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crypt32: Accept any matching CN when checking a certificate's name.
[wine/testsucceed.git] / dlls / crypt32 / chain.c
blobd7c10b353344bbae0654ba3dccdba3040faaf2f4
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
3 *
4 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
7 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
8 *
9 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
10 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
12 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
13 *
14 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
15 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
16 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
17 *
18 */
19 #include <stdarg.h>
20 #define NONAMELESSUNION
21 #include "windef.h"
22 #include "winbase.h"
23 #define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
24 #define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
25 #include "wincrypt.h"
26 #include "wininet.h"
27 #include "wine/debug.h"
28 #include "wine/unicode.h"
29 #include "crypt32_private.h"
30
31 WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt);
32 WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain);
33
34 #define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
35
36 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_defaultChainEngine;
37
38 /* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
39 * the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
40 * It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
41 * CTLs or complex certificate chains.
42 */
43 typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
44 {
45 LONG ref;
46 HCERTSTORE hRoot;
47 HCERTSTORE hWorld;
48 DWORD dwFlags;
49 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
50 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
51 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
52 } CertificateChainEngine, *PCertificateChainEngine;
53
54 static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection,
55 DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
56 {
57 DWORD i;
58
59 for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
60 CertAddStoreToCollection(collection, stores[i], 0, 0);
61 }
62
63 static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores, HCERTSTORE *stores)
64 {
65 DWORD i;
66
67 for (i = 0; i < cStores; i++)
68 CertCloseStore(stores[i], 0);
69 }
70
71 static const WCHAR rootW[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
72
73 /* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
74 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
75 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
76 {
77 PCCERT_CONTEXT matching = NULL;
78 BYTE hash[20];
79 DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
80
81 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID, hash, &size))
82 {
83 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
84
85 matching = CertFindCertificateInStore(store, cert->dwCertEncodingType,
86 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH, &blob, NULL);
87 }
88 return matching;
89 }
90
91 static BOOL CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store)
92 {
93 BOOL ret = TRUE;
94
95 if (store)
96 {
97 HCERTSTORE rootStore = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
98 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL, check;
99
100 do {
101 cert = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store, cert);
102 if (cert)
103 {
104 if (!(check = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore, cert)))
105 ret = FALSE;
106 else
107 CertFreeCertificateContext(check);
108 }
109 } while (ret && cert);
110 if (cert)
111 CertFreeCertificateContext(cert);
112 CertCloseStore(rootStore, 0);
113 }
114 return ret;
115 }
116
117 HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root,
118 PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig)
119 {
120 static const WCHAR caW[] = { 'C','A',0 };
121 static const WCHAR myW[] = { 'M','y',0 };
122 static const WCHAR trustW[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
123 PCertificateChainEngine engine =
124 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine));
125
126 if (engine)
127 {
128 HCERTSTORE worldStores[4];
129
130 engine->ref = 1;
131 engine->hRoot = root;
132 engine->hWorld = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
133 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
134 worldStores[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine->hRoot);
135 worldStores[1] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, caW);
136 worldStores[2] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, myW);
137 worldStores[3] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, trustW);
138 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld,
139 sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]), worldStores);
140 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine->hWorld,
141 pConfig->cAdditionalStore, pConfig->rghAdditionalStore);
142 CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores) / sizeof(worldStores[0]),
143 worldStores);
144 engine->dwFlags = pConfig->dwFlags;
145 engine->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout = pConfig->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
146 engine->MaximumCachedCertificates =
147 pConfig->MaximumCachedCertificates;
148 if (pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus)
149 engine->CycleDetectionModulus = pConfig->CycleDetectionModulus;
150 else
151 engine->CycleDetectionModulus = DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS;
152 }
153 return engine;
154 }
155
156 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT
157 {
158 DWORD cbSize;
159 HCERTSTORE hRestrictedRoot;
160 HCERTSTORE hRestrictedTrust;
161 HCERTSTORE hRestrictedOther;
162 DWORD cAdditionalStore;
163 HCERTSTORE *rghAdditionalStore;
164 DWORD dwFlags;
165 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
166 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
167 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
168 } CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT;
169
170 BOOL WINAPI CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig,
171 HCERTCHAINENGINE *phChainEngine)
172 {
173 BOOL ret;
174
175 TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig, phChainEngine);
176
177 if (pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_NO_EXCLUSIVE_ROOT)
178 && pConfig->cbSize != sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG))
179 {
180 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
181 return FALSE;
182 }
183 *phChainEngine = NULL;
184 ret = CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
185 if (ret)
186 {
187 HCERTSTORE root;
188 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine;
189
190 if (pConfig->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG) &&
191 pConfig->hExclusiveRoot)
192 root = CertDuplicateStore(pConfig->hExclusiveRoot);
193 else if (pConfig->hRestrictedRoot)
194 root = CertDuplicateStore(pConfig->hRestrictedRoot);
195 else
196 root = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW);
197 engine = CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(root, pConfig);
198 if (engine)
199 {
200 *phChainEngine = engine;
201 ret = TRUE;
202 }
203 else
204 ret = FALSE;
205 }
206 return ret;
207 }
208
209 VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine)
210 {
211 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
212
213 TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine);
214
215 if (engine && InterlockedDecrement(&engine->ref) == 0)
216 {
217 CertCloseStore(engine->hWorld, 0);
218 CertCloseStore(engine->hRoot, 0);
219 CryptMemFree(engine);
220 }
221 }
222
223 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(void)
224 {
225 if (!CRYPT_defaultChainEngine)
226 {
227 CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config = { 0 };
228 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine;
229
230 config.cbSize = sizeof(config);
231 CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&config, &engine);
232 InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&CRYPT_defaultChainEngine, engine,
233 NULL);
234 if (CRYPT_defaultChainEngine != engine)
235 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine);
236 }
237 return CRYPT_defaultChainEngine;
238 }
239
240 void default_chain_engine_free(void)
241 {
242 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(CRYPT_defaultChainEngine);
243 }
244
245 typedef struct _CertificateChain
246 {
247 CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context;
248 HCERTSTORE world;
249 LONG ref;
250 } CertificateChain, *PCertificateChain;
251
252 static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
253 {
254 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
255 DWORD size;
256 BOOL ret;
257
258 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
259 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
260 {
261 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
262
263 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
264 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
265 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
266 &info, &size);
267 if (ret)
268 {
269 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
270 info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
271 {
272 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
273 DWORD i;
274
275 for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
276 i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
277 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
278 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
279 directoryName =
280 &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
281 if (directoryName)
282 {
283 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
284 &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer)
285 && CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
286 &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber);
287 }
288 else
289 {
290 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
291 ret = FALSE;
292 }
293 }
294 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
295 {
296 ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
297 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
298 if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
299 {
300 LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
301
302 if (buf)
303 {
304 CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
305 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
306 ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size);
307 CryptMemFree(buf);
308 }
309 }
310 else
311 ret = FALSE;
312 }
313 LocalFree(info);
314 }
315 }
316 else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
317 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
318 {
319 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
320
321 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
322 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
323 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
324 &info, &size);
325 if (ret)
326 {
327 if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
328 {
329 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
330 &info->CertIssuer, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer) &&
331 CertCompareIntegerBlob(&info->CertSerialNumber,
332 &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber);
333 }
334 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
335 {
336 ret = CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
337 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, NULL, &size);
338 if (ret && size == info->KeyId.cbData)
339 {
340 LPBYTE buf = CryptMemAlloc(size);
341
342 if (buf)
343 {
344 CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert,
345 CERT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_PROP_ID, buf, &size);
346 ret = !memcmp(buf, info->KeyId.pbData, size);
347 CryptMemFree(buf);
348 }
349 else
350 ret = FALSE;
351 }
352 else
353 ret = FALSE;
354 }
355 else
356 ret = FALSE;
357 LocalFree(info);
358 }
359 }
360 else
361 ret = CertCompareCertificateName(cert->dwCertEncodingType,
362 &cert->pCertInfo->Subject, &cert->pCertInfo->Issuer);
363 return ret;
364 }
365
366 static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element)
367 {
368 CertFreeCertificateContext(element->pCertContext);
369 CryptMemFree(element);
370 }
371
372 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
373 {
374 DWORD i, j, cyclicCertIndex = 0;
375
376 /* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
377 for (i = 0; !cyclicCertIndex && i < chain->cElement; i++)
378 for (j = i + 1; !cyclicCertIndex && j < chain->cElement; j++)
379 if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
380 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
381 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo))
382 cyclicCertIndex = j;
383 if (cyclicCertIndex)
384 {
385 chain->rgpElement[cyclicCertIndex]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
386 |= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
387 /* Release remaining certs */
388 for (i = cyclicCertIndex + 1; i < chain->cElement; i++)
389 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
390 /* Truncate chain */
391 chain->cElement = cyclicCertIndex + 1;
392 }
393 }
394
395 /* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
396 static inline BOOL CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain)
397 {
398 if (chain->cElement)
399 return chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus
400 & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC;
401 else
402 return FALSE;
403 }
404
405 static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS *chainStatus,
406 const CERT_TRUST_STATUS *elementStatus)
407 {
408 /* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
409 chainStatus->dwErrorStatus |= elementStatus->dwErrorStatus;
410 /* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
411 * chain.
412 */
413 chainStatus->dwInfoStatus |= (elementStatus->dwInfoStatus & 0xfffffff0);
414 }
415
416 static BOOL CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
417 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, DWORD subjectInfoStatus)
418 {
419 BOOL ret = FALSE;
420 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
421
422 if (element)
423 {
424 if (!chain->cElement)
425 chain->rgpElement = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
426 else
427 chain->rgpElement = CryptMemRealloc(chain->rgpElement,
428 (chain->cElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
429 if (chain->rgpElement)
430 {
431 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement++] = element;
432 memset(element, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
433 element->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT);
434 element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert);
435 if (chain->cElement > 1)
436 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 2]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus
437 = subjectInfoStatus;
438 /* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
439 if (!(chain->cElement % engine->CycleDetectionModulus))
440 {
441 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain);
442 /* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
443 * cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
444 */
445 element = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
446 }
447 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
448 &element->TrustStatus);
449 ret = TRUE;
450 }
451 else
452 CryptMemFree(element);
453 }
454 return ret;
455 }
456
457 static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
458 {
459 DWORD i;
460
461 for (i = 0; i < chain->cElement; i++)
462 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain->rgpElement[i]);
463 CryptMemFree(chain->rgpElement);
464 CryptMemFree(chain);
465 }
466
467 static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot,
468 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
469 {
470 PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot,
471 rootElement->pCertContext);
472
473 if (!trustedRoot)
474 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
475 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT;
476 else
477 CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot);
478 }
479
480 static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hRoot,
481 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement)
482 {
483 PCCERT_CONTEXT root = rootElement->pCertContext;
484
485 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root->dwCertEncodingType,
486 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT, (void *)root,
487 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT, (void *)root, 0, NULL))
488 {
489 TRACE_(chain)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
490 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
491 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
492 }
493 CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot, rootElement);
494 }
495
496 /* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
497 * or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
498 * CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
499 * constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
500 * Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
501 */
502 static BOOL CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert,
503 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *constraints, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified)
504 {
505 BOOL ret = TRUE;
506 PCERT_EXTENSION ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
507 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
508
509 constraints->fPathLenConstraint = FALSE;
510 if (ext)
511 {
512 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
513 DWORD size = 0;
514
515 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
516 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
517 NULL, &info, &size);
518 if (ret)
519 {
520 if (info->SubjectType.cbData == 1)
521 constraints->fCA =
522 info->SubjectType.pbData[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG;
523 LocalFree(info);
524 }
525 }
526 else
527 {
528 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2,
529 cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
530 if (ext)
531 {
532 DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
533
534 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
535 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
536 0, NULL, constraints, &size);
537 }
538 else
539 constraints->fCA = defaultIfNotSpecified;
540 }
541 return ret;
542 }
543
544 /* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
545 * remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
546 * basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
547 * allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
548 * allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
549 * This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
550 * CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
551 * used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
552 * section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
553 * application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
554 * through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
555 * certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
556 * accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
557 * Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
558 * constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
559 * root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
560 * the next certificate in the chain.
