security/selinux/xfrm.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Serge Hallyn <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
   7  *            Trent Jaeger <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
   8  *
   9  *  Updated: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
  10  *
  11  *           Granular IPSec Associations for use in MLS environments.
  12  *
  13  *  Copyright (C) 2005 International Business Machines Corporation
  14  *  Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  15  *
  16  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  17  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  18  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  19  */
  20
  21 /*
  22  * USAGE:
  23  * NOTES:
  24  *   1. Make sure to enable the following options in your kernel config:
  25  *      CONFIG_SECURITY=y
  26  *      CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
  27  *      CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
  28  *      CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=m/y
  29  * ISSUES:
  30  *   1. Caching packets, so they are not dropped during negotiation
  31  *   2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines
  32  *   3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt
  33  */
  34 #include <linux/module.h>
  35 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  36 #include <linux/init.h>
  37 #include <linux/security.h>
  38 #include <linux/types.h>
  39 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
  40 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  41 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  42 #include <linux/ip.h>
  43 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  44 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
  45 #include <linux/xfrm.h>
  46 #include <net/xfrm.h>
  47 #include <net/checksum.h>
  48 #include <net/udp.h>
  49 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
  50
  51 #include "avc.h"
  52 #include "objsec.h"
  53 #include "xfrm.h"
  54
  55
  56 /*
  57  * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
  58  */
  59 static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
  60 {
  61         return (ctx &&
  62                 (ctx->ctx_doi == XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM) &&
  63                 (ctx->ctx_alg == XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX));
  64 }
  65
  66 /*
  67  * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux
  68  */
  69 static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
  70 {
  71         return selinux_authorizable_ctx(x->security);
  72 }
  73
  74 /*
  75  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
  76  * a xfrm policy rule.
  77  */
  78 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
  79 {
  80         int rc;
  81         u32 sel_sid;
  82         struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
  83
  84         /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
  85         if ((ctx = xp->security)) {
  86                 if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
  87                         return -EINVAL;
  88
  89                 sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
  90         }
  91         else
  92                 /*
  93                  * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an
  94                  * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This
  95                  * would prevent inadvertent "leaks".
  96                  */
  97                 return 0;
  98
  99         rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 100                           ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
 101                           NULL);
 102
 103         if (rc == -EACCES)
 104                 rc = -ESRCH;
 105
 106         return rc;
 107 }
 108
 109 /*
 110  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
 111  * the given policy, flow combo.
 112  */
 113
 114 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
 115                         struct flowi *fl)
 116 {
 117         u32 state_sid;
 118         int rc;
 119
 120         if (!xp->security)
 121                 if (x->security)
 122                         /* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
 123                         return 0;
 124                 else
 125                         /* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
 126                         return 1;
 127         else
 128                 if (!x->security)
 129                         /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
 130                         return 0;
 131                 else
 132                         if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
 133                                 /* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
 134                                 return 0;
 135
 136         state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
 137
 138         if (fl->secid != state_sid)
 139                 return 0;
 140
 141         rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 142                           ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
 143                           NULL)? 0:1;
 144
 145         /*
 146          * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
 147          * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
 148          * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
 149          * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
 150          */
 151
 152         return rc;
 153 }
 154
 155 /*
 156  * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
 157  * incoming packet.
 158  */
 159
 160 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
 161 {
 162         struct sec_path *sp;
 163
 164         *sid = SECSID_NULL;
 165
 166         if (skb == NULL)
 167                 return 0;
 168
 169         sp = skb->sp;
 170         if (sp) {
 171                 int i, sid_set = 0;
 172
 173                 for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
 174                         struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
 175                         if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
 176                                 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
 177
 178                                 if (!sid_set) {
 179                                         *sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
 180                                         sid_set = 1;
 181
 182                                         if (!ckall)
 183                                                 break;
 184                                 }
 185                                 else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
 186                                         return -EINVAL;
 187                         }
 188                 }
 189         }
 190
 191         return 0;
 192 }
 193
 194 /*
 195  * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
 196  * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
 197  */
 198 static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 199         struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid)
 200 {
 201         int rc = 0;
 202         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 203         struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
 204         char *ctx_str = NULL;
 205         u32 str_len;
 206
 207         BUG_ON(uctx && sid);
 208
 209         if (!uctx)
 210                 goto not_from_user;
 211
 212         if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
 213                 return -EINVAL;
 214
 215         if (uctx->ctx_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
 216                 return -ENOMEM;
 217
 218         *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
 219                               uctx->ctx_len + 1,
 220                               GFP_KERNEL);
 221
 222         if (!ctx)
 223                 return -ENOMEM;
 224
 225         ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
 226         ctx->ctx_len = uctx->ctx_len;
 227         ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
 228
 229         memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
 230                uctx+1,
 231                ctx->ctx_len);
 232         ctx->ctx_str[ctx->ctx_len] = 0;
 233         rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
 234                                      ctx->ctx_len,
 235                                      &ctx->ctx_sid);
 236
 237         if (rc)
 238                 goto out;
 239
 240         /*
 241          * Does the subject have permission to set security context?
