * attribute [RFC2985]."
1128 * If an email address constraint exists, check that constraint separately.
1129 */
1130 for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree;
1131 i++)
1132 if (nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
1133 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1134 hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
1135 for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree;
1136 i++)
1137 if (nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
1138 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1139 hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
1140 if (hasEmailConstraint)
1141 compare_subject_with_email_constraints(subjectName, nameConstraints,
1142 trustErrorStatus);
1143 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1144 {
1145 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1146 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
1147
1148 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME &&
1149 directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName, subjectName))
1150 {
1151 TRACE_(chain)("subject name is excluded\n");
1152 *trustErrorStatus |=
1153 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1154 }
1155 }
1156 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1157 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present.
1158 * If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is
1159 * acceptable."
1160 * An empty name can't have the name form present, so don't check it.
1161 */
1162 if (nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree && !CRYPT_IsEmptyName(subjectName))
1163 {
1164 BOOL match = FALSE, hasDirectoryConstraint = FALSE;
1165
1166 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1167 {
1168 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1169 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
1170
1171 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
1172 {
1173 hasDirectoryConstraint = TRUE;
1174 match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
1175 subjectName);
1176 }
1177 }
1178 if (hasDirectoryConstraint && !match)
1179 {
1180 TRACE_(chain)("subject name is not permitted\n");
1181 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1182 }
1183 }
1184 }
1185
1186 static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
1187 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, const CERT_INFO *cert,
1188 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1189 {
1190 CERT_EXTENSION *ext = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert);
1191
1192 if (ext)
1193 compare_alt_name_with_constraints(ext, nameConstraints,
1194 trustErrorStatus);
1195 /* Name constraints apply to the subject alternative name as well as the
1196 * subject name. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1197 * "Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to
1198 * subject alternative names."
1199 */
1200 compare_subject_with_constraints(&cert->Subject, nameConstraints,
1201 trustErrorStatus);
1202 }
1203
1204 /* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
1205 static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO *cert)
1206 {
1207 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info = NULL;
1208
1209 CERT_EXTENSION *ext;
1210
1211 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, cert->cExtension,
1212 cert->rgExtension)))
1213 {
1214 DWORD size;
1215
1216 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
1217 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1218 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info,
1219 &size);
1220 }
1221 return info;
1222 }
1223
1224 static BOOL CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info)
1225 {
1226 DWORD i;
1227 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1228
1229 /* Make sure at least one permitted or excluded subtree is present. From
1230 * RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1231 * "Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an
1232 * empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the
1233 * excludedSubtrees MUST be present."
1234 */
1235 if (!info->cPermittedSubtree && !info->cExcludedSubtree)
1236 {
1237 WARN_(chain)("constraints contain no permitted nor excluded subtree\n");
1238 ret = FALSE;
1239 }
1240 /* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
1241 * See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1242 * "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
1243 * any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
1244 * absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
1245 * constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
1246 * maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
1247 * application MUST either process these fields or reject the
1248 * certificate."
1249 * Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
1250 * reject any name constraint that contains them.
1251 */
1252 for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1253 if (info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
1254 info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
1255 {
1256 TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
1257 ret = FALSE;
1258 }
1259 for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1260 if (info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
1261 info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
1262 {
1263 TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
1264 ret = FALSE;
1265 }
1266 return ret;
1267 }
1268
1269 static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
1270 {
1271 int i, j;
1272
1273 /* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
1274 * MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
1275 * name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
1276 * the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
1277 * in the chain, not just the end cert.
1278 * Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
1279 * certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
1280 * them.
1281 * In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
1282 * still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
1283 * constraints.
1284 */
1285 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
1286 {
1287 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
1288
1289 if ((nameConstraints = CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
1290 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo)))
1291 {
1292 if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints))
1293 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1294 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1295 else
1296 {
1297 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
1298 {
1299 DWORD errorStatus = 0;
1300
1301 /* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
1302 * constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
1303 */
1304 if (j == 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1305 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext))
1306 {
1307 CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints,
1308 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
1309 &errorStatus);
1310 if (errorStatus)
1311 {
1312 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1313 errorStatus;
1314 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1315 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1316 }
1317 else
1318 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
1319 CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1320 }
1321 }
1322 }
1323 LocalFree(nameConstraints);
1324 }
1325 }
1326 }
1327
1328 /* Gets cert's policies info, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
1329 static CERT_POLICIES_INFO *CRYPT_GetPolicies(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1330 {
1331 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1332 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies = NULL;
1333
1334 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
1335 cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
1336 if (ext)
1337 {
1338 DWORD size;
1339
1340 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
1341 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1342 &policies, &size);
1343 }
1344 return policies;
1345 }
1346
1347 static void CRYPT_CheckPolicies(const CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies, CERT_INFO *cert,
1348 DWORD *errorStatus)
1349 {
1350 DWORD i;
1351
1352 for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
1353 {
1354 /* For now, the only accepted policy identifier is the anyPolicy
1355 * identifier.
1356 * FIXME: the policy identifiers should be compared against the
1357 * cert's certificate policies extension, subject to the policy
1358 * mappings extension, and the policy constraints extension.
1359 * See RFC 5280, sections 4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.1.11.