561 * Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
562 * 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
563 * 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
564 * Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
565 * occurs.
566 * Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
567 * chain is valid.
568 */
569 static BOOL CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
570 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO *chainConstraints,
571 DWORD remainingCAs, BOOL isRoot, BOOL *pathLengthConstraintViolated)
572 {
573 BOOL validBasicConstraints, implicitCA = FALSE;
574 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
575
576 if (isRoot)
577 implicitCA = TRUE;
578 else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
579 cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
580 {
581 BYTE hash[20];
582 DWORD size = sizeof(hash);
583
584 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID,
585 hash, &size))
586 {
587 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob = { sizeof(hash), hash };
588 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CertFindCertificateInStore(
589 engine->hWorld, cert->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH,
590 &blob, NULL);
591
592 if (localCert)
593 {
594 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
595 implicitCA = TRUE;
596 }
597 }
598 }
599 if ((validBasicConstraints = CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert,
600 &constraints, implicitCA)))
601 {
602 chainConstraints->fCA = constraints.fCA;
603 if (!constraints.fCA)
604 {
605 TRACE_(chain)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs + 1);
606 validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
607 }
608 else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint)
609 {
610 /* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
611 * entire remaining chain.
612 */
613 if (!chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint ||
614 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint <
615 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
616 {
617 TRACE_(chain)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
618 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
619 chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint = TRUE;
620 chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint =
621 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint;
622 }
623 }
624 }
625 if (chainConstraints->fPathLenConstraint &&
626 remainingCAs > chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint)
627 {
628 TRACE_(chain)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
629 remainingCAs, chainConstraints->dwPathLenConstraint);
630 validBasicConstraints = FALSE;
631 *pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
632 }
633 return validBasicConstraints;
634 }
635
636 static BOOL domain_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name)
637 {
638 BOOL match;
639
640 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
641 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name...
642 * When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one
643 * or more labels. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by
644 * both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint
645 * ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint
646 * does not begin with a period, it specifies a host."
647 * and for email addresses,
648 * "To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the
649 * constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint
650 * "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host
651 * "example.com". To specify any address within a domain, the constraint
652 * is specified with a leading period (as with URIs)."
653 */
654 if (constraint[0] == '.')
655 {
656 /* Must be strictly greater than, a name can't begin with '.' */
657 if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
658 match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
659 constraint);
660 else
661 {
662 /* name is too short, no match */
663 match = FALSE;
664 }
665 }
666 else
667 match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
668 return match;
669 }
670
671 static BOOL url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
672 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
673 {
674 BOOL match = FALSE;
675
676 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
677
678 if (!constraint)
679 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
680 else if (!name)
681 ; /* no match */
682 else
683 {
684 LPCWSTR colon, authority_end, at, hostname = NULL;
685 /* The maximum length for a hostname is 254 in the DNS, see RFC 1034 */
686 WCHAR hostname_buf[255];
687
688 /* RFC 5280: only the hostname portion of the URL is compared. From
689 * section 4.2.1.10:
690 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.
691 * The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name
692 * and MAY specify a host or a domain."
693 * The format for URIs is in RFC 2396.
694 *
695 * First, remove any scheme that's present. */
696 colon = strchrW(name, ':');
697 if (colon && *(colon + 1) == '/' && *(colon + 2) == '/')
698 name = colon + 3;
699 /* Next, find the end of the authority component. (The authority is
700 * generally just the hostname, but it may contain a username or a port.
701 * Those are removed next.)
702 */
703 authority_end = strchrW(name, '/');
704 if (!authority_end)
705 authority_end = strchrW(name, '?');
706 if (!authority_end)
707 authority_end = name + strlenW(name);
708 /* Remove any port number from the authority. The userinfo portion
709 * of an authority may contain a colon, so stop if a userinfo portion
710 * is found (indicated by '@').
711 */
712 for (colon = authority_end; colon >= name && *colon != ':' &&
713 *colon != '@'; colon--)
714 ;
715 if (*colon == ':')
716 authority_end = colon;
717 /* Remove any username from the authority */
718 if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
719 name = at;
720 /* Ignore any path or query portion of the URL. */
721 if (*authority_end)
722 {
723 if (authority_end - name < sizeof(hostname_buf) /
724 sizeof(hostname_buf[0]))
725 {
726 memcpy(hostname_buf, name,
727 (authority_end - name) * sizeof(WCHAR));
728 hostname_buf[authority_end - name] = 0;
729 hostname = hostname_buf;
730 }
731 /* else: Hostname is too long, not a match */
732 }
733 else
734 hostname = name;
735 if (hostname)
736 match = domain_name_matches(constraint, hostname);
737 }
738 return match;
739 }
740
741 static BOOL rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
742 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
743 {
744 BOOL match = FALSE;
745 LPCWSTR at;
746
747 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
748
749 if (!constraint)
750 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
751 else if (!name)
752 ; /* no match */
753 else if (strchrW(constraint, '@'))
754 match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
755 else
756 {
757 if ((at = strchrW(name, '@')))
758 match = domain_name_matches(constraint, at + 1);
759 else
760 match = !lstrcmpiW(constraint, name);
761 }
762 return match;
763 }
764
765 static BOOL dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint, LPCWSTR name,
766 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
767 {
768 BOOL match = FALSE;
769
770 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint), debugstr_w(name));
771
772 if (!constraint)
773 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
774 else if (!name)
775 ; /* no match */
776 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
777 * "DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS name
778 * that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the
779 * left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example,
780 * www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but host1.example.com
781 * would not."
782 */
783 else if (lstrlenW(name) == lstrlenW(constraint))
784 match = !lstrcmpiW(name, constraint);
785 else if (lstrlenW(name) > lstrlenW(constraint))
786 {
787 match = !lstrcmpiW(name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint),
788 constraint);
789 if (match)
790 {
791 BOOL dot = FALSE;
792 LPCWSTR ptr;
793
794 /* This only matches if name is a subdomain of constraint, i.e.
795 * there's a '.' between the beginning of the name and the
796 * matching portion of the name.
797 */
798 for (ptr = name + lstrlenW(name) - lstrlenW(constraint);
799 !dot && ptr >= name; ptr--)
800 if (*ptr == '.')
801 dot = TRUE;
802 match = dot;
803 }
804 }
805 /* else: name is too short, no match */
806
807 return match;
808 }
809
810 static BOOL ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *constraint,
811 const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB *name, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
812 {
813 BOOL match = FALSE;
814
815 TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint->cbData, constraint->pbData,
816 name->cbData, name->pbData);
817
818 /* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
819 * IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
820 */
821 if (constraint->cbData != sizeof(DWORD) * 2 && constraint->cbData != 32)
822 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
823 else if (name->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) &&
824 constraint->cbData == sizeof(DWORD) * 2)
825 {
826 DWORD subnet, mask, addr;
827
828 memcpy(&subnet, constraint->pbData, sizeof(subnet));
829 memcpy(&mask, constraint->pbData + sizeof(subnet), sizeof(mask));
830 memcpy(&addr, name->pbData, sizeof(addr));
831 /* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
832 * don't need to swap to host order
833 */
834 match = (subnet & mask) == (addr & mask);
835 }
836 else if (name->cbData == 16 && constraint->cbData == 32)
837 {
838 const BYTE *subnet, *mask, *addr;
839 DWORD i;
840
841 subnet = constraint->pbData;
842 mask = constraint->pbData + 16;
843 addr = name->pbData;
844 match = TRUE;
845 for (i = 0; match && i < 16; i++)
846 if ((subnet[i] & mask[i]) != (addr[i] & mask[i]))
847 match = FALSE;
848 }
849 /* else: name is wrong size, no match */
850
851 return match;
852 }
853
854 static BOOL directory_name_matches(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *constraint,
855 const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
856 {
857 CERT_NAME_INFO *constraintName;
858 DWORD size;
859 BOOL match = FALSE;
860
861 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME, constraint->pbData,
862 constraint->cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &constraintName, &size))
863 {
864 DWORD i;
865
866 match = TRUE;
867 for (i = 0; match && i < constraintName->cRDN; i++)
868 match = CertIsRDNAttrsInCertificateName(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
869 CERT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_IS_RDN_ATTRS_FLAG,
870 (CERT_NAME_BLOB *)name, &constraintName->rgRDN[i]);
871 LocalFree(constraintName);
872 }
873 return match;
874 }
875
876 static BOOL alt_name_matches(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
877 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint, DWORD *trustErrorStatus, BOOL *present)
878 {
879 BOOL match = FALSE;
880
881 if (name->dwAltNameChoice == constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
882 {
883 if (present)
884 *present = TRUE;
885 switch (constraint->dwAltNameChoice)
886 {
887 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
888 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
889 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
890 break;
891 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
892 match = dns_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
893 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
894 break;
895 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
896 match = url_matches(constraint->u.pwszURL,
897 name->u.pwszURL, trustErrorStatus);
898 break;
899 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
900 match = ip_address_matches(&constraint->u.IPAddress,
901 &name->u.IPAddress, trustErrorStatus);
902 break;
903 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
904 match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
905 &name->u.DirectoryName);
906 break;
907 default:
908 ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
909 constraint->dwAltNameChoice);
910 *trustErrorStatus |=
911 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
912 }
913 }
914 else if (present)
915 *present = FALSE;
916 return match;
917 }
918
919 static BOOL alt_name_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
920 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
921 {
922 DWORD i;
923 BOOL match = FALSE;
924
925 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
926 match = alt_name_matches(name,
927 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus, NULL);
928 return match;
929 }
930
931 static BOOL alt_name_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *name,
932 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
933 BOOL *present)
934 {
935 DWORD i;
936 BOOL match = FALSE;
937
938 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
939 match = alt_name_matches(name,
940 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base, trustErrorStatus,
941 present);
942 return match;
943 }
944
945 static inline PCERT_EXTENSION get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO *cert)
946 {
947 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
948
949 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2,
950 cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
951 if (!ext)
952 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
953 cert->cExtension, cert->rgExtension);
954 return ext;
955 }
956
957 static void compare_alt_name_with_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *altNameExt,
958 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
959 {
960 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectAltName;
961 DWORD size;
962
963 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
964 altNameExt->Value.pbData, altNameExt->Value.cbData,
965 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
966 &subjectAltName, &size))
967 {
968 DWORD i;
969
970 for (i = 0; i < subjectAltName->cAltEntry; i++)
971 {
972 BOOL nameFormPresent;
973
974 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is present.
975 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
976 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
977 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
978 * the certificate is acceptable."