 242          */
 243         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 244                           SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 245                           ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
 246         if (rc)
 247                 goto out;
 248
 249         return rc;
 250
 251 not_from_user:
 252         rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
 253         if (rc)
 254                 goto out;
 255
 256         *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
 257                               str_len,
 258                               GFP_ATOMIC);
 259
 260         if (!ctx) {
 261                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 262                 goto out;
 263         }
 264
 265         ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
 266         ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
 267         ctx->ctx_sid = sid;
 268         ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
 269         memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
 270                ctx_str,
 271                str_len);
 272
 273         goto out2;
 274
 275 out:
 276         *ctxp = NULL;
 277         kfree(ctx);
 278 out2:
 279         kfree(ctx_str);
 280         return rc;
 281 }
 282
 283 /*
 284  * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
 285  * xfrm_policy.
 286  */
 287 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
 288                 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
 289 {
 290         int err;
 291
 292         BUG_ON(!xp);
 293         BUG_ON(!uctx);
 294
 295         err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, 0);
 296         return err;
 297 }
 298
 299
 300 /*
 301  * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
 302  * new for policy cloning.
 303  */
 304 int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new)
 305 {
 306         struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, *new_ctx;
 307
 308         old_ctx = old->security;
 309
 310         if (old_ctx) {
 311                 new_ctx = new->security = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx) +
 312                                                   old_ctx->ctx_len,
 313                                                   GFP_KERNEL);
 314
 315                 if (!new_ctx)
 316                         return -ENOMEM;
 317
 318                 memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
 319                 memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
 320         }
 321         return 0;
 322 }
 323
 324 /*
 325  * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_policy security information.
 326  */
 327 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
 328 {
 329         struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
 330         if (ctx)
 331                 kfree(ctx);
 332 }
 333
 334 /*
 335  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
 336  */
 337 int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
 338 {
 339         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 340         struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
 341         int rc = 0;
 342
 343         if (ctx)
 344                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 345                                   SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 346                                   ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
 347
 348         return rc;
 349 }
 350
 351 /*
 352  * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
 353  * xfrm_state.
 354  */
 355 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
 356                 u32 secid)
 357 {
 358         int err;
 359
 360         BUG_ON(!x);
 361
 362         err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid);
 363         return err;
 364 }
 365
 366 /*
 367  * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_state security information.
 368  */
 369 void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 370 {
 371         struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
 372         if (ctx)
 373                 kfree(ctx);
 374 }
 375
 376  /*
 377   * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
 378   */
 379 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 380 {
 381         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 382         struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
 383         int rc = 0;
 384
 385         if (ctx)
 386                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 387                                   SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 388                                   ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
 389
 390         return rc;
 391 }
 392
 393 /*
 394  * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets.  If
 395  * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
 396  * already authorized by the IPSec process.  If not, then
 397  * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
 398  * gone thru the IPSec process.
 399  */
 400 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 401                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 402 {
 403         int i, rc = 0;
 404         struct sec_path *sp;
 405         u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 406
 407         sp = skb->sp;
 408
 409         if (sp) {
 410                 for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
 411                         struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
 412
 413                         if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
 414                                 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
 415                                 sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
 416                                 break;
 417                         }
 418                 }
 419         }
 420
 421         /*
 422          * This check even when there's no association involved is
 423          * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
 424          * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
 425          * explicitly allowed by policy.
 426          */
 427
 428         rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 429                           ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
 430
 431         return rc;
 432 }
 433
 434 /*
 435  * POSTROUTE_LAST hook's XFRM processing:
 436  * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
 437  * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
 438  * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
 439  * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
 440  */
 441 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 442                                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 443 {
 444         struct dst_entry *dst;
 445         int rc = 0;
 446
 447         dst = skb->dst;
 448
 449         if (dst) {
 450                 struct dst_entry *dst_test;
 451
 452                 for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
 453                      dst_test = dst_test->child) {
 454                         struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
 455
 456                         if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
 457                                 goto out;
 458                 }
 459         }
 460
 461         switch (proto) {
 462         case IPPROTO_AH:
 463         case IPPROTO_ESP:
 464         case IPPROTO_COMP:
 465                 /*
 466                  * We should have already seen this packet once before
 467                  * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
 468                  * unlabeled check.
 469                  */
 470                 goto out;
 471         default:
 472                 break;
 473         }
 474
 475         /*
 476          * This check even when there's no association involved is
 477          * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
 478          * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
 479          * explicitly allowed by policy.
 480          */
 481
 482         rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
 483                           ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
 484 out:
 485         return rc;
 486 }