1360 */
1361 if (strcmp(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier,
1362 szOID_ANY_CERT_POLICY))
1363 {
1364 FIXME("unsupported policy %s\n",
1365 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier);
1366 *errorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS;
1367 }
1368 }
1369 }
1370
1371 static void CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
1372 {
1373 int i, j;
1374
1375 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
1376 {
1377 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
1378
1379 if ((policies = CRYPT_GetPolicies(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext)))
1380 {
1381 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
1382 {
1383 DWORD errorStatus = 0;
1384
1385 CRYPT_CheckPolicies(policies,
1386 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo, &errorStatus);
1387 if (errorStatus)
1388 {
1389 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1390 errorStatus;
1391 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1392 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1393 }
1394 }
1395 LocalFree(policies);
1396 }
1397 }
1398 }
1399
1400 static LPWSTR name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
1401 {
1402 DWORD len = cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
1403 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, NULL, 0);
1404 LPWSTR str = NULL;
1405
1406 if (len)
1407 {
1408 str = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1409 if (str)
1410 cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
1411 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, str, len);
1412 }
1413 return str;
1414 }
1415
1416 static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *entry)
1417 {
1418 LPWSTR str;
1419
1420 switch (entry->dwAltNameChoice)
1421 {
1422 case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME:
1423 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
1424 debugstr_a(entry->u.pOtherName->pszObjId));
1425 break;
1426 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
1427 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
1428 debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszRfc822Name));
1429 break;
1430 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
1431 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
1432 debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszDNSName));
1433 break;
1434 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
1435 str = name_value_to_str(&entry->u.DirectoryName);
1436 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str));
1437 CryptMemFree(str);
1438 break;
1439 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
1440 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszURL));
1441 break;
1442 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
1443 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
1444 entry->u.IPAddress.cbData);
1445 break;
1446 case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID:
1447 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
1448 debugstr_a(entry->u.pszRegisteredID));
1449 break;
1450 default:
1451 TRACE_(chain)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry->dwAltNameChoice);
1452 }
1453 }
1454
1455 static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type, const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1456 {
1457 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *name;
1458 DWORD size;
1459
1460 TRACE_(chain)("%s:\n", type);
1461 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
1462 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1463 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
1464 {
1465 DWORD i;
1466
1467 TRACE_(chain)("%d alt name entries:\n", name->cAltEntry);
1468 for (i = 0; i < name->cAltEntry; i++)
1469 dump_alt_name_entry(&name->rgAltEntry[i]);
1470 LocalFree(name);
1471 }
1472 }
1473
1474 static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1475 {
1476 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
1477 DWORD size = 0;
1478
1479 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
1480 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
1481 NULL, &info, &size))
1482 {
1483 TRACE_(chain)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info->SubjectType.pbData[0]);
1484 TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
1485 info->fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
1486 TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", info->dwPathLenConstraint);
1487 LocalFree(info);
1488 }
1489 }
1490
1491 static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1492 {
1493 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
1494 DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
1495
1496 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1497 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1498 0, NULL, &constraints, &size))
1499 {
1500 TRACE_(chain)("basic constraints:\n");
1501 TRACE_(chain)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints.fCA ? "" : "not");
1502 TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
1503 constraints.fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
1504 TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", constraints.dwPathLenConstraint);
1505 }
1506 }
1507
1508 static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1509 {
1510 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1511 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1512
1513 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
1514 ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
1515 {
1516 #define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
1517 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1518 if (usage.cbData)
1519 {
1520 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE);
1521 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE);
1522 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1523 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1524 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1525 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
1526 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
1527 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE);
1528 }
1529 #undef trace_usage_bit
1530 if (usage.cbData > 1 && usage.pbData[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE)
1531 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
1532 }
1533 }
1534
1535 static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE *subtree)
1536 {
1537 dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree->Base);
1538 TRACE_(chain)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
1539 subtree->dwMinimum, subtree->fMaximum, subtree->dwMaximum);
1540 }
1541
1542 static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1543 {
1544 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
1545 DWORD size;
1546
1547 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
1548 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1549 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &nameConstraints,
1550 &size))
1551 {
1552 DWORD i;
1553
1554 TRACE_(chain)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
1555 nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree);
1556 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1557 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i]);
1558 TRACE_(chain)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
1559 nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree);
1560 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1561 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i]);
1562 LocalFree(nameConstraints);
1563 }
1564 }
1565
1566 static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1567 {
1568 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
1569 DWORD size;
1570
1571 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
1572 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1573 &policies, &size))
1574 {
1575 DWORD i, j;
1576
1577 TRACE_(chain)("%d policies:\n", policies->cPolicyInfo);
1578 for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
1579 {
1580 TRACE_(chain)("policy identifier: %s\n",
1581 debugstr_a(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier));
1582 TRACE_(chain)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
1583 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier);
1584 for (j = 0; j < policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier; j++)
1585 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
1586 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].rgPolicyQualifier[j].
1587 pszPolicyQualifierId));
1588 }
1589 LocalFree(policies);
1590 }
1591 }
1592
1593 static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1594 {
1595 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
1596 DWORD size;
1597
1598 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
1599 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1600 &usage, &size))
1601 {
1602 DWORD i;
1603
1604 TRACE_(chain)("%d usages:\n", usage->cUsageIdentifier);
1605 for (i = 0; i < usage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
1606 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
1607 LocalFree(usage);
1608 }
1609 }
1610
1611 static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1612 {
1613 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1614 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1615
1616 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
1617 ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
1618 {
1619 #define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
1620 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1621 if (usage.cbData)
1622 {
1623 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
1624 NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
1625 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
1626 NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
1627 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE);
1628 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE);
1629 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1630 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1631 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1632 }
1633 #undef trace_cert_type_bit
1634 }
1635 }
1636
1637 static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1638 {
1639 TRACE_(chain)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext->pszObjId),
1640 ext->fCritical ? "" : "not ");
1641 if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
1642 dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext);
1643 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME))
1644 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext);
1645 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
1646 dump_basic_constraints(ext);
1647 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
1648 dump_key_usage(ext);
1649 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
1650 dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext);
1651 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2))
1652 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext);
1653 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
1654 dump_basic_constraints2(ext);
1655 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
1656 dump_name_constraints(ext);
1657 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
1658 dump_cert_policies(ext);
1659 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
1660 dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext);
1661 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE))
1662 dump_netscape_cert_type(ext);
1663 }
1664
1665 static LPCWSTR filetime_to_str(const FILETIME *time)
1666 {
1667 static WCHAR date[80];
1668 WCHAR dateFmt[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
1669 SYSTEMTIME sysTime;
1670
1671 if (!time) return NULL;
1672
1673 GetLocaleInfoW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE, dateFmt,
1674 sizeof(dateFmt) / sizeof(dateFmt[0]));
1675 FileTimeToSystemTime(time, &sysTime);
1676 GetDateFormatW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, 0, &sysTime, dateFmt, date,
1677 sizeof(date) / sizeof(date[0]));
1678 return date;
1679 }
1680
1681 static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1682 {
1683 LPWSTR name = NULL;
1684 DWORD len, i;
1685
1686 TRACE_(chain)("%p: version %d\n", cert, cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
1687 len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
1688 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, NULL, 0);
1689 name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1690 if (name)
1691 {
1692 CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
1693 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, name, len);
1694 TRACE_(chain)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
1695 CryptMemFree(name);
1696 }
1697 len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
1698 NULL, 0);
1699 name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1700 if (name)
1701 {
1702 CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
1703 name, len);
1704 TRACE_(chain)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
1705 CryptMemFree(name);
1706 }
1707 TRACE_(chain)("valid from %s to %s\n",
1708 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotBefore)),
1709 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotAfter)));
1710 TRACE_(chain)("%d extensions\n", cert->pCertInfo->cExtension);
1711 for (i = 0; i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
1712 dump_extension(&cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i]);
1713 }
1714
1715 static BOOL CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
1716 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, BOOL isRoot, BOOL isCA, DWORD index)
1717 {
1718 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1719 BOOL ret;
1720 BYTE usageBits = 0;
1721
1722 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
1723 cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
1724 if (ext)
1725 {
1726 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1727 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1728
1729 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType, X509_BITS,
1730 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
1731 &usage, &size);
1732 if (!ret)
1733 return FALSE;
1734 else if (usage.cbData > 2)
1735 {
1736 /* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
1737 * bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
1738 */
1739 return FALSE;
1740 }
1741 else
1742 {
1743 /* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
1744 * bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
1745 * key usage bits.