979 */
980 if (alt_name_matches_excluded_name(
981 &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
982 trustErrorStatus))
983 {
984 TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d excluded\n",
985 subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
986 *trustErrorStatus |=
987 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
988 }
989 nameFormPresent = FALSE;
990 if (!alt_name_matches_permitted_name(
991 &subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i], nameConstraints,
992 trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
993 {
994 TRACE_(chain)("subject alternate name form %d not permitted\n",
995 subjectAltName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice);
996 *trustErrorStatus |=
997 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
998 }
999 }
1000 LocalFree(subjectAltName);
1001 }
1002 else
1003 *trustErrorStatus |=
1004 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1005 }
1006
1007 static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
1008 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1009 {
1010 DWORD i;
1011 BOOL match = FALSE;
1012
1013 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1014 {
1015 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1016 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
1017
1018 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1019 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
1020 (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
1021 }
1022 return match;
1023 }
1024
1025 static BOOL rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr,
1026 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus,
1027 BOOL *present)
1028 {
1029 DWORD i;
1030 BOOL match = FALSE;
1031
1032 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1033 {
1034 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1035 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
1036
1037 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1038 {
1039 *present = TRUE;
1040 match = rfc822_name_matches(constraint->u.pwszRfc822Name,
1041 (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData, trustErrorStatus);
1042 }
1043 }
1044 return match;
1045 }
1046
1047 static void compare_subject_with_email_constraints(
1048 const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
1049 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1050 {
1051 CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
1052 DWORD size;
1053
1054 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
1055 subjectName->pbData, subjectName->cbData,
1056 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
1057 {
1058 DWORD i, j;
1059
1060 for (i = 0; i < name->cRDN; i++)
1061 for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
1062 if (!strcmp(name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId,
1063 szOID_RSA_emailAddr))
1064 {
1065 BOOL nameFormPresent;
1066
1067 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is
1068 * present. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1069 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
1070 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
1071 * the certificate is acceptable."
1072 */
1073 if (rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(
1074 &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
1075 trustErrorStatus))
1076 {
1077 TRACE_(chain)(
1078 "email address in subject name is excluded\n");
1079 *trustErrorStatus |=
1080 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1081 }
1082 nameFormPresent = FALSE;
1083 if (!rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(
1084 &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j], nameConstraints,
1085 trustErrorStatus, &nameFormPresent) && nameFormPresent)
1086 {
1087 TRACE_(chain)(
1088 "email address in subject name is not permitted\n");
1089 *trustErrorStatus |=
1090 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1091 }
1092 }
1093 LocalFree(name);
1094 }
1095 else
1096 *trustErrorStatus |=
1097 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1098 }
1099
1100 static BOOL CRYPT_IsEmptyName(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
1101 {
1102 BOOL empty;
1103
1104 if (!name->cbData)
1105 empty = TRUE;
1106 else if (name->cbData == 2 && name->pbData[1] == 0)
1107 {
1108 /* An empty sequence is also empty */
1109 empty = TRUE;
1110 }
1111 else
1112 empty = FALSE;
1113 return empty;
1114 }
1115
1116 static void compare_subject_with_constraints(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *subjectName,
1117 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1118 {
1119 BOOL hasEmailConstraint = FALSE;
1120 DWORD i;
1121
1122 /* In general, a subject distinguished name only matches a directory name
1123 * constraint. However, an exception exists for email addresses.
1124 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.6:
1125 * "Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is
1126 * embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress
1127 * attribute [RFC2985]."
1128 * If an email address constraint exists, check that constraint separately.
1129 */
1130 for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree;
1131 i++)
1132 if (nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
1133 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1134 hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
1135 for (i = 0; !hasEmailConstraint && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree;
1136 i++)
1137 if (nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base.dwAltNameChoice ==
1138 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME)
1139 hasEmailConstraint = TRUE;
1140 if (hasEmailConstraint)
1141 compare_subject_with_email_constraints(subjectName, nameConstraints,
1142 trustErrorStatus);
1143 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1144 {
1145 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1146 &nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i].Base;
1147
1148 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME &&
1149 directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName, subjectName))
1150 {
1151 TRACE_(chain)("subject name is excluded\n");
1152 *trustErrorStatus |=
1153 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1154 }
1155 }
1156 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1157 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present.
1158 * If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is
1159 * acceptable."
1160 * An empty name can't have the name form present, so don't check it.
1161 */
1162 if (nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree && !CRYPT_IsEmptyName(subjectName))
1163 {
1164 BOOL match = FALSE, hasDirectoryConstraint = FALSE;
1165
1166 for (i = 0; !match && i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1167 {
1168 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *constraint =
1169 &nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i].Base;
1170
1171 if (constraint->dwAltNameChoice == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
1172 {
1173 hasDirectoryConstraint = TRUE;
1174 match = directory_name_matches(&constraint->u.DirectoryName,
1175 subjectName);
1176 }
1177 }
1178 if (hasDirectoryConstraint && !match)
1179 {
1180 TRACE_(chain)("subject name is not permitted\n");
1181 *trustErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1182 }
1183 }
1184 }
1185
1186 static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
1187 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints, const CERT_INFO *cert,
1188 DWORD *trustErrorStatus)
1189 {
1190 CERT_EXTENSION *ext = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert);
1191
1192 if (ext)
1193 compare_alt_name_with_constraints(ext, nameConstraints,
1194 trustErrorStatus);
1195 /* Name constraints apply to the subject alternative name as well as the
1196 * subject name. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1197 * "Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to
1198 * subject alternative names."
1199 */
1200 compare_subject_with_constraints(&cert->Subject, nameConstraints,
1201 trustErrorStatus);
1202 }
1203
1204 /* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
1205 static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO *cert)
1206 {
1207 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info = NULL;
1208
1209 CERT_EXTENSION *ext;
1210
1211 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, cert->cExtension,
1212 cert->rgExtension)))
1213 {
1214 DWORD size;
1215
1216 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
1217 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1218 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &info,
1219 &size);
1220 }
1221 return info;
1222 }
1223
1224 static BOOL CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info)
1225 {
1226 DWORD i;
1227 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1228
1229 /* Make sure at least one permitted or excluded subtree is present. From
1230 * RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1231 * "Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an
1232 * empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the
1233 * excludedSubtrees MUST be present."
1234 */
1235 if (!info->cPermittedSubtree && !info->cExcludedSubtree)
1236 {
1237 WARN_(chain)("constraints contain no permitted nor excluded subtree\n");
1238 ret = FALSE;
1239 }
1240 /* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
1241 * See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1242 * "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
1243 * any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
1244 * absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
1245 * constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
1246 * maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
1247 * application MUST either process these fields or reject the
1248 * certificate."
1249 * Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
1250 * reject any name constraint that contains them.
1251 */
1252 for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1253 if (info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
1254 info->rgPermittedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
1255 {
1256 TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
1257 ret = FALSE;
1258 }
1259 for (i = 0; ret && i < info->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1260 if (info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].dwMinimum ||
1261 info->rgExcludedSubtree[i].fMaximum)
1262 {
1263 TRACE_(chain)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
1264 ret = FALSE;
1265 }
1266 return ret;
1267 }
1268
1269 static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
1270 {
1271 int i, j;
1272
1273 /* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
1274 * MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
1275 * name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
1276 * the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
1277 * in the chain, not just the end cert.
1278 * Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
1279 * certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
1280 * them.
1281 * In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
1282 * still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
1283 * constraints.
1284 */
1285 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
1286 {
1287 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
1288
1289 if ((nameConstraints = CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
1290 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo)))
1291 {
1292 if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints))
1293 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1294 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT;
1295 else
1296 {
1297 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
1298 {
1299 DWORD errorStatus = 0;
1300
1301 /* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
1302 * constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
1303 */
1304 if (j == 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1305 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext))
1306 {
1307 CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints,
1308 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo,
1309 &errorStatus);
1310 if (errorStatus)
1311 {
1312 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1313 errorStatus;
1314 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1315 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1316 }
1317 else
1318 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
1319 CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS;
1320 }
1321 }
1322 }
1323 LocalFree(nameConstraints);
1324 }
1325 }
1326 }
1327
1328 /* Gets cert's policies info, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
1329 static CERT_POLICIES_INFO *CRYPT_GetPolicies(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1330 {
1331 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1332 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies = NULL;
1333
1334 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
1335 cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
1336 if (ext)
1337 {
1338 DWORD size;
1339
1340 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
1341 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1342 &policies, &size);
1343 }
1344 return policies;
1345 }
1346
1347 static void CRYPT_CheckPolicies(const CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies, CERT_INFO *cert,
1348 DWORD *errorStatus)
1349 {
1350 DWORD i;
1351
1352 for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
1353 {
1354 /* For now, the only accepted policy identifier is the anyPolicy
1355 * identifier.
1356 * FIXME: the policy identifiers should be compared against the
1357 * cert's certificate policies extension, subject to the policy
1358 * mappings extension, and the policy constraints extension.
1359 * See RFC 5280, sections 4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.1.11.