1746 */
1747 usageBits = usage.pbData[usage.cbData - 1];
1748 }
1749 }
1750 if (isCA)
1751 {
1752 if (!ext)
1753 {
1754 /* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
1755 * here. Quoting the RFC:
1756 * "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
1757 * contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
1758 * on other public key certificates or CRLs."
1759 * MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
1760 * extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
1761 * extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
1762 * perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
1763 * certs without key usage extensions. We are more restrictive:
1764 * we accept locally installed V1 or V2 certs as CA certs.
1765 * We also accept a lack of key usage extension on root certs,
1766 * which is implied in RFC 5280, section 6.1: the trust anchor's
1767 * only requirement is that it was used to issue the next
1768 * certificate in the chain.
1769 */
1770 if (isRoot)
1771 ret = TRUE;
1772 else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
1773 cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
1774 {
1775 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(
1776 engine->hWorld, cert);
1777
1778 ret = localCert != NULL;
1779 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
1780 }
1781 else
1782 ret = FALSE;
1783 if (!ret)
1784 WARN_(chain)("no key usage extension on a CA cert\n");
1785 }
1786 else
1787 {
1788 if (!(usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
1789 {
1790 WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
1791 ret = FALSE;
1792 }
1793 else
1794 ret = TRUE;
1795 }
1796 }
1797 else
1798 {
1799 if (ext && (usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
1800 {
1801 WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
1802 ret = FALSE;
1803 }
1804 else
1805 ret = TRUE;
1806 }
1807 return ret;
1808 }
1809
1810 static BOOL CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1811 {
1812 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1813 DWORD i;
1814
1815 for (i = 0; ret && i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
1816 {
1817 if (cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].fCritical)
1818 {
1819 LPCSTR oid = cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].pszObjId;
1820
1821 if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
1822 ret = TRUE;
1823 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
1824 ret = TRUE;
1825 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
1826 ret = TRUE;
1827 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
1828 ret = TRUE;
1829 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
1830 ret = TRUE;
1831 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
1832 ret = TRUE;
1833 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
1834 ret = TRUE;
1835 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
1836 ret = TRUE;
1837 else
1838 {
1839 FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
1840 debugstr_a(oid));
1841 ret = FALSE;
1842 }
1843 }
1844 }
1845 return ret;
1846 }
1847
1848 static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1849 {
1850 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1851
1852 /* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
1853 switch (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion)
1854 {
1855 case CERT_V1:
1856 /* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
1857 * section 4.1.2.8:
1858 * "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
1859 * 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
1860 */
1861 if (cert->pCertInfo->IssuerUniqueId.cbData ||
1862 cert->pCertInfo->SubjectUniqueId.cbData)
1863 ret = FALSE;
1864 /* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1865 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1866 */
1867 if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
1868 ret = FALSE;
1869 break;
1870 case CERT_V2:
1871 /* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1872 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1873 */
1874 if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
1875 ret = FALSE;
1876 break;
1877 case CERT_V3:
1878 /* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
1879 break;
1880 default:
1881 WARN_(chain)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
1882 ret = FALSE;
1883 }
1884 return ret;
1885 }
1886
1887 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
1888 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, LPFILETIME time)
1889 {
1890 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
1891 int i;
1892 BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated = FALSE;
1893 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints = { FALSE, FALSE, 0 };
1894
1895 TRACE_(chain)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
1896 chain->cElement, debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(time)));
1897 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i >= 0; i--)
1898 {
1899 BOOL isRoot;
1900
1901 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
1902 dump_element(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
1903 if (i == chain->cElement - 1)
1904 isRoot = CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1905 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
1906 else
1907 isRoot = FALSE;
1908 if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
1909 {
1910 /* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
1911 * contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
1912 */
1913 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1914 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1915 }
1916 if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time,
1917 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo) != 0)
1918 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1919 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID;
1920 if (i != 0)
1921 {
1922 /* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
1923 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1924 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT,
1925 (void *)chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->pCertContext,
1926 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT,
1927 (void *)chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, 0, NULL))
1928 chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1929 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
1930 /* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
1931 * CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
1932 */
1933 if (pathLengthConstraintViolated)
1934 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1935 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1936 else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine,
1937 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, i - 1, isRoot,
1938 &pathLengthConstraintViolated))
1939 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1940 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1941 else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint &&
1942 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint)
1943 {
1944 /* This one's valid - decrement max length */
1945 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint--;
1946 }
1947 }
1948 else
1949 {
1950 /* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
1951 if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
1952 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, FALSE))
1953 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1954 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1955 }
1956 if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext,
1957 isRoot, constraints.fCA, i))
1958 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1959 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
1960 if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain))
1961 {
1962 /* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
1963 * are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
1964 */
1965 pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
1966 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1967 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN |
1968 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1969 }
1970 /* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
1971 if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
1972 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
1973 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1974 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1975 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1976 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1977 }
1978 CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain);
1979 CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(chain);
1980 if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement->pCertContext))
1981 {
1982 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
1983 CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED | CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
1984 CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine->hRoot, rootElement);
1985 }
1986 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &rootElement->TrustStatus);
1987 }
1988
1989 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_GetIssuer(HCERTSTORE store, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject,
1990 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer, DWORD *infoStatus)
1991 {
1992 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = NULL;
1993 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1994 DWORD size;
1995
1996 *infoStatus = 0;
1997 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
1998 subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
1999 {
2000 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
2001 BOOL ret;
2002
2003 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
2004 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2005 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
2006 &info, &size);
2007 if (ret)
2008 {
2009 CERT_ID id;
2010
2011 if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
2012 {
2013 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
2014 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer, &info->CertIssuer,
2015 sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
2016 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
2017 &info->CertSerialNumber, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
2018 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2019 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
2020 prevIssuer);
2021 if (issuer)
2022 {
2023 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n");
2024 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
2025 }
2026 }
2027 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
2028 {
2029 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
2030 memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
2031 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2032 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
2033 prevIssuer);
2034 if (issuer)
2035 {
2036 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
2037 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
2038 }
2039 }
2040 LocalFree(info);
2041 }
2042 }
2043 else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
2044 subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
2045 {
2046 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
2047 BOOL ret;
2048
2049 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
2050 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2051 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
2052 &info, &size);
2053 if (ret)
2054 {
2055 CERT_ID id;
2056
2057 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
2058 info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
2059 {
2060 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
2061 DWORD i;
2062
2063 for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
2064 i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
2065 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
2066 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
2067 directoryName =
2068 &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
2069 if (directoryName)
2070 {
2071 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
2072 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer,
2073 &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
2074 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
2075 &info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
2076 sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
2077 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2078 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
2079 prevIssuer);
2080 if (issuer)
2081 {
2082 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by directory name\n");
2083 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
2084 }
2085 }
2086 else
2087 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
2088 }
2089 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
2090 {
2091 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
2092 memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
2093 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2094 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
2095 prevIssuer);
2096 if (issuer)
2097 {
2098 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
2099 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
2100 }
2101 }
2102 LocalFree(info);
2103 }
2104 }
2105 else
2106 {
2107 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2108 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME,
2109 &subject->pCertInfo->Issuer, prevIssuer);
2110 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by name\n");
2111 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
2112 }
2113 return issuer;
2114 }
2115
2116 /* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
2117 * until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
2118 */
2119 static BOOL CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
2120 HCERTSTORE world, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
2121 {
2122 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2123 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
2124
2125 while (ret && !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain) &&
2126 !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert))
2127 {
2128 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(world, cert, NULL,
2129 &chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
2130
2131 if (issuer)
2132 {
2133 ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, issuer,
2134 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
2135 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
2136 * close the enumeration that found it
2137 */
2138 CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer);
2139 cert = issuer;
2140 }
2141 else
2142 {
2143 TRACE_(chain)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
2144 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
2145 break;
2146 }
2147 }
2148 return ret;
2149 }
2150
2151 static BOOL CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
2152 HCERTSTORE world, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime,
2153 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *ppChain)
2154 {
2155 BOOL ret = FALSE;
2156 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain;
2157
2158 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", engine, world, cert, pTime);
2159
2160 chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2161 if (chain)
2162 {
2163 memset(chain, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2164 chain->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
2165 ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, cert, 0);
2166 if (ret)
2167 {
2168 ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, world, chain);
2169 if (ret)
2170 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine, chain, pTime);
2171 }
2172 if (!ret)
2173 {
2174 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain);
2175 chain = NULL;
2176 }
2177 *ppChain = chain;
2178 }
2179 return ret;
2180 }
2181
2182 static BOOL CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
2183 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2184 PCertificateChain *ppChain)
2185 {
2186 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
2187 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain = NULL;
2188 HCERTSTORE world;
2189 BOOL ret;
2190
2191 world = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
2192 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
2193 CertAddStoreToCollection(world, engine->hWorld, 0, 0);
2194 if (hAdditionalStore)
2195 CertAddStoreToCollection(world, hAdditionalStore, 0, 0);
2196 /* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
2197 * supported yet.
2198 */
2199 if ((ret = CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine, world, cert, pTime,
2200 &simpleChain)))
2201 {
2202 PCertificateChain chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
2203
2204 if (chain)
2205 {
2206 chain->ref = 1;
2207 chain->world = world;
2208 chain->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
2209 chain->context.TrustStatus = simpleChain->TrustStatus;
2210 chain->context.cChain = 1;
2211 chain->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2212 chain->context.rgpChain[0] = simpleChain;
2213 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2214 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2215 chain->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
2216 chain->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
2217 }
2218 else
2219 ret = FALSE;
2220 *ppChain = chain;
2221 }
2222 return ret;
2223 }
2224
2225 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
2226 static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
2227 const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain, DWORD iElement)
2228 {
2229 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2230
2231 if (copy)
2232 {
2233 memset(copy, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2234 copy->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
2235 copy->rgpElement =
2236 CryptMemAlloc((iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2237 if (copy->rgpElement)
2238 {
2239 DWORD i;
2240 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2241
2242 memset(copy->rgpElement, 0,
2243 (iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2244 for (i = 0; ret && i <= iElement; i++)
2245 {
2246 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element =
2247 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2248
2249 if (element)
2250 {
2251 *element = *chain->rgpElement[i];
2252 element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2253 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
2254 /* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
2255 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2256 */
2257 memset(&element->TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
2258 copy->rgpElement[copy->cElement++] = element;
2259 }
2260 else
2261 ret = FALSE;
2262 }
2263 if (!ret)
2264 {
2265 for (i = 0; i <= iElement; i++)
2266 CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement[i]);
2267 CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement);
2268 CryptMemFree(copy);
2269 copy = NULL;
2270 }
2271 }
2272 else
2273 {
2274 CryptMemFree(copy);
2275 copy = NULL;
2276 }
2277 }
2278 return copy;
2279 }
2280
2281 static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(PCertificateChain chain)
2282 {
2283 DWORD i;
2284
2285 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
2286 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]);
2287 CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext);
2288 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2289 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2290 }
2291
2292 static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(PCertificateChain chain)
2293 {
2294 DWORD i;
2295
2296 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
2297 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
2298 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain->context.rgpChain[i]);
2299 CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpChain);
2300 CertCloseStore(chain->world, 0);
2301 CryptMemFree(chain);
2302 }
2303
2304 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
2305 * simple chain iChain.
2306 */
2307 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(PCertificateChain chain,
2308 DWORD iChain, DWORD iElement)
2309 {
2310 PCertificateChain copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
2311
2312 if (copy)
2313 {
2314 copy->ref = 1;
2315 copy->world = CertDuplicateStore(chain->world);
2316 copy->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
2317 /* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
2318 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2319 */
2320 memset(&copy->context.TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
2321 copy->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2322 copy->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2323 copy->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
2324 copy->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
2325 copy->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(
2326 (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2327 if (copy->context.rgpChain)
2328 {
2329 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2330 DWORD i;
2331
2332 memset(copy->context.rgpChain, 0,
2333 (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2334 if (iChain)
2335 {
2336 for (i = 0; ret && iChain && i < iChain - 1; i++)
2337 {
2338 copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
2339 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
2340 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1);
2341 if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
2342 ret = FALSE;
2343 }
2344 }
2345 else
2346 i = 0;
2347 if (ret)
2348 {
2349 copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
2350 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
2351 iElement);
2352 if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
2353 ret = FALSE;
2354 }
2355 if (!ret)
2356 {
2357 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy);
2358 copy = NULL;
2359 }
2360 else
2361 copy->context.cChain = iChain + 1;
2362 }
2363 else
2364 {
2365 CryptMemFree(copy);
2366 copy = NULL;
2367 }
2368 }
2369 return copy;
2370 }
2371
2372 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
2373 HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2374 PCertificateChain chain)
2375 {
2376 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
2377 PCertificateChain alternate;
2378
2379 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pTime, hAdditionalStore, chain);
2380
2381 /* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
2382 * order of alternate creation:
2383 */
2384 if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
2385 chain = (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
2386 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext - 1];
2387 /* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
2388 if (chain->context.cChain <= 1 && chain->context.rgpChain[0]->cElement <= 1)
2389 alternate = NULL;
2390 else
2391 {
2392 DWORD i, j, infoStatus;
2393 PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer = NULL;
2394
2395 alternate = NULL;
2396 for (i = 0; !alternateIssuer && i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
2397 for (j = 0; !alternateIssuer &&
2398 j < chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1; j++)
2399 {
2400 PCCERT_CONTEXT subject =
2401 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
2402 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2403 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext);
2404
2405 alternateIssuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(prevIssuer->hCertStore,
2406 subject, prevIssuer, &infoStatus);
2407 }
2408 if (alternateIssuer)
2409 {
2410 i--;
2411 j--;
2412 alternate = CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain, i, j);
2413 if (alternate)
2414 {
2415 BOOL ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine,
2416 alternate->context.rgpChain[i], alternateIssuer, infoStatus);
2417
2418 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
2419 * to close the enumeration that found it
2420 */
2421 CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer);
2422 if (ret)
2423 {
2424 ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, alternate->world,
2425 alternate->context.rgpChain[i]);
2426 if (ret)
2427 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine,
2428 alternate->context.rgpChain[i], pTime);
2429 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate->context.TrustStatus,
2430 &alternate->context.rgpChain[i]->TrustStatus);
2431 }
2432 if (!ret)
2433 {
2434 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate);
2435 alternate = NULL;
2436 }
2437 }
2438 }
2439 }
2440 TRACE("%p\n", alternate);
2441 return alternate;
2442 }
2443
2444 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
2445 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
2446 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
2447 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
2448 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
2449
2450 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
2451 CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
2452 CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
2453 CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
2454
2455 #define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
2456 (TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
2457
2458 static DWORD CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain *chain)
2459 {
2460 DWORD quality = CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST;
2461
2462 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2463 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT))
2464 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT;
2465 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2466 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
2467 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
2468 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2469 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN))
2470 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN;
2471 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2472 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED))
2473 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID;
2474 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2475 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID))
2476 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID;
2477 return quality;
2478 }
2479
2480 /* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
2481 * alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
2482 * chains as lower quality chains of it.