1360 */
1361 if (strcmp(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier,
1362 szOID_ANY_CERT_POLICY))
1363 {
1364 FIXME("unsupported policy %s\n",
1365 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier);
1366 *errorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS;
1367 }
1368 }
1369 }
1370
1371 static void CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
1372 {
1373 int i, j;
1374
1375 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i > 0; i--)
1376 {
1377 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
1378
1379 if ((policies = CRYPT_GetPolicies(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext)))
1380 {
1381 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
1382 {
1383 DWORD errorStatus = 0;
1384
1385 CRYPT_CheckPolicies(policies,
1386 chain->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext->pCertInfo, &errorStatus);
1387 if (errorStatus)
1388 {
1389 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1390 errorStatus;
1391 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1392 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1393 }
1394 }
1395 LocalFree(policies);
1396 }
1397 }
1398 }
1399
1400 static LPWSTR name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB *name)
1401 {
1402 DWORD len = cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
1403 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, NULL, 0);
1404 LPWSTR str = NULL;
1405
1406 if (len)
1407 {
1408 str = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1409 if (str)
1410 cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING, 0, name,
1411 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR, str, len);
1412 }
1413 return str;
1414 }
1415
1416 static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY *entry)
1417 {
1418 LPWSTR str;
1419
1420 switch (entry->dwAltNameChoice)
1421 {
1422 case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME:
1423 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
1424 debugstr_a(entry->u.pOtherName->pszObjId));
1425 break;
1426 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME:
1427 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
1428 debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszRfc822Name));
1429 break;
1430 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME:
1431 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
1432 debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszDNSName));
1433 break;
1434 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME:
1435 str = name_value_to_str(&entry->u.DirectoryName);
1436 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str));
1437 CryptMemFree(str);
1438 break;
1439 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL:
1440 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry->u.pwszURL));
1441 break;
1442 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS:
1443 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
1444 entry->u.IPAddress.cbData);
1445 break;
1446 case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID:
1447 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
1448 debugstr_a(entry->u.pszRegisteredID));
1449 break;
1450 default:
1451 TRACE_(chain)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry->dwAltNameChoice);
1452 }
1453 }
1454
1455 static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type, const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1456 {
1457 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *name;
1458 DWORD size;
1459
1460 TRACE_(chain)("%s:\n", type);
1461 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
1462 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1463 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &name, &size))
1464 {
1465 DWORD i;
1466
1467 TRACE_(chain)("%d alt name entries:\n", name->cAltEntry);
1468 for (i = 0; i < name->cAltEntry; i++)
1469 dump_alt_name_entry(&name->rgAltEntry[i]);
1470 LocalFree(name);
1471 }
1472 }
1473
1474 static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1475 {
1476 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *info;
1477 DWORD size = 0;
1478
1479 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
1480 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG,
1481 NULL, &info, &size))
1482 {
1483 TRACE_(chain)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info->SubjectType.pbData[0]);
1484 TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
1485 info->fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
1486 TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", info->dwPathLenConstraint);
1487 LocalFree(info);
1488 }
1489 }
1490
1491 static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1492 {
1493 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints;
1494 DWORD size = sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO);
1495
1496 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1497 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1498 0, NULL, &constraints, &size))
1499 {
1500 TRACE_(chain)("basic constraints:\n");
1501 TRACE_(chain)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints.fCA ? "" : "not");
1502 TRACE_(chain)("%s path length constraint\n",
1503 constraints.fPathLenConstraint ? "has" : "doesn't have");
1504 TRACE_(chain)("path length=%d\n", constraints.dwPathLenConstraint);
1505 }
1506 }
1507
1508 static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1509 {
1510 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1511 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1512
1513 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
1514 ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
1515 {
1516 #define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
1517 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1518 if (usage.cbData)
1519 {
1520 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE);
1521 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE);
1522 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1523 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1524 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE);
1525 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
1526 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE);
1527 trace_usage_bit(usage.pbData[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE);
1528 }
1529 #undef trace_usage_bit
1530 if (usage.cbData > 1 && usage.pbData[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE)
1531 TRACE_(chain)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
1532 }
1533 }
1534
1535 static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE *subtree)
1536 {
1537 dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree->Base);
1538 TRACE_(chain)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
1539 subtree->dwMinimum, subtree->fMaximum, subtree->dwMaximum);
1540 }
1541
1542 static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1543 {
1544 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO *nameConstraints;
1545 DWORD size;
1546
1547 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS,
1548 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
1549 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &nameConstraints,
1550 &size))
1551 {
1552 DWORD i;
1553
1554 TRACE_(chain)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
1555 nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree);
1556 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cPermittedSubtree; i++)
1557 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgPermittedSubtree[i]);
1558 TRACE_(chain)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
1559 nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree);
1560 for (i = 0; i < nameConstraints->cExcludedSubtree; i++)
1561 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints->rgExcludedSubtree[i]);
1562 LocalFree(nameConstraints);
1563 }
1564 }
1565
1566 static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1567 {
1568 CERT_POLICIES_INFO *policies;
1569 DWORD size;
1570
1571 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_CERT_POLICIES,
1572 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1573 &policies, &size))
1574 {
1575 DWORD i, j;
1576
1577 TRACE_(chain)("%d policies:\n", policies->cPolicyInfo);
1578 for (i = 0; i < policies->cPolicyInfo; i++)
1579 {
1580 TRACE_(chain)("policy identifier: %s\n",
1581 debugstr_a(policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier));
1582 TRACE_(chain)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
1583 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier);
1584 for (j = 0; j < policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].cPolicyQualifier; j++)
1585 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
1586 policies->rgPolicyInfo[i].rgPolicyQualifier[j].
1587 pszPolicyQualifierId));
1588 }
1589 LocalFree(policies);
1590 }
1591 }
1592
1593 static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1594 {
1595 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
1596 DWORD size;
1597
1598 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
1599 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL,
1600 &usage, &size))
1601 {
1602 DWORD i;
1603
1604 TRACE_(chain)("%d usages:\n", usage->cUsageIdentifier);
1605 for (i = 0; i < usage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
1606 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
1607 LocalFree(usage);
1608 }
1609 }
1610
1611 static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1612 {
1613 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1614 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1615
1616 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_BITS, ext->Value.pbData,
1617 ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
1618 {
1619 #define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
1620 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1621 if (usage.cbData)
1622 {
1623 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
1624 NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
1625 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0],
1626 NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE);
1627 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE);
1628 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE);
1629 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1630 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1631 trace_cert_type_bit(usage.pbData[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE);
1632 }
1633 #undef trace_cert_type_bit
1634 }
1635 }
1636
1637 static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext)
1638 {
1639 TRACE_(chain)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext->pszObjId),
1640 ext->fCritical ? "" : "not ");
1641 if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
1642 dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext);
1643 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME))
1644 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext);
1645 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
1646 dump_basic_constraints(ext);
1647 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
1648 dump_key_usage(ext);
1649 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
1650 dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext);
1651 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2))
1652 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext);
1653 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
1654 dump_basic_constraints2(ext);
1655 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
1656 dump_name_constraints(ext);
1657 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
1658 dump_cert_policies(ext);
1659 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
1660 dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext);
1661 else if (!strcmp(ext->pszObjId, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE))
1662 dump_netscape_cert_type(ext);
1663 }
1664
1665 static LPCSTR filetime_to_str(const FILETIME *time)
1666 {
1667 static char date[80];
1668 char dateFmt[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
1669 SYSTEMTIME sysTime;
1670
1671 if (!time) return NULL;
1672
1673 GetLocaleInfoA(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE, dateFmt,
1674 sizeof(dateFmt) / sizeof(dateFmt[0]));
1675 FileTimeToSystemTime(time, &sysTime);
1676 GetDateFormatA(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT, 0, &sysTime, dateFmt, date,
1677 sizeof(date) / sizeof(date[0]));
1678 return date;
1679 }
1680
1681 static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1682 {
1683 LPWSTR name = NULL;
1684 DWORD len, i;
1685
1686 TRACE_(chain)("%p: version %d\n", cert, cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
1687 len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
1688 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, NULL, 0);
1689 name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1690 if (name)
1691 {
1692 CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE,
1693 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG, NULL, name, len);
1694 TRACE_(chain)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
1695 CryptMemFree(name);
1696 }
1697 len = CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
1698 NULL, 0);
1699 name = CryptMemAlloc(len * sizeof(WCHAR));
1700 if (name)
1701 {
1702 CertGetNameStringW(cert, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0, NULL,
1703 name, len);
1704 TRACE_(chain)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name));
1705 CryptMemFree(name);
1706 }
1707 TRACE_(chain)("valid from %s to %s\n",
1708 filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotBefore),
1709 filetime_to_str(&cert->pCertInfo->NotAfter));
1710 TRACE_(chain)("%d extensions\n", cert->pCertInfo->cExtension);
1711 for (i = 0; i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
1712 dump_extension(&cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i]);
1713 }
1714
1715 static BOOL CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
1716 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, BOOL isRoot, BOOL isCA, DWORD index)
1717 {
1718 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1719 BOOL ret;
1720 BYTE usageBits = 0;
1721
1722 ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE, cert->pCertInfo->cExtension,
1723 cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension);
1724 if (ext)
1725 {
1726 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage;
1727 DWORD size = sizeof(usage);
1728
1729 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert->dwCertEncodingType, X509_BITS,
1730 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
1731 &usage, &size);
1732 if (!ret)
1733 return FALSE;
1734 else if (usage.cbData > 2)
1735 {
1736 /* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
1737 * bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
1738 */
1739 return FALSE;
1740 }
1741 else
1742 {
1743 /* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
1744 * bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
1745 * key usage bits.
1746 */
1747 usageBits = usage.pbData[usage.cbData - 1];
1748 }
1749 }
1750 if (isCA)
1751 {
1752 if (!ext)
1753 {
1754 /* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
1755 * here. Quoting the RFC:
1756 * "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
1757 * contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
1758 * on other public key certificates or CRLs."
1759 * MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
1760 * extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
1761 * extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
1762 * perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
1763 * certs without key usage extensions. We are more restrictive:
1764 * we accept locally installed V1 or V2 certs as CA certs.
1765 * We also accept a lack of key usage extension on root certs,
1766 * which is implied in RFC 5280, section 6.1: the trust anchor's
1767 * only requirement is that it was used to issue the next
1768 * certificate in the chain.
1769 */
1770 if (isRoot)
1771 ret = TRUE;
1772 else if (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V1 ||
1773 cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion == CERT_V2)
1774 {
1775 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert = CRYPT_FindCertInStore(
1776 engine->hWorld, cert);
1777
1778 ret = localCert != NULL;
1779 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert);
1780 }
1781 else
1782 ret = FALSE;
1783 if (!ret)
1784 WARN_(chain)("no key usage extension on a CA cert\n");
1785 }
1786 else
1787 {
1788 if (!(usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
1789 {
1790 WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
1791 ret = FALSE;
1792 }
1793 else
1794 ret = TRUE;
1795 }
1796 }
1797 else
1798 {
1799 if (ext && (usageBits & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
1800 {
1801 WARN_(chain)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
1802 ret = FALSE;
1803 }
1804 else
1805 ret = TRUE;
1806 }
1807 return ret;
1808 }
1809
1810 static BOOL CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1811 {
1812 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1813 DWORD i;
1814
1815 for (i = 0; ret && i < cert->pCertInfo->cExtension; i++)
1816 {
1817 if (cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].fCritical)
1818 {
1819 LPCSTR oid = cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension[i].pszObjId;
1820
1821 if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
1822 ret = TRUE;
1823 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2))
1824 ret = TRUE;
1825 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS))
1826 ret = TRUE;
1827 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_KEY_USAGE))
1828 ret = TRUE;
1829 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME))
1830 ret = TRUE;
1831 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2))
1832 ret = TRUE;
1833 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_CERT_POLICIES))
1834 ret = TRUE;
1835 else if (!strcmp(oid, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE))
1836 ret = TRUE;
1837 else
1838 {
1839 FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
1840 debugstr_a(oid));
1841 ret = FALSE;
1842 }
1843 }
1844 }
1845 return ret;
1846 }
1847
1848 static BOOL CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert)
1849 {
1850 BOOL ret = TRUE;
1851
1852 /* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
1853 switch (cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion)
1854 {
1855 case CERT_V1:
1856 /* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
1857 * section 4.1.2.8:
1858 * "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
1859 * 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
1860 */
1861 if (cert->pCertInfo->IssuerUniqueId.cbData ||
1862 cert->pCertInfo->SubjectUniqueId.cbData)
1863 ret = FALSE;
1864 /* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1865 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1866 */
1867 if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
1868 ret = FALSE;
1869 break;
1870 case CERT_V2:
1871 /* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1872 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1873 */
1874 if (cert->pCertInfo->cExtension)
1875 ret = FALSE;
1876 break;
1877 case CERT_V3:
1878 /* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
1879 break;
1880 default:
1881 WARN_(chain)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert->pCertInfo->dwVersion);
1882 ret = FALSE;
1883 }
1884 return ret;
1885 }
1886
1887 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
1888 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain, LPFILETIME time)
1889 {
1890 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1];
1891 int i;
1892 BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated = FALSE;
1893 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints = { FALSE, FALSE, 0 };
1894
1895 TRACE_(chain)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
1896 chain->cElement, filetime_to_str(time));
1897 for (i = chain->cElement - 1; i >= 0; i--)
1898 {
1899 BOOL isRoot;
1900
1901 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
1902 dump_element(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
1903 if (i == chain->cElement - 1)
1904 isRoot = CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1905 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
1906 else
1907 isRoot = FALSE;
1908 if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
1909 {
1910 /* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
1911 * contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
1912 */
1913 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1914 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1915 }
1916 if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time,
1917 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext->pCertInfo) != 0)
1918 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1919 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID;
1920 if (i != 0)
1921 {
1922 /* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
1923 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1924 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT,
1925 (void *)chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->pCertContext,
1926 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT,
1927 (void *)chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, 0, NULL))