2483 */
2484 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
2485 PCertificateChain chain)
2486 {
2487 DWORD i;
2488
2489 /* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
2490 * alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
2491 * has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
2492 * quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
2493 * lower quality contexts.
2494 */
2495 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
2496 {
2497 PCertificateChain alternate =
2498 (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i];
2499
2500 if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain))
2501 {
2502 alternate->context.cLowerQualityChainContext =
2503 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext;
2504 alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2505 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext;
2506 alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i] =
2507 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
2508 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2509 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2510 chain = alternate;
2511 }
2512 }
2513 return chain;
2514 }
2515
2516 static BOOL CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(PCertificateChain chain,
2517 const CertificateChain *alternate)
2518 {
2519 BOOL ret;
2520
2521 if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
2522 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2523 CryptMemRealloc(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext,
2524 (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext + 1) *
2525 sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
2526 else
2527 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2528 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
2529 if (chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext)
2530 {
2531 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
2532 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext++] =
2533 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)alternate;
2534 ret = TRUE;
2535 }
2536 else
2537 ret = FALSE;
2538 return ret;
2539 }
2540
2541 static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2542 const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT *chain, DWORD i)
2543 {
2544 DWORD j, iElement;
2545 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = NULL;
2546
2547 for (j = 0, iElement = 0; !element && j < chain->cChain; j++)
2548 {
2549 if (iElement + chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement < i)
2550 iElement += chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement;
2551 else
2552 element = chain->rgpChain[j]->rgpElement[i - iElement];
2553 }
2554 return element;
2555 }
2556
2557 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS {
2558 DWORD cbSize;
2559 CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage;
2560 } CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS, *PCERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS;
2561
2562 static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
2563 LPFILETIME pTime, const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara, DWORD chainFlags)
2564 {
2565 DWORD cContext;
2566
2567 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT)
2568 cContext = 1;
2569 else if ((chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN) ||
2570 (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT))
2571 {
2572 DWORD i;
2573
2574 for (i = 0, cContext = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
2575 {
2576 if (i < chain->cChain - 1 ||
2577 chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN)
2578 cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement;
2579 else
2580 cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1;
2581 }
2582 }
2583 else
2584 cContext = 0;
2585 if (cContext)
2586 {
2587 PCCERT_CONTEXT *contexts =
2588 CryptMemAlloc(cContext * sizeof(PCCERT_CONTEXT));
2589
2590 if (contexts)
2591 {
2592 DWORD i, j, iContext, revocationFlags;
2593 CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara = { sizeof(revocationPara), 0 };
2594 CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus =
2595 { sizeof(revocationStatus), 0 };
2596 BOOL ret;
2597
2598 for (i = 0, iContext = 0; iContext < cContext && i < chain->cChain;
2599 i++)
2600 {
2601 for (j = 0; iContext < cContext &&
2602 j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++)
2603 contexts[iContext++] =
2604 chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
2605 }
2606 revocationFlags = CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG;
2607 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY)
2608 revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION;
2609 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT)
2610 revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG;
2611 revocationPara.pftTimeToUse = pTime;
2612 if (pChainPara->cbSize == sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
2613 {
2614 revocationPara.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout =
2615 pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
2616 revocationPara.fCheckFreshnessTime =
2617 pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime;
2618 revocationPara.dwFreshnessTime =
2619 pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime;
2620 }
2621 ret = CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
2622 CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE, cContext, (void **)contexts,
2623 revocationFlags, &revocationPara, &revocationStatus);
2624 if (!ret)
2625 {
2626 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element =
2627 CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(chain, revocationStatus.dwIndex);
2628 DWORD error;
2629
2630 switch (revocationStatus.dwError)
2631 {
2632 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
2633 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL:
2634 case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE:
2635 /* If the revocation status is unknown, it's assumed to be
2636 * offline too.
2637 */
2638 error = CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN |
2639 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
2640 break;
2641 case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
2642 error = CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
2643 break;
2644 case CRYPT_E_REVOKED:
2645 error = CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED;
2646 break;
2647 default:
2648 WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus.dwError);
2649 error = 0;
2650 }
2651 if (element)
2652 {
2653 /* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
2654 element->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
2655 }
2656 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
2657 }
2658 CryptMemFree(contexts);
2659 }
2660 }
2661 }
2662
2663 static void CRYPT_CheckUsages(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
2664 const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
2665 {
2666 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS) &&
2667 pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2668 {
2669 PCCERT_CONTEXT endCert;
2670 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
2671 BOOL validForUsage;
2672
2673 /* A chain, if created, always includes the end certificate */
2674 endCert = chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
2675 /* The extended key usage extension specifies how a certificate's
2676 * public key may be used. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12:
2677 * "This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
2678 * certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the
2679 * basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension."
2680 * If the extension is present, it only satisfies the requested usage
2681 * if that usage is included in the extension:
2682 * "If the extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be used
2683 * for one of the purposes indicated."
2684 * There is also the special anyExtendedKeyUsage OID, but it doesn't
2685 * have to be respected:
2686 * "Applications that require the presence of a particular purpose
2687 * MAY reject certificates that include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID
2688 * but not the particular OID expected for the application."
2689 * For now, I'm being more conservative and ignoring the presence of
2690 * the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID.
2691 */
2692 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
2693 endCert->pCertInfo->cExtension, endCert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
2694 {
2695 const CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *requestedUsage =
2696 &pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage;
2697 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
2698 DWORD size;
2699
2700 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
2701 X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2702 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
2703 {
2704 if (pChainPara->RequestedUsage.dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND)
2705 {
2706 DWORD i, j;
2707
2708 /* For AND matches, all usages must be present */
2709 validForUsage = TRUE;
2710 for (i = 0; validForUsage &&
2711 i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2712 {
2713 BOOL match = FALSE;
2714
2715 for (j = 0; !match && j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
2716 match = !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
2717 requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2718 if (!match)
2719 validForUsage = FALSE;
2720 }
2721 }
2722 else
2723 {
2724 DWORD i, j;
2725
2726 /* For OR matches, any matching usage suffices */
2727 validForUsage = FALSE;
2728 for (i = 0; !validForUsage &&
2729 i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2730 {
2731 for (j = 0; !validForUsage &&
2732 j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
2733 validForUsage =
2734 !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
2735 requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2736 }
2737 }
2738 LocalFree(usage);
2739 }
2740 else
2741 validForUsage = FALSE;
2742 }
2743 else
2744 {
2745 /* If the extension isn't present, any interpretation is valid:
2746 * "Certificate using applications MAY require that the extended
2747 * key usage extension be present and that a particular purpose
2748 * be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to
2749 * that application."
2750 * Not all web sites include the extended key usage extension, so
2751 * accept chains without it.
2752 */
2753 TRACE_(chain)("requested usage from certificate with no usages\n");
2754 validForUsage = TRUE;
2755 }
2756 if (!validForUsage)
2757 {
2758 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
2759 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
2760 chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
2761 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
2762 }
2763 }
2764 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA) &&
2765 pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2766 FIXME("unimplemented for RequestedIssuancePolicy\n");
2767 }
2768
2769 static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH *usageMatch)
2770 {
2771 if (usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2772 {
2773 DWORD i;
2774
2775 TRACE_(chain)("%s: %s\n", name,
2776 usageMatch->dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND ? "AND" : "OR");
2777 for (i = 0; i < usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2778 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usageMatch->Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2779 }
2780 }
2781
2782 static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
2783 {
2784 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->cbSize);
2785 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS))
2786 dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara->RequestedUsage);
2787 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
2788 {
2789 dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
2790 &pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy);
2791 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout);
2792 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime);
2793 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime);
2794 }
2795 }
2796
2797 BOOL WINAPI CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
2798 PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2799 PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara, DWORD dwFlags, LPVOID pvReserved,
2800 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT* ppChainContext)
2801 {
2802 BOOL ret;
2803 PCertificateChain chain = NULL;
2804
2805 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pCertContext,
2806 pTime, hAdditionalStore, pChainPara, dwFlags, pvReserved, ppChainContext);
2807
2808 if (ppChainContext)
2809 *ppChainContext = NULL;
2810 if (!pChainPara)
2811 {
2812 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
2813 return FALSE;
2814 }
2815 if (!pCertContext->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId)
2816 {
2817 SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
2818 return FALSE;
2819 }
2820
2821 if (!hChainEngine)
2822 hChainEngine = CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine();
2823 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
2824 dump_chain_para(pChainPara);
2825 /* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
2826 ret = CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(hChainEngine, pCertContext, pTime,
2827 hAdditionalStore, &chain);
2828 if (ret)
2829 {
2830 PCertificateChain alternate = NULL;
2831 PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain;
2832
2833 do {
2834 alternate = CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(hChainEngine,
2835 pTime, hAdditionalStore, chain);
2836
2837 /* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
2838 * chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
2839 * The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
2840 */
2841 if (alternate)
2842 ret = CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain, alternate);
2843 } while (ret && alternate);
2844 chain = CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain);
2845 if (!(dwFlags & CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS))
2846 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
2847 pChain = (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
2848 if (!pChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus)
2849 CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain, pTime, pChainPara, dwFlags);
2850 CRYPT_CheckUsages(pChain, pChainPara);
2851 TRACE_(chain)("error status: %08x\n",
2852 pChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus);
2853 if (ppChainContext)
2854 *ppChainContext = pChain;
2855 else
2856 CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain);
2857 }
2858 TRACE("returning %d\n", ret);
2859 return ret;
2860 }
2861
2862 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
2863 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
2864 {
2865 PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext;
2866
2867 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
2868
2869 if (chain)
2870 InterlockedIncrement(&chain->ref);
2871 return pChainContext;
2872 }
2873
2874 VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
2875 {
2876 PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext;
2877
2878 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
2879
2880 if (chain)
2881 {
2882 if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain->ref) == 0)
2883 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain);
2884 }
2885 }
2886
2887 static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, DWORD error,
2888 LONG *iChain, LONG *iElement)
2889 {
2890 DWORD i, j;
2891
2892 for (i = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
2893 for (j = 0; j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++)
2894 if (chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2895 error)
2896 {
2897 *iChain = i;
2898 *iElement = j;
2899 return;
2900 }
2901 }
2902
2903 static BOOL WINAPI verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2904 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2905 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2906 {
2907 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2908 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2909 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
2910 {
2911 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
2912 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2913 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2914 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2915 }
2916 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2917 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT)
2918 {
2919 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
2920 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2921 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2922 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2923 }
2924 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
2925 {
2926 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CHAINING;
2927 find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC,
2928 &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2929 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2930 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2931 }
2932 else
2933 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
2934 return TRUE;
2935 }
2936
2937 static BYTE msTestPubKey1[] = {
2938 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
2939 0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
2940 0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
2941 0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
2942 0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2943 static BYTE msTestPubKey2[] = {
2944 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
2945 0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
2946 0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
2947 0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
2948 0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2949
2950 static BOOL WINAPI verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2951 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2952 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2953 {
2954 BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
2955 pPolicyStatus);
2956
2957 if (ret && pPolicyStatus->dwError == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT)
2958 {
2959 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
2960 BOOL isMSTestRoot = FALSE;
2961 PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert =
2962 pChainContext->rgpChain[pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex]->
2963 rgpElement[pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex]->pCertContext;
2964 DWORD i;
2965 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
2966 { sizeof(msTestPubKey1), msTestPubKey1 },
2967 { sizeof(msTestPubKey2), msTestPubKey2 },
2968 };
2969
2970 /* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
2971 for (i = 0; !isMSTestRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
2972 i++)
2973 {
2974 msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
2975 msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
2976 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
2977 X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
2978 &failingCert->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
2979 isMSTestRoot = TRUE;
2980 }
2981 if (isMSTestRoot)
2982 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT;
2983 }
2984 return ret;
2985 }
2986
2987 static BOOL WINAPI verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2988 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2989 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2990 {
2991 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2992 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2993 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)
2994 {
2995 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
2996 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2997 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2998 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2999 }
3000 else
3001 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
3002 return TRUE;
3003 }
3004
3005 static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext,
3006 LPCWSTR server_name)
3007 {
3008 BOOL matches = FALSE;
3009 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectName;
3010 DWORD size;
3011
3012 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
3013 /* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
3014 * returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
3015 * encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
3016 * the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
3017 */
3018 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
3019 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
3020 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
3021 &subjectName, &size))
3022 {
3023 DWORD i;
3024
3025 /* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
3026 * in section 4.2.1.6:
3027 * "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
3028 * MAY be included."