1928 chain->rgpElement[i - 1]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1929 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID;
1930 /* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
1931 * CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
1932 */
1933 if (pathLengthConstraintViolated)
1934 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1935 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1936 else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine,
1937 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, i - 1, isRoot,
1938 &pathLengthConstraintViolated))
1939 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1940 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1941 else if (constraints.fPathLenConstraint &&
1942 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint)
1943 {
1944 /* This one's valid - decrement max length */
1945 constraints.dwPathLenConstraint--;
1946 }
1947 }
1948 else
1949 {
1950 /* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
1951 if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
1952 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext, &constraints, FALSE))
1953 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1954 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1955 }
1956 if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine, chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext,
1957 isRoot, constraints.fCA, i))
1958 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1959 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
1960 if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain))
1961 {
1962 /* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
1963 * are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
1964 */
1965 pathLengthConstraintViolated = TRUE;
1966 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1967 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN |
1968 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
1969 }
1970 /* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
1971 if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
1972 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext))
1973 chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
1974 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION |
1975 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT;
1976 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus,
1977 &chain->rgpElement[i]->TrustStatus);
1978 }
1979 CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain);
1980 CRYPT_CheckChainPolicies(chain);
1981 if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement->pCertContext))
1982 {
1983 rootElement->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus |=
1984 CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED | CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
1985 CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine->hRoot, rootElement);
1986 }
1987 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain->TrustStatus, &rootElement->TrustStatus);
1988 }
1989
1990 static PCCERT_CONTEXT CRYPT_GetIssuer(HCERTSTORE store, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject,
1991 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer, DWORD *infoStatus)
1992 {
1993 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = NULL;
1994 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
1995 DWORD size;
1996
1997 *infoStatus = 0;
1998 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
1999 subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
2000 {
2001 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO *info;
2002 BOOL ret;
2003
2004 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
2005 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2006 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
2007 &info, &size);
2008 if (ret)
2009 {
2010 CERT_ID id;
2011
2012 if (info->CertIssuer.cbData && info->CertSerialNumber.cbData)
2013 {
2014 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
2015 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer, &info->CertIssuer,
2016 sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
2017 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
2018 &info->CertSerialNumber, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
2019 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2020 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
2021 prevIssuer);
2022 if (issuer)
2023 {
2024 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n");
2025 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
2026 }
2027 }
2028 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
2029 {
2030 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
2031 memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
2032 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2033 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
2034 prevIssuer);
2035 if (issuer)
2036 {
2037 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
2038 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
2039 }
2040 }
2041 LocalFree(info);
2042 }
2043 }
2044 else if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2,
2045 subject->pCertInfo->cExtension, subject->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
2046 {
2047 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO *info;
2048 BOOL ret;
2049
2050 ret = CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject->dwCertEncodingType,
2051 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2052 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
2053 &info, &size);
2054 if (ret)
2055 {
2056 CERT_ID id;
2057
2058 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry &&
2059 info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber.cbData)
2060 {
2061 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName = NULL;
2062 DWORD i;
2063
2064 for (i = 0; !directoryName &&
2065 i < info->AuthorityCertIssuer.cAltEntry; i++)
2066 if (info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice
2067 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME)
2068 directoryName =
2069 &info->AuthorityCertIssuer.rgAltEntry[i];
2070 if (directoryName)
2071 {
2072 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER;
2073 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.Issuer,
2074 &directoryName->u.DirectoryName, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB));
2075 memcpy(&id.u.IssuerSerialNumber.SerialNumber,
2076 &info->AuthorityCertSerialNumber,
2077 sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB));
2078 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2079 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
2080 prevIssuer);
2081 if (issuer)
2082 {
2083 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by directory name\n");
2084 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER;
2085 }
2086 }
2087 else
2088 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
2089 }
2090 else if (info->KeyId.cbData)
2091 {
2092 id.dwIdChoice = CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
2093 memcpy(&id.u.KeyId, &info->KeyId, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB));
2094 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2095 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID, &id,
2096 prevIssuer);
2097 if (issuer)
2098 {
2099 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by key id\n");
2100 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER;
2101 }
2102 }
2103 LocalFree(info);
2104 }
2105 }
2106 else
2107 {
2108 issuer = CertFindCertificateInStore(store,
2109 subject->dwCertEncodingType, 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME,
2110 &subject->pCertInfo->Issuer, prevIssuer);
2111 TRACE_(chain)("issuer found by name\n");
2112 *infoStatus = CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER;
2113 }
2114 return issuer;
2115 }
2116
2117 /* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
2118 * until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
2119 */
2120 static BOOL CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine *engine,
2121 HCERTSTORE world, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain)
2122 {
2123 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2124 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
2125
2126 while (ret && !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain) &&
2127 !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert))
2128 {
2129 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(world, cert, NULL,
2130 &chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
2131
2132 if (issuer)
2133 {
2134 ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, issuer,
2135 chain->rgpElement[chain->cElement - 1]->TrustStatus.dwInfoStatus);
2136 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
2137 * close the enumeration that found it
2138 */
2139 CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer);
2140 cert = issuer;
2141 }
2142 else
2143 {
2144 TRACE_(chain)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
2145 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
2146 break;
2147 }
2148 }
2149 return ret;
2150 }
2151
2152 static LPCSTR debugstr_filetime(LPFILETIME pTime)
2153 {
2154 if (!pTime)
2155 return "(nil)";
2156 return wine_dbg_sprintf("%p (%s)", pTime, filetime_to_str(pTime));
2157 }
2158
2159 static BOOL CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(PCertificateChainEngine engine,
2160 HCERTSTORE world, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime,
2161 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *ppChain)
2162 {
2163 BOOL ret = FALSE;
2164 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain;
2165
2166 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %s)\n", engine, world, cert, debugstr_filetime(pTime));
2167
2168 chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2169 if (chain)
2170 {
2171 memset(chain, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2172 chain->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
2173 ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine, chain, cert, 0);
2174 if (ret)
2175 {
2176 ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, world, chain);
2177 if (ret)
2178 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine, chain, pTime);
2179 }
2180 if (!ret)
2181 {
2182 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain);
2183 chain = NULL;
2184 }
2185 *ppChain = chain;
2186 }
2187 return ret;
2188 }
2189
2190 static BOOL CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
2191 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2192 PCertificateChain *ppChain)
2193 {
2194 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
2195 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain = NULL;
2196 HCERTSTORE world;
2197 BOOL ret;
2198
2199 world = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION, 0, 0,
2200 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG, NULL);
2201 CertAddStoreToCollection(world, engine->hWorld, 0, 0);
2202 if (hAdditionalStore)
2203 CertAddStoreToCollection(world, hAdditionalStore, 0, 0);
2204 /* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
2205 * supported yet.
2206 */
2207 if ((ret = CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine, world, cert, pTime,
2208 &simpleChain)))
2209 {
2210 PCertificateChain chain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
2211
2212 if (chain)
2213 {
2214 chain->ref = 1;
2215 chain->world = world;
2216 chain->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
2217 chain->context.TrustStatus = simpleChain->TrustStatus;
2218 chain->context.cChain = 1;
2219 chain->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2220 chain->context.rgpChain[0] = simpleChain;
2221 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2222 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2223 chain->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
2224 chain->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
2225 }
2226 else
2227 ret = FALSE;
2228 *ppChain = chain;
2229 }
2230 return ret;
2231 }
2232
2233 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
2234 static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
2235 const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *chain, DWORD iElement)
2236 {
2237 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2238
2239 if (copy)
2240 {
2241 memset(copy, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2242 copy->cbSize = sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN);
2243 copy->rgpElement =
2244 CryptMemAlloc((iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2245 if (copy->rgpElement)
2246 {
2247 DWORD i;
2248 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2249
2250 memset(copy->rgpElement, 0,
2251 (iElement + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2252 for (i = 0; ret && i <= iElement; i++)
2253 {
2254 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element =
2255 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT));
2256
2257 if (element)
2258 {
2259 *element = *chain->rgpElement[i];
2260 element->pCertContext = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2261 chain->rgpElement[i]->pCertContext);
2262 /* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
2263 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2264 */
2265 memset(&element->TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
2266 copy->rgpElement[copy->cElement++] = element;
2267 }
2268 else
2269 ret = FALSE;
2270 }
2271 if (!ret)
2272 {
2273 for (i = 0; i <= iElement; i++)
2274 CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement[i]);
2275 CryptMemFree(copy->rgpElement);
2276 CryptMemFree(copy);
2277 copy = NULL;
2278 }
2279 }
2280 else
2281 {
2282 CryptMemFree(copy);
2283 copy = NULL;
2284 }
2285 }
2286 return copy;
2287 }
2288
2289 static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(PCertificateChain chain)
2290 {
2291 DWORD i;
2292
2293 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
2294 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]);
2295 CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext);
2296 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2297 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2298 }
2299
2300 static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(PCertificateChain chain)
2301 {
2302 DWORD i;
2303
2304 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
2305 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
2306 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain->context.rgpChain[i]);
2307 CryptMemFree(chain->context.rgpChain);
2308 CertCloseStore(chain->world, 0);
2309 CryptMemFree(chain);
2310 }
2311
2312 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
2313 * simple chain iChain.
2314 */
2315 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(PCertificateChain chain,
2316 DWORD iChain, DWORD iElement)
2317 {
2318 PCertificateChain copy = CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain));
2319
2320 if (copy)
2321 {
2322 copy->ref = 1;
2323 copy->world = CertDuplicateStore(chain->world);
2324 copy->context.cbSize = sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT);
2325 /* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
2326 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2327 */
2328 memset(&copy->context.TrustStatus, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS));
2329 copy->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2330 copy->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2331 copy->context.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime = FALSE;
2332 copy->context.dwRevocationFreshnessTime = 0;
2333 copy->context.rgpChain = CryptMemAlloc(
2334 (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2335 if (copy->context.rgpChain)
2336 {
2337 BOOL ret = TRUE;
2338 DWORD i;
2339
2340 memset(copy->context.rgpChain, 0,
2341 (iChain + 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN));
2342 if (iChain)
2343 {
2344 for (i = 0; ret && iChain && i < iChain - 1; i++)
2345 {
2346 copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
2347 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
2348 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1);
2349 if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
2350 ret = FALSE;
2351 }
2352 }
2353 else
2354 i = 0;
2355 if (ret)
2356 {
2357 copy->context.rgpChain[i] =
2358 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain->context.rgpChain[i],
2359 iElement);
2360 if (!copy->context.rgpChain[i])
2361 ret = FALSE;
2362 }
2363 if (!ret)
2364 {
2365 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy);
2366 copy = NULL;
2367 }
2368 else
2369 copy->context.cChain = iChain + 1;
2370 }
2371 else
2372 {
2373 CryptMemFree(copy);
2374 copy = NULL;
2375 }
2376 }
2377 return copy;
2378 }
2379
2380 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
2381 HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2382 PCertificateChain chain)
2383 {
2384 PCertificateChainEngine engine = (PCertificateChainEngine)hChainEngine;
2385 PCertificateChain alternate;
2386
2387 TRACE("(%p, %s, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, debugstr_filetime(pTime),
2388 hAdditionalStore, chain);
2389
2390 /* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
2391 * order of alternate creation:
2392 */
2393 if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
2394 chain = (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
2395 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext - 1];
2396 /* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
2397 if (chain->context.cChain <= 1 && chain->context.rgpChain[0]->cElement <= 1)
2398 alternate = NULL;
2399 else
2400 {
2401 DWORD i, j, infoStatus;
2402 PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer = NULL;
2403
2404 alternate = NULL;
2405 for (i = 0; !alternateIssuer && i < chain->context.cChain; i++)
2406 for (j = 0; !alternateIssuer &&
2407 j < chain->context.rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1; j++)
2408 {
2409 PCCERT_CONTEXT subject =
2410 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
2411 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer = CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2412 chain->context.rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext);
2413
2414 alternateIssuer = CRYPT_GetIssuer(prevIssuer->hCertStore,
2415 subject, prevIssuer, &infoStatus);
2416 }
2417 if (alternateIssuer)
2418 {
2419 i--;
2420 j--;
2421 alternate = CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain, i, j);
2422 if (alternate)
2423 {
2424 BOOL ret = CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine,
2425 alternate->context.rgpChain[i], alternateIssuer, infoStatus);
2426
2427 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
2428 * to close the enumeration that found it
2429 */
2430 CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer);
2431 if (ret)
2432 {
2433 ret = CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine, alternate->world,
2434 alternate->context.rgpChain[i]);
2435 if (ret)
2436 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine,
2437 alternate->context.rgpChain[i], pTime);
2438 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate->context.TrustStatus,
2439 &alternate->context.rgpChain[i]->TrustStatus);
2440 }
2441 if (!ret)
2442 {
2443 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate);
2444 alternate = NULL;
2445 }
2446 }
2447 }
2448 }
2449 TRACE("%p\n", alternate);
2450 return alternate;
2451 }
2452
2453 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
2454 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
2455 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
2456 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
2457 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
2458
2459 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
2460 CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
2461 CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
2462 CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
2463
2464 #define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
2465 (TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
2466
2467 static DWORD CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain *chain)
2468 {
2469 DWORD quality = CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST;
2470
2471 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2472 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT))
2473 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT;
2474 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2475 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS))
2476 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
2477 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2478 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN))
2479 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN;
2480 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2481 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED))
2482 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID;
2483 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain->context.TrustStatus,
2484 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID))
2485 quality &= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID;
2486 return quality;
2487 }
2488
2489 /* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
2490 * alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
2491 * chains as lower quality chains of it.
2492 */
2493 static PCertificateChain CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
2494 PCertificateChain chain)
2495 {
2496 DWORD i;
2497
2498 /* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
2499 * alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
2500 * has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
2501 * quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
2502 * lower quality contexts.
2503 */
2504 for (i = 0; i < chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext; i++)
2505 {
2506 PCertificateChain alternate =
2507 (PCertificateChain)chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i];
2508
2509 if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain))
2510 {
2511 alternate->context.cLowerQualityChainContext =
2512 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext;
2513 alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2514 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext;
2515 alternate->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i] =
2516 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
2517 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext = 0;
2518 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext = NULL;
2519 chain = alternate;
2520 }
2521 }
2522 return chain;
2523 }
2524
2525 static BOOL CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(PCertificateChain chain,
2526 const CertificateChain *alternate)
2527 {
2528 BOOL ret;
2529
2530 if (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext)
2531 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2532 CryptMemRealloc(chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext,
2533 (chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext + 1) *
2534 sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
2535 else
2536 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext =
2537 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT));
2538 if (chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext)
2539 {
2540 chain->context.rgpLowerQualityChainContext[
2541 chain->context.cLowerQualityChainContext++] =
2542 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)alternate;
2543 ret = TRUE;
2544 }
2545 else
2546 ret = FALSE;
2547 return ret;
2548 }
2549
2550 static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2551 const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT *chain, DWORD i)
2552 {
2553 DWORD j, iElement;
2554 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = NULL;
2555
2556 for (j = 0, iElement = 0; !element && j < chain->cChain; j++)
2557 {
2558 if (iElement + chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement < i)
2559 iElement += chain->rgpChain[j]->cElement;
2560 else
2561 element = chain->rgpChain[j]->rgpElement[i - iElement];
2562 }
2563 return element;
2564 }
2565
2566 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS {
2567 DWORD cbSize;
2568 CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage;
2569 } CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS, *PCERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS;
2570
2571 static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
2572 LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2573 const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara, DWORD chainFlags)
2574 {
2575 DWORD cContext;
2576
2577 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT)
2578 cContext = 1;
2579 else if ((chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN) ||
2580 (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT))
2581 {
2582 DWORD i;
2583
2584 for (i = 0, cContext = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
2585 {
2586 if (i < chain->cChain - 1 ||
2587 chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN)
2588 cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement;
2589 else
2590 cContext += chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1;
2591 }
2592 }
2593 else
2594 cContext = 0;
2595 if (cContext)
2596 {
2597 DWORD i, j, iContext, revocationFlags;
2598 CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara = { sizeof(revocationPara), 0 };
2599 CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus =
2600 { sizeof(revocationStatus), 0 };
2601 BOOL ret;
2602
2603 revocationFlags = CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG;
2604 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY)
2605 revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION;
2606 if (chainFlags & CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT)
2607 revocationFlags |= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG;
2608 revocationPara.pftTimeToUse = pTime;
2609 if (hAdditionalStore)
2610 {
2611 revocationPara.cCertStore = 1;
2612 revocationPara.rgCertStore = &hAdditionalStore;
2613 revocationPara.hCrlStore = hAdditionalStore;
2614 }
2615 if (pChainPara->cbSize == sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
2616 {
2617 revocationPara.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout =
2618 pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
2619 revocationPara.fCheckFreshnessTime =
2620 pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime;
2621 revocationPara.dwFreshnessTime =
2622 pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime;
2623 }
2624 for (i = 0, iContext = 0; iContext < cContext && i < chain->cChain; i++)
2625 {
2626 for (j = 0; iContext < cContext &&
2627 j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++, iContext++)
2628 {
2629 PCCERT_CONTEXT certToCheck =
2630 chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->pCertContext;
2631
2632 if (j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement - 1)
2633 revocationPara.pIssuerCert =
2634 chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j + 1]->pCertContext;
2635 else
2636 revocationPara.pIssuerCert = NULL;
2637 ret = CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
2638 CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE, 1, (void **)&certToCheck,
2639 revocationFlags, &revocationPara, &revocationStatus);
2640 if (!ret)
2641 {
2642 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element = CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2643 chain, iContext);
2644 DWORD error;
2645
2646 switch (revocationStatus.dwError)
2647 {
2648 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
2649 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL:
2650 case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE:
2651 /* If the revocation status is unknown, it's assumed
2652 * to be offline too.
2653 */
2654 error = CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN |
2655 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
2656 break;
2657 case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
2658 error = CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION;
2659 break;
2660 case CRYPT_E_REVOKED:
2661 error = CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED;
2662 break;
2663 default:
2664 WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus.dwError);
2665 error = 0;
2666 }
2667 if (element)
2668 {
2669 /* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
2670 element->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
2671 }
2672 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |= error;
2673 }
2674 }
2675 }
2676 }
2677 }
2678
2679 static void CRYPT_CheckUsages(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain,
2680 const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
2681 {
2682 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS) &&
2683 pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2684 {
2685 PCCERT_CONTEXT endCert;
2686 PCERT_EXTENSION ext;
2687 BOOL validForUsage;
2688
2689 /* A chain, if created, always includes the end certificate */
2690 endCert = chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
2691 /* The extended key usage extension specifies how a certificate's
2692 * public key may be used. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12:
2693 * "This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
2694 * certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the
2695 * basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension."
2696 * If the extension is present, it only satisfies the requested usage
2697 * if that usage is included in the extension:
2698 * "If the extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be used
2699 * for one of the purposes indicated."
2700 * There is also the special anyExtendedKeyUsage OID, but it doesn't
2701 * have to be respected:
2702 * "Applications that require the presence of a particular purpose
2703 * MAY reject certificates that include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID
2704 * but not the particular OID expected for the application."
2705 * For now, I'm being more conservative and ignoring the presence of
2706 * the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID.
2707 */
2708 if ((ext = CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE,
2709 endCert->pCertInfo->cExtension, endCert->pCertInfo->rgExtension)))
2710 {
2711 const CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *requestedUsage =
2712 &pChainPara->RequestedUsage.Usage;
2713 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *usage;
2714 DWORD size;
2715
2716 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING,
2717 X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE, ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
2718 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, &usage, &size))
2719 {
2720 if (pChainPara->RequestedUsage.dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND)
2721 {
2722 DWORD i, j;
2723
2724 /* For AND matches, all usages must be present */
2725 validForUsage = TRUE;
2726 for (i = 0; validForUsage &&
2727 i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2728 {
2729 BOOL match = FALSE;
2730
2731 for (j = 0; !match && j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
2732 match = !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
2733 requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2734 if (!match)
2735 validForUsage = FALSE;
2736 }
2737 }
2738 else
2739 {
2740 DWORD i, j;
2741
2742 /* For OR matches, any matching usage suffices */
2743 validForUsage = FALSE;
2744 for (i = 0; !validForUsage &&
2745 i < requestedUsage->cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2746 {
2747 for (j = 0; !validForUsage &&
2748 j < usage->cUsageIdentifier; j++)
2749 validForUsage =
2750 !strcmp(usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[j],
2751 requestedUsage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2752 }
2753 }
2754 LocalFree(usage);
2755 }
2756 else
2757 validForUsage = FALSE;
2758 }
2759 else
2760 {
2761 /* If the extension isn't present, any interpretation is valid:
2762 * "Certificate using applications MAY require that the extended
2763 * key usage extension be present and that a particular purpose
2764 * be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to
2765 * that application."
2766 * Not all web sites include the extended key usage extension, so
2767 * accept chains without it.