3029 * It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818
3030 * and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches.
3031 */
3032 for (i = 0; !matches && i < subjectName->cAltEntry; i++)
3033 {
3034 if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice ==
3035 CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME)
3036 {
3037 TRACE_(chain)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
3038 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName));
3039 if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName[0] == '*')
3040 {
3041 LPCWSTR server_name_dot;
3042
3043 /* Matching a wildcard: a wildcard matches a single name
3044 * component, which is terminated by a dot. RFC 1034
3045 * doesn't define whether multiple wildcards are allowed,
3046 * but I will assume that they are not until proven
3047 * otherwise. RFC 1034 also states that 'the "*" label
3048 * always matches at least one whole label and sometimes
3049 * more, but always whole labels.' Native crypt32 does not
3050 * match more than one label with a wildcard, so I do the
3051 * same here. Thus, a wildcard only accepts the first
3052 * label, then requires an exact match of the remaining
3053 * string.
3054 */
3055 server_name_dot = strchrW(server_name, '.');
3056 if (server_name_dot)
3057 {
3058 if (!strcmpiW(server_name_dot,
3059 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName + 1))
3060 matches = TRUE;
3061 }
3062 }
3063 else if (!strcmpiW(server_name,
3064 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName))
3065 matches = TRUE;
3066 }
3067 }
3068 LocalFree(subjectName);
3069 }
3070 return matches;
3071 }
3072
3073 static BOOL find_matching_domain_component(const CERT_NAME_INFO *name,
3074 LPCWSTR component)
3075 {
3076 BOOL matches = FALSE;
3077 DWORD i, j;
3078
3079 for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
3080 for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
3081 if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT,
3082 name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId))
3083 {
3084 const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr;
3085
3086 attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
3087 /* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
3088 * a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
3089 * must match one domain component attribute's entire string
3090 * value with a case-insensitive match.
3091 */
3092 matches = !memicmpW(component, (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData,
3093 attr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR));
3094 }
3095 return matches;
3096 }
3097
3098 static BOOL match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component, DWORD allowed_len,
3099 LPCWSTR server_component, DWORD server_len, BOOL allow_wildcards,
3100 BOOL *see_wildcard)
3101 {
3102 LPCWSTR allowed_ptr, server_ptr;
3103 BOOL matches = TRUE;
3104
3105 *see_wildcard = FALSE;
3106 if (server_len < allowed_len)
3107 {
3108 WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
3109 debugstr_wn(server_component, server_len),
3110 debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
3111 /* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
3112 * component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
3113 */
3114 return FALSE;
3115 }
3116 for (allowed_ptr = allowed_component, server_ptr = server_component;
3117 matches && allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len;
3118 allowed_ptr++, server_ptr++)
3119 {
3120 if (*allowed_ptr == '*')
3121 {
3122 if (allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len - 1)
3123 {
3124 WARN_(chain)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
3125 matches = FALSE;
3126 }
3127 else if (!allow_wildcards)
3128 {
3129 WARN_(chain)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
3130 matches = FALSE;
3131 }
3132 else
3133 {
3134 /* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
3135 * the component also matches.
3136 */
3137 *see_wildcard = TRUE;
3138 break;
3139 }
3140 }
3141 matches = tolowerW(*allowed_ptr) == tolowerW(*server_ptr);
3142 }
3143 if (matches && server_ptr - server_component < server_len)
3144 {
3145 /* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
3146 * the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
3147 */
3148 matches = *allowed_ptr == '*';
3149 }
3150 return matches;
3151 }
3152
3153 static BOOL match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name, const CERT_RDN_ATTR *nameAttr)
3154 {
3155 LPCWSTR allowed = (LPCWSTR)nameAttr->Value.pbData;
3156 LPCWSTR allowed_component = allowed;
3157 DWORD allowed_len = nameAttr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR);
3158 LPCWSTR server_component = server_name;
3159 DWORD server_len = strlenW(server_name);
3160 BOOL matches = TRUE, allow_wildcards = TRUE;
3161
3162 TRACE_(chain)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
3163
3164 /* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
3165 * "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
3166 * any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
3167 * *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
3168 * but not bar.com."
3169 *
3170 * And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
3171 * "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
3172 * the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
3173 * foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
3174 *
3175 * There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
3176 * authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
3177 * *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
3178 * www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
3179 */
3180 do {
3181 LPCWSTR allowed_dot, server_dot;
3182
3183 allowed_dot = memchrW(allowed_component, '.',
3184 allowed_len - (allowed_component - allowed));
3185 server_dot = memchrW(server_component, '.',
3186 server_len - (server_component - server_name));
3187 /* The number of components must match */
3188 if ((!allowed_dot && server_dot) || (allowed_dot && !server_dot))
3189 {
3190 if (!allowed_dot)
3191 WARN_(chain)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
3192 debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
3193 else
3194 WARN_(chain)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
3195 debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
3196 matches = FALSE;
3197 }
3198 else
3199 {
3200 LPCWSTR allowed_end, server_end;
3201 BOOL has_wildcard;
3202
3203 allowed_end = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot : allowed + allowed_len;
3204 server_end = server_dot ? server_dot : server_name + server_len;
3205 matches = match_domain_component(allowed_component,
3206 allowed_end - allowed_component, server_component,
3207 server_end - server_component, allow_wildcards, &has_wildcard);
3208 /* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
3209 * may follow
3210 */
3211 if (!has_wildcard)
3212 allow_wildcards = FALSE;
3213 if (matches)
3214 {
3215 allowed_component = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot + 1 : allowed_end;
3216 server_component = server_dot ? server_dot + 1 : server_end;
3217 }
3218 }
3219 } while (matches && allowed_component &&
3220 allowed_component - allowed < allowed_len &&
3221 server_component && server_component - server_name < server_len);
3222 TRACE_(chain)("returning %d\n", matches);
3223 return matches;
3224 }
3225
3226 static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPCWSTR server_name)
3227 {
3228 BOOL matches = FALSE;
3229 CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
3230 DWORD size;
3231
3232 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
3233 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
3234 cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData,
3235 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
3236 &name, &size))
3237 {
3238 /* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
3239 * make sure all of them are present.
3240 */
3241 if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, name))
3242 {
3243 LPCWSTR ptr = server_name;
3244
3245 matches = TRUE;
3246 do {
3247 LPCWSTR dot = strchrW(ptr, '.'), end;
3248 /* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
3249 WCHAR component[255];
3250 DWORD len;
3251
3252 end = dot ? dot : ptr + strlenW(ptr);
3253 len = end - ptr;
3254 if (len >= sizeof(component) / sizeof(component[0]))
3255 {
3256 WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too long\n",
3257 debugstr_wn(ptr, len));
3258 matches = FALSE;
3259 }
3260 else
3261 {
3262 memcpy(component, ptr, len * sizeof(WCHAR));
3263 component[len] = 0;
3264 matches = find_matching_domain_component(name, component);
3265 }
3266 ptr = dot ? dot + 1 : end;
3267 } while (matches && ptr && *ptr);
3268 }
3269 else
3270 {
3271 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr;
3272
3273 /* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
3274 * make sure the common name matches.
3275 */
3276 if ((attr = CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_COMMON_NAME, name)))
3277 matches = match_common_name(server_name, attr);
3278 }
3279 LocalFree(name);
3280 }
3281 return matches;
3282 }
3283
3284 static BOOL WINAPI verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3285 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3286 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3287 {
3288 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3289 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3290 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
3291 {
3292 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
3293 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3294 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3295 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3296 }
3297 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3298 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT)
3299 {
3300 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
3301 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3302 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3303 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3304 }
3305 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
3306 {
3307 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
3308 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3309 CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3310 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3311 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
3312 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3313 }
3314 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3315 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID)
3316 {
3317 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
3318 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3319 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3320 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3321 }
3322 else
3323 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
3324 /* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
3325 * matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
3326 */
3327 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError && pPolicyPara &&
3328 pPolicyPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA))
3329 {
3330 HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
3331
3332 if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
3333 {
3334 if (sslPara->dwAuthType == AUTHTYPE_SERVER &&
3335 sslPara->pwszServerName &&
3336 !(sslPara->fdwChecks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_CN_INVALID))
3337 {
3338 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert;
3339 PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt;
3340 BOOL matches;
3341
3342 cert = pChainContext->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
3343 altNameExt = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert->pCertInfo);
3344 /* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
3345 * is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
3346 * it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
3347 * distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
3348 * "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
3349 * certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
3350 * alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
3351 * name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
3352 * domainComponent attribute."
3353 */
3354 if (altNameExt)
3355 matches = match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt,
3356 sslPara->pwszServerName);
3357 else
3358 matches = match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert,
3359 sslPara->pwszServerName);
3360 if (!matches)
3361 {
3362 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH;
3363 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = 0;
3364 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
3365 }
3366 }
3367 }
3368 }
3369 return TRUE;
3370 }
3371
3372 static BYTE msPubKey1[] = {
3373 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
3374 0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
3375 0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
3376 0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
3377 0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
3378 0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
3379 0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
3380 0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
3381 0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
3382 0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
3383 0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
3384 0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
3385 0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
3386 0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
3387 0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
3388 0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
3389 0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
3390 0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3391 static BYTE msPubKey2[] = {
3392 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
3393 0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
3394 0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
3395 0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
3396 0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
3397 0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
3398 0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
3399 0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
3400 0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
3401 0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
3402 0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
3403 0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
3404 0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
3405 0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
3406 0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
3407 0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
3408 0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
3409 0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3410 static BYTE msPubKey3[] = {
3411 0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
3412 0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
3413 0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
3414 0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
3415 0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
3416 0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
3417 0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
3418 0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
3419 0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
3420 0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
3421 0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
3422 0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
3423 0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
3424 0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
3425 0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
3426 0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
3427 0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
3428 0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
3429 0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
3430 0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
3431 0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
3432 0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
3433 0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
3434 0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
3435 0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
3436 0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
3437 0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
3438 0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
3439 0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
3440 0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
3441 0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
3442 0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
3443 0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
3444 0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
3445 0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
3446 0x01 };
3447
3448 static BOOL WINAPI verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3449 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3450 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3451 {
3452 BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3453 pPolicyStatus);
3454
3455 if (ret && !pPolicyStatus->dwError)
3456 {
3457 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
3458 BOOL isMSRoot = FALSE;
3459 DWORD i;
3460 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
3461 { sizeof(msPubKey1), msPubKey1 },
3462 { sizeof(msPubKey2), msPubKey2 },
3463 { sizeof(msPubKey3), msPubKey3 },
3464 };
3465 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain =
3466 pChainContext->rgpChain[pChainContext->cChain -1 ];
3467 PCCERT_CONTEXT root =
3468 rootChain->rgpElement[rootChain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
3469
3470 for (i = 0; !isMSRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
3471 i++)
3472 {
3473 msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
3474 msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
3475 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
3476 X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
3477 &root->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
3478 isMSRoot = TRUE;
3479 }
3480 if (isMSRoot)
3481 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
3482 }
3483 return ret;
3484 }
3485
3486 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3487 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3488 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus);
3489
3490 BOOL WINAPI CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3491 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3492 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3493 {
3494 static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set = NULL;
3495 BOOL ret = FALSE;
3496 CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy = NULL;
3497 HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc = NULL;
3498
3499 TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID), pChainContext,
3500 pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus);
3501
3502 if (IS_INTOID(szPolicyOID))
3503 {
3504 switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID))
3505 {
3506 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE):
3507 verifyPolicy = verify_base_policy;
3508 break;
3509 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE):
3510 verifyPolicy = verify_authenticode_policy;
3511 break;
3512 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL):
3513 verifyPolicy = verify_ssl_policy;
3514 break;
3515 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS):
3516 verifyPolicy = verify_basic_constraints_policy;
3517 break;
3518 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT):
3519 verifyPolicy = verify_ms_root_policy;
3520 break;
3521 default:
3522 FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID));
3523 }
3524 }
3525 if (!verifyPolicy)
3526 {
3527 if (!set)
3528 set = CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
3529 CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC, 0);
3530 CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set, X509_ASN_ENCODING, szPolicyOID, 0,
3531 (void **)&verifyPolicy, &hFunc);
3532 }
3533 if (verifyPolicy)
3534 ret = verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3535 pPolicyStatus);
3536 if (hFunc)
3537 CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc, 0);
3538 TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret, pPolicyStatus->dwError);
3539 return ret;
3540 }
an attempt at megring old patches into wine