2768 */
2769 TRACE_(chain)("requested usage from certificate with no usages\n");
2770 validForUsage = TRUE;
2771 }
2772 if (!validForUsage)
2773 {
2774 chain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
2775 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
2776 chain->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus |=
2777 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE;
2778 }
2779 }
2780 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA) &&
2781 pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2782 FIXME("unimplemented for RequestedIssuancePolicy\n");
2783 }
2784
2785 static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH *usageMatch)
2786 {
2787 if (usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier)
2788 {
2789 DWORD i;
2790
2791 TRACE_(chain)("%s: %s\n", name,
2792 usageMatch->dwType == USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND ? "AND" : "OR");
2793 for (i = 0; i < usageMatch->Usage.cUsageIdentifier; i++)
2794 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", usageMatch->Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier[i]);
2795 }
2796 }
2797
2798 static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA *pChainPara)
2799 {
2800 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->cbSize);
2801 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS))
2802 dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara->RequestedUsage);
2803 if (pChainPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA))
2804 {
2805 dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
2806 &pChainPara->RequestedIssuancePolicy);
2807 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout);
2808 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime);
2809 TRACE_(chain)("%d\n", pChainPara->dwRevocationFreshnessTime);
2810 }
2811 }
2812
2813 BOOL WINAPI CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine,
2814 PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext, LPFILETIME pTime, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore,
2815 PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara, DWORD dwFlags, LPVOID pvReserved,
2816 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT* ppChainContext)
2817 {
2818 BOOL ret;
2819 PCertificateChain chain = NULL;
2820
2821 TRACE("(%p, %p, %s, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine, pCertContext,
2822 debugstr_filetime(pTime), hAdditionalStore, pChainPara, dwFlags,
2823 pvReserved, ppChainContext);
2824
2825 if (ppChainContext)
2826 *ppChainContext = NULL;
2827 if (!pChainPara)
2828 {
2829 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG);
2830 return FALSE;
2831 }
2832 if (!pCertContext->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId)
2833 {
2834 SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
2835 return FALSE;
2836 }
2837
2838 if (!hChainEngine)
2839 hChainEngine = CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine();
2840 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
2841 dump_chain_para(pChainPara);
2842 /* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
2843 ret = CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(hChainEngine, pCertContext, pTime,
2844 hAdditionalStore, &chain);
2845 if (ret)
2846 {
2847 PCertificateChain alternate = NULL;
2848 PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain;
2849
2850 do {
2851 alternate = CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(hChainEngine,
2852 pTime, hAdditionalStore, chain);
2853
2854 /* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
2855 * chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
2856 * The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
2857 */
2858 if (alternate)
2859 ret = CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain, alternate);
2860 } while (ret && alternate);
2861 chain = CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain);
2862 if (!(dwFlags & CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS))
2863 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain);
2864 pChain = (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT)chain;
2865 CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain, pTime, hAdditionalStore,
2866 pChainPara, dwFlags);
2867 CRYPT_CheckUsages(pChain, pChainPara);
2868 TRACE_(chain)("error status: %08x\n",
2869 pChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus);
2870 if (ppChainContext)
2871 *ppChainContext = pChain;
2872 else
2873 CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain);
2874 }
2875 TRACE("returning %d\n", ret);
2876 return ret;
2877 }
2878
2879 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
2880 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
2881 {
2882 PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext;
2883
2884 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
2885
2886 if (chain)
2887 InterlockedIncrement(&chain->ref);
2888 return pChainContext;
2889 }
2890
2891 VOID WINAPI CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext)
2892 {
2893 PCertificateChain chain = (PCertificateChain)pChainContext;
2894
2895 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext);
2896
2897 if (chain)
2898 {
2899 if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain->ref) == 0)
2900 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain);
2901 }
2902 }
2903
2904 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI CertFindChainInStore(HCERTSTORE store,
2905 DWORD certEncodingType, DWORD findFlags, DWORD findType,
2906 const void *findPara, PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT prevChainContext)
2907 {
2908 FIXME("(%p, %08x, %08x, %d, %p, %p): stub\n", store, certEncodingType,
2909 findFlags, findType, findPara, prevChainContext);
2910 return NULL;
2911 }
2912
2913 static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, DWORD error,
2914 LONG *iChain, LONG *iElement)
2915 {
2916 DWORD i, j;
2917
2918 for (i = 0; i < chain->cChain; i++)
2919 for (j = 0; j < chain->rgpChain[i]->cElement; j++)
2920 if (chain->rgpChain[i]->rgpElement[j]->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2921 error)
2922 {
2923 *iChain = i;
2924 *iElement = j;
2925 return;
2926 }
2927 }
2928
2929 static BOOL WINAPI verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
2930 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
2931 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
2932 {
2933 DWORD checks = 0;
2934
2935 if (pPolicyPara)
2936 checks = pPolicyPara->dwFlags;
2937 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2938 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
2939 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2940 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
2941 {
2942 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
2943 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2944 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2945 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2946 }
2947 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
2948 {
2949 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CHAINING;
2950 find_element_with_error(pChainContext, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC,
2951 &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex, &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2952 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2953 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
2954 }
2955 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
2956 pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT &&
2957 !(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_CA_FLAG))
2958 {
2959 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
2960 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2961 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2962 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2963 }
2964 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
2965 pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID)
2966 {
2967 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
2968 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2969 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2970 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2971 }
2972 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
2973 pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2974 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE &&
2975 !(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE_FLAG))
2976 {
2977 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE;
2978 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2979 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2980 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2981 }
2982 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError &&
2983 pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
2984 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT &&
2985 !(checks & CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT_FLAG))
2986 {
2987 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CRITICAL;
2988 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
2989 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
2990 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
2991 }
2992 return TRUE;
2993 }
2994
2995 static BYTE msTestPubKey1[] = {
2996 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
2997 0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
2998 0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
2999 0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
3000 0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3001 static BYTE msTestPubKey2[] = {
3002 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
3003 0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
3004 0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
3005 0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
3006 0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3007
3008 static void dump_authenticode_extra_chain_policy_para(
3009 AUTHENTICODE_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA *extraPara)
3010 {
3011 if (extraPara)
3012 {
3013 TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", extraPara->cbSize);
3014 TRACE_(chain)("dwRegPolicySettings = %08x\n",
3015 extraPara->dwRegPolicySettings);
3016 TRACE_(chain)("pSignerInfo = %p\n", extraPara->pSignerInfo);
3017 }
3018 }
3019
3020 static BOOL WINAPI verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3021 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3022 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3023 {
3024 BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3025 pPolicyStatus);
3026 AUTHENTICODE_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA *extraPara = NULL;
3027
3028 if (pPolicyPara)
3029 extraPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
3030 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
3031 dump_authenticode_extra_chain_policy_para(extraPara);
3032 if (ret && pPolicyStatus->dwError == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT)
3033 {
3034 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
3035 BOOL isMSTestRoot = FALSE;
3036 PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert =
3037 pChainContext->rgpChain[pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex]->
3038 rgpElement[pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex]->pCertContext;
3039 DWORD i;
3040 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
3041 { sizeof(msTestPubKey1), msTestPubKey1 },
3042 { sizeof(msTestPubKey2), msTestPubKey2 },
3043 };
3044
3045 /* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
3046 for (i = 0; !isMSTestRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
3047 i++)
3048 {
3049 msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
3050 msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
3051 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
3052 X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
3053 &failingCert->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
3054 isMSTestRoot = TRUE;
3055 }
3056 if (isMSTestRoot)
3057 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT;
3058 }
3059 return ret;
3060 }
3061
3062 static BOOL WINAPI verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3063 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3064 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3065 {
3066 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3067 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3068 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)
3069 {
3070 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS;
3071 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3072 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3073 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3074 }
3075 else
3076 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
3077 return TRUE;
3078 }
3079
3080 static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(const CERT_EXTENSION *ext,
3081 LPCWSTR server_name)
3082 {
3083 BOOL matches = FALSE;
3084 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO *subjectName;
3085 DWORD size;
3086
3087 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
3088 /* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
3089 * returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
3090 * encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
3091 * the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
3092 */
3093 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME,
3094 ext->Value.pbData, ext->Value.cbData,
3095 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
3096 &subjectName, &size))
3097 {
3098 DWORD i;
3099
3100 /* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
3101 * in section 4.2.1.6:
3102 * "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
3103 * MAY be included."
3104 * It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818
3105 * and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches.
3106 */
3107 for (i = 0; !matches && i < subjectName->cAltEntry; i++)
3108 {
3109 if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].dwAltNameChoice ==
3110 CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME)
3111 {
3112 TRACE_(chain)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
3113 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName));
3114 if (subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName[0] == '*')
3115 {
3116 LPCWSTR server_name_dot;
3117
3118 /* Matching a wildcard: a wildcard matches a single name
3119 * component, which is terminated by a dot. RFC 1034
3120 * doesn't define whether multiple wildcards are allowed,
3121 * but I will assume that they are not until proven
3122 * otherwise. RFC 1034 also states that 'the "*" label
3123 * always matches at least one whole label and sometimes
3124 * more, but always whole labels.' Native crypt32 does not
3125 * match more than one label with a wildcard, so I do the
3126 * same here. Thus, a wildcard only accepts the first
3127 * label, then requires an exact match of the remaining
3128 * string.
3129 */
3130 server_name_dot = strchrW(server_name, '.');
3131 if (server_name_dot)
3132 {
3133 if (!strcmpiW(server_name_dot,
3134 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName + 1))
3135 matches = TRUE;
3136 }
3137 }
3138 else if (!strcmpiW(server_name,
3139 subjectName->rgAltEntry[i].u.pwszDNSName))
3140 matches = TRUE;
3141 }
3142 }
3143 LocalFree(subjectName);
3144 }
3145 return matches;
3146 }
3147
3148 static BOOL find_matching_domain_component(const CERT_NAME_INFO *name,
3149 LPCWSTR component)
3150 {
3151 BOOL matches = FALSE;
3152 DWORD i, j;
3153
3154 for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
3155 for (j = 0; j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
3156 if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT,
3157 name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j].pszObjId))
3158 {
3159 const CERT_RDN_ATTR *attr;
3160
3161 attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
3162 /* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
3163 * a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
3164 * must match one domain component attribute's entire string
3165 * value with a case-insensitive match.
3166 */
3167 matches = !memicmpW(component, (LPCWSTR)attr->Value.pbData,
3168 attr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR));
3169 }
3170 return matches;
3171 }
3172
3173 static BOOL match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component, DWORD allowed_len,
3174 LPCWSTR server_component, DWORD server_len, BOOL allow_wildcards,
3175 BOOL *see_wildcard)
3176 {
3177 LPCWSTR allowed_ptr, server_ptr;
3178 BOOL matches = TRUE;
3179
3180 *see_wildcard = FALSE;
3181 if (server_len < allowed_len)
3182 {
3183 WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
3184 debugstr_wn(server_component, server_len),
3185 debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
3186 /* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
3187 * component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
3188 */
3189 return FALSE;
3190 }
3191 for (allowed_ptr = allowed_component, server_ptr = server_component;
3192 matches && allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len;
3193 allowed_ptr++, server_ptr++)
3194 {
3195 if (*allowed_ptr == '*')
3196 {
3197 if (allowed_ptr - allowed_component < allowed_len - 1)
3198 {
3199 WARN_(chain)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
3200 matches = FALSE;
3201 }
3202 else if (!allow_wildcards)
3203 {
3204 WARN_(chain)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
3205 matches = FALSE;
3206 }
3207 else
3208 {
3209 /* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
3210 * the component also matches.
3211 */
3212 *see_wildcard = TRUE;
3213 break;
3214 }
3215 }
3216 matches = tolowerW(*allowed_ptr) == tolowerW(*server_ptr);
3217 }
3218 if (matches && server_ptr - server_component < server_len)
3219 {
3220 /* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
3221 * the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
3222 */
3223 matches = *allowed_ptr == '*';
3224 }
3225 return matches;
3226 }
3227
3228 static BOOL match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name, const CERT_RDN_ATTR *nameAttr)
3229 {
3230 LPCWSTR allowed = (LPCWSTR)nameAttr->Value.pbData;
3231 LPCWSTR allowed_component = allowed;
3232 DWORD allowed_len = nameAttr->Value.cbData / sizeof(WCHAR);
3233 LPCWSTR server_component = server_name;
3234 DWORD server_len = strlenW(server_name);
3235 BOOL matches = TRUE, allow_wildcards = TRUE;
3236
3237 TRACE_(chain)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component, allowed_len));
3238
3239 /* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
3240 * "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
3241 * any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
3242 * *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
3243 * but not bar.com."
3244 *
3245 * And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
3246 * "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
3247 * the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
3248 * foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
3249 *
3250 * There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
3251 * authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
3252 * *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
3253 * www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
3254 */
3255 do {
3256 LPCWSTR allowed_dot, server_dot;
3257
3258 allowed_dot = memchrW(allowed_component, '.',
3259 allowed_len - (allowed_component - allowed));
3260 server_dot = memchrW(server_component, '.',
3261 server_len - (server_component - server_name));
3262 /* The number of components must match */
3263 if ((!allowed_dot && server_dot) || (allowed_dot && !server_dot))
3264 {
3265 if (!allowed_dot)
3266 WARN_(chain)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
3267 debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
3268 else
3269 WARN_(chain)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
3270 debugstr_w(server_name), debugstr_wn(allowed, allowed_len));
3271 matches = FALSE;
3272 }
3273 else
3274 {
3275 LPCWSTR allowed_end, server_end;
3276 BOOL has_wildcard;
3277
3278 allowed_end = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot : allowed + allowed_len;
3279 server_end = server_dot ? server_dot : server_name + server_len;
3280 matches = match_domain_component(allowed_component,
3281 allowed_end - allowed_component, server_component,
3282 server_end - server_component, allow_wildcards, &has_wildcard);
3283 /* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
3284 * may follow
3285 */
3286 if (!has_wildcard)
3287 allow_wildcards = FALSE;
3288 if (matches)
3289 {
3290 allowed_component = allowed_dot ? allowed_dot + 1 : allowed_end;
3291 server_component = server_dot ? server_dot + 1 : server_end;
3292 }
3293 }
3294 } while (matches && allowed_component &&
3295 allowed_component - allowed < allowed_len &&
3296 server_component && server_component - server_name < server_len);
3297 TRACE_(chain)("returning %d\n", matches);
3298 return matches;
3299 }
3300
3301 static BOOL match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, LPCWSTR server_name)
3302 {
3303 BOOL matches = FALSE;
3304 CERT_NAME_INFO *name;
3305 DWORD size;
3306
3307 TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name));
3308 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_UNICODE_NAME,
3309 cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData,
3310 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, NULL,
3311 &name, &size))
3312 {
3313 /* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
3314 * make sure all of them are present.
3315 */
3316 if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, name))
3317 {
3318 LPCWSTR ptr = server_name;
3319
3320 matches = TRUE;
3321 do {
3322 LPCWSTR dot = strchrW(ptr, '.'), end;
3323 /* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
3324 WCHAR component[255];
3325 DWORD len;
3326
3327 end = dot ? dot : ptr + strlenW(ptr);
3328 len = end - ptr;
3329 if (len >= sizeof(component) / sizeof(component[0]))
3330 {
3331 WARN_(chain)("domain component %s too long\n",
3332 debugstr_wn(ptr, len));
3333 matches = FALSE;
3334 }
3335 else
3336 {
3337 memcpy(component, ptr, len * sizeof(WCHAR));
3338 component[len] = 0;
3339 matches = find_matching_domain_component(name, component);
3340 }
3341 ptr = dot ? dot + 1 : end;
3342 } while (matches && ptr && *ptr);
3343 }
3344 else
3345 {
3346 DWORD i, j;
3347
3348 /* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
3349 * make sure at least one common name matches. From RFC 2818,
3350 * section 3.1:
3351 * "If more than one identity of a given type is present in the
3352 * certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any
3353 * one of the set is considered acceptable.)"
3354 */
3355 for (i = 0; !matches && i < name->cRDN; i++)
3356 for (j = 0; !matches && j < name->rgRDN[i].cRDNAttr; j++)
3357 {
3358 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr = &name->rgRDN[i].rgRDNAttr[j];
3359
3360 if (attr->pszObjId && !strcmp(szOID_COMMON_NAME,
3361 attr->pszObjId))
3362 matches = match_common_name(server_name, attr);
3363 }
3364 }
3365 LocalFree(name);
3366 }
3367 return matches;
3368 }
3369
3370 static void dump_ssl_extra_chain_policy_para(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara)
3371 {
3372 if (sslPara)
3373 {
3374 TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", sslPara->u.cbSize);
3375 TRACE_(chain)("dwAuthType = %d\n", sslPara->dwAuthType);
3376 TRACE_(chain)("fdwChecks = %08x\n", sslPara->fdwChecks);
3377 TRACE_(chain)("pwszServerName = %s\n",
3378 debugstr_w(sslPara->pwszServerName));
3379 }
3380 }
3381
3382 static BOOL WINAPI verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3383 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3384 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3385 {
3386 HTTPSPolicyCallbackData *sslPara = NULL;
3387 DWORD checks = 0;
3388
3389 if (pPolicyPara)
3390 sslPara = pPolicyPara->pvExtraPolicyPara;
3391 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
3392 dump_ssl_extra_chain_policy_para(sslPara);
3393 if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
3394 checks = sslPara->fdwChecks;
3395 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3396 if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3397 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID)
3398 {
3399 pPolicyStatus->dwError = TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE;
3400 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3401 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3402 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3403 }
3404 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3405 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT &&
3406 !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CA))
3407 {
3408 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
3409 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3410 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3411 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3412 }
3413 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC)
3414 {
3415 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT;
3416 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3417 CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3418 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3419 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
3420 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = -1;
3421 }
3422 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3423 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID &&
3424 !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_DATE_INVALID))
3425 {
3426 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_EXPIRED;
3427 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3428 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3429 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3430 }
3431 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3432 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE &&
3433 !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE))
3434 {
3435 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE;
3436 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3437 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3438 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3439 }
3440 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3441 CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED && !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION))
3442 {
3443 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_REVOKED;
3444 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3445 CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3446 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3447 }
3448 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3449 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION &&
3450 !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION))
3451 {
3452 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE;
3453 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3454 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3455 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3456 }
3457 else if (pChainContext->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus &
3458 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT)
3459 {
3460 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CRITICAL;
3461 find_element_with_error(pChainContext,
3462 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT, &pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex,
3463 &pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex);
3464 }
3465 else
3466 pPolicyStatus->dwError = NO_ERROR;
3467 /* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
3468 * matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
3469 */
3470 if (!pPolicyStatus->dwError && pPolicyPara &&
3471 pPolicyPara->cbSize >= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA))
3472 {
3473 if (sslPara && sslPara->u.cbSize >= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData))
3474 {
3475 if (sslPara->dwAuthType == AUTHTYPE_SERVER &&
3476 sslPara->pwszServerName &&
3477 !(checks & SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_CN_INVALID))
3478 {
3479 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert;
3480 PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt;
3481 BOOL matches;
3482
3483 cert = pChainContext->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
3484 altNameExt = get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert->pCertInfo);
3485 /* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
3486 * is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
3487 * it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
3488 * distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
3489 * "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
3490 * certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
3491 * alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
3492 * name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
3493 * domainComponent attribute."
3494 */
3495 if (altNameExt)
3496 matches = match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt,
3497 sslPara->pwszServerName);
3498 else
3499 matches = match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert,
3500 sslPara->pwszServerName);
3501 if (!matches)
3502 {
3503 pPolicyStatus->dwError = CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH;
3504 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = 0;
3505 pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
3506 }
3507 }
3508 }
3509 }
3510 return TRUE;
3511 }
3512
3513 static BYTE msPubKey1[] = {
3514 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
3515 0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
3516 0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
3517 0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
3518 0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
3519 0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
3520 0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
3521 0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
3522 0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
3523 0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
3524 0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
3525 0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
3526 0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
3527 0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
3528 0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
3529 0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
3530 0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
3531 0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3532 static BYTE msPubKey2[] = {
3533 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
3534 0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
3535 0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
3536 0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
3537 0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
3538 0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
3539 0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
3540 0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
3541 0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
3542 0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
3543 0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
3544 0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
3545 0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
3546 0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
3547 0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
3548 0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
3549 0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
3550 0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3551 static BYTE msPubKey3[] = {
3552 0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
3553 0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
3554 0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
3555 0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
3556 0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
3557 0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
3558 0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
3559 0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
3560 0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
3561 0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
3562 0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
3563 0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
3564 0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
3565 0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
3566 0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
3567 0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
3568 0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
3569 0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
3570 0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
3571 0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
3572 0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
3573 0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
3574 0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
3575 0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
3576 0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
3577 0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
3578 0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
3579 0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
3580 0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
3581 0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
3582 0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
3583 0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
3584 0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
3585 0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
3586 0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
3587 0x01 };
3588
3589 static BOOL WINAPI verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3590 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3591 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3592 {
3593 BOOL ret = verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3594 pPolicyStatus);
3595
3596 if (ret && !pPolicyStatus->dwError)
3597 {
3598 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey = { { 0 } };
3599 BOOL isMSRoot = FALSE;
3600 DWORD i;
3601 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs[] = {
3602 { sizeof(msPubKey1), msPubKey1 },
3603 { sizeof(msPubKey2), msPubKey2 },
3604 { sizeof(msPubKey3), msPubKey3 },
3605 };
3606 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain =
3607 pChainContext->rgpChain[pChainContext->cChain -1 ];
3608 PCCERT_CONTEXT root =
3609 rootChain->rgpElement[rootChain->cElement - 1]->pCertContext;
3610
3611 for (i = 0; !isMSRoot && i < sizeof(keyBlobs) / sizeof(keyBlobs[0]);
3612 i++)
3613 {
3614 msPubKey.PublicKey.cbData = keyBlobs[i].cbData;
3615 msPubKey.PublicKey.pbData = keyBlobs[i].pbData;
3616 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
3617 X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
3618 &root->pCertInfo->SubjectPublicKeyInfo, &msPubKey))
3619 isMSRoot = TRUE;
3620 }
3621 if (isMSRoot)
3622 pPolicyStatus->lChainIndex = pPolicyStatus->lElementIndex = 0;
3623 }
3624 return ret;
3625 }
3626
3627 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3628 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3629 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus);
3630
3631 static void dump_policy_para(PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA para)
3632 {
3633 if (para)
3634 {
3635 TRACE_(chain)("cbSize = %d\n", para->cbSize);
3636 TRACE_(chain)("dwFlags = %08x\n", para->dwFlags);
3637 TRACE_(chain)("pvExtraPolicyPara = %p\n", para->pvExtraPolicyPara);
3638 }
3639 }
3640
3641 BOOL WINAPI CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID,
3642 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara,
3643 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus)
3644 {
3645 static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set = NULL;
3646 BOOL ret = FALSE;
3647 CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy = NULL;
3648 HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc = NULL;
3649
3650 TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID), pChainContext,
3651 pPolicyPara, pPolicyStatus);
3652 if (TRACE_ON(chain))
3653 dump_policy_para(pPolicyPara);
3654
3655 if (IS_INTOID(szPolicyOID))
3656 {
3657 switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID))
3658 {
3659 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE):
3660 verifyPolicy = verify_base_policy;
3661 break;
3662 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE):
3663 verifyPolicy = verify_authenticode_policy;
3664 break;
3665 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL):
3666 verifyPolicy = verify_ssl_policy;
3667 break;
3668 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS):
3669 verifyPolicy = verify_basic_constraints_policy;
3670 break;
3671 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT):
3672 verifyPolicy = verify_ms_root_policy;
3673 break;
3674 default:
3675 FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID));
3676 }
3677 }
3678 if (!verifyPolicy)
3679 {
3680 if (!set)
3681 set = CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
3682 CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC, 0);
3683 CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set, X509_ASN_ENCODING, szPolicyOID, 0,
3684 (void **)&verifyPolicy, &hFunc);
3685 }
3686 if (verifyPolicy)
3687 ret = verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID, pChainContext, pPolicyPara,
3688 pPolicyStatus);
3689 if (hFunc)
3690 CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc, 0);
3691 TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret, pPolicyStatus->dwError);
3692 return ret;
3693 }
Quick hack tree for wine patches julliard doesn't want to